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THE  LIBRARIES 


WOODROW  WILSON 

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WORLD  SETTLEMENT 


WOODROW  WILSON 

AND 

WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

WRITTEN  FROM  HIS  UNPUBLISHED 
AND  PERSONAL  MATERIAL 

BY 
RAY  STANNARD  BAKER 


ORIGINAL     DOCUMENTS 

OF     THE 

PEACE     CONFERENCE 

\'  0  L  U  M  E 

III 

GARDEN    CITY  NEW    YORK 

DOUBLEDAY,  PAGE  &  COMPANY 


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COPYHIOHT,  1922,  BY 

DOUBLEDAY,  PAGE    &   COMPANY 

ALL    BIOIITS    RESERVED,    INCLUDING    THAT    OF    TRANSLATION 

INTO  KOREION    LANGUAGES,   INCLUDING   THE   SCANDINAVIAN 

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PREFACE 

This  volume,  it  is  hoped,  will  contribute  vitally  to  the 
documentary  record  of  America  at  Paris,  illuminating  not 
only  the  inside  history  of  the  Peace  Conference,  but  ex- 
hibiting in  the  form  of  original  letters,  memoranda,  and 
minutes,  the  underlying  processes  through  which  the 
final  decisions  were  reached.  Nothing  could  more  clearly 
present  the  workings  of  the  President's  mind,  or  his  in- 
timate relationships  with  his  advisers,  than  many  of  these 
documents;  here  are  exposed  the  veritable  procedures 
by  which  the  Americans  worked  out  their  policies  and 
came  to  their  decisions.  Relatively  few  of  the  sixty- 
nine  documents  here  included  have  been  published  before; 
and  all  are  referred  to  or  quoted  from  in  Volumes  I  and  II 
of  this  book.  They  are  all  from  Woodrow  Wilson's 
private  files,  his  own  records  preserved  at  Paris,  except 
the  following: 

From  Norman  H.  Davis: 

Documents  49,  54,  55. 
From  Bernard  M.  Baruch: 

Documents  29,  47,  60. 
From  Professor  Douglas  Johnson: 

Documents  31,  32,  40. 
From  Dr.  Isaiah  Bowman : 

Document  36. 
From  Major  General  Mason  M.  Patrick: 

Document  61. 
From  Ray  Stannard  Baker: 

Documents  4,  5,  6,  16,  21,  35,  38,  39,  43,  68,  69. 

It  is  a  matter  of  great  regret  that  the  minutes  of  the 
Councils  of  Four,  Ten,  and  Five,  upon  which  so  much  of 
the  narrative  in  Volumes  I  and  II  is  based,  have  not  yet 
been  published.     Their  great  bulk  makes  it  w^holly  im- 


vi  PREFACE 

possible,  of  course,  to  include  them  here,  except  for  a  few 
annexed  reports  and  memoranda.  The  minutes  of  one 
important  meeting  of  the  Heads  of  States,  however,  that 
of  ]\Iarcli  20,  before  the  Council  of  Four  began  functioning 
formally,  is  here  presented  in  full  in  Document  I.  It 
will  serVe  as  an  excellent  specimen  of  the  voluminous  min- 
utes of  the  Four  as  kept  by  the  Secretary,  Sir  M.  P.  A. 
Hankey. 

Since  the  League  of  Nations  was  so  peculiarly  an  enter- 
prise of  the  Americans  at  Paris  with  President  Wilson 
as  its  chief  sponsor  the  record  of  the  origin  and  devel- 
opment of  the  Covenant  is  of  special  interest.  The 
President  methodically  preserved  every  scrap  of  memo- 
randa connected  with  the  League,  including  not  only  his 
his  own  original  notes,  made  upon  his  typewriter  or  in 
shorthand,  but  letters  and  memoranda  from  Colonel 
House,  General  Bliss,  and  other  American  advisers;  and 
these  are  here  presented  as  completely  as  possible. 

A  number  of  important  unpublished  documents  of 
foreign  origin — British,  French,  and  Italian — are  here 
included  not  only  for  the  light  they  throw  upon  the 
methods  of  the  Peace  Conference,  but  more  especially 
for  the  influence  they  had  upon  American  policies  at 
Paris. 


CONTENTS  OF  VOLUME  III 
DOCUMENTS 

PAGE 

Preface v 

Part  I.  Foundations  of  the  Peace  Conference 

Document  I.  Minutes  of  the  Secret  Conference  of  the 
Four  Heads  of  States,  on  March  20,  1919,  relative 
to  the  partition  of  Turkey  under  the  secret  agree- 
ments of  1916  and  1917 1 

Part  IL    The  Old  and  the  New  Diplomacy.     Organiza- 
tion AND  Procedure. 

Document  2.  Report  made  early  in  January,  1918,  by 
the  American  Inquiry  to  President  Wilson  regard- 
ing "War  Aims  and  Peace  Terms."  It  was  pre- 
pared by  Dr.  S.  E.  Mezes,  David  Hunter  Miller 
and  Walter  Lippmann.  The  President  used  this 
report  in  formulating  six  of  his  Fourteen  Points. 
Stenographic  notes  which  he  made  on  the  margin 
of  this  document  (see  facsimile,  Volume  I,  p. 
Ill)  were  translated  by  him  for  the  author  and  ap- 
pear in  this  volume  in  italic  type  in  brackets  at  the 
head  of  paragraphs  that  were  annotated  in  the 
text 


23    l^,^ 


Document  3.  The  "Fourteen  Points"  and  the  Four 
Points.  President  Wilson's  Fourteen  Points,  from 
his  Address  to  the  Joint  Session  of  Congress,  Jan- 
uary 8,  1918.  President  Wilson's  Four  Points, 
from  his  Address  at  Mount  Vernon,  July  4,  1918.        42 

Document  4.  Statement  adopted  by  the  Council  of 
Ten,  January  17,  for  presentation  to  the  Press  rep- 
resentatives at  Paris,  explaining  policies  of  pub- 
licity       47 


ii  CONTENTS 

PACK 

Document  5.  Text  of  Resolutions  adopted  by  dele- 
gates of  the  Allied  and  American  Press,  at  the 
Hotel  Ritz,  January  16,  1919 50 

Doci'MEXT  C.  Record  of  protests  and  resolutions 
adojjted  by  American  press  correspondents,  April 
2.'J,  1019,  regarding  admission  to  mt^eting  of  Allied 
with  German  delegates  at  Versailles  ]\Iay  7,  at 
which  the  treaty  was  formally  presented  to  the 
Germans.  53 

Document  7.  Preliminary  French  plan  of  procedure 
for  the  Peace  Conference  with  letters  of  trans- 
mission from  Ambassador  Jusserand,  November  29, 
1918,  to  the  State  Department,  and  from  Frank 
L.  Polk,  Counsellor  of  the  State  Department,  De- 
cember 2,  1918,  to  President  Wilson 55 


Part  III.     The  League  and  the  Peace. 

Document  8.  The  "Phillimore  Report"  of  March 
20,  1918,  to  the  British  Cabinet  regarding  the  or- 
ganization of  a  League  of  Nations.  The  basic 
document  used  by  President  Wilson  in  the  prepara- 
tion of  his  Covenant.         67 

Document  9.  Colonel  House's  proposed  draft  of  a 
covenant  for  the  League  of  Nations,  Jul}'  16,  1918, 
with  his  letter  of  transmittal  and  explanation  to 
President  Wilson.  The  articles  starred  are  those 
checked  by  President  Wilson 79 

Document  10.     President  Wilson's  first  draft  of  the 

Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations 88 

DocinsiENT  11.  General  J.  C.  Smuts's  recommenda- 
tions for  a  League  of  Nations,  as  copied  from  his 
pamphlet  for  President  Wilson's  use 94 

DocuMKNT  12.  President  Wilson's  .second  draft  (first 
printed  draft)  of  the  Covenant,  distributed  Jan- 
uary 10,  1919 100 

Document  l.S.  ISIemorandum  made  by  Major-General 
Tasker  H.  Bliss  for  President  Wilson,  January 
14,  1919,  criticizing  the  draft  of  the  Covenant  .    .      Ill 


CONTENTS  ix 

PAGE 

Document  14.     President  Wilson's  third  draft  of  the 

Covenant.     Printed  but  not  distributed.     .  117 

Document  15.     British  draft  of  the  Covenant.  130 

Document  16.  Hurst-Miller  compromise  draft  of  the 
League  of  Nations  Covenant  used  as  the  basis  of 
discussion  in  the  League  of  Nations  Commission. 
Introduced  at  First  Meeting,  February  3,  1919.    .      144 

Document  17.     Official  French  plan  for  a  League  of 

Nations 152 

Document  18.  Text  of  the  Covenant  as  adopted  at 
the  Plenary  Session  of  February  14  and  taken  by 
President  Wilson  to  America 163 

Document  19.  Letter  of  United  States  Senator  Gil- 
bert M.  Hitchcock  to  President  Wilson,  March  4, 
1919,  containing  suggestions  for  amendments  in 
Covenant  to  satisfy  American  criticism.  174 

Document  20,  Final  text  of  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations  as  it  appears  in  the  Treaty  of 
Versailles 175 

Document  21.  Text  of  the  so-called  "Loucheur  Re- 
port," from  Appendix  B  to  Secret  Minutes,  Coun- 
cil of  Ten,  February  7 189 

Part  IV.     Struggle  for  Limitation  of  Armaments. 

Document  22.  Letter  to  President  Wilson,  March  14, 
1919,  from  Rear-Admiral  W.  S.  Benson,  sub- 
mitting memorandum  dated  March  13,  of  United 
States  Naval  Advisory  Staff  on  "Disposition  of 
German  and  Austrian  Vessels  of  War."  197 

Document  23.  Letter  to  President  Wilson,  April  9, 
1919,  from  Rear-Admiral  W.  S.  Benson,  submit- 
ting memorandum  dated  April  7,  of  LTnited  States 
Naval  Advisory  Staff  on  "United  States  Naval 
Pohcy".     .     206 

Document  24.  Confidential  Report  of  Major  General 
F.  J.  Kernan,  Chief  American  representative  on 
the  Inter-Allied  Commission  to  Poland,  to  Presi- 
dent Wilson,  April  11,  giving  his  view  of  con- 
ditions in  Central  Europe 218 


s  CONTENTS 

\ 
1    Vvc 
Part  V.     The  D.u^k  Period:  The  French  Crisis. 

Document  25.  IMemorandum  of  ISIarshal  Foch,  dated 
January  10,  1919,  presenting  the  French  demand 
for  the  miHtary  frontier  of  the  Rhine.  Letter  of 
Marshal  Foch,  March  14,  1919,  transmitting  this 
memorandum  to  President  Wilson.         ....     227 

Document  26.  Letter  from  Major  General  Tasker  IL 
Bliss,  ]\Iarch  28,  for  President  Wilson  with  two 
memoranda  on  the  military  intrigues  in  Hungary .     238 

Document  27.  Letter  of  King  of  Spain  to  President 
Wilson,  March  2oth  (written  by  hand  in  English 
and  autographed)  with  copy  of  letter  of  Ex- 
Emperor  Karl  of  Austria-Hungary  (written  in 
German  and  translated  by  Dr.  J.  V.  Fuller.)    .  246 

Document  28.  Letter  of  INI.  Clemenceau  to  Presi- 
dent Wilson,  March  31,  together  with  his  note  of 
replv  to  Lloyd  George's  memorandum  of  JNIarch 
26 249 

Document  29.  Bernard  M.  Baruch's  letter  to  Presi- 
dent Wilson  of  April  9  arguing  against  French 
owTiership  of  the  coal  mines  of  the  Saar.     .      .      .     253 

Document  30.  Letter  of  P.  B.  Noyes,  American 
delegate,  Inter-Allied  Rhineland  Commission,  to 
President  Wilson,  May  27,  sharply  criticizing  the 
proposed  arrangements  for  the  "Left  Bank."  .  255 

Part  VI.     The  Italian  Crisis. 

Document  31.  Basic  Recommendation  of  American 
Experts,  January  21,  1919,  regarding  Italian 
boundary  settlements 259 

Document  32.  jNIemorandum,  March  18,  of  four 
American  experts,  reaffirming  their  recommenda- 
tion that  "Fiume  and  all  Dalmatia  shall  go  to  the 
Jugo-Slavs." 263 

Document  33.  Memorandum,  April  4,  of  five  Ameri- 
can experts  to  President  Wilson,  regarding  dis- 
position of  Fiume,  advising  that  "it  is  unwise  to 
make  Fiume  a  free  city,"  with  memorandum  on 
the  legal  aspects  of  the  situation  by  David  Hunter 
Miller 266 


CONTENTS  xi 

PAGE 

Document  34.  Letter  of  Orlando  to  President  Wilson, 
April  3, 191 9,  refusing  to  discuss  boundary  problems 
while  representatives  of  the  Croats  and  Slovenes 
were  present 272 

Document  35,  IMemorandum  concerning  the  question 
of  the  Italian  claims  on  the  Adriatic  presented 
by  President  Wilson  to  the  Italian  delegation 
on  April  14,  with  permission  to  make  it  public  in 
Italy.     Rejected  by  Orlando 274 

Document  36,  Letter  of  six  American  experts  to  Presi- 
dent Wilson  urging  him  not  to  yield  on  the  Italian 
claims 278 

Document  37,  Memorandum  of  A.  J.  Balfour,  April 
24,  explaining  attitude  of  Great  Britain  and  France 
regarding  the  Italian  settlement,  A  great  con- 
troversy raged  over  making  this  document  public, 
but  it  was  finally  kept  secret  and  has  never  before 
been  published 281 

Document  38,  Famous  public  statement  of  President 
Wilson,  April  23,  on  the  Italian  settlement,  which 
nearly  disrupted  the  Peace  Conference,       .      .      .     287 

Document  39.     Orlando's  reply  to  President  Wilson, 

April  24 291 

Document  40,  Memorandum  of  May  8  for  Adriatic 
settlement  through  plebiscites  and  the  develop- 
ment of  a  new  port  for  the  Jugo-Slavs  (Buccari)  to 
take  the  place  of  Fiume,  Presented  by  the  Chief 
of  Boundary  Geography,  Douglas  W,  Johnson,  to 
President  Wilson  and  by  him  laid  before  the 
Council  of  Four 296 

Document  41.     Balfour's  memorandum  of  May  17,  on 

the  "Problem  of  Italy  and  Turkey  in  Anatolia,"    .     303 

Part  VII,     The  Japanese  Crisis. 

Document  42,  Memorandum  by  A.  J,  Balfour  of  his 
conversation  with  the  Japanese  Delegates,  pre- 
sented to  the  Council  of  Four,  April  28,  with  im- 
portant letter  of  INIr.  Balfour  to  Baron  Makino  of 
the  same  date  in  which  the  relationship  of  the 


ii  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Shantung  settlement  to  Japanese  acceptance  of 

the  League  of  Nations  is  set  forth 311 

Document  43.  Statement,  April  30,  of  President 
Wilson  regarding  the  Shantung  settlement,  the 
substance  of  which,  but  not  the  text,  was  given  to 
the  press  on  the  same  day:  also  cabled  to  Mr. 
Tumulty 315 

Part  Ylll.    The  Economic  Settlements. 

Document  44.  Cablegram,  November  21,  1918, 
William  G.  McAdoo,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury, 
to  Oscar  T.  Crosby,  United  States  financial  repre- 
sentative in  London,  regarding  policies  of  continued 
financial  and  economic  cooperation:  with  letter  of 
transmittal  to  President  Wilson  from  Secretary 
McAdoo,  November  22,  1918 319 

Document  45.  The  Pork  Crisis.  Letter  of  Herbert 
Hoover  to  President  Wilson,  January  8,  1919,  re- 
garding the  refusal  of  Great  Britain  to  continue 
buying  American  food,  especially  pork,  at  war 
prices:  with  his  memorandum  regarding  plans  for 
meeting  the  situation 323 

Document  46.  Letter  of  Herbert  Hoover  to  Presi- 
dent Wilson  February  4,  1919,  regarding  French 
obstruction  to  plans  for  feeding  Germany,  w^ith 
copy  of  proposed  resolutions,  to  be  presented  to 
the  Council  of  Ten,  providing  for  extending  food 
supply  both  to  Germany  and  to  neutral  nations.        328 

Document  47.  Series  of  letters  regarding  economic 
situation  and  plan  of  financial  reconstruction  of 
Europe  exchanged  between  Lord  Robert  Cecil  for 
Great  Britain,  and  Edward  M.  House  and  Bernard 
M.  Baruch  for  America.  These  are:  (1)  Colonel 
House  to  Lord  Robert  Cecil,  April  10,  1919.    .      .     331 

2.  Response  of  Lord  Robert  Cecil  to  Colonel 
House,  April  11,  1919 332 

3.  Letter    of    Bernard    M.    Baruch    to    Lord 
Robert  Cecil,  April  12,  1919 332 

4.  Resjx)nse  of  Lord  Robert  Cecil  to  Bernard  M. 
Baruch,  April  14,  1919 3.'U 


CONTENTS  xiii 

PAGE 

Document  48.  The  Keynes  Financial  Scheme,  to- 
gether with  letter  of  explanation,  dated  April  23, 
1919,  from  Mr.  Lloyd  George  to  President  Wilson  .     336 

Document  49.  Letter  of  President  Wilson  to  Mr. 
Lloyd  George,  May  5,  1919,  criticizing  and  oppos- 
ing the  Keynes  financial  scheme 344 

Document  50.  Letter  of  Bernard  M.  Baruch  to 
President  Wilson,  May  7,  suggesting  American 
ideas  for  the  reconstruction  of  Europe.  347 

Document  51.  Printed  memorandum  of  Norman  H. 
Davis,  and  Thomas  W.  Lamont,  May  15,  "Obser- 
vations upon  the  European  [Economic]  Situation: 
Possible  Measures  to  Be  Taken,"  with  letter  of 
transmittal  from  Lamont.  The  idea  of  the  Ameri- 
can economic  advisors  as  to  America's  relation  to 
the  European  situation 352 

Document  52,  Confidential  report,  June  4,  1919, 
from  a  Committee  of  Economists  appointed  by  the 
Four  Heads  of  States  to  report  on  Europe's  re- 
quirements of  food  and  raw  materials  and  the 
means  of  financing  such  supplies.  This  important 
and  significant  report  was  never  seriously  con- 
sidered by  The  Four 363 

Document  53.  Cablegram  from  R.  C.  LeflSngwell, 
Assistant  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  to  Norman  H. 
Davis,  May  7,  1919,  giving  views  of  Treasury  re- 
garding further  financial  assistance  to  Europe. 
Transmitted  to  President  Wilson  May  9    .      .      .373 

Document  54.  Report,  March  20,  1919,  made  bj^ 
Norman  H.  Davis,  Rt.  Hon.  E.  S.  Montagu  and 
Louis  Loucheur  regarding  the  reparation  settle- 
ment, with  special  reference  to  Germany's  capacity 
to  pay 376 

Document  55.     Memorandum  on  reparations  made 

by  Norman  H.  Davis  for  Mr.  Lloyd  George.  .  380 

Document  56.  Letter  of  Norman  H.  Da\'is,  March 
25,  1919,  to  President  Wilson,  with  memorandum 
of  American  experts  on  the  reparation  settlement, 
their  estimates,  and  those  of  the  French  and 
British 383 


xiv  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Document  57.  IMemorandum  of  progress  with  the 
reparation  settlement,  April,  with  Anglo-American 
draft  of  Reparations  Clauses 397 

Document  58.  Letter  of  Norman  H.  Davis  and  Vance 
McCormick  to  President  Wilson,  April  4,  with 
draft  clauses,  comments,  and  reservations.  403 

Document  59.  French  memorandum,  April  5,  criti- 
cizing the  Anglo-American  draft  of  reparations 
clauses ...     409 

Document  60.  French  memorandum  (printed;  no 
date)  submitted  to  the  Economic  Commission, 
on  permanent  economic  relations,  together  with 
draft  clauses  for  the  treaty  of  peace.  In  French: 
translated  by  Dr.  J.  V.  Fuller 413 

DocuTViENT  61.  Draft  convention  submitted  to  the 
Aeronautical  Commission  by  the  American  mem- 
bers, Rear-Admiral  H.  S.  Knapp  and  INIajor 
General  INIason  M.  Patrick 419 

Document  02.  Cablegram  of  Postmaster  General 
A.  S.  Burleson  to  President  Wilson  (forw^arded 
through  Secretary  Tumulty,  JNIarch  14)  regarding 
American  policy  and  control  of  international 
cable  lines 425 

Document  63.  Memorandum  on  cables  and  radio, 
submitted  to  President  Wilson  by  Walter  S. 
Rogers,  communications  expert  of  the  American 
Commission  to  Negotiate  Peace  on  February  12, 
1918 427 

Document  64.  Letter  of  Walter  S.  Rogers,  communi- 
cations expert  of  the  American  Commission  to 
Negotiate  Peace,  to  President  Wilson,  dated  May 
2,  1919,  discussing  the  problem  of  the  disposition 
of  the  captured  German  oceanic  cables.      .      .      .     443 

Part  IX.     Germany  and  the  Peace  Conference. 

Docuime;nt  65.  IMemorandum  of  ISIajor-General 
Tasker  H.  Bliss  for  President  Wilson,  "Some  con- 
siderations for  the  Peace  Conference  before  they 
finally  draft  their  terms,"  dated  March  25,  1919.     449 


CONTENTS  XV 

PAGB 

DocxjMENT  66.  Letter  of  General  J.  C.  Smuts  to  the 
Prime  Minister,  Lloyd  George,  May  22,  criticizing 
the  terms  of  the  Treaty  as  drawn  and  suggesting 
changes 458 

Document  67.  Letter  of  General  J.  C.  Smuts  to  Presi- 
dent Wilson,  dated  May  30,  1919,  criticizing  the 
Treaty  and  asserting  that  it  "is  against  the  letter 
and  spirit  of  your  points." 466 

Document  68.  Stenographic  Report  of  meeting  be- 
tween President  Wilson,  the  Peace  Commissioners, 
and  technical  advisers  of  the  American  Com- 
mission to  Negotiate  Peace,  Hotel  Crillon,  June  3, 
1919,  at  11  o'clock  a.  m.  This  was  the  meeting 
in  which  President  W'ilson  sought  advice  upon  sug- 
gested changes  in  the  Treaty 469 

Document  69.  Letter  of  Major-General  Tasker  H. 
Bliss  to  President  Wilson,  June  6,  1919,  making 
"A  Brief  Analysis  of  the  German  Proposals  on  the 
Military  Terms  of  the  Draft  Treaty."  ....     505 


PART  I 
FOUNDATIONS  OF  THE  PEACE   CONFERENCE 


WOODROW  WILSON  AND 
WORLD  SETTLEMENT 


Document  1. 

Minutes  of  the  Secret  Conference  of  the  Four 
Heads  of  States  on  March  20,  1919,  relative  to 
the  partition  of  Turkey  under  the  secret  agree- 
ments of  1916  and  1917. 

Secret, 

I.  C— 163— ^. 

Notes  of  a  Conference  held  in  the  Prime  Min- 
ister's Flat  at  23  Rue  Nitot,  Paris,  on  Thurs- 
day, March  20, 1919,  at  3  p.  m. 

Present: 
United  States  of  America  British  Empire 

President  Wilson  The    Rt.    Hon.    D.    Lloyd 

George,  M.  P. 
The  Rt.  Hon.  A.  J.  Balfour, 

O.  M.,  M.  P. 
General  Allenby. 
General  Bols  [Botha.'*] 
Lt.-Col.  Sir  M.  P.  A.  Han- 
key,  K.  C.  B. 

France  Italy 

M.  Clemenceau  M.  Orlando 

M.  Pichon  Baron  Sonnino 
M.  Berthelot 

Interpreter  Prof.  P.  J.  Mantoux 
1 


2  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

SYRL\   AND   TURKEY. 

M.  Clemenceau  suggested  that  M.  Pichon  should 
open  the  discussion. 

M.  Pichon  began  by  explaining  that  the  origin  of  this 
question  was  the  agreement  of  May  191G  (Sykes-Picot) 
concluded  between  Great  Britain  and  France  in  regard 
to  Mesopotamia,  Syria,  and  the  adjoining  regions.  This 
agreement  had  two  objects.  First,  to  detach  the  Arabs 
from  the  Turks;  second,  to  decide  the  claims  of  Great 
Britain  and  France.  He  then  proceeded  to  explain  the 
principles  of  the  dispositions  made  on  a  map.  The  agree- 
ment fixed  a  zone  colored  blue  within  which  France 
would  exercise  direct  administration,  and  a  zone  colored 
red  in  which  England  would  exercise  direct  administration. 
In  addition,  there  was  a  zone  colored  white  enclosed  by 
a  blue  line  within  which  France  should  exercise  indirect 
administration,  known  as  zone  A,  and  a  corresponding  zone 
enclosed  in  a  red  line  within  which  Great  Britain  would 
exercise  indirect  administration  (zone  B).  At  this  stage 
it  was  unnecessary  to  say  anything  of  the  subsequent 
agreement  with  Italy.  Within  the  A  and  B  zones  it 
was  intended  to  favor  the  creation  of  an  independent 
Arab  State  or  Confederation  of  Arab  States.  In  area  A 
France,  and  area  B  Great  Britain,  should  alone  supply 
advisers  or  foreign  functionaries  at  the  request  of  the 
Arab  State  or  Confederation  of  Arab  States.  In  addition 
Great  Britain  was  to  be  accorded  the  ports  of  Haifa  and 
Acre.  Haifa  was  to  be  a  free  port  as  regards  the  trade  of 
France,  and  there  was  to  be  freedom  of  transit  for  French 
goods  through  Haifa  by  the  British  railway,  for  w^hich  fa- 
cilities were  to  be  given.  Alexandretta,  which  fell  in  the 
blue  area,  was  to  be  a  free  port  as  regards  the  trade  of  the 
British  Empire,  and  there  was  to  be  freedom  of  traffic  for 
British  goods  through  Alexandretta  by  railway  through 
the  blue  area.  In  addition,  there  were  certain  customs 
and  political  stipulations.  Such  were  the  general  disposi- 
tions of  1916  which,  he  emphasized,  were  designated: 

(1)  to  favor  the  establishment  of  an   Arab   State  or 


SECRET  CONFERENCE  OF  MARCH  20.  1919  3 

Confederation  of  States  and  to  detach  the  Arabs 
from  Turkey; 

and 
(2)  To  decide  between  the  claims  of  Great  Britain 
and  France. 
The  above  agreement,  confirmed  by  an  exchange  of  Notes 
between  M.  Paul  Cambon  and  Sir  Edward  Grey  (Lord 
Grey),  declarations  which  had  been  made  by  Great 
Britain  as  early  as  1912,  in  which  Great  Britain  had  dis- 
interested herself  and  recognized  the  rights  of  France  in 
Syria,  subject  only  to  Great  Britain's  insistence  on  keep- 
ing untouched  her  economic  rights.  In  short.  Great 
Britain  had  declared  she  had  no  political  claims,  but  that 
her  economic  rights  must  remain  intact  in  Syria. 

Since  the  conclusion  of  the  Agreement  of  1916  there 
had  been  a  long  further  correspondence  and  an  exchange 
of  many  Notes  between  France  and  Great  Britain  con- 
cerning particularly  various  local  interests.  This  brought 
us  to  the  most  recent  period  in  which  the  French  made, 
he  would  not  say  a  protest  against,  but  a  series  of  observa- 
tions in  regard  to,  the  British  attitude  in  Syria.  The 
whole  series  of  these  had  recently  been  handed  by  the 
President  of  the  Council  to  Lord  Milner. 

The  incidents  referred  to  in  this  correspondence  were 
chiefly  due  to  the  disproportion  in  the  relative  contingents 
furnished  by  Great  Britain  and  France  to  the  campaign 
in  Syria.  It  had  only  been  possible  for  France  to  send 
a  very  small  number  of  troops  to  Syria  in  consequence 
of  the  large  demands  made  on  her  for  the  protection  of 
French  soil  and  to  the  prominent  part  played  by  her 
armies  in  Salonica.  Great  Britain,  however,  had  inter- 
ested herself  far  more  in  the  Turkish  campaigns,  and 
had  sent  many  troops  which  had  been  led  by  General 
AUenby.  From  that  disproportion  there  resulted  a  great 
many  incidents.  Eventually,  the  President  of  the  Council 
had  thought  it  right  to  bring  them  before  the  British 
Government  with  a  view  to  putting  an  end  to  the  faction 
and  the  friction  which  now  existed. 

From  all  the  declarations  made  by  the  British  and  French 
governments  he  only  wanted  to  quote  one,  namely,  that 


4  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

of  November  9,  1918.  This  was  particularly  important 
as  showing  the  disinterested  attitude  of  both  governments 
towards  the  Arabs.  This  declaration  had  been  communi- 
cated shortly  after  its  issue  by  the  French  Ambassador  in 
Washington  to  President  Wilson. 

Mr.  Lloyd  George  interpolated  at  this  point  that 
this  announcement,  which  was  the  latest  expression  of 
polic}^  by  the  two  governments,  was  more  important 
than  all  the  old  agreements. 

M.  PiCHON  then  read  the  declaration  of  November  9, 
1918,  as  follows: — 

The  aim  which  France  and  Great  Britain  have  in  view  in 
prosecuting  in  the  East  the  war  let  loose  by  German  ambition  is  the 
complete  and  final  hberation  of  the  peoples  so  long  oppressed  by  the 
Turks,  and  the  establishment  of  national  governments  and  adminis- 
trations deriving  their  authority  from  the  initiative  and  free  choice  of 
the  native  populations. 

In  order  to  give  effect  to  these  intentions,  France  and  Great 
Britain  have  agreed  to  encourage  and  assist  the  establishment  of 
native  governments  and  administrations  in  Syria  and  Mesopotamia 
already  liberated  by  the  Allies,  and  in  the  territories  which  they  are 
proceeding  to  liberate,  and  they  have  agreed  to  recognize  such  gov- 
ernments as  soon  as  they  are  effectively  established.  So  far  from  de- 
siring to  impose  specific  institutions  upon  the  populations  of  these 
regions,  their  sole  object  is  to  ensure,  by  their  support  and  effective 
assistance,  that  the  governments  and  administrations  adopted  by 
these  regions  of  their  own  free  will  shall  be  exercised  in  the  normal 
way.  The  function  which  the  two  allied  governments  claim  for  them- 
selves in  the  liberated  territories  is  to  ensure  impartial  and  equal  jus- 
tice for  all;  to  facilitate  the  economic  development  of  the  country  by 
encouraging  local  initiative;  to  promote  the  diffusion  of  education;  and 
to  put  an  end  to  the  divisions  too  long  exploited  by  Turkish  policy. 

As  the  difficulties  between  the  two  governments  con- 
tinued, and  as  the  French  Government  particularly  did 
not  wish  them  to  reach  a  point  where  ultimate  agreement 
would  be  compromised,  the  President  of  the  Council,  on 
his  visit  to  London  in  December,  1918,  had  asked  Mr. 
Lloyd  George  to  confirm  the  agreement  between  the  two 
countries.  Mr.  Lloyd  George  had  replied  that  he  saw 
no  difficulty  about  the  rights  of  France  in  Syria  and 
Cilicia,  but  he  made  demands  for  certain  places  which 
he  thought  should  be  included  in  tlie  British  zone,  and 


SECRET  CONFERENCE  OF  MARCH  20,  1919  5 

which,  under  the  1916  agreement,  were  in  the  French 
zone  of  influence,  namely,  Mosul.  He  also  asked  for 
Palestine.  M.  Clemenceau  had,  on  his  return  to  Paris, 
been  desirous  that  this  suggestion  should  be  examined 
in  the  most  favorable  spirit.  In  consequence,  he  had 
ordered  a  scheme  of  agreement  to  be  prepared,  with  the 
inclusion  of  Mosul  in  the  British  zone  of  influence,  and 
this  had  been  handed  to  the  British  Government  on  the 
15th  of  February,  1919.  The  letter  which  accompanied 
this  proposal  had  asked  for  a  recognition  of  the  historic 
and  traditional  case  for  including  the  regions  claimed 
in  the  French  zone.  It  had  pointed  out  that  there 
was  no  government  in  the  world  which  had  such  a  posi- 
tion as  France  in  the  regions  claimed.  It  had  given  an 
exposition  of  the  historic  rights  of  France  dating  from 
the  time  of  Louis  XIV.  M.  Pichon  continued  by  point- 
ing out  that  French  intervention  in  Syria  had  been  fre- 
quent, the  last  instance  being  the  case  of  the  expedition 
organized  in  Syria  and  Lebanon  in  1860,  which  had 
resulted  in  the  establishment  of  the  status  of  the  Lebanon. 
France,  he  pointed  out,  had  a  great  number  of  hospitals 
in  Syria.  There  were  a  great  number  of  schools  in  many 
villages,  and  some  50,000  children  were  educated  in 
French  primary  schools.  There  were  also  a  number  of 
secondary  schools  and  one  great  university  in  Beyrout. 
Moreover,  the  railway  system  of  Syria  was  French,  and 
included  the  Beyrout  to  Damascus  line  and  the  Tripoli- 
Homs  line,  which  later  it  was  proposed  to  prolong  to  the 
Euphrates  and  to  unite  with  the  Bagdad  system.  Alto- 
gether it  was  contemplated  to  have  a  system  of  1,233 
kilometers,  of  which  683  kilometers  had  already  been 
constructed.  Beyrout  was  entirely  a  French  port.  The 
gas  and  electricity  works  were  French,  and  the  same 
applied  to  the  lighting  along  the  coast.  This  was  not 
the  limit  of  French  enterprise,  for  France  had  perfected 
the  agriculture  and  the  viticulture  of  Syria  and  had 
established  many  factories.  No  other  country  had  any- 
thing like  so  complete  a  development  in  these  regions. 
Hence,  France  could  not  abandon  her  rights.  More- 
over, France  strongly  protested  against  any  idea  of  divid- 


6  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

ing  Syria.  Syria  had  geographical  and  historic  unity. 
The  French  Government  frankly  avowed  that  they  did 
not  want  the  responsibility  of  administering  Palestine, 
though  they  would  prefer  to  see  it  under  an  international 
administration.     What  they  asked  was: 

(1)  That  the  whole  Syrian  regions  should  be  treated 
as  a  unit; 

and  ■ 

(2)  That  France  should  become  the  mandatory  of  the 
League  of  Nations  of  this  region. 

On  January  30  of  this  year  Mr.  Lloyd  George  had 
urged  the  Conference  to  reconsider  the  distribution  of 
troops  in  Turkey  and  the  Caucasus  with  the  object  of 
lightening  the  heavy  burden  which  fell  on  Great  Britain. 
As  a  result,  the  Military  Representatives  had  been  asked 
to  prepare  a  plan.  The  scheme  of  the  Military  Repre- 
sentatives provided  for: 

The  occupation  by  France  of  Syria  and  Cilicia,  with 
2  divisions  and  1  cavalry  brigade; 

The  occupation  by  Great  Britain  of  Mesopotamia,  in- 
cluding Mosul,  by  2  divisions  and  1  cavalry  brigade; 

The  occupation  by  Italy  of  the  Caucasus  and  Konia. 

The  economy  which  Great  Britain  would  achieve  by  this 
plan  would  have  amounted  to  10  divisions  of  infantry  and 
4  divisions  of  cavalry.  The  plan  of  the  Military  Rep- 
resentatives had  been  placed  on  the  Agenda  Paper  of  the 
Conference,  but  at  Lord  Milner's  request  the  subject  had 
been  adjourned  and  had  never  been  discussed. 

About  this  time  a  conversation  had  taken  place  between 
IVI.  Clemenceau  and  M.  Pichon  and  Mr.  Lloyd  George  and 
Mr.  Balfour,  as  a  result  of  which  Sir  Maurice  Hankey  had 
handed  M.  Pichon  a  map  containing  a  British  counter 
proposal  to  the  French  proposal  of  February  15.  This 
scheme  provided  for  a  great  limitation  of  the  territory  to 
come  under  French  influence,  both  on  the  east  and  on  the 
south  as  regards  the  Jebel  Druse.  The  French  Govern- 
ment was  quite  unable  to  take  this  project  into  consid- 
eration.    Recently   Lord   Milner  had   left   a  map  with 


SECRET  CONFERENCE  OF  MARCH  20,  1919  7 

M.  Clemenceau  containing  yet  another  project,  which  M. 
PiCHON  proceeded  to  explain,  and  which,  he  added, 
greatly  circumscribed  the  French  area.  It  was  evident 
that  the  French  Government  could  not  look  at  this  scheme 
either,  even  though  they  had  the  greatest  desire  to  reach 
an  agreement.  No  one  felt  more  deeply  than  he  what 
Great  Britain  and  France  owed  to  each  other,  and  no 
one  had  a  greater  desire  to  reach  an  agreement.  It  was, 
however,  quite  impossible  to  accept  a  proposal  such  as  that 
put  forward  by  Lord  Milner.  It  would  be  absolutely 
indefensible  in  the  Chamber.  It  was  enough  for  the 
Chamber  to  know  that  the  Government  were  in  negotia- 
tion with  Great  Britain  for  the  handing  over  of  Mosul  to 
create  a  movement  that  had  resulted  in  a  proposal  in  the 
Budget  Committee  for  a  diminution  of  credits  for  Syria. 
This  had  not  been  a  mere  budget  trick,  but  represented  a 
real  movement  of  public  opinion.  French  opinion  would 
not  admit  that  France  could  be  even  partly  excluded 
after  the  sacrifices  she  had  made  in  the  war,  even  if  she 
had  not  been  able  to  play  a  great  part  in  the  Syrian  cam- 
paign. In  consequence,  the  minimum  that  France  could 
accept  was  what  had  been  put  forward  in  the  French 
Government's  note  to  Mr.  Lloyd  George,  the  object  of 
which  had  been  to  give  satisfaction  to  his  desire  for  the 
inclusion  of  Mosul  in  the  British  zone. 

Mr.  Lloyd  George  said  that  M.  Pichon  had  opened  as 
though  the  question  of  the  mandate  for  Syria  was  one 
between  Great  Britain  and  France.  There  was,  in  fact, 
no  such  question  as  far  as  Great  Britain  was  concerned. 
He  wished  to  say  at  once  that  just  as  we  had  disinter- 
ested ourselves  in  1912,  so  we  now  disinterested  ourselves 
in  1919.  If  the  Conference  asked  us  to  take  Syria,  we 
should  reply  in  the  negative.  The  British  Government 
had  definitely  decided  this  because  otherwise  it  would  be 
said  afterward  in  France  that  they  had  created  dis- 
turbances in  order  to  keep  the  French  out.  Hence,  the 
British  Government  definitely  intended  to  have  nothing 
to  do  with  Syria.  The  question  of  the  extent  to  which 
Great  Britain  and  France  were  concerned  was  cleared  up 
in  the  interview  he  had  had  with  M.   Clemenceau  in 


8  WOODROW  \\TLSON  .VND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

London,  and  at  which  he  had  said  that  he  wanted  Mosul 
with  the  adjacent  regions  and  Palestine. 

As  there  was  no  question  between  France  and  Great 
Britain  in  regard  to  Syria,  we  could  examine  the  question 
in  as  disinterested  a  spirit  as  we  could  a  Carpathian 
boundary  to  be  decided  in  accordance  with  the  general 
principles  accepted  by  the  Conference.  He  wished  to 
make  this  clear  before  General  Allenby  said  what  he  had 
to  say.  In  regard  to  Mosul,  he  wished  to  acknowledge 
the  cordial  spirit  in  which  M.  Pichon  had  met  our  desires. 

But  if  there  was  a  French  public  opinion  there  was  also 
a  British  public  opinion,  and  it  must  be  remembered  that 
the  whole  burden  of  the  Syrian  campaign  had  fallen  upon 
Great  Britain.  The  number  of  French  troops  taking 
part  in  the  campaign  had  been  so  small  as  to  make  no 
difference.  Sometimes  they  had  been  helpful,  but  not  on 
all  occasions.  The  British  Empire  and  India  had  main- 
tained from  900,000  to  1,000,000  troops  in  Turkey  and 
the  Caucasus.  Their  casualties  had  amounted  to  125,000, 
the  campaign  had  cost  hundreds  of  millions  of  pounds. 
He  himself  had  done  his  best  to  induce  M.  Clemenceau's 
predecessors  to  take  part  in  the  campaign.  He  had  also 
pressed  Marshal  Foch  on  the  subject,  and  to  this  day  he 
had  in  his  possession  a  rough  plan  drawn  up  by  Marshal 
Foch  during  an  air  raid  at  Boulogne.  He  had  begged  the 
French  Government  to  cooperate,  and  had  pointed  out  to 
them  that  it  would  enable  them  to  occupy  Syria,  although, 
at  the  time,  the  British  troops  had  not  yet  occupied  Gaza. 
This  had  occurred  in  1917  and  1918,  at  a  time  when  the 
heaviest  casualties  in  France  also  were  being  incurred  by 
British  troops.  From  that  time  onward  most  of  the 
heavy  and  continuous  fighting  in  France  had  been  done  by 
British  troops,  although  Marshal  Petain  had  made  a 
number  of  valuable  smaller  attacks.  This  was  one  of  the 
reasons  why  he  had  felt  justified  in  asking  Marshal  Foch 
for  troops.  He  had  referred  to  this  in  order  to  show  that 
the  reason  we  had  fought  so  hard  in  Palestine  was  not 
because  we  had  not  been  fighting  in  France.  M.  Pichon 
seemed  to  think  that  we  were  departing  from  the  1910 
agreement  in  other  respects,  as  well  as  in  respect  to  Mosul 


SECRET  CONFERENCE  OF  MARCH  20,  1919  9 

and  Palestine.  In  fact,  we  were  not.  M.  Pichon  had 
omitted  in  his  lucid  statement  to  explain  that  the  blue 
area  in  which  France  was  "allowed  to  establish  such  direct 
or  indirect  administration  or  control  as  they  may  desire 
and  as  they  may  think  fit  to  arrange  with  the  Arab  State 
or  Confederation  of  Arab  States"  did  not  include  Damas- 
cus, Homs,  Hama,  or  Aleppo.  In  area  A  France  was 
"prepared  to  recognise  and  uphold  an  independent  Arab 
State  or  Confederation  of  Arab  States  .  .  .  under  the 
suzerainty  of  an  Arab  Chief."  Also  in  area  A  France 
would  "have  priority  of  right  of  enterprise  and  local  loans 
.  .  .  and  .  .  .  shall  alone  supply  advisers  or 
foreign  functionaries  at  the  request  of  the  Arab  State  or 
Confederation  of  Arab  States."  Was  France  prepared 
to  accept  that?  This,  however,  was  not  a  question  be- 
tween Great  Britain  and  France;  it  was  a  question  between 
France  and  an  agreement  which  we  had  signed  with 
King  Hussein. 

(At  this  point  M.  Orlando  and  General  Diaz  entered.) 

M.  Pichon  said  he  wished  to  say  one  word.  In  the 
new  arrangements  which  were  contemplated  no  direct 
administration  whatsoever  was  claimed  by  France.  Since 
the  Agreement  of  1916,  the  whole  mandatory  system  had 
been  adopted.  If  a  mandate  were  granted  by  the  League 
of  Nations  over  these  territories,  all  that  he  asked  was 
that  France  should  have  that  part  put  aside  for  her. 

Mr.  Lloyd  George  said  that  we  could  not  do  that. 
The  League  of  Nations  could  not  be  used  for  putting  aside 
our  bargain  with  King  Hussein.  He  asked  if  M.  Pichon 
intended  to  occupy  Damascus  with  French  troops.  If 
he  did,  it  would  clearly  be  a  violation  of  the  Treaty  with 
the  Arabs. 

M.  Pichon  said  that  France  had  no  convention  with 
King  Hussein. 

Mr.  Lloyd  George  said  that  the  whole  of  the  agree- 
ment of  1916  (Sykes-Picot)  was  based  on  a  letter  from 
Sir  Henry  McMahon  to  King  Hussein  from  which  he 
quoted  the  following  extracts : — 


10  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

The  districts  of  Mersina  and  Alexandretta,  and  portions  of 
Syria  lying  to  the  west  of  the  districts  of  Damascus,  Homs,  Hama,  and 
Aleppo,  cannot  be  said  to  be  purely  Arab,  and  should  be  excluded 
from  the  proposed  limits  of  boundaries.  With  the  above  modi- 
fications, and  without  prejudice  to  our  existing  treaties  with  Arab 
chiefs,  we  accept  these  limits  of  boundaries;  and  in  regard  to  those 
portions  of  the  territories  therein  in  which  Great  Britain  is  free  to 
act  without  detriment  to  the  interests  of  her  ally  France,  I  am  em- 
powered, in  the  name  of  the  Government  of  Great  Britain,  to  give 
the  following  assurances  and  make  the  following  reply  to  your 
letter: 

"Subject  to  the  above  modifications  Great  Britain  is  prepared  to 
recognize  and  support  the  independence  of  the  Arabs  within  terri- 
tories included  in  the  limits  of  boundaries  proposed  by  the  Sherif 
of  Mecca." — (Extract  from  a  letter  from  Sir  H.  McMahon  to 
King  Hussein,  Oct.  24,  '14.) 

M.  PicHON  said  that  this  undertaking  had  been  made  by 
Great  Britain  (Angleterre)  alone.  France  had  never 
seen  it  until  a  few  weeks  before,  when  Sir  Maurice  Hankey 
had  handed  him  a  copy. 

Mr.  Lloyd  George  said  the  agreement  might  have 
I)een  made  by  England  (Angleterre)  alone,  but  it  was 
England  (Angleterre)  who  had  organized  the  whole  of  the 
Syrian  campaign.  There  would  have  been  no  question 
of  Syria  but  for  England  (Angleterre).  Great  Britain 
had  put  from  900,000  to  1,000,000  men  in  the  field  against 
Turkey,  but  Arab  help  had  been  essential;  that  was  a 
point  on  which  General  Allenby  could  speak. 

General  Allenby  said  it  had  been  invaluable. 

Mr.  Lloyd  George,  continuing,  said  that  it  was  on 
the  basis  of  the  above  quoted  letter  that  King  Hussein  had 
put  all  his  resources  into  the  field  which  had  helped  us 
most  materially  to  win  the  victory.  France  had  for 
practical  purposes  accepted  our  undertaking  to  King 
Hussein  in  signing  the  1916  agreement.  This  had  not 
been  M.  Pichon,  but  his  predecessors.  He  was  bound  to 
say  that  if  the  British  Government  now  agreed  that 
Damascus,  Homs,  Hama,  and  Aleppo  should  be  included 
in  the  sphere  of  direct  French  influence,  they  would  be 
breaking  faith  with  the  Arabs,  and  they  could  not  face 
this.  He  was  particularly  anxious  for  M.  Clemenceau  to 
follow  this.     The  agreement  of  1916  had  been  signed  sub- 


SECRET  CONFERENCE  OF  MARCH  20,  1919  11 

sequent  to  the  letter  to  King  Hussein.  In  the  following 
extract  from  the  agreement  of  1916  France  recognized 
Arab  independence: 

It  is  accordingly  understood  between  the  French  and  British  Gov- 
ernments : 

(1)  That  France  and  Great  Britain  are  prepared  to  recognize  and 
uphold  an  independent  Arab  State  or  Confederation  of  Arab  States 
in  the  areas  A  and  B  marked  on  the  annexed  map  under  the  su- 
zerainty of  an  Arab  Chief. 

Hence,  France,  by  this  act,  practically  recognized  our 
agreement  with  King  Hussein  by  excluding  Damascus, 
Horns,  Hama,  and  Aleppo  from  the  blue  zone  of  direct 
administration,  for  the  map  attached  to  the  agreement 
showed  that  Damascus,  Homs,  Hama,  and  Aleppo  were 
included,  not  in  the  zone  of  direct  administration,  but  in 
the  independent  Arab  State. 

M.  PiCHON  said  that  this  had  never  been  contested, 
but  how  could  France  be  bound  by  an  agreement  the 
very  existence  of  which  was  imknown  to  her  at  the  time 
when  the  1916  agreement  was  signed.'^  In  the  1916  agree- 
ment France  had  not  in  any  way  recognized  the  Hedjaz. 
She  had  undertaken  to  uphold  "an  independent  Arab 
State  or  Confederation  of  Arab  States,"  but  not  the 
King  of  the  Hedjaz.  If  France  was  promised  a  man- 
date for  Syria,  she  would  undertake  to  do  nothing  except 
in  agreement  with  the  Arab  State  or  Confederation  of 
States.  This  is  the  role  which  France  demanded  in  Syria. 
If  Great  Britain  would  only  promise  her  good  offices,  he 
believed  that  France  could  reach  an  understanding  with 
Feisal. 

President  Wilson  said  that  he  would  now  seek  to 
establish  his  place  in  the  Conference.  Up  to  the  present 
he  had  had  none.  He  could  only  be  here,  like  his  colleague 
M.  Orlando,  as  one  of  the  representatives  assembled  to 
establish  the  peace  of  the  world.  This  was  his  only 
interest,  although,  of  course,  he  was  a  friend  of  both 
parties  to  the  controversy.  He  was  not  indifferent  to  the 
understanding  which  had  been  reached  between  the 
British  and  French  Governments,  and  was  interested  to 


12  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

know  about  the  undertakings  to  King  Hussein  and  the 
1916  agreement,  but  it  was  not  permissible  for  him  to 
express  an  opinion  thereon.  He  would,  however,  like  to 
point  out  that  one  of  the  parties  to  the  1916  agreement  had 
been  Russia,  and  Russia  had  now  disappeared.  Hence, 
the  partnership  of  interest  had  been  dissolved,  since  one 
of  the  parties  had  gone  out.  This  seemed  to  him  to  alter 
the  basis  of  the  agreement.  The  point  of  view  of  the 
United  States  of  America  was,  however,  indifferent  to  the 
claims  both  of  Great  Britain  and  France  over  peoples  un- 
less those  peoples  wanted  them.  One  of  the  fundamental 
principles  to  which  the  United  States  of  America  adhered 
was  the  consent  of  the  governed.  This  was  ingrained  in 
the  United  States  of  America  thought.  Hence,  the  only 
idea  from  the  United  States  of  America  point  of  view  was 
as  to  whether  France  would  be  agreeable  to  the  Syrians. 
The  same  applied  as  to  whether  Great  Britain  would  be 
agreeable  to  the  inhabitants  of  Mesopotamia.  It  might 
not  be  his  business,  but  if  the  question  was  made  his 
business,  owing  to  the  fact  that  it  was  brought  before  the 
Conference,  the  only  way  to  deal  with  it  was  to  discover 
the  desires  of  the  population  of  these  regions. 

He  recalled  that,  in  the  Council  of  Ten,  resolutions 
had  been  adopted  in  regard  to  mandatories,  and  they 
contained  a  very  carefully  thought  out  graduation  of 
different  stages  of  mandate  according  to  the  civilization  of 
the  peoples  concerned.  One  of  the  elements  in  those 
mandates  was  the  desire  of  the  people  over  whom  the 
mandate  was  to  be  exercised.  The  present  controversy 
broadened  out  into  very  important  questions.  Cilicia, 
for  example,  from  its  geographical  position,  cut  Armenia 
off  from  the  IMediterranean.  If  there  was  one  mandatory 
in  the  south,  and  another  in  the  north  of  Armenia,  there 
would  be  a  great  danger  of  friction,  since  the  troublesome 
population  lived  in  the  south.  Hence,  the  controversy 
broadened  into  a  case  affecting  the  peace  of  the  whole 
world  in  this  region.  He  hoped,  therefore,  that  the 
question  would  be  discussed  from  this  point  of  view.  If 
this  were  agreed  to,  he  hoped  that  he  might  ask  General 
Allenby  certain   questions.     If  the  participation  of  M. 


SECRET  CONFERENCE  OF  MARCH  20,  1919  13 

Orlando  and  himself  were  recognized  as  a  matter  of  right 
and  not  of  courtesy,  the  question  he  wanted  to  know  was 
whether  the  undertaking  to  King  Hussein,  and  the  1916 
agreement,  provided  an  agreement  which  would  work. 
If  not,  and  you  asked  his  opinion,  he  would  reply  that  we 
ought  to  ask  what  is  the  opinion  of  the  people  in  the  part  of 
the  world  concerned.  He  was  told  that,  if  France  insisted 
on  occupying  Damascus  and  Aleppo,  there  would  be 
instant  war.  Feisal  had  said  that  he  could  not  say  how 
many  men  he  had  had  in  the  field  at  one  time,  as  it  had 
been  a  fluctuating  figure,  but  from  the  first  to  last  he  had 
probably  had  100,000  men. 

General  Allenby  said  that  he  had  never  had  so  many 
at  one  time. 

President  Wilson  said  that,  nevertheless,  from  first 
to  last,  France  would  have  to  count  on  having  100,000 
troops  against  her.  This  would  mean  that  France  must 
send  a  large  number  of  troops.  He  was  greatly  concerned 
in  a  fight  between  friends,  since  he  was  a  friend  of  France 
and  the  friend  of  Feisal.  He  was  very  concerned  to  know 
if  a  "scrap"  was  developing.  Hence,  he  asked  that  it 
might  be  taken  for  granted  that  this  question  was  on  the 
Council  table,  since  it  was  one  of  interest  to  the  peace  of 
the  world,  and  that  it  was  not  merely  a  question  of  agree- 
ment between  France  and  Great  Britain.  The  Turkish 
Empire  at  the  present  time  was  as  much  in  solution  as 
though  it  were  made  of  quicksilver.  Austria,  at  any  rate, 
had  been  broken  into  pieces,  and  the  pieces  remained,  but 
the  Turkish  Empire  was  in  complete  solution.  The 
Councils  of  the  world  would  have  to  take  care  of  it.  For 
his  part  he  was  quite  disinterested,  since  the  United  States 
of  America  did  not  want  anything  in  Turkey.  They  would 
be  only  too  delighted  if  France  and  Great  Britain  would 
undertake  the  responsibility.  Lately,  however,  it  had  been 
put  to  him  that  he  must  approach  his  own  people  on  this 
matter,  and  he  intended  to  try,  although  it  would  mean 
some  very  good  talking  on  his  part.  He  admitted  that  the 
United  States  of  America  must  take  the  responsibilities  as 
well  as  the  benefits,  of  the  League  of  Nations.  Neverthe- 
less, there  was  great  antipathy  in  the  United  States  of 


U  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

America  to  the  assumption  of  these  responsibihties.  Even 
the  PhiHppines  were  regarded  as  something  hot  in  the  hand 
that  they  would  hke  to  drop.  If  we  said  to  the  French 
Government  "Occupy  this  region,"  what  would  happen? 
He  had  a  method  to  propose  of  finding  out,  which  he  would 
develop  later. 

Mr.  Lloyd  George  suggested  that  General  AUenby 
should  be  questioned  at  this  point. 

President  Wilson  asked  the  following  question:  "If 
before  we  arrive  at  a  permanent  settlement  under  the 
League  of  Nations  we  invite  France  to  occupy  the  region 
of  Syria,  even  as  narrowly  defined,  what  would  the  re- 
sult be?" 

General  Allenby  said  there  would  be  the  strongest 
possible  opposition  by  the  whole  of  the  Moslems,  and 
especially  by  the  Arabs.  Shortly  after  the  capture  of 
Damascus,  Feisal  had  been  allowed  to  occupy  and  ad- 
minister the  city.  He  had  said  that  he  would  like  to  be 
helped  in  the  administration.  A  little  later,  after  the 
setting  up  of  the  military  administration  in  these  regions, 
General  Allenby  had  put  French  administrators  in  the 
blue  area.  When  they  arrived  Emir  Feisal  had  said  that 
he  could  not  retain  the  command  of  the  Arab  Army  if 
France  occupied  the  ports.  He  had  said  that  it  meant 
that  he  was  occupying  a  house  without  a  door,  and  it 
would  be  said  that  he  had  broken  faith  with  the  Arab 
nation.  Feisal  had  originally  asked  if  he  could  occupy 
Bey  rout  and  the  ports.  General  Allenby  had  replied 
in  the  affirmative,  but  had  told  him  that  he  must  with- 
draw when  the  allied  armies  came  along,  and  he  had 
done  so.  To  Feisal's  protests  against  the  occupation  by 
the  French  of  places  in  the  blue  zone,  General  Allenby 
had  replied  that  he  himself  was  in  charge  of  the  ad- 
ministration, as  Commander-in-Chief;  and  that  the 
French  officers,  appointed  as  administrators  must  be 
regarded,  not  as  French  officers,  but  as  allied  military 
officers.  Feisal  had  then  said  that  he  would  admit  it 
for  the  present,  but  would  it  last  for  ever?  General 
Allenby  had  replied  that  the  League  of  Nations  intended 
to  give  the  small  nations  the  right  of  self-determination. 


SECRET  CONFERENCE  OF  MARCH  20,  1919  15 

Feisal  had  insisted  that  "if  put  under  French  control" 
he  would  oppose  to  the  uttermost.  General  Allenby 
had  replied  that  at  present  there  was  no  French  control, 
but  only  the  control  of  the  Allies,  and  that  eventually 
Feisal's  rights  would  be  considered.  Soon  afterwards  he 
had  visited  Beyrout,  and  there  and  in  other  places  depu- 
tations had  come  to  protest  against  the  French  Adminis- 
tration. These  had  included  various  Christians,  Orthodox 
and  Protestants,  as  well  as  Mussulmans.  General 
Allenby  had  again  replied  that  it  was  not  a  French  admin- 
istration, but  merely  officers  put  in  by  himself  as  Allied 
Commander-in-Chief.  Every  time  he  had  been  in  that 
country  he  had  found  the  greatest  opposition  to  French 
administration.  He  had  done  his  utmost  to  make  a 
rapprochement  among  the  Arabs  and  the  French,  but 
without  success.  The  French  liaison  officers  did  not  get 
on  well  with  the  Arabs.  M.  Picot  had  been  with  him  to 
Damascus  and  Aleppo  and  was  perfectly  conversant  with 
the  situation.  M.  Picot  would  say  that  General  Allenby 
had  done  his  best  to  create  good  feeling.  Lately,  Sir 
Mark  Sykes  had  been  to  Beyrout,  Aleppo,  and  Damascus 
with  M.  Picot,  and  had  done  his  best.  Nevertheless,  the 
misunderstanding  continued.  If  the  French  were  given 
a  mandate  in  Syria,  there  would  be  serious  trouble  and 
probably  war.  If  Feisal  undertook  the  direction  of 
operations  there  might  be  a  huge  war  covering  the  whole 
area,  and  the  Arabs  of  the  Hedjaz  would  join.  This  would 
necessitate  the  employment  of  a  very  large  force.  This 
would  probably  involve  Great  Britain  also  if  they  were  in 
Palestine.  It  might  even  involve  them  in  Egypt,  and 
the  consequences  would  be  incalculable. 

He  had  gone  with  M.  Picot  to  Damascus  and  had  seen 
there  Ali  Riza  el  Rikaby  Pasha,  the  Governor  of  the 
territory  to  the  east  of  Damascus.  The  administration 
had  not  been  doing  well.  There  was  practically  no 
Budget,  and  it  had  been  necessary  to  give  him  advisers. 
General  Allexby  had  given  him  two  British  advisers, 
Majors  Cornwallis  and  Stirling.  M.  Picot  had  subse- 
quently sent  a  very  good  man  named  Captain  Cousse,  to 
replace  a  liaison  officer  (Captain  Mercier)  who  had  been 


iG       ^vooDRo^^  wilscn  and  world  seitlement 

there  before  [but]  who  had  not  got  on  with  the  Arabs  be- 
cause he  had  stood  too  much  on  his  dignity.  Even  Captain 
Cousse,  however,  had  not  been  able  to  get  on  well.  After- 
w^ard,  General  Allenby  had  sent  a  British  Financial 
Expert,  and  had  invited  M.  Picot  to  send  a  French  Finan- 
cial expert.  The  British  adviser.  Colonel  Graves,  had 
cooperated  with  M.  Moulin,  the  French  adviser.  They 
reported  very  badly  on  finance.  There  had  practically 
been  no  budget.  Then  General  Allenby  had  with- 
drawn Colonel  Graves.  M.  Moulin  was  still  there,  but 
was  meeting  great  difficulties  owing  to  Ali  Riza  el  Rikaby's 
dislike  of  the  French  administration.  General  Allenby 
had  visited  Damascus  with  M.  Picot  and  had  there  inter- 
viewed Riza  el  Rikaby  Pasha.  General  Allenby  pro- 
duced at  the  Conference  a  document  containing  the  gist 
of  the  communication  made  by  him  to  Riza  el  Rikaby 
Pasha.  A  copy  of  this  document  in  Arabic  and  English 
had  been  left  with  Riza  el  Rikaby  Pasha. 

In  reply  to  Mr.  Lloyd  George  he  said  that  at  Damascus 
there  was  a  brigade  of  infantry  and  two  regiments  of 
cavalry.  The  Sherifian  troops  were  only  used  for  police 
purposes,  since  the  Sherifian  army  was  still  in  process  of 
formation. 

(At  this  point  there  was  an  adjournment.) 

President  Wilson  suggested  that  the  fittest  men  that 
could  be  obtained  should  be  selected  to  form  an  Inter- 
Allied  Commission  to  go  to  Syria,  extending  their  in- 
quiries, if  they  led  them  beyond  the  confines  of  Syria. 
Their  object  should  be  to  elucidate  the  state  of  opinion 
and  the  soil  to  be  worked  on  by  any  mandatory.  They 
should  be  asked  to  come  back  and  tell  the  Conference 
what  they  found  with  regard  to  these  matters.  He  made 
this  suggestion,  not  because  he  lacked  confidence  in  the 
experts  whose  views  he  had  heard,  such  as  Dr.  Howard 
Bliss  and  General  Allenby.  These,  however,  had  been 
involved  in  some  way  with  the  population,  with  special 
objects,  either  educational  or  military.  If  we  were  to 
send  a  commission  of  men  with  no  previous  contact  with 


SECRET  CONFERENCE  OF  MARCH  20,  1919  17 

Syria,  it  would,  at  any  rate,  convince  the  world  that  the 
Conference  had  tried  to  do  all  it  could  to  find  the  most 
scientific  basis  possible  for  a  settlement.  The  Commission 
should  be  composed  of  an  equal  number  of  French,  British, 
Italian,  and  American  representatives.  He  would  send 
it  with  carte  blanche  to  tell  facts  as  they  found  them. 

M.  Clemenceau  said  he  adhered  in  principle  to  an 
inquiry,  but  it  was  necessary  to  have  certain  guarantees. 
The  inquiry  must  not  confine  itself  to  Syria.  Mandates 
were  required  for  Palestine,  Mesopotamia,  and  Armenia, 
and  other  parts  of  the  Turkish  Empire,  as  well  as  Syria. 
The  peoples  of  these  districts  were  not  isolated.  They 
were  all  connected  by  historical  and  religious  and  other 
links,  including  mutual  feuds,  and  old  quarrels  existed 
between  all  of  them.  Without  contesting  what  General 
AUenby  had  said,  he  wished  it  to  be  recorded,  if  there  were 
a  proces-verbal,  that  many  Syrians  were  not  Arab,  and 
that  if  the  Syrians  were  put  under  the  Arabs  they  would 
revolt.  He  knew  quite  well  the  great  share  taken  by 
Feisal  in  the  Syrian  campaign,  and  he  thought  that 
the  British  were  also  a  little  afraid  of  it.  The  whole 
inquiry  would  be  an  extremely  delicate  one.  Orientals 
were  very  timid  and  afraid  to  say  what  was  at  the  back 
of  their  minds.  It  was  very  difficult  to  get  the  real  feelings 
of  the  people.  It  was  very  important,  therefore,  that  the 
inquiry  should  not  be  merely  superficial.  Hence,  he 
would  ask  for  twenty-four  hours  of  reflection  before  setting 
up  the  Commission.  He  might  like  to  send  some  French 
Arabs  there,  as  Feisal  only  represented  one  side  of  the 
Arab  race.  Moreover,  Feisal  was  practically  a  soldier 
of  England.  That  was  a  fact  that  all  the  world  knew. 
He  said  he  would  revolt  if  the  French  w^ere  at  Damascus, 
but,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  French  artillery  had  recently 
been  sent  there  and  had  been  received  quite  well.  He  had 
made  every  effort  to  bring  himself  to  agree  with  the  prin- 
ciples propounded  by  President  Wilson,  but  something 
must  be  said  for  the  historical  claims  and  for  the  efforts 
that  nations  had  made  in  different  regions.  For  example, 
insistence  on  an  Arab  outlet  to  the  sea  would  destroy 
the  claim  of  one  nation  in  that  part  of  the  world.     The 


18  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEIVIENT 

members  of  the  Commission  must  be  very  carefully 
selected,  and  they  must  inquire  into  every  Turkish  man- 
date. Subject  to  these  provisions  he  was  prepared  to 
accept  President  Wilson's  proposal  in  principle. 

Mr.  Lloyd  George  said  he  had  no  objection  to  an 
inquiry  into  Palestine  and  Mesopotamia,  which  were  the 
regions  in  which  the  British  Empire  w^ere  principally 
concerned.  Neither  would  he  object  to  an  inquiry  into 
Armenia,  in  which  they  were  not  so  closely  concerned. 

President  Wilson  said  he  saw  advantages  in  an  unified 
inquiry  into  Turkish  mandates. 

Mr.  Lloyd  George  said  if  this  extension  was  to  be 
given  to  the  Commission  it  was  essential  it  should  get  to 
work  at  once,  as  the  burden  of  military  forces  in  Turkey 
fell  mainly  on  the  British. 

Mr.  Balfour  said  that  he  felt  these  proposals  might 
postpone  the  making  of  peace. 

President  Wilson  said  this  was  not  so.  For  the  pur- 
poses of  peace  all  that  was  necessary  to  tell  Turkey  was 
that  she  would  have  nothing. 

Mr.  Lloyd  George  said  that  Turkey  was  entitled  to 
know  who  would  be  the  mandatory  for  Turkish  territory. 

President  Wilson  said  it  was  rather  that  they  ought  to 
know  how  much  was  to  remain  Turkish. 

Mr.  Lloyd  George  said  that  the  question  of  who  was 
to  be  mandatory  of  Anatolia  would  make  all  the  difference 
for  the  arrangements  for  Turkey. 

President  Wilson  said  that  Turkey  was  entitled  to 
know  if  she  was  to  have  territory  of  her  own,  and  that 
other  parts  of  Turkey  were  to  be  placed  under  the  League 
of  Nations.  Subsequently  she  would  be  informed  who 
would  be  her  next-door  neighbor. 

Mr.  Lloyd  George  said  that  he  supposed  that  if  the 
evidence  were  so  overwhelming  that,  for  example,  the 
British  Empire  was  ruled  out  of  Mesopotamia,  they  would 
be  free  to  consider  whether  they  could  take  a  mandate 
elsewhere  in  Turkey.'* 

President  Wilson  said  this  was  an  administrative 
matter  and  not  one  of  sovereignty.  Turkey  was  entitled 
to  knowledge  on  all  questions  affecting  the  sovereignty. 


SECRET  CONFERENCE  OF  MARCH  20,  1919  19 

M.  PiCHON  suggested  that,  in  order  to  avoid  delay,  the 
Commission  might  divide  into  sub-commissions  working 
in  different  sections. 

Mr.  Balfour  asked  whether  it  would  be  wise  to  in- 
clude Western  Anatolia  in  the  purview  of  the  Commission. 
Constantinople  was  mainly  a  military  question  (Presi- 
dent Wilson  said  a  strategic  question),  but  south  of  the 
region  which  went  with  Constantinople  came  regions  to 
which  the  Greeks  laid  claim. 

Mr.  Lloyd  George  said  there  was  no  suggestion  that 
the  Commission  was  to  travel  beyond  Armenia. 

At  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  request.  President  Wilson  under- 
took to  draft  a  Terms  of  Reference  to  the  Commission. 


PART  II 

THE  OLD  AND  THE  NEW  DIPLOIMACY:  ORGAN- 
IZATION AND  PROCEDURE 


Document  2. 

Report  made  early  in  January,  1918,  by  the 
American  Inquiry  to  PresidentrWitson  regarding 
"  War  Aims  and  Peace  Terms. "  It  was  prepared 
by  Dr.  S.  E.  Mezes,  David  Hunter  Miller,  and 
Walter  Lippmann,  The  President  used  this 
report  in  formulating  six  of  his  Fourteen  Points. 
Stenographic  notes  which  he  made  on  the  margin 
of  this  document  (see  facsimile.  Volume  I,  p.  Ill) 
were  translated  by  him  for  the  author  and  appear 
in  this  volume  in  italic  type  in  brackets  at  the 
head  of  paragraphs  that  were  annotated  in  the 
text.     (Typewritten  original.) 

THE   PRESENT  SITUATION 

The  War  Aims  and  Peace  Terms  It  Suggests 
OUR  objectives 

The  allied  military  situation  and  Berlin-Bagdad. 

The  Allies  have  had  various  opportunities  to  destroy 
Middle  Europe  by  arms,  to  wit:  the  Russian  invasion  of 
Galicia,  the  protection  of  Serbia,  the  intervention  of 
Rumania,  the  offensive  of  Italy,  the  expedition  of  Galli- 
poli,  the  expedition  to  Saloniki,  the  Mesopotamian  cam- 
paign, and  the  Palestinian  campaign.  The  use  made  of 
these  opportunities  has  produced  roughly  the  following 
results:  The  Russian  Army  has  ceased  to  be  an  offensive 
force,  and  Germany  occupies  a  large  part  of  that  territory 
of  the  Russian  Empire  which  is  inhabited  by  more  or 
less  non-Russian  peoples;  Rumania  is  occupied  to  the 
mouth  of  the  Danube;  Serbia  and  Montenegro  are  occu- 
pied; the  Austrian  and  German  are  deep  into  Italian 
territory.     As    the    Russian,    Rumanian,    Serbian,    and 

23 


24  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

Italian  armies  cannot  be  expected  to  resume  a  dangerous 
offensive,  the  invasion  of  Austria-Hungary  has  ceased 
to  be  a  possibiHty.  The  Allies  hold  Saloniki,  which  they 
are  unable  to  use  as  a  base  for  offensive  operations.  There 
is  a  danger  that  they  may  be  driven  from  it.  If  they  are 
able  to  hold  it,  and  to  keep  it  from  Austrian  hands,  they 
have  made  a  blind  alley  of  one  subordinate  part  of  the 
Berlin-Bagdad  project,  which  has  always  included  a 
branch  line  to  Saloniki,  and  then  to  the  sea.  By  the  cap- 
ture of  Bagdad  they  cannot  only  control  the  rich  resources 
of  Mesopotamia,  but  have  made  a  blind  alley  of  the  main 
Berlin-Bagdad  line,  so  far  as  that  line  was  aimed  to  be  a 
line  of  communication  to  the  Persian  Gulf  as  a  threat 
against  India.  By  the  capture  of  Palestine  the  British 
have  nullified  a  subordinate  part  of  the  Berlin-Bagdad 
scheme,  that  is,  the  threat  to  the  Suez  Canal.  By  the 
almost  complete  separation  of  Arabia  from  Turkey,  the 
Turks  have  not  only  lost  the  Holy  Cities,  but  another 
threat  to  the  Red  Sea  has  been  removed.  Germany  has 
therefore  lost  the  terminals  of  her  project,  and  if  Saloniki, 
Jerusalem,  Bagdad,  and  Arabia  remain  in  non-German 
hands  the  possibilities  of  defense  against  the  politico- 
military  portions  of  the  Bagdad  scheme  exist. 

The  problem  of  Berlin-Bagdad. 

The  problem  is  therefore  reduced  to  this :  how  effectively 
is  it  possible  for  Germany  to  organize  the  territory  now 
under  her  political  and  military  influence  so  as  to  be  in 
a  position  at  a  later  date  to  complete  the  scheme  and  to 
use  the  resources  and  the  man-power  of  Middle  Europe 
in  the  interests  of  her  own  foreign  policy?  She  faces  here 
four  critical  political  problems:  (1)  The  Poles;  (2)  the 
Czechs;  (3)  the  South  Slavs;  and  (4)  Bulgaria.  The 
problem  may  be  stated  as  follows :  if  these  peoples  become 
either  the  willing  accomplices  or  the  helpless  servants 
of  Germany  and  her  political  purposes,  Berlin  will  have 
established  a  power  in  Central  Europe  which  will  be  the 
master  of  the  continent.  The  interest  of  the  United 
States  in  preventing  this  must  be  carefully  distinguished 
before  our  objectives  can  become  clear.     It  can  be  no 


REPORT  OF  THE  AMERICAN  INQUIRY  25 

part  of  our  policy  to  prevent  a  free  interplay  of  economic 
and  cultural  forces  in  Central  Europe.  We  should  have 
no  interest  in  thwarting  a  tendency  towards  unification. 
Our  interest  is  in  the  disestablishment  of  a  system  by 
which  adventurous  and  imperialistic  groups  in  Berlin 
and  Vienna  and  Budapest  could  use  the  resources  of  this 
area  in  the  interest  of  a  fiercely  selfish  foreign  policy 
;direated  against  their  neighbours  and  the  rest  of  the  world. 
In  our  opposition  to  Middle  Europe,  therefore,  we  should 
distinguish  between  the  drawing  together  of  an  area 
which  has  a  certain  economic  unity,  and  the  uses  of  that 
unity  and  the  methods  by  which  it  is  controlled.  We  are 
interested  primarily  in  the  nature  of  the  control. 

The  chief  binding  interests  in  Middle  Europe. 

The  present  control  rests  upon  an  alliance  of  interest 
between  the  ruling  powers  at  Vienna,  Budapest,  Sofia, 
Constantinople  and  Berlin.  There  are  certain  common 
interests  which  bind  these  ruling  groups  together.  The 
chief  ones  are:  (1)  the  common  interests  of  Berlin, 
Vienna,  and  Budapest  in  the  subjection  of  the  Poles,  the 
Czechs,  and  the  Croats;  (2)  from  the  point  of  view  of"^ 
Berlin  the  present  arrangement  assures  a  control  of  the 
external  affairs  and  of  the  military  and  economic  resources 
of  Austria-Hungary;  (3)  from  the  point  of  view  of  Vienna 
and  Budapest  it  assures  the  German-Magyar  ascendancy; 
(4)  the  interest  that  binds  Sofia  to  the  alliance  lay  chiefly 
in  the  ability  of  Germany  to  exploit  the  wrong  done  Bul- 
garia in  the  treaty  of  Bucharest;  (5)  the  interest  of  Con- 
stantinople is  no  doubt  in  part  bought,  in  part  coerced, 
but  it  is  also  in  a  measure  due  to  the  fact  that  in  the  Ger- 
man alliance  alone  lies  the  possibility  of  even  a  nominal 
integrity  for  the  Turkish  Empire;  (6)  at  the  conclusion  of 
the  war,  the  greatest  tie  which  will  bind  Austria-Hungary, 
Bulgaria,  and  Turkey  to  Germany  will  be  the  debts  of 
these  countries  to  Germany. 

The  disestablishment  of  a  Prussian  Middle  Europe. 

It  follows  that  the  objectives  to  be  aimed  at  in  order 
to  render  Middle  Europe  safe  are  the  following: 


26  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

1 .  Increased  democratization  of  Germany,  which  means, 
no  doubt,  legal  changes  like  the  reform  of  the  Prussian 
franchise,  increased  ministerial  responsibility,  control 
of  the  army  and  navy,  of  the  war  power  and  foreign  policy, 
by  representatives  responsible  to  the  German  people. 
But  it  means  something  more.  It  means  the  appointment 
to  office  of  men  who  represent  the  interests  of  south  and 
west  Germany  and  the  large  cities  of  Prussia — men  who 
today  vote  Progressive,  Centrist,  or  Social  Democrat 
tickets — in  brief,  the  men  who  stood  behind  the  Bloc 
which  forced  through  the  Reichstag  resolution  of  July. 

2.  In  addition  to  increased  democratization  of  Ger- 
many, we  have  to  aim  at  an  independent  foreign  policy 
in  Austria-Hungary. 

3.  We  must  aim  at  preventing  the  military  union  of 
Austria-Hungary  and  Germany. 

4.  We  must  aim  at  the  contentment  and  friendship  of 
Bulgaria  through  a  satisfactory  solution  of  the  Balkan 
frontiers. 

5.  We  must  aim  at  the  neutralization  and  the  inter- 
nationalization of  Constantinople  and  the  Straits. 

6.  We  must  see  that  the  control  of  the  two  military 
terminals  of  Berlin-Bagdad  remain  in  the  hands  of  an 
administration  friendly  to  the  western  nations. 

7.  As  a  result  of  the  accomplishment  of  the  foregoing, 
we  must  secure  a  guaranteed  autonomy  for  the  Armenians, 
not  only  as  a  matter  of  justice  and  humanity  but  in  order 
to  reestablish  the  one  people  of  Asia  Minor  capable  of 
preventing  economic  monopolization  of  Turkey  by  the 
Germans. 

These  being  our  objectives,  what  are  our  present  assets 
and  liabilities.'^ 

ASSETS. 

Our  economic  weapon. 

The  commercial  control  of  the  outer  world,  and  the 
possibility  of  German  exclusion  both  from  the  sources  of 
raw  materials  and  the  richer  markets,  and  from  the  routes 
of  communication,  lie  in  our  hands.  The  possibility  of 
a   continued    commercial    exclusion    weighs    heavily,    in 


REPORT  OF  THE  AMERICAN  INQUIRY  27 

fact,  most  heavily  of  all,  upon  the  German  mind  at 
present,  because  upon  the  conclusion  of  peace  a  successful 
demobilization  is  possible  only  as  there  are  raw  materials 
and  markets  for  the  resumption  of  German  industry. 
Without  these  the  army  would  become  a  discontented 
and  dangerous  body.  If  the  possibility  of  exclusion  from 
economic  opportunity  is  associated  with  a  vision  of  a 
world  cooperation  realized,  the  double  motives  of  fear 
and  hope  can  be  used  upon  the  German  people.  This  is 
our  strongest  weapon,  and  the  Germans  realize  its  menace. 
Held  over  them  it  can  win  priceless  concessions.  It  should 
be  noted  that  this  weapon  will  be  of  special  advantage 
after  the  peace  conference  has  assembled.  Our  ability 
to  protract  the  discussion  at  the  industrial  expense  of 
Germany  and  to  our  own  benefit,  and  will  give  us 
a  bargaining  power  of  great  advantage.  Skilfully 
handled,  this  asset  can  be  used  both  to  threaten  and 
to  lure  them;  and  its  appeal  is  well  nigh  universal,  as  the 
utterances  and  comment  from  Germany  clearly  show. 
To  the  dynasty  and  the  ruling  classes,  it  presents  the  most 
tangible  threat  of  revolution,  because  it  is  obvious  that 
the  danger  of  revolution  will  be  enormously  increased 
upon  the  conclusion  of  peace,  when  the  patriotic  motive 
subsides.  To  the  commercial  classes  it  presents  the 
obvious  picture  of  financial  ruin  and  of  disorder.  To 
the  army  it  presents  a  picture  of  a  long  period  following  the 
conclusion  of  the  war  in  which  government  will  not  dare 
to  demobilize  rapidly.  To  the  poorer  classes  generally 
it  presents  the  picture  of  a  long  period  after  the  war  in 
which  the  present  hardships  will  continue. 

II.  Our  assets  in  Austria-Hungary. 

In  Austria-Hungary  we  have  a  number  of  assets  which 
may  seem  contradictory  at  first,  but  which  can  all  be 
employed  at  the  same  time.  There  is  the  nationalistic 
discontent  of  the  Czechs  and  probably  of  the  South  Slavs. 
The  increase  of  nationalistic  discontent  among  the 
Czechs  and  the  possibility  of  some  kind  of  Poland  will 
tend  to  break  the  political  coalition  which  has  existed 
between  the  Austrian  Poles  and  the  German  Austrians. 


28  \VOODRO\V  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

On  the  part  of  the  Emperor  and  of  the  present  ruHng  powers 
in  Austria-Hungary  there  is  a  great  desire  to  emerge  from 
the  war  with  the  patrimony  of  Francis  Joseph  unimpaired. 
This  desire  has  taken  two  interesting  forms:  (1)  it  has  re- 
sulted in  the  adoption  of  a  poHcy  of  no  annexations,  which 
is  obvious  enough;  and  (2)  in  the  adoption,  evidently  with 
much  sincerity,  of  a  desire  for  disarmament  and  a  league 
of  nations.  The  motive  here  is  evidently  a  realization 
that  financially  xVustria  cannot  maintain  armaments  at  the 
present  scale  after  the  war,  and  a  realization  that  in  a 
league^  of  nations  she  would  find  a  guarantee  of  the  status 
quo.  It  follows  that  the  more  turbulent  the  subject 
nationalities  become  and  the  less  the  present  Magj^iar- 
Austrian  ascendancy  sees  itself  threatened  with  absolute 
extinction,  the  more  fervent  will  become  the  desire  in 
Austria-Hungary  to  make  itself  a  fit  partner  in  a  league 
of  nations.  Our  policy  must  therefore  consist  first  in  a 
stirring  up  of  nationalist  discontent,  and  then  in  refusing 
to  accept  the  extreme  logic  of  this  discontent  which  ivould  he 
the  dismemberment  of  Austria-Hungary .  By  threatening 
fKe  present  German-Magyar  combination  with  national- 
ist uprisings  on  the  one  side,  and  by  showing  it  a  mode  of 
safety  on  the  other,  its  resistance  would  be  reduced  to 
a  minimum,  and  the  motive  to  an  independence  from 
Berlin  in  foreign  affairs  would  be  enormously  accelerated. 
Austria-Hungary  is  in  the  position  where  she  must  be 
good  in  order  to  survive. 

It  should  be  noted  that  the  danger  of  economic  exclusion 
after  the  war  affects  Austria-Hungary  as  well  as  Germany 
very  seriously,  and  no  amount  of  ultimate  trade  in  transit 
to  Turkey  will  be  able  to  solve  for  her  the  immediate 
problem  of  finding  work  for  her  demobilized  army,  of  re- 
plenishing her  exhausted  supplies,  and  of  finding  enough 
wealth  to  meet  her  financial  burdens. 

III.  Our  assets  in  Bulgaria. 

In  regard  to  Bulgaria  our  greatest  asset  is  the  possibil- 
ity of  satisfying  her  just  claims,  now  that  the  threat  of 
an  imperialistic  Russian  occupation  of  Constantinople 
is  removed.     A  satisfied  Bulgaria  would  no  doubt  share 


REPORT  OF  THE  AMERICAN  INQUIRY  29 

in  the  economic  advantages  of  Middle  Europe,  but  with- 
out a  strong  national  grievance  of  her  own,  her  exploita- 
tion for  political  and  military  purposes  is  improbable. 
To  this  should  be  added  the  consideration  that  the  re- 
verberations of  the  Russian  revolution  are  sure  to  be  felt 
in  Bulgaria. 

IV.  Our  assets  in  Turkey. 

In  regard  to  Turkey  our  primary  assets  are  our  military 
successes,  already  commented  upon  above.  These  military 
successes  should  have  a  religio-political  effect  upon  the 
Ottoman  Turk.  The  great  financial  and  economic  weak- 
ness of  Turkey  immediately  after  the  war  and  her  need 
of  assistance  are  also  assets  to  be  considered. 

V.  Our  assets  outside  of  Europe. 

The  German  colonies  are  obvious  material  to  bargain 
with,  as  is  Germany's  exclusion  from  the  Pacific  and  from 
Central  and  South  America. 

\  I.  The  radicalism  of  Russia. 

It  is  often  overlooked  that  the  Russian  revolution,  in- 
spired as  it  is  by  deep  hatred  of  autocracy,  contains  within 
it  at  least  three  other  great  motives  of  serious  danger 
to  German  domination:  (1)  anti-capitalist  feeling,  which 
would  be  fully  as  intense,  or  more  intense,  against  German 
capitalism;  (2)  a  religious  love  of  Russia  which  is  spiritu- 
ally antagonistic  to  protestant  Germany;  and  (3)  a  power- 
ful nationalist  feeling  among  the  Moderates,  who  will 
either  return  to  power  or  at  least  exercise  a  strong  influence 
in  Russia.  The  revolution,  therefore,  must  be  regarded 
not  only  as  inherently  difficult  for  the  Germans  to  manage 
and  to  master,  but  as  being  in  itself  a  great  dissolving 
force  through  its  sheer  example.  Note  in  this  regard  the 
reported  interpellation  of  a  deputy  in  the  Austrian  parlia- 
ment, who  wanted  to  know  when  the  Austrian  and  Hun- 
garian landed  estates  were  to  be  broken  up  upon  Bolshe- 
viki  principles,  seeing  that  the  government  had  recognized 
the  Bolshevjki. 


30  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

VII.  The  Vatican. 

The  Vatican  has  been  rightly  regarded  as  pro-German 
in  its  neutrahty.  But  we  should  not  be  misled  in  regard 
to  it  as  we  have  been  misled  in  regard  to  the  Russian  rev- 
olution. The  Germans  have  been  skilful  enough  to  use 
it.  The  Vatican  is  one  of  those  forces  in  the  world  which 
require  exceedingly  skilful  handling  and  contains  within 
it  the  possibility  of  great  assistance  to  our  cause,  as  is 
shown,  for  example,  by  the  opportunity  it  offered  the 
President  to  carry  on  the  first  successful  diplomatic  of- 
fensive made  by  the  Allies  since  the  beginning  of  the 
war. 

VIII.  American  resources. 

The  fact  tliat  with  time  the  man-power  and  resources 
of  this  country,  added  to  the  present  forces  of  the  Entente, 
render  a  complete  and  crushing  military  victory  over  the 
Central  Powers  a  certainty. 

IX.  The  intangibles. 

To  be  counted  on  our  side  if  skilfully  used  are  certain 
intangibles  which  the  President  undoubtedly  had  in  mind 
when  he  w^arned  the  statesmen  of  the  world  in  his  last 
message  that  they  w^ere  living  "in  this  midda}^  hour  of  the 
world's  life."  These  are:  (1)  the  universal  longing  for 
peace,  which  under  the  circumstances  should  not  be 
handed  over  to  Germany  as  something  for  them  to  cap- 
italize; (2)  the  almost  universal  feeling  on  the  part  of  the 
common  people  of  the  world  that  the  old  diplomacy  is 
bankrupt,  and  that  the  system  of  the  armed  peace  must 
not  be  restored.  This  is  a  sentiment  fundamentally  anti- 
Prussian  in  its  nature,  and  should  be  capitalized  for  our 
side;  (3)  there  is  then,  too,  a  great  hope  of  a  league  of 
nations  which  has  the  approbation  of  disinterested  people 
everywhere;  (4)  there  is  the  menace  of  the  social  revolu- 
tion all  over  the  world,  and  as  a  factor  in  it  a  realization 
by  the  governing  political  and  financial  groups  that  the 
meeting  of  the  war  debts  is  virtually  insoluble  without 
revolutionary  measures  about  property.     In  a  war  fought 


REPORT  OF  THE  AMERICAN  INQUIRY  31 

for  democratic  aims,  these  fears  should  be  made  to  fight 
on  our  side. 

X.  The  changed  direction  of  German  policy. 

In  estimating  the  objects  of  German  policy,  as  well  as 
the  concessions  which  Germany  offers,  it  should  be  borne 
in  mind  that  her  first  economic  and  political  penetration 
pointed  due  south  through  Italy,  that  later  it  swerved 
southeast  towards  Constantinople,  Bagdad,  and  the 
Persian  Gulf,  and  that  at  present,  in  view  of  the  Russian 
debacle,  its  direction  of  easiest  advance  is  due  east.  The 
present  is  the  best  time  for  Germany  to  seize  the  oppor- 
tunities offering  themselves  there,  and  this  may  very 
well  cause  her  to  decide  that  she  will  accept  sacrifices 
towards  the  southeast,  the  west,  on  other  continents,  and  in 
distant  seas,  in  order  to  assure  her  contol  of  the  Russian 
opportunities. 

LIABILITIES. 

Balanced  off  against  these  assets  are  our  liabilities. 
They  are,  briefly: 

I.  The  military  impotence  of  Russia. 

II.  The  strategic  impossibility  of  any  military  operation 
which  will  cut  to  the  heart  of  Middle  Europe. 

III.  The  costs  and  dangers  of  a  war  of  attrition  on  the 
western  front,  and  the  improbability  of  anything  more 
than  a  slow  withdrawal  by  the  Germans,  leaving  behind 
them  an  absolute  devastation  of  western  Belgium  and 
of  northern  France. 

IV.  The  possession  by  the  Germans  at  this  time  of  the 
occupied  areas. 

V.  The  concentration  of  France  upon  Alsace-Lorraine, 
which  opens  at  least  as  a  possibility  an  attempt  by  the 
Germans  to  cause  an  almost  complete  rupture  of  the 
western  alliance  by  offering  France  an  attractive  com- 
promise solution.  In  case  the  Germans  should  decide 
within  the  next  few  months  that  they  could  compensate 
themselves  in  the  east,  they  may  offer  France  enough 
in  the  west  to  force  either  a  peace  or  so  keep  a  schism  of 
French  opinion  as  to  render  France  impotent. 


32  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

VI.  In  regard  to  Italy,  our  liabilities  are  also  heavy. 
There  is  the  obvious  danger  of  social  revolution  and  dis- 
organization. 

VII.  Another  liability  lies  in  the  present  unwillingness 
of  the  dominant  opinion  of  Great  Britain  to  discuss  modi- 
fications of  sea  power. 

A  Programme  for  a  Diplomatic  Offensive. 

Bulgaria,  Servia,  and  Italy. 

Attention  may  first  be  directed  to  Bulgaria  as  a  weak 
section  of  the  German  line.  The  Allies  should  publicly 
recognize  Bulgaria's  just  national  claims  and  Serbia's 
right  to  independence  and  to  access  to  the  sea.  This 
should  be  accompanied  by  a  strong  public  move  in  the 
direction  of  Italy,  emphasizing  Italy's  just  claims  to  a 
rectification  of  her  frontier,  both  for  defensive  and  for 
nationalistic  reasons.  The  abandonment  by  Italy  of  her 
imperialist  claims  can  be  covered  by  strong  assurances 
that  her  territory  shall  be  evacuated  and  her  pressing 
economic  needs  now  and  after  the  war  assured. 

Austria-Hungary. 

Towards  Austria-Hungary  the  approach  should  consist 
of  references  to  the  subjection  of  the  various  nationalities, 
in  order  to  keep  that  agitation  alive,  but  coupled  with  it 
should  go  repeated  assurances  that  no  dismemberment 
of  the  Empire  is  intended,  together  with  allusions  to  the 
humiliating  vassalage  of  the  proudest  court  in  Europe. 
It  will  probably  be  well  to  inject  into  the  discussion  a 
mention  of  the  fact  that  Austria-Hungary  is  bound  to 
Germany  by  huge  debts  expended  in  the  interest  of  Ger- 
man ambition.  In  regard  to  Austria-Hungary  it  will 
probably  not  be  wise  to  suggest  frankly  the  cancellation  of 
these  debts,  as  in  the  case  of  Turkey.  Reference  to  their 
existence  and  to  the  bondage  which  they  imply  will,  how- 
ever, produce  a  useful  ferment.  The  desire  of  Austria- 
Hungary  to  discuss  the  question  of  disarmament  should 
not  be  ignored.  The  discussion  should  specifically  be 
accepted  and  the  danger  of  disarmament  in  the  face  of 
an  autocratic  Germany  explained  again. 


REPORT  OF  THE  AMERICAN  INQUIRY  38 

Germany. 

As  against  Germany  the  lines  of  the  offensive  have 
already  been  laid  down  by  the  President.  There  should 
be  more  explicit  assertion  that  the  penalty  of  a  failure 
to  democratize  Germany  more  adequately  must  mean 
exclusion  from  freedom  of  intercourse  after  the  war,  that 
the  reward  for  democratization  is  a  partnership  of  all 
nations  in  meeting  the  problems  that  will  follow  the  peace. 
This  offensive  should  of  course  contain  the  explicit  assur- 
ance that  we  do  not  intend  to  dictate  the  form  of  respon- 
sible government  in  Germany,  and  that  we  are  quite 
within  the  justified  limits  of  intercourse  with  nations  if 
we  take  the  position  that  our  attitude  towards  a  respon- 
sible Germany  would  be  different  from  our  attitude 
towards  the  present  Germany. 

Russia. 

Towards  Russia  our  best  success  will  lie:  (1)  in  showing 
that  we  are  not  unwilling  to  state  war  aims;  (2)  in  a  hearty 
propaganda  of  the  idea  of  a  league  of  nations;  and  (3)  in 
a  demonstration  to  them  that  the  diplomatic  offensive  is 
in  progress,  and  that  the  Allies  are  not  relying  totally 
upon  force. 

France. 

For  the  sake  of  the  morale  of  France  it  will  perhaps 
be  w  ise  to  indicate  an  interest  in  the  solution  of  the  prob- 
lem of  Alsace-Lorraine. 

The  western  Allies  in  general. 

All  of  the  western  Allies  should  be  braced:  (1)  by  an 
energetic  movement  for  economic  unity  of  control ;  (2)  by 
utterances  from  the  United  States  which  will  show  the  way 
to  the  Liberals  in  Great  Britain  and  in  France,  and  there- 
fore restore  their  national  unity  of  purpose.  These 
Liberals  will  readily  accept  the  leadership  of  the  Presi- 
dent if  he  undertakes  a  liberal  diplomatic  offensive,  be- 
cause they  will  find  in  that  offensive  an  invaluable  support 
for  their  internal  domestic  troubles;  finally  (3)  such  a 
powerful  liberal  offensive  on  the  part  of  the  United  States 


3i  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

will  immensely  stimulate  American  pride  and  interest  in 
the  war,  and  will  assure  the  administration  the  support  of 
the  great  mass  of  the  American  people  who  desire  an 
idealistic  solution.  Such  a  liberal  offensive  will  do  more 
than  any  other  thing  to  create  in  this  country  the  sort 
of  public  opinion  that  the  President  needs  in  order  to 
carry  through  the  programme  he  has  outlined. 

A  Suggested  Statement  of  Peace  Terms. 

What  follows  is  suggested  as  a  statement  of  peace  terms 
in  case  a  general  statement  of  terms  at  this  time  is  desired. 
The  different  items  are  phrased,  both  with  a  view  to  what 
they  include  and  exclude,  in  their  relationship  to  the 
present  military  and  diplomatic  situation.  The  purpose 
is  to  make  them  serve  both  as  the  bases  of  an  ultimate 
just  peace  and  as  a  programme  of  war  aims  which  would 
cause  the  maximum  disunity  in  the  enemy  and  the  maxi- 
mum unity  among  our  associates. 

Belgium: 

Belgium  Must  Be  Evacuated  and  Restored  by 
Germany,  without  any  Attempt  to  Limit  the  Sov- 
ereignty WHICH  She  Enjoys  in  common  w^ith  All 
Other  Free  Nations. 

Northern  France: 

["All  the  French  territory  must  be  freed  and  invaded  por- 
tions restored."]* 

The  Invaded  Portions  of  Northern  France  Must 
Be  Evacuated  and  Restored. 

Luxembourg  : 

This  question  should  be  ignored  at  this  time  and  left 
to  negotiation. 

Alsace-Lorraine  : 

["  Alsace-LorraiTie  must  he  restored  to  France  without  ex- 
cluding Germany  from  the  use  of  the  economic  resources  of 
those  provinces.]* 

*Translation  of  President  Wilson's  stenographic  annotation. 


REPORT  OF  THE  AMERICAN  INQUIRY  35 

Every  Act  of  Germany  towards  Alsace-Lorraine 
FOR  Half  a  Century  Has  Proclaimed  that  These 
Provinces  Are  Foreign  Territory,  and  no  Genuine 
Part  of  the  German  Empire.  Germany  Cannot  Be 
Permitted  to  Escape  the  Stern  Logic  of  Her  Own 
Conduct.  The  Wrong  Done  in  1871  Must  Be  Un- 
done. 

This  paragraph  is  phrased  so  as  to  avoid  making  the 
return  of  Alsace-Lorraine  to  France  an  essential  aim  of  the 
United  States  in  the  war,  while  giving  all  possible  moral 
support  to  France  in  her  effort  to  regain  the  provinces. 
It  is  our  belief  that  the  recovery  of  Alsace-Lorraine  is 
highly  desirable  and  practically  essential  to  the  successful 
recovery  of  France.  It  is  also  our  belief  that  the  relin- 
quishment of  Alsace-Lorraine  would  be  the  final  seal 
upon  the  destruction  of  German  militarism.  At  the 
same  time,  we  recognize  that  America  cannot  insist  upon 
fighting  for  Alsace-Lorraine  longer  than  France  herself  is 
willing  to  fight,  and  therefore  if  Germany  should  offer 
France  a  compromise  which  France  herself  was  willing  to 
accept,  it  would  be  unwise  for  us  to  have  a  commit- 
ment on  record  which  we  could  not  fulfill. 

Italy: 

["  That  is  the  readjustment  of  the  frontiers  of  Italy  along 
clearly  recognized  lines  of  nationality .^'Y 

We  Recognize  that  Italy  Is  Entitled  to  Rectifi- 
cations OF  Her  Boundaries  on  the  Basis  of  a  Just 
Balance  of  Defensive  and  Nationalist  Considera- 
tions. This  Right  Was  Recognized  in  Principle 
BY  Austria-Hungary  before  Italy  Entered  the 
War  and  Justice  towards  Italy  Is  in  no  wise 
Altered  By  Any  Subsequent  Military  Events. 
We  Recognize  also  that  the  Port  of  Trieste  Should 
Be  Commercially  Free  and  that  the  Inhabitants  of 
the  City  Deserve  Their  Cultural  Autonomy. 

It  is  our  belief  that  the  application  of  this  plank  will 
meet  the  just  demands  of  Italy,  without  yielding  to  those 


"Translation  of  President  Wilson's  stenographic  annotation.. 


36  WOODROW  WILSON  .VND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

larger  ambitions  along  the  eastern  shore  of  the  Adriatic 
for  which  we  can  find  no  substantial  justification. 

The  Balkans: 

["'  Roumania,  Serbia  and  Montenegro  must  he  evacuated; 
occupied  territories  restored;  Serbia  accorded  free  and  secure 
access  to  tJie  sea;  and  the  relationships  of  the  several  Balkan 
States  to  one  another  determined  by  friendly  counsel  along 
historically  established  lines  of  allegiance  and  nationality. 
International  guarantees  should  he  entered  into  of  the  politi- 
cal independence  and  territorial  integrity  of  all  the  Balkan 
States."]* 

No  Just  or  Lasting  Settlement  of  the  Tangled 
Problems  Confronting  the  Deeply  Wronged  Peoples 
OF  the  Balkans  Can  Be  Based  upon  the  Arbitrary 
Treaty  of  Bucharest.  That  Treaty  Was  a  Product 
OF  the  Evil  Diplomacy  which  the  Peoples  of  the 
World  Are  Now  Determined  to  End.  That  Treaty 
Wronged  Every  Nation  in  the  Balkans,  even  those 
which  It  Appeared  to  Favour,  by  Imposing  upon 
Them  all  the  Permanent  Menace  of  War.  It  Un- 
questionably Tore  Men  and  Women  of  Bulgarian 
Loyalty  from  Their  Natural  Allegiance.  It  De- 
nied TO  Serbia  that  Access  to  the  Sea  which  She 
Must  Have  in  Order  to  Complete  Her  Independence. 
Any  Just  Settlement  Must  of  course  Begin  with 
THE  Evacuation  of  Rumania,  Serbia,  and  Monte- 
negro by  the  Armies  of  the  Central  Powers,  and 
THE  Restoration  of  Serbia  and  Montenegro.  The 
Ultimate  Relationship  of  the  Different  Balkan 
Nations  Must  Be  Based  upon  a  Fair  Balance  of 
Nationalistic  and  Economic  Considerations,  Applied 
in  a  Generous  and  Inventive  Spirit  after  Impartial 
AND  Scientific  Inquiry.  The  Meddling  and  In- 
triguing of  Great  Powers  Must  Be  Stopped,  and 
the  Efforts  to  Attain  National  Unity  by  Massacre 
Must  Be  Abandoned. 

It  would  obviously  be  unwise  to  attempt  at  this  time  to 
draw  frontiers  for  the  Balkan  states.     Certain  broad  con- 

*Translation  of  President  Wilson's  stenographic  annotation. 


REPORT  OF  THE  AMERICAN  INQUIRY  37 

siderations,  however,  may  tentatively  be  kept  in  mind. 
They  are  in  brief  these:  (1)  that  the  area  annexed  by 
Rumania  in  the  Dobrudja  is  almost  surely  Bulgarian  in 
character  and  should  be  returned ;  (2)  that  the  boundary 
between  Bulgaria  and  Turkey  should  be  restored  to  the 
Enos-Midia  line,  as  agreed  upon  at  the  conference  of 
London ;  (3)  that  the  south  boundary  of  Bulgaria  should  be 
the  ^gean  Sea  coast  from  Enos  to  the  gulf  of  Orfano,  and 
should  leave  the  mouth  of  the  Struma  river  in  Bulgarian 
territory;  (4)  that  the  best  access  to  the  sea  for  Serbia  is 
through  Saloniki;  (5)  that  the  final  disposition  of  Mace- 
donia cannot  be  determined  without  further  inquiry; 
(6)  that  an  independent  Albania  is  almost  and  certainly 
an  undesirable  political  entity. 

We  are  strongly  of  the  opinion  that  in  the  last  analysis 
economic  considerations  will  outweigh  nationalistic  af- 
filiations in  the  Balkans,  and  that  a  settlement  which 
insures  economic  prosperity  is  most  likely  to  be  a  lasting 
one. 

Poland: 

["An  independent  Polish  State  must  be  established, 
whose  political  and  economic  independence  and  territorial 
integrity  shall  be  guaranteed  by  international  covenant. 
It  shall  include  the  territories  inhabited  by  an  indisputably 
Polish  population,  and  shall  be  granted  a  free  and  secure 
access  to  the  sea.'']* 

An  Independent  and  Democratic  Poland  Shall  Be 
Established.  Its  Boundaries  Shall  Be  Based  on  a 
Fair  Balance  of  National  and  Economic  Con- 
siderations, GivixXG  Due  Weight  to  the  Necessity 
FOR  Adequate  Access  to  the  Sea.  The  Form  of 
Poland's  Government  and  Its  Economic  and  Political 
Relations  Should  Be  Left  to  the  Determination  of 
the  People  of  Poland  Acting  through  Their  Chosen 
Representatives. 

The  subject  of  Poland  is  by  far  the  most  complex  of  all 
the  problems  to  be  considered.  The  present  distribution 
of  Poles  is  such  as  to  make  their  complete  unification 

*Translation  of  President  Wilson's  stenographic  annotation. 


38  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

impossible  without  separating  East  Prussia  from  Ger- 
many. This  is  probably  not  within  the  bounds  of  practical 
politics.  A  Poland  which  consists  essentially^  of  Russian 
and  perhaps  Austrian  Poland  would  probably  secure  its 
access  to  the  sea  through  the  Vistula  River  and  the  canals 
of  Germany  which  run  to  Hamburg  and  Bremen.  This 
relationship  would  very  probably  involve  both  the  eco- 
nomic subjection  of  Poland  and  the  establishment  of  an 
area  of  great  friction.  If  Russia  is  to  remain  weak  the  new 
Poland  will  lie  in  an  exceedingly  exposed  position.  The 
experiment  must  no  doubt  be  made,  however,  but  in  order 
to  assure  it  a  fair  start,  it  is  necessary  to  insist  at  the  outset 
upon  a  democratic  basis  for  the  Polish  state.  Unless 
this  is  loyally  observed,  the  internal  friction  of  Poles, 
Ruthenians,  and  Jews  is  likely  to  render  Poland  impotent 
in  the  presence  of  Germany. 

Austria-Hungary 

["The  peoples  of  Austria-Hungary,  whose  place  among  the 
nations  of  the  ivorld  we  wish  to  see  safeguarded  and  assured 
must  be  accorded  the  freest  opportunity  of  autonomous 
development.'']* 

We  See  Promise  in  the  Discussions  now  Going 
on  between  the  austro-hungarian  governments  and 
THE  Peoples  of  the  Monarchy,  but  the  Vassalage 
OF  Austria-Hungary  to  the  Masters  of  Germany, 
Riveted  upon  Them  by  Debts  for  Money  Expended  in 
the  Interests  of  German  Ambition  must  Be  Done 
Away  with  in  Order  that  Austria-Hungary  May  Be 
Free  toTake  Her  Rightful  Place  ajmong  the  Nations. 

The  object  of  this  is  to  encourage  the  present  move- 
ment towards  federalism  in  Austria,  a  movement  which, 
if  it  is  successful  will  break  the  German-Magyar  ascend- 
ency. By  injecting  the  idea  of  a  possible  cancellation 
of  the  war  debts  to  Germany,  it  is  hoped  to  encourage  all 
the  separatist  tendencies  as  between  Austria-Hungary  and 
Germany,  as  well  as  the  social  revolutionary  sentiment 
which  poverty  has  stimulated. 

*TransIation  of  President  Wilson's  stenographic  annotation. 


REPORT  OF  THE  AMERICAN  INQUIRY  39 

Turkey : 

["  The  Turkish  portions  of  the  present  Turkish  Empire  must 
he  assured  a  secure  sovereignty  and  the  other  nationalities 
which  are  now  under  Turkish  rule  must  he  assured  full 
opportunity   of  autonomous  development.^^]* 

It  Is  Necessary  to  Free  the  Subject  Races  of  the 
Turkish  Empire  from  Oppression  and  Misrule.  This 
Implies  at  the  Very  Least  Autonomy  for  Armenia 
AND  THE  Protection  of  Palestine,  Syria,  Mesopo- 
tamia, AND  Arabia  by  the  Civilized  Nations.     It  Is 

NECESSARY  ALSO  TO  ESTABLISH  FrEE  INTERCOURSE 
THROUGH    AND    ACROSS    THE    StRAITS.      TuRKEY   PrOPER 

Must  Be  Justly  Treated  and  Freed  from  Economic 
AND  Political  Bondage.  Her  War  Debts  to  Germany 
Must  Be  Cancelled.  None  of  the  Money  Involved 
Was  Spent  in  the  Interest  of  Turkey,  and  None  of  It 
Should  Be  Regarded  as  a  Turkish  Obligation.  An 
Adjustment  of  Her  Pre-War  Debt  in  Accordance  with 
Her  Territorial  Limitations  Is  also  Required  by  the 
Considerations  of  Justice.  Moreover  It  Will  Un- 
doubtedly Be  Feasible  to  Arrange  Advances  of 
Money  to  Turkey  in  Order  to  Enable  Her  Under 
Suitable  Supervision  to  Institute  and  Maintain 
Satisfactory  Educational  and  Sanitary  Conditions, 
and  to  Undertake  Her  Economic  Rehabilitation. 
Thus  Turkey  Can  Be  Freed  from  Intermeddling 
and  Enabled  to  Develop  Institutions  Adapted  to 
THE  Genius  of  Her  Own  People. 

This  will  appear  on  the  surface  to  be  a  drastic  solution 
of  the  Turkish  problem,  but  it  is  one  which  the  military 
situation  enables  us  to  accomplish,  and  it  can  hardly  be 
doubted  that  no  principle  of  justice  requires  the  return 
of  occupied  portions  of  Turkey  to  the  German-Turkish 
alliance.  The  cancellation  of  Turkey's  debt  to  Germany 
is  the  one  final  way  to  abolish  German  political  and  com- 
mercial penetration.  It  is  also  the  one  method  by  which 
Turkey  can  be  given  a  new  start,  considerably  reduced 
in  size,  without  power  to  misgovern  alien  races,  and  there- 

*Translation  of  President  Wilson's  stenographic  annotation. 


40  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

fore  free  to  concentrate  upon  the  needs  of  her  own  popu- 
lation. It  should  be  noted  in  this  regard  that  only  a  few 
days  ago  it  was  announced  that  Germany  had  agreed 
to  forego  interest  on  the  Turkish  debt  for  a  period  of 
twelve  years  after  the  war.  This  implies  a  realization 
on  Germany's  part  that  if  she  insists  upon  the  interest 
payments  a  repudiation  is  possible,  carrying  with  it  a 
destruction  of  German  influence  in  Turkey. 

The  League  of  Nations 

From  the  Nations  at  Present  Engaged  in  Resist- 
ance TO  Germany's  Effort  to  Dominate  the  World 
there  Is  Growing  a  League  of  Nations  for  Common 
Protection,  for  the  Peaceful  Settlement  of  Inter- 
national Disputes,  for  the  Attainment  of  a  Joint 
Economic  Prosperity  Including  Equal  Opportunity 
upon  the  Highways  of  the  World  and  Equitable  Ac- 
cess TO  the  Raw  Materials  Which  all  Nations  Need, 
whether  this  League  Is  to  Remain  Armed  and  Ex- 
clusive, OR  WHETHER  ThERE  Is  TO  Be  A  REDUCTION  OF 

Armaments  and  a  Cordial  Inclusion  of  Germany, 
WILL  Depend  upon  Whether  the  German  Governtvient 
Is  in  fact  Representative  of  the  German  Democracy. 
This  is,  of  course,  simply  another  statement  of  the 
alternative  before  Germany. 

Conclusion 

W^e  regard  all  of  the  terms  mentioned  as  essential  to 
any  final  agreement.  It  may  well  be,  however,  that 
some  of  the  provisions  other  than  those  relating  to  Belgium 
and  northern  France,  the  evacuation  of  Italy  and  Ru- 
mania, and  the  evacuation  and  restoration  of  Serbia  and 
Montenegro,  do  not  require  assent  as  a  preliminary  to 
discussion  at  the  conference.  And  this  is  due  to  the  fact 
that  we  have  the  power  to  compel  Germany's  assent  at 
the  peace  conference  by  our  ability  to  bar  her  indefinitely 
from  access  to  supplies  and  to  protract  the  negotiations 
at  her  cost  and  at  our  own  benefit. 

We  emphasize  our  belief  that  no  surrender  of  this  power, 
even  by  inference,  should  be  considered  until  all  the  terms 


REPORT  OF  THE  AMERICAN  INQUIRY  41 

stated  above  are  definitely  agreed  to,  in  detail  as  well  as 
in  principle,  by  Germany  at  the  peace  conference.  This 
involves  adopting  as  our  policy  the  reserving  of  the  dis- 
cussion of  economic  peace  until  our  political,  social,  and 
international  objects  are  attained. 

We  might   well  adopt  as  our  slogan   "No  economic 
peace  until  the  peoples  are  freed." 


Document  3. 

The  "Fourteen  Points"  and  the  "Four  Points." 
President  Wilson's  Fourteen  Points,  from  his 
address  to  the  Joint  Session  of  Congress,  January 
8,  1918. 

President  Wilson's  Four  Points,  from  his  ad- 
dress at  Mount  Vernon,  July  4,  1918. 

THE   "FOURTEEN   POINTS"   AND   THE   "FOUR 

POINTS.  " 

President  Wilson's  Fourteen  Points. 

From  His  Address  to  the  Joint  Session  of  Congress,  January  8,  1918. 

We  entered  this  war  because  violations  of  right  had 
occurred  which  touched  us  to  the  quick  and  made  the  life 
of  our  own  people  impossible  unless  they  were  corrected 
and  the  world  secured  once  for  all  against  their  re- 
currence. What  we  demand  in  this  war,  therefore,  is 
nothing  peculiar  to  ourselves.  It  is  that  the  world  be 
made  fit  and  safe  to  live  in;  and  particularly  that  it  be 
made  safe  for  every  peace-loving  nation  which,  like  our 
own,  wishes  to  live  its  own  life,  determine  its  own  insti- 
tutions, be  assured  of  justice  and  fair  dealing  by  the  other 
peoples  of  the  world  as  against  force  and  selfish  aggres- 
sion. All  the  peoples  of  the  world  are  in  effect  partners 
in  this  interest,  and  for  our  own  part  we  see  very  clearly 
that  unless  justice  be  done  to  others  it  will  not  be  done  to 
us.  The  programme  of  the  world's  peace,  therefore,  is 
our  programme;  and  that  programme,  the  only  possible 
programme,  as  we  see  it,  is  this: 

I.  Open  covenants  of  peace,  openly  arrived  at,  after 
which   there   shall   be   no   private    international   under- 

42 


THE  "FOURTEEN  POINTS"  AND  "FOUR  POINTS"        43 

standings  of  any  kind  but  diplomacy  shall  proceed  always 
frankly  and  in  the  public  view. 

II.  Absolute  freedom  of  navigation  upon  the  seas, 
outside  territorial  waters,  alike  in  peace  and  in  war,  except 
as  the  seas  may  be  closed  in  whole  or  in  part  by  inter- 
national action  for  the  enforcement  of  international 
covenants. 

III.  The  removal,  so  far  as  possible,  of  all  economic 
barriers  and  the  establishment  of  an  equality  of  trade 
conditions  among  all  the  nations  consenting  to  the  peace 
and  associating  themselves  for  its  maintenance. 

IV.  Adequate  guarantees  given  and  taken  that  national 
armaments  will  be  reduced  to  the  lowest  point  consistent 
with  domestic  safety. 

V.  A  free,  open-minded,  and  absolutely  impartial  ad- 
justment of  all  colonial  claims,  based  upon  a  strict  observ- 
ance of  the  principle  that  in  determining  all  such  questions 
of  sovereignty  the  interests  of  the  populations  concerned 
must  have  equal  weight  with  the  equitable  claims  of  the 
government  whose  title  is  to  be  determined. 

VI.  The  evacuation  of  all  Russian  territory  and  such 
a  settlement  of  all  questions  affecting  Russia  as  will  secure 
the  best  and  freest  cooperation  of  the  other  nations  of  the 
world  in  obtaining  for  her  an  unhampered  and  unem- 
barrassed opportunity  for  the  independent  determination 
of  her  own  political  development  and  national  policy  and 
assure  her  of  a  sincere  welcome  into  the  society  of  free 
nations  under  institutions  of  her  own  choosing;  and, 
more  than  a  welcome,  assistance  also  of  every  kind  that 
she  may  need  and  may  herself  desire.  The  treatment 
accorded  Russia  by  her  sister  nations  in  the  months  to 
come  will  be  the  acid  test  of  their  good  will,  of  their  com- 
prehension of  her  needs  as  distinguished  from  their  own 
interests,  and  of  their  intelligent  and  unselfish  sympathy. 

VII.  Belgium,  the  whole  world  will  agree,  must  be 
evacuated  and  restored,  without  any  attempt  to  limit  the 
sovereignty  which  she  enjoys  in  common  with  all  other  free 
nations.  No  other  single  act  will  serve  as  this  will  serve 
to  restore  confidence  among  the  nations  in  the  laws  which 
they  have  themselves  set  and  determined  for  the  govern- 


44  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

ment  of  their  relations  with  one  another.  Without  this 
healing  act  the  whole  structure  and  validity  of  inter- 
national law  is  forever  impaired. 

VIII.  All  French  territory  should  be  freed  and  the 
invaded  portions  restored,  and  the  wrong  done  to  France 
by  Prussia  in  1871  in  the  matter  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  which 
has  unsettled  the  peace  of  the  world  for  nearly  fifty  years, 
should  be  righted,  in  order  that  peace  may  once  more  be 
made  secure  in  the  interest  of  all. 

IX.  A  readjustment  of  the  frontiers  of  Italy  should  be 
effected  along  clearly  recognizable  lines  of  nationality. 

X.  The  peoples  of  Austria-Hungary,  whose  place 
among  the  nations  we  wish  to  see  safeguarded  and  assured, 
should  be  accorded  the  freest  opportunity  of  autonomous 
development. 

XL  Rumania,  Serbia,  and  Montenegro  should  be 
evacuated;  occupied  territories  restored;  Serbia  accorded 
free  and  secure  access  to  the  sea;  and  the  relations  of  the 
several  Balkan  states  to  one  another  determined  by 
friendly  counsel  along  historically  established  lines  of 
allegiance  and  nationality;  and  international  guarantees 
of  the  political  and  economic  independence  and  territorial 
integrity  of  the  several  Balkan  states  should  be  entered 
into. 

XII.  The  Turkish  portions  of  the  present  Ottoman 
Empire  should  be  assured  a  secure  sovereignty,  but  the 
other  nationalities  which  are  now  under  Turkish  rule 
should  be  assured  an  undoubted  security  of  life  and  an  ab- 
solutely unmolested  opportunity  of  autonomous  develop- 
ment, and  the  Dardanelles  should  be  permanently  opened 
as  a  free  passage  to  the  ships  and  commerce  of  all  nations 
under  international  guarantees. 

XIII.  An  independent  Polish  state  should  be  erected 
which  should  include  the  territories  inhabited  by  in- 
disputably Polish  populations,  which  should  be  assured 
a  free  and  secure  access  to  the  sea,  and  whose  politi- 
cal and  economic  independence  and  territorial  integrity 
should  be  guaranteed  by  international  covenant. 

XIV.  A  general  association  of  nations  must  be  formed 
under  specific  covenants   for  the  purpose  of  affording 


THE  "FOURTEEN  POINTS"  AND  "FOUR  POINTS"        45 

mutual  guarantees  of  political  independence  and  terri- 
torial integrity  to  great  and  small  states  alike. 

In  regard  to  these  essential  rectifications  of  wrong  and 
assertions  of  right  we  feel  ourselves  to  be  intimate  partners 
of  all  the  governments  and  peoples  associated  together 
against  the  Imperialists.  We  cannot  be  separated  in 
interest  or  divided  in  purpose.  We  stand  together  until 
the  end. 


We  have  spoken  now,  surely,  in  terms  too  concrete  to 
admit  of  any  further  doubt  or  question.  An  evident 
principle  runs  through  the  whole  programme  I  have  out- 
lined. It  is  the  principle  of  justice  to  all  peoples  and 
nationalities,  and  their  right  to  live  on  equal  terms  of 
liberty  and  safety  with  one  another,  whether  they  be 
strong  or  weak.  Unless  this  principle  be  made  its 
foundation  no  part  of  the  structure  of  international 
justice  can  stand.  The  people  of  the  United  States  could 
act  upon  no  other  principle ;  and  to  the  vindication  of  this 
principle  they  are  ready  to  devote  their  lives,  their  honor, 
and  everything  that  they  possess.  The  moral  climax  of 
this  the  culminating  and  final  war  for  human  liberty  has 
come,  and  they  are  ready  to  put  their  own  strength,  their 
own  highest  purpose,  their  own  integrity  and  devotion  to 
the  test. 

President  W^ilson's  Four  Points. 

From  His  Address  at  Mount  Vernon,  July  i,  1918. 

I.  The  destruction  of  every  arbitrary  power  anywhere 
that  can  separately,  secretly,  and  of  its  single  choice 
disturb  the  peace  of  the  world ;  or,  if  it  cannot  be  presently 
destroyed,  at  the  least  its  reduction  to  virtual  impotence. 

II.  The  settlement  of  every  question,  whether  of 
territory,  of  sovereignty,  of  economic  arrangement,  or  of 
political  relationship  upon  the  basis  of  the  free  acceptance 
of  that  settlement  by  the  people  immediately  concerned, 
and  not  upon  the  basis  of  the  material  interest  or  ad- 
vantage of  any  other  nation  or  people  which  may  desire  a 


46  WOODROW  WTLSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

different  settlement  for  the  sake  of  its  own  exterior  in- 
fluence or  mastery. 

III.  The  consent  of  all  nations  to  be  governed  in  their 
conduct  toward  each  other  by  the  same  principles  of 
honor  and  of  respect  for  the  common  law  of  civilized 
society  that  govern  the  individual  citizens  of  all  modern 
States  in  their  relations  with  one  another;  to  the  end  that 
all  promises  and  covenants  may  be  sacredly  observed,  no 
private  plots  or  conspiracies  hatched,  no  selfish  injuries 
wrought  with  impunity,  and  a  mutual  trust  established 
upon  the  handsome  foundation  of  a  mutual  respect  for 
right. 

IV.  The  establishment  of  an  organization  of  peace 
which  shall  make  it  certain  that  the  combined  power  of 
free  nations  will  check  every  invasion  of  right  and  serve 
to  make  peace  and  justice  the  more  secure  by  affording  a 
definite  tribunal  of  opinion  to  which  all  must  submit  and 
by  which  every  international  readjustment  that  cannot  be 
amicably  agreed  upon  by  the  peoples  directly  concerned 
shall  be  sanctioned.  These  great  objects  can  be  put  into 
a  single  sentence.  What  we  seek  is  the  reign  of  law,  based 
upon  the  consent  of  the  governed  and  sustained  by  the 
organized  opinion  of  mankind. 


Document  4. 

Statement  adopted  by  the  Council  of  Ten, 
January  17,  for  presentation  to  the  Press  repre- 
sentatives at  Paris,  explaining  policies  of  publi- 
city (mimeograph). 

STATEMENT  OF  PEACE  CONFERENCE  ON  PUB- 
LICITY, JANUARY  17,  1919. 

The  representatives  of  the  Allied  and  Associated 
Powers  have  given  earnest  consideration  to  the  question 
of  publicity  for  the  proceedings  of  the  Peace  Conference. 
They  are  anxious  that  the  public,  through  the  Press, 
should  have  the  fullest  information  compatible  with 
safeguarding  the  supreme  interest  of  all,  which  is  that  a 
just  and  honorable  settlement  should  be  arrived  at  with 
the  minimum  of  delay.  It  is,  however,  obvious  that 
publicity  with  regard  to  the  preliminary  conversations 
now  proceeding  must  be  subject  to  the  limitations  neces- 
sarily imposed  by  the  difficult  and  delicate  nature  of  their 
object. 

The  proceedings  of  a  Peace  Conference  are  far  more 
analogous  to  those  of  a  Cabinet  than  to  those  of  a  legis- 
lature. Nobody  has  ever  suggested  that  Cabinet  meet- 
ings should  be  held  in  public,  and  if  they  were  so  held,  the 
work  of  government  would  become  impossible.  One 
reason  why  Cabinets  are  held  in  private  is  in  order  that 
differences  may  be  reconciled  and  agreement  reached 
before  the  stage  of  publicity  is  begun.  The  essence  of 
democratic  method  is  not  that  deliberations  of  a  Govern- 
ment should  be  conducted  in  public,  but  that  its  conclu- 
sions should  be  subject  to  the  consideration  of  a  popular 
Chamber  and  to  free  and  open  discussion  on  the  platform 
and  in  the  Press. 

47 


48  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

The  representatives  of  the  AUied  and  Associated 
Powers  are  holding  conversations  in  order  to  solve  ques- 
tions which  affect  the  vital  interests  of  many  nations  and 
upon  which  they  may,  at  present,  hold  many  diverse 
views.  These  deliberations  cannot  proceed  by  the  method 
of  a  majority  vote.  No  nation  can  be  committed  except 
by  the  free  vote  of  its  own  delegates.  The  conclusions 
arrived  at  at  these  consultations,  therefore,  can  only  be 
formed  by  the  difficult  process  of  reaching  agreement 
among  all.  This  vital  process  would  only  be  hindered  if 
the  discussion  of  every  disputed  question  were  to  open  by 
a  public  declaration  by  each  Delegation  of  its  own  national 
point  of  view.  Such  a  declaration  would  in  many  cases 
be  followed  by  premature  public  controversy.  This 
would  be  serious  enough  if  it  were  confined  to  controversy 
between  parties  within  each  State.  It  might  be  extremely 
dangerous  if,  as  would  often  be  inevitable,  it  resulted  in 
controversy  between  nations.  Moreover  such  public 
declarations  would  render  that  give  and  take  on  the  part 
of  the  delegates  themselves,  which  is  essential  to  a  success- 
ful negotiation,  a  matter  of  infinitely  greater  difficulty. 

It  is  also  extremely  important  that  the  settlement 
should  be  not  only  just  but  speedy.  Every  belligerent 
Power  is  anxious  for  the  early  conclusion  of  peace,  in 
order  that  its  armies  may  be  demobilised  and  that  it  may 
return  once  more  to  the  ways  of  peace.  If  premature 
publicity  is  given  to  the  negotiations,  the  proceedings  of 
the  Peace  Conference  would  be  interminably  protracted, 
and  the  delegates  would  be  forced  to  speak  not  only  to 
the  business  before  the  Conference,  but  to  concern  them- 
selves with  the  controversies  which  had  been  raised  by  the 
account  of  their  proceedings  outside. 

Finally,  there  will  often  be  very  strong  reasons  against 
announcing  the  conclusions  of  the  conversations  as  they 
are  arrived  at.  Representatives  of  a  nation  may  be 
wiUing  to  give  their  assent  on  one  point  only  provided  they 
receive  a  concession  on  another  point  which  has  not  yet 
been  discussed.  It  will  not  be  possible  to  judge  of  the 
wisdom  and  justice  of  the  Peace  settlement  until  it  can 
be  viewed  as  a  whole,  and  premature   announcements 


COUNCIL  OF  TEN,  TOLICIES  OF  PUBLICITY  49 

might  lead  to  misapprehensions  and  anxiety  as  to  the 
ultimate  results  for  which  there  was  no  real  foundation. 

In  calling  attention,  however,  to  these  necessary 
limitations  on  publicity,  the  representatives  of  the 
Powers  do  not  underrate  the  importance  of  carrying 
public  opinion  with  them  in  the  vast  task  by  which  they 
are  confronted.  They  recognize  that  unless  public 
opinion  approves  of  the  results  of  their  labours,  they  will 
be  nugatory. 

This  reasoning  applies  with  conclusive  force  to  the 
present  conversations  between  the  representatives  of  the 
Great  Powers. 

With  regard  to  the  full  conferences,  the  following  rule 
was  adopted : 

Representatives  of  the  Press  shall  be  admitted  to  the 
meetings  of  the  full  conference  but  upon  necessary  occa- 
sions the  deliberations  of  the  Conference  may  be  held  in 
camera. 


Document  5. 

Text  of  Resolutions  adopted  by  delegates  of 
the  Allied  and  American  Press,  at  the  Hotel  Ritz, 
January  16,  1919  (mimeograph). 

At  a  meeting  of  the  special  committee  appointed  by  the 
delegates  of  the  Allied  and  American  press,  held  at  the 
Hotel  Ritz,  Paris,  the  sixteenth  of  January,  1919,  it  was 
unanimously  resolved : 

One — That  it  is  essential  to  ensure  full  publicity  to  the 
peace  negotiations. 

Two — That  the  official  communiques  issued  by  the  Peace 
Conference  shall  be  as  complete  as  possible. 

Three — That,  in  addition  to  the  official  communiques, 
full  summaries  of  each  day's  proceedings  should  be 
issued,  not  necessarily  for  textual  publication,  but  for  the 
guidance  of  the  members  of  the  press  who  will  maintain 
full  freedom  of  comment. 

Four — That  this  committee  is  opposed  to  any  rule  of  the 
Conference  which  would  interfere  with  free  intercourse 
between  delegates  and  responsible  journalists. 

Five — That  the  committee  recommends  equality  of 
treatment  of  the  Allied  press  by  the  abolition  of  the 
censorship  in  all  Allied  countries. 

Six — That,  apart  from  the  general  question  of  the  admis- 
sion of  representatives  of  the  press  to  the  Peace  Confer- 
ence and  conversations,  the  committee  is  of  opinion  that 
journalists  representing  all  Allied  countries  and  America 
should  be  permitted  to  attend  the  formal  opening  session 
of  the  Conference. 

There  being  substantial  agreement  among  the  British, 
Italian  and  American  delegations,  and  that  of  the  smaller 
nations,  to  recommend  equal  representation  of  the  press 
at  the  Conferences,   from  which,  however,   the  French 

50 


PRESS  RESOLUTIONS,  JANUARY  16,  1919  51 

delegation  dissents,  no  joint  proposal  on  this  point  is  made, 
it  having  been  left  to  the  representatives  of  each  nation- 
ality to  make  separate  recommendations  to  their  own 
delegates  on  this  subject. 

[Sigjied]    L.  Marcellin') 

St.  Brice         >  For  France 
Leon  Bassee  J 

George  A.  RiddellI 

George  Adam  >  For  Great  Britain 

P.  GiLMORE  J 

H.  B.  SwoPE  j 

Arthur  B.  Crock  >  For  the  United  States 

John  E.  Nevin      J 

Mario  Borsa  1 

GuGLiELAio  Emanuel  >  For  Italy 
Roberto  CantelupoJ 

F.  Collin  )  p^^  ^j^^  Smaller  Nations 

Frano  Cvietsa) 

These  further  resolutions  were  unanimously  adopted 
by  the  British,  Italian,  and  American  press  committee, 
and  by  that  representing  the  smaller  nations : 

One — ^That  there  should  be  direct  representation  of 
the  press  at  the  sittings  of  the  Peace  Conference. 

Two — That  the  press  of  each  of  the  great  powers  should 
be  represented  by  not  fewer  than  five  delegates,  and  that 
each  of  the  smaller  nations  which  have  taken  an  active 
part  in  the  war  should  have  proportionate  representation. 

George  Riddell] 

George  Adam      [  t^     ^      j.  t>  -x  • 

p.  GiLMORE  (    ^°'  ^'''^^  ^"^"^ 

G.  H.  Perris       J 

H.  B.  SwoPE  ^ 

Arthur  B.  Krock>  For  the  United  States 

John  E.  Nevin       ) 


52  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

Mario  Borsa  j 

GuGLiELMO  Emanuel  >  For  Italy 
Roberto  CantelupoJ 

F.  Collin  ^    p^^  ^^^  Smaller  Nations 

Frano  Cvietsa 


Document  6. 

Record  of  protests  and  resolutions  adopted  by 
American  press  correspondents  April  23,  1919, 
regarding  admission  to  meeting  of  Allied  with 
German  delegates  at  Versailles,  May  7,  at  which 
the  Treaty  was  formally  presented  to  the 
Germans  (carbon  copy). 

MEETING  OF  PRESS  REPRESENTATIVES. 

April  23,  1919. 

Mr.  William  Allen  White  in  the  Chair. 
Moved  by  Mr.  Frank  Simonds : — 

That  a  Committee  of  Nine — four  in  addition  to  the 
present  Press  Executive  Committee — be  appointed  by 
the  Chair  to  draw  up  a  resolution  expressing  the  sentiment 
of  the  meeting  that  the  representatives  of  the  press  be  per- 
mitted to  be  present  when  the  Peace  Treaty  is  handed 
to  the  German  plenipotentiaries.  Motion  carried  unani- 
mously. 

After  discussion  of  several  motions,  presented  and 
amended,  all  motions  were  withdrawn  and  a  vote  was 
taken  on  the  simple  question  of  whether  it  was  or  was 
not  the  sense  of  the  meeting  that  the  representatives 
of  the  press  must  be  permitted  to  see  the  spokesman  of 
the  Germans.  Motion  carried  by  vote  16  in  favor  and  7 
opposed. 

Meeting  adjourned  subject  to  call  of  Chair.  Commit- 
tee appointed  by  Chair  to  confer  with  existing  Press 
Committee : 

John  E.  Nevin, 

Fred  S.  Ferguson, 

Burge  McFall, 

Alice  Riggs  Hunt. 

53 


54  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

Existing  Press  Committee: 

Lawrence  Hills, 
Herbert  Bayard  Swope, 
Henry  G.  Wales. 

April  25,  1919. 

The  following  letter  was  submitted  to  and  unanimously 
adopted  at  a  subsequent  meeting  of  the  correspondents  on 
April  25th— 

To  the  Honorables, 

Members  of  the  American  Peace  Commission: — 

We,  the  properly  accredited  representatives  of  the 
newspapers  and  magazines  of  the  United  States,  request 
in  the  interest  of  the  people  of  the  United  States  that  we 
shall  be  afforded  in  the  coming  negotiations  with  the 
enemy  delegates: 

First: — Full  and  complete  opportunity  to  witness  and 
record  the  initial  meeting  betvveen  the  representatives  of 
the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers  and  enemy  delegates  at 
Versailles. 

Second: — That  we  shall  be  afforded  opportunity  to 
confer  from  time  to  time  with  the  spokesmen  of  the 
German  delegation  in  order  that  we  may  be  able  to  secure 
their  viewpoint  on  the  peace  negotiations  to  present  it  to 
the  American  public  properly  unbiased  and  analyzed 
from  the  standpoint  of  patriotic  American  citizens. 

We  respectfully  point  out  to  the  Honorables  of  the 
American  Commission  that  from  the  standpoint  of  the 
Allied  interests,  and  from  the  standpoint  of  equity  and 
fairness,  it  is  far  more  to  be  desired  that  this  news  shall  be 
handled  from  Paris  where  the  sympathy  is  entirely  with 
the  Allied  and  Associated  cause,  rather  than  through 
Berlin  and  neutral  countries  where  there  is  always  danger 
that  the  versions  made  public  will  be  garbled  to  suit  the 
German  viewpoint. 

[Signed]  William  Allen  White,  Chairman, 
Alice  Riggs  Hunt,  Secretary. 


Document  7. 

Preliminary  French  plan  of  procedure  (type- 
written translation)  for  the  Peace  Conference 
with  letters  of  transmission  from  Ambassador 
Jusserand,  November  29,  1918,  to  the  State 
Department  (typewritten  translation),  and 
from  Frank  L.  Polk,  Counsellor  of  the  State 
Department,  December  2,  1918,  to  President 
Wilson  (autographed  original). 

THE  COUNSELOR 

FOR   THE    DEPARTMENT    OF   STATE 

WASHINGTON 

December  2,  1918. 
My  dear  Mr.  President: 

The  French  Ambassador  brought  in  on  Saturday  the 
enclosed  letter  and  the  attached  study  of  the  procedure  of 
the  Peace  Conference.  He  was  very  anxious  that  this 
should  reach  you  as  soon  as  possible,  in  order  to  get  your 
views. 

I  told  him  you  would  probably  not  have  an  opportunity 
to  take  this  up  until  you  were  at  sea,  as  you  were  so 
rushed,  and  if  you  desired  to  make  any  observations, 
they  could  be  then  sent  to  the  French  Government  by 
wireless. 

Yours  faithfully, 

[Signed]  Frank  L.  Polk. 

Enclosure. 
The  President, 
The  White  House. 

65 


56  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLE^tENT 

( Translation) 

Embassy  of  the  French  Republic  to  the  United 

States. 

Washington,  November  29,  1918. 
Mr.  Secretary  of  State: 

My  Government  has  just  informed  me  that,  with  a 
view  to  expediting  the  peace  preUminaries,  which  any 
way  can  not  be  actually  determined  until  after  the  arrival 
in  Paris  of  the  President  of  the  United  States,  it  had 
taken  up  a  preliminary  study  of  the  various  problems 
bearing  upon  that  very  important  question. 

In  compliance  with  the  instructions  I  have  received, 
I  have  the  honor  to  communicate  herewith  to  Your 
Excellency  a  statement  of  the  results  of  that  examina- 
tion. My  Government  would  be  glad  to  know  whether 
the  plan  of  studies  suggested  by  it,  and  the  principles 
upon  which  they  rest,  meet  with  the  general  approval  of 
the  American  Government.  It  would  be  also  very 
desirous  of  being  informed  of  all  the  remarks  which  you 
might  see  fit  to  offer. 

Be  pleased  to  accept,  etc., 

Jusserand. 
His  Excellency 

The  Honorable  Robert  Lansing, 
Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  States. 
Di-s  jsm/mvd 

( Translation) 
Enclosure 

The  French  Government  upon  examination  of  the  pre- 
cedents of  the  Congresses  of  Vienna  1814-1815,  Paris, 
1856,  and  Berlin,  1878,  has  taken  up  the  various  problems 
raised  by  the  determination  of  the  peace  preliminaries 
and  the  establishment  of  the  general  peace  treaty  by  the 
Congress  which  is  to  meet  at  Versailles. 

The  arrival  of  President  Wilson  in  Paris  in  the  middle 
of  December  will  enable  the  four  Great  Powers  to  agree 
among  themselves  upon  the  conditions  of  the  peace  pre- 


FRENCH  PLAN  OF  PROCEDURE  51 

liminaries  to  be  imposed  severally  on  the  enemy  without 
any  discussion  with  him. 

The  examination  will  first  apply  to  Germany  and 
Bulgaria,  with  which  it  is  to  our  interest  to  negotiate  at 
once  in  order  to  promote  on  the  one  hand  the  disassocia- 
tion  of  the  countries  which  compose  the  first  named :  and 
on  the  other  hand,  as  to  the  second  country,  avoid  the 
dangerous  Bulgarian  intrigues  at  home  and  abroad. 

The  peace  preliminaries  with  Germany  will  further- 
more shape  the  way  for  the  settlement  of  the  main  terri- 
torial restorations:  Alsace-Lorraine,  Poland,  the  Slav 
countries,  Belgium,  Luxembourg,  the  cession  of  the  Ger- 
man colonies,  the  full  recognition  of  the  protectorates  of 
France  over  Morocco  and  of  England  over  Egypt,  the 
provisional  acceptance  of  the  Constitution  of  new  in- 
dependent states  out  of  the  territories  of  the  former 
Russian  and  Austro-Hungarian  empires,  as  well  as  the 
conclusion  of  the  treaties  signed  among  the  Allies  with 
Bulgaria ;  and  about  Turkey,  the  abrogation  of  the  Brest- 
Litovsk  and  Bucharest  treaties,  and  of  all  the  previous 
conventions  with  Russia  and  Roumania. 

The  speedy  establishment  of  peace  preliminaries  with 
Germany  raises  the  question  of  a  future  regime.  Even 
now  one  may  notice  the  antagonism  of  the  Centralist 
tendency,  which  was  that  of  the  Hohenzollern  Prussian 
Administration,  the  National  Liberals  and  the  Socialists, 
to  the  Federalist  tendency  (represented  by  the  dynasty 
and  administration  of  the  secondary  states  and  by  the 
deputies  to  the  Reichstag).  We  are  interested  in  favor- 
ing Federalism  and  furnishing  it  with  a  basis  by  elections 
held  under  universal  suffrage  by  promoting  the  mani- 
festation of  variances  through  the  clauses  of  the  treaty. 
Indeed,  we  can  not  negotiate  except  with  a  Constituent 
Assembly  freely  elected  by  universal,  secret,  and  direct 
suffrage. 

The  peace  preliminaries  with  Bulgaria  will  likewise 
define  the  main  lines  of  the  respective  territorial  status 
of  the  Bulgarian  countries. 

The  question  of  peace  preliminaries  with  the  other  two 
enemy  powers  presents  itself  in  a  different  aspect.     With 


58  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

respect  to  Austria-Hungary  it  is  not  even  existent,  since 
that  Power  has  disappeared ;  it  will  then  be  within  the 
jDi'ovince  of  Congress  to  admit  de  piano  the  two  Jiew 
states  that  have  already  been  recognized:  the  Czecho- 
slovaks and  Poland,  and  to  listen  to  the  claims  of  the 
Jugo-Slav  state  now  forming.  As  for  the  country  of  the 
Magyars  (formerly  Hungary  stripped  of  the  Slovaks, 
Roumanians  of  Transylvania,  and  Croatians)  and  Austria 
(German),  the  objections  of  [blank  in  the  text]  growing 
out  of  their  interpretations  suggest  exclusion. 

The  same,  of  course,  applies  a  fortiori  to  Turkey  whose 
complete  reorganization,  accompanied  by  intervention 
in  her  internal  regime  (which  on  principle  is  barred  with 
respect  to  other  states),  is  worthy  of  consideration.  It 
seems  preferable  to  leave  to  the  Congress  the  discussion 
of  the  fate  of  those  nationalities,  for  if  peace  preliminaries 
were  signed  with  them,  it  w^ould  be  tantamount  to  pledg- 
ing ourselves  at  once  to  maintain  the  Ottoman  Empire, 
that  is  to  say,  a  rule  which  for  a  century  has  perpetrated 
its  abuses,  crimes,  and  causes  of  discussion  among  the 
great  civilized  states.  Furthermore,  w^here  could  the 
power  authorized  to  ratify  in  the  name  of  Turkey  be 
found?  Is  it  not  better  that  the  Allies  should  determine 
the  fate  of  the  territories  lying  within  the  former  Ottoman 
Empire  without  the  encumbrance  of  negotiations  with 
that  Empire.'^ 

After  reaching  an  agreement  as  to  the  peace  prelimi- 
naries, the  representatives  of  the  Great  Powers  will  have 
to  come  to  an  agreement  on  the  principles  of  the  represen- 
tation of  the  several  belligerent,  neutral,  and  enemy 
states  at  the  Peace  Congress.  They  will  take  up  seriatim 
the  cases  of  the  actual  and  theoretical  belligerents,  the 
newly  recognized  states,  and  the  states  in  formation, 
the  former  Allies  who  have  concluded  treaties  with  the 
enemy  but  whose  treaties  have  not  been  recognized  by 
us  (Russia  and  Roumania),  the  neutrals  and  the  enemies. 
Among  the  belligerents  it  will  be  proper  to  distinguish 
in  respect  of  the  number  of  plenipotentiaries  and  of  ad- 
mission to  the  sessions  as  between  the  small  and  the  great 
powers.     The  great  victorious  powers  alone  will  attend 


FRENCH  PLAN  OF  PROCEDURE  59 

all  its  sessions,  the  small  powers  being  called  only  to 
sessions  designated  for  their  special  affairs.  As  for  the 
neutrals  and  states  in  formation,  they  may  be  called  when 
their  own  interests  are  at  stake. 

The  number  of  plenipotentiaries  will  be  limited  to  avoid 
congestion  and  confusion  in  the  debates ;  the  Great  Powers 
may  designate  from  three  to  five  plenipotentiaries,  the 
small  powers  from  one  to  two,  the  neutral  and  forming 
states  only  one.  As  the  decisions  are  to  be  taken  by  a 
majority  vote,  and  as  the  representation  of  a  state  is  but 
one  unit,  it  is  not  necessary  that  any  state  should  have  as 
many  representatives  as  a  power  of  the  same  category, 
as  provided  by  the  precedents  of  the  Congresses  of  the 
nineteenth  century:  each  state  may  freely  choose  the 
number  of  its  delegates  within  the  limits  above  cited. 

It  seems  that  the  labors  of  the  Congress  should  be 
divided  into  two  main  series:  the  settlement  of  the  war 
properly  so-called,  and  the  organization  of  the  Society 
of  Nations.  The  examination  of  the  second  question  no 
doubt  calls  for  the  settlement  of  the  first.  Furthermore, 
the  settlement  of  the  concrete  questions  should  not  be 
confounded  with  the  enforcement  of  the  stipulation  of 
general  public  law.  Besides,  that  distinction  is  made 
necessary  by  the  fact  that  the  enemy  has  no  right  to 
discuss  the  terms  that  will  be  imposed  upon  him  by  the 
victors,  and  that  the  neutrals  will  only  be  called  in  ex- 
ceptional cases  to  attend  the  sessions  where  the  belliger- 
ents will  fix  the  peace  terms,  while  all  the  peoples,  whether 
belligerents,  neutrals  or  enemies,  will  be  called  to  discuss 
and  take  part  in  the  principle  of  the  Society  of  Nations. 

On  the  contrary  those  principles  of  President  Woodrow 
Wilson's  which  are  not  sufiiciently  defined  in  their  char- 
acter to  be  taken  as  a  basis  for  a  concrete  settlement  of 
the  war,  even  if  appealed  to  as  they  have  been  admitted 
by  the  Allies,  will  resume  their  full  strength  in  the  matter 
of  the  future  settlement  of  public  law,  and  this  will  remove 
one  of  the  difficulties  that  might  obstruct  the  Allies. 

The  procedure  of  the  Congress  will  also  be  determined 
at  the  preliminary  meetings  in  the  second  half  of  De- 
cember: Election  of  the  President,  appointment  of  the 


60  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

secretarial  forces  (charged  with  the  duties  of  drawing  the 
protocols,  filing  the  archives,  preparing  daily  communi- 
ques, provide  for  the  administrative  organization  of  the 
Congress  and  the  regular  operation  of  the  services) 
motions  in  writing  read  at  the  previous  session  discussed 
jointly  (so  as  to  bring  about  an  agreement  on  the  principle 
and  afterwards  work  out  the  details)  printing  of  the  proto- 
cols, organization  of  a  drafting  committee,  etc. 

The  programme  of  the  labors  will  then  be  determined, 
for  in  all  the  previous  Congresses  the  stipulations  of  a 
treaty  (the  Paris  Treaty  of  May  30,  1814  at  the  Vienna 
Congress;  the  protocol  signed  at  Vienna  on  February  1, 
1854  at  the  Paris  Congress;  the  treaty  of  San  Stefano 
signed  March  3,  1878  at  the  Berlin  Congress),  has  served 
as  a  basis  while  the  Congress  of  1919  has  no  fixed  basis 
before  it;  indeed  neither  the  four  armistices  signed  with 
Bulgaria,  Austria-Hungary,  Turkey  and  Germany,  nor 
the  answer  of  the  Allies  of  January  10,  1917,  jointly 
making  known  their  war  aims  to  President  Wilson, 
nor  the  President's  fourteen  propositions  which  are 
principles  of  public  law  can  furnish  a  concrete  basis  for 
the  labors  of  the  Congress. 

That  basis  can  only  be  a  methodical  statement  of  the 
questions  to  be  taken  up  which  may  be  classified  as 
follows : 

First — Settlement  of  the  War 

A.  Political  stipulations. 

1.  New  States:  a.  already  recognized  (Bohemia). 

b.  Being  formed  (Jugo-Slavia,  Russian  States, 
etc.). 

2.  Territorial    questions:    restitution    of    territories. 
Neutralization  for  protection  purposes. 

a.  Alsace-Lorraine  (8th  Wilson  proposition). 

b.  Belgium  (7th  Wilson  proposition). 

c.  Italy  (9th  Wilson  proposition). 

d.  Boundary    lines    (France,    Belgium,    Serbia, 

Roumania,  etc.). 

e.  International  regime  of  means  of  transporta- 

tion, rivers,  railways,  canals,  harbors. 


FRENCH  PLAN  OF  PROCEDURE  61 

3.  Eastern  Questions  (12th  Wilson  proposition). 

4.  Colonies  (5th  Wilson  proposition). 

5.  Far  East. 

B.  MiHtary  and  Naval  stipulations.  Military  guar- 
antees on  land  and  at  sea.  Number  of  effectives,  dis- 
mantling of  fortifications,  reduction  of  war  manufactures, 
territorial  occupation. 

C.  Indemnities  stipulations:  reparation  for  war  damage 
on  land  and  at  sea,  restitution,  reconstruction,  compensa- 
tion in  kind,  reimbursement  of  expenses  unlawfully  im- 
posed.    "(C.R.B.)" 

D.  Economic  and  financial  stipulations :  raw  materials, 
economic  systems,  settlement  of  accounts. 

E.  Stipulations  of  private  law:  settlement  of  private 
debts,  liquidation  of  sequestrated  property. 

F.  Punishments  to  be  inflicted  on  account  of  acts  of 
violence  and  crimes  committed  during  the  war  in  violation 
of  public  law. 

G.  Stipulations  of  a  moral  character:  Recognition  by 
Germany  of  the  responsibility  and  premeditation  of  her 
rulers  justifying  the  measures  of  penalization  and  pre- 
caution taken  against  her.  Solemn  disavowal  of  the 
breaches  of  international  law  and  of  the  crimes  against 
humanity. 

H.  Restoration  of  the  conventional  regime  broken  by 
the  war. 

Second — Organization  of  the  Society  of  Nations. 

A.  Stipulations  of  general  public  law. 

B.  Guarantees  and  Penalties. 

C.  Freedom  of  the  seas  (2nd  Wilson  proposition). 

D.  International  economic  regime  (3rd  Wilson  propo- 
sition) . 

E.  Publication  of  the  treaties  (1st  Wilson  proposition). 

F.  Limitation  of  armaments  (4th  Wilson  proposition). 

G.  International  arbitral  organization  of  the  Hague. 
H.  Society  of  Nations. 

The  programme  of  labors  being  thus  defined,  there 
would  be  left  only  to  make  a  logical  distribution  deter- 
mining their  order  and  the  conditions  under  which  com- 


62  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

missions  should  study  them  as  to  territorial  and  poHtical 
affairs  and  Committees  as  to  general  international  questions. 

A.  Commissions. 

1.  Polish  affairs. 

2.  Russian  affairs. 

3.  Baltic  nationalities. 

4.  States  sprung  from  former  Austria-Hungary. 

5.  Balkan  affairs. 

6.  Eastern  affairs. 

7.  Affairs  of  the  Far  East  and  the  Pacific. 

B.  Committees. 

1.  Committee  on  Jewish  affairs. 

2.  Committee  on  the  international  river  navigation 
(Rhine,  Danube,  Scheldt,  Elbe)  practice  of  the 
society  of  nations. 

3.  Committee  on  international  railways  (railways 
of  the  45th  parallel  from  the  Adriatic  to  the  Baltic, 
Bagdad  trans-African  railways  from  Capetow^n  to 
Cairo  and  from  Capetown  to  Algiers). 

4.  Committee  on  public  law  (free  determination  of 
the  peoples  combined  with  the  rights  of  the 
ethnical  and  religious  minorities). 

5.  Committee  on  international  labor  legislation 
(a  very  important  question,  the  initiative,  man- 
agement and  settlement  of  which  must  be  left 
to  the  Socialists). 

6.  Committee  on  law  relative  to  patents  and  trade- 
marks. 

7.  Committee  on  punishment  for  crimes  committed 
during  the  war. 

It  may  be  remarked  that  a  certain  number  of  the 
questions  that  are  raised  have  to  be  settled  directly 
amongst  the  great  powers  without  calling  upon  any 
committee  to  discuss  them;  this  also  applies  to  colo- 
nial affairs  which  essentially  concern  England  and  France. 
It  also  applies  to  indemnities,  for  outside  of  the  tor- 
pedoing from  which  the  British  fleet  mainly  suffered, 
Belgium  and  France  alone  are  entitled  to  indemnities  on 
account  of  the  systematic  devastation  suffered  by  them. 


FRENCH  PLAN  OF  PROCEDURE  63 

(The  states  which  have  become  independent  and  those 
which  have  secured  considerable  territorial  enlargement 
would  have  but  a  slight  claim  to  indemnities.)  It  also 
applies  to  economic  and  financial  stipulations,  the  amount 
of  which  will  be  determined  by  the  great  powers  but  the 
mode  of  payment  of  which  alone  will  be  discussed  by  the 
peace  treaty. 

The  Congress  finally  could  place  itself  as  has  sometimes 
been  done  in  the  past  under  the  invocation  of  some  of  the 
great  principles  leading  to  justice,  morals  and  liberty, 
which  would  be  proclaimed  at  its  very  opening  and  even 
before  fixing  the  procedure  (concerning  which  an  un- 
official agreement  only  would  have  been  reached) :  right  of 
self-determination  of  the  peoples,  right  of  the  minorities, 
suspension  of  all  previous  special  agreements  arrived  at  by 
some  of  the  Allies  only,  with  a  view  to  the  fullest  freedom 
of  the  examination  by  the  Congress,  declaration  that  the 
metropolitan  and  colonial  territory  held  by  the  Allies  on 
August  1,1914,  shall  not  be  touched,  solemn  repudiation  of 
all  the  violations  of  international  law  and  of  humane 
principles  and  disqualification  of  enemy  delegates  who 
have  signed  violated  instruments  or  are  personally 
guilty  of  violations  of  the  law  of  nations  or  of  the  crimes 
against  humanity. 

The  foregoing  sums  up  the  plan  of  study  and  the 
principles  suggested  by  the  French  Government. 


PART  III 
THE  LEAGUE  AND  THE  PEACE 


Document  8. 

The  "Phillimore  Report"  of  March  20,  1918, 
to  the  British  Cabinet  regarding  the  organization 
of  a  League  of  Nations.  The  basic  document 
used  by  President  Wilson  in  the  preparation  of 
his  Covenant  (printed). 

Confidential. 
[53848/W.  39] 

This  Interim  Report  of  Sir  Walter  Phillimore's  Committee 
is  circulated  to  the  War  Cabinet  for  their  considera- 
tion. It  is  suggested  that  a  copy  should  be  sent  to 
President  Wilson  confidentially,  so  that  if  he  thinks 
right  he  may  have  it  considered  by  an  American  expert 
committee.  Copies  should  perhaps  also  be  sent  to 
the  Dominions  in  view  of  the  approaching  conference. 

Robert  Cecil. 

The  Committee  on  the  League  of  Nations 

The  Right  Hon.  Sir  Walter  G.  F.  Phillimore,  Bart.,  P.  C. 

{Chairman) . 
Professor  A.  F.  Pollard,  M.  A. 
Sir  Julian  S.  Corbett. 
Dr.  J.  Holland  Rose,  Litt.  D. 
Sir  Eyre  Crowe,  K.  C.  M.  G. 
Sir  William  Tyrrell,  K.  C.  M.  G. 
Mr.  C.  J.  B.  Hurst,  K.  C,  C.  B. 

Mr.  A.  R.  Kennedy  {Secretary). 

Interim  Report 

To  THE  Right  Hon.  A.  J.  Balfour,  P.  C,  O.  M.  «&c.,  «&;c. 
Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs. 

March  20,  1918. 
1.  We  had  the  honour  to  be  appointed  by  you  as  a 
Committee  to  enquire  particularly  from  a  juridical  and 

67 


(J8  WOODROW  WILSON  .\ND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

historical  point  of  view  into  the  various  schemes  for 
estabhshing  by  means  of  a  League  of  Nations,  or  other 
device,  some  alternative  to  war  as  a  means  of  settling 
international  disputes,  to  report  on  their  practicability, 
to  suggest  amendments,  or  to  elaborate  a  further  scheme 
if  on  consideration  it  should  be  deemed  possible  and  expe- 
dient, and  to  report  to  you  the  result  of  our  deliberations. 

2.  AYe  have  held  nine  meetings  in  which  our  attention 
has  been  directed  mainly  to  the  various  proposals  for  a 
League  of  Nations  which  were  formulated  in  the  16th  and 
17th  centuries  and  to  those  which  have  been  put  forward 
since  the  recent  revival  of  the  movement. 

3.  With  regard  to  other  methods  of  international 
combinations  for  avoiding  war  which  were  actually 
attempted  during  the  19th  century,  we  have  not  completed 
our  investigation,  and  without  further  inquiry  into  past 
political  experience  we  would  offer  no  opinion  as  to 
whether  a  modification  of  those  methods  or  a  formal 
League  of  Nations  is  the  more  promising  means  of  secur- 
ing the  end  in  view. 

4.  The  earlier  projects  which  aimed  at  setting  up  a  kind 
of  European  Confederation  with  a  supernational  authority 
we  have  after  consideration  rejected,  feeling  that  inter- 
national opinion  is  not  ripe  for  so  drastic  a  pooling  of 
sovereignty,  and  that  the  only  feasible  method  of  securing 
the  object  is  by  way  of  co-operation  or  possibly  a  treaty  of 
alliance  on  the  lines  of  the  more  recent  schemes. 

5.  We  have  accordingly  carefully  considered  those 
schemes,  all  of  which  substitute,  in  place  of  the  earlier 
idea  of  confederation,  a  system  working  by  means  of  a 
permanent  conference  and  an  arbitral  tribunal.  None 
of  them,  however,  in  their  entirety  appear  to  your  Com- 
mittee to  be  practicable  or  likely  to  meet  with  acceptance. 
We  have  therefore  drafted  a  Convention  in  which,  while 
embodying  their  leading  ideas,  we  have  endeavored  to 
avoid  their  more  obvious  stumbling  blocks. 

6.  On  the  assumption  that  a  League  of  Nations  may  be 
regarded  as  a  possible  solution  of  the  problem,  we  now 
submit  this  draft  as  the  best  we  have  been  able  to  devise, 
to  serve  as  a  basis  for  an  interchange  of  views.     In  mak- 


"PHILLIMORE  PLAN"  FOR  A  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS       (J9 

ing  it  the  subject  of  an  Interim  Report  we  have  been 
influenced  by  the  consideration  that  His  Majesty's 
Government  may  regard  it  as  desirable  to  initiate  such 
an  interchange  of  views  before  the  termination  of  the 
war. 

7.  The  primary  object  of  the  proposed  alUance  will  be 
that  whatever  happens  peace  shall  be  preserved  between 
members  of  the  alliance.  The  secondary  object  will  be 
the  provision  of  means  for  disposing  of  disputes  which 
may  arise  between  the  members  of  the  alliance.  Our 
draft  treaty,  therefore,  divides  itself  into  four  parts: 
Articles  1  and  2,  which  stand  very  much  by  themselves, 
are  to  provide  for  the  avoidance  of  war;  Articles  3  to  12, 
for  the  pacific  settlement  of  international  disputes; 
Articles  13  to  17,  for  the  relations  between  the  allied 
States  and  States  not  party  to  the  Convention;  while 
Article  18  provides  that  this  treaty  shall  override  all 
others. 

8.  The  mutual  covenant  not  to  go  to  war  is  contained 
in  Article  1.  We  have  not  covered  all  cases.  We  have 
provided  that  no  State  shall  go  to  war  without  previously 
submitting  the  matter  to  arbitration  or  to  the  Conference 
of  the  League,  nor  while  the  discussion  is  pending  in 
debate,  nor  shall  seek  any  further  satisfaction  than  that 
which  the  award  or  the  recommendation  of  the  Conference 
requires.  This  leaves  untouched  the  case  in  which  the 
Conference  can  make  no  recommendation,  but  we  are  in 
great  hope  that  this  event  will  be  rare.  There  wull  be 
every  inducement  to  the  Conference  to  find  a  mode  of 
escaping  from  war,  and,  at  any  rate,  the  time  will  be  so 
long  drawn  out  that  passions  will  have  cooled.  The  other 
case  omitted  is  when  a  State  that  has  given  cause  of 
offense  refuses  to  abide  by  the  award  or  the  recommenda- 
tion of  the  Conference.  It  might  be  suggested  that  in 
this  case  the  whole  power  of  the  League  should  be  used 
to  enforce  submission,  but  we  have  felt  a  doubt  whether 
States  would  contract  to  do  this,  and  a  still  greater  doubt 
whether,  when  the  time  came,  they  would  fulfil  their 
contract.  Most  of  the  writers  on  this  subject  have  hesi- 
tated to  recommend  such  a  provision. 


70       ^^ooDRo^v  wilson  and  world  settleivient 

9.  It  will  be  noted  that  the  proposed  moratorium  only 
extends  to  actual  warfare.  Some  writers  have  suggested 
that  there  should  be  no  warlike  preparations  during  the 
period.     We  have  rejected  this 

(a)  because  it  would  be  difficult  to  ascertain  what  were 
special  warlike  preparations; 

(6)  because  we  would  designedly  give  an  opportunity  to 
the  most  peaceful  State  which  had  not  kept  its 
armaments  up  to  a  high  pitch  to  improve  them 
during  the  period  of  the  moratorium,  in  this  way 
discounting  to  some  extent  the  advantages  which 
a  State  which  kept  up  excessive  armaments 
would  otherwise  have  had. 

10.  Article  2  contains  the  sanction  proposed.  We  have 
desired  to  make  it  as  weighty  as  possible.  We  have, 
therefore,  made  it  unanimous  and  automatic,  and  one  to 
which  each  State  must  contribute  its  force  without  wait- 
ing for  the  others,  but  w^e  have  recognized  that  some  States 
may  not  be  able  to  make,  at  any  rate  in  certain  cases,  an 
effective  contribution  of  military  or  naval  force.  We 
have  accordingly  provided  that  such  States  shall  at  the 
least  take  the  financial,  economic,  and  other  measures  in- 
dicated in  the  Article. 

11.  Article  3  is  adapted  from  Article  38  of  The  Hague 
Convention  for  the  Pacific  Settlement  of  International 
Disputes,  1907. 

12.  Article  4  expands  an  idea,  the  germ  of  which  appears 
in  Article  48  of  the  same  Covention ;  it  gives  the  power  to  a 
State  to  apply  ex  parte  to  the  Conference  of  the  Allied 
States.  Reference  to  arbitration  requires  the  consent  of 
both  parties,  but  this  provision  will  enable  any  one 
State,  party  to  the  dispute,  to  bring  its  case  before  the 
Conference  even  if  the  other  State  is  not  willing.  We 
have  been  careful  to  remember  that  there  will  be  much 
jealousy,  particularly  among  the  continental  Powers  of 
Europe,  of  any  provision  which  will  appear  to  infringe 
their  independence  or  sovereignty,  and  therefore  we  do 
not  give  the  Conference,  thus  appealed  to,  any  power  of 
adjudication,  but  only  one  of  recommendation. 

13.  Article  5. — ^It  is  in  our  view  desirable  that  if  the 


"PHILLIMORE  PLAN"  FOR  A  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS       71 

Conference  be  appealed  to  it  shall  not  fail  to  act,  and,  as 
in  cases  which  will  come  under  Article  12  speedy  action 
would  be  required,  we  have  made  the  assembly  of  the 
Conference  as  it  were  automatic.  It  must  be  a  matter  for 
diplomatic  determination  to  settle  its  seat.  If  the  League 
should  be  in  the  first  place  confined  to  the  present  Allies, 
a  convenient  seat  might  be  Versailles.  If  the  League 
should  embrace  a  number  of  States,  and  some  of  those  at 
present  neutral,  it  might  be  better  to  place  the  seat  in 
Holland  or  Switzerland,  or  possibly  in  Belgium;  but  it 
should  be  a  fixed  place,  and  in  this  connection  we  have 
been  much  impressed  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Sir  Maurice 
Hankey's  memorandum  and  address  to  us,  in  which  he 
pointed  out  the  great  advantage  arising  from  constant  mu- 
tual intercourse  between  the  representatives  of  nations,  and 
we  therefore  propose  that,  subject  to  the  power  of  substitu- 
tion or  addition,  the  ordinary  diplomatic  representatives 
at  the  capital  which  is  the  seat  of  the  Conference  should 
represent  their  respective  States. 

14.  The  next  questions  which  enter  into  consideration  in 
Articles  7,  10,  11,  and  12  are  whether  the  decisions  of 
the  Conference  must  be  unanimous,  and  whether,  if  any 
resolutions  may  be  passed  by  a  majority,  the  voting 
strength  of  the  States  should  differ.  We  have  concluded 
to  eliminate  the  States  parties  to  the  dispute,  but  the 
precedents  in  favour  of  unanimity  are  so  invariable  that 
we  have  not  seen  our  way  to  give  power  to  a  majority,  or 
even  a  preponderant  majority,  to  issue  a  definite  recom- 
mendation, though  we  are  aware  that  many  English 
writers  express  themselves  in  a  contrary  sense.  On  the 
other  hand,  we  have  felt  that  for  all  preliminary  work  the 
vote  of  a  majority  should  be  sufficient.  We  may  add 
that  we  have  been  rather  loath  to  frame  a  scheme  under 
which  our  own  country  should  be  rendered  liable  to  have  a 
recommendation  passed  against  it  by  a  majority  vote 
in  a  matter  vitally  affecting  the  national  interests,  and 
that  we  have  also  felt  that  if  some  of  the  enemy  Powers  are 
even  to  come  into  this  League  they  would  equally  be 
unwilling  to  submit  themselves  to  such  a  liability.  As  to 
the   question  of  the  voting  strength   in  cases  where  a 


72       wooDROw  ^^^xsoN  and  world  settlement 

majority  is  to  determine,  most  English  and  American 
writers  have  contemplated  giving  a  larger  vote  to  the 
more  important  Powers,  and  there  are  precedents,  such  as 
the  General  Postal  Union  Treaty  of  1878  and  the  Tele- 
graphic Convention  of  1897,  for  giving  to  those  Powers 
which  have  important  colonial  possessions  additional 
votes  in  respect  of  their  colonies;  but  the  experience 
obtained  during  The  Hague  Conference  of  1907  shows 
that  any  such  superiority  would  be  greatly  resented  by 
some  States,  and  we  have  shrunk  from  providing  it. 

15.  Article  11,  as  it  will  be  seen,  is  expressed  in  an 
alternative  form.  The  first  alternative  is  that  which 
commended  itself  to  the  majority  of  the  Committee. 

16.  Article  12  is  a  substitutional  provision  for  that 
power  of  injunction  which  has  been  recommended  by 
many  English  and  American  writers.  It  has  been  felt 
that  if  there  is  to  be  a  moratorium,  there  may  be  cases 
of  continuing  or  irreparable  injury  to  which  the  injured 
State  cannot  be  expected  to  submit.  In  order  to  meet 
this  difficulty  these  writers  have  taken  an  idea  from  the 
legal  procedure  common  to  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States.  But  in  applying  this  procedure  to  international 
matters  the  following  objections  seem  to  arise: — 

(a)  If  final  awards  or  recommendations  are  not  to  be 

the  subject  of  enforcement  by  the  League,  it 
would  seem  illogical  that  interlocutory  awards  or 
recommendations  should  be  so  enforced. 

(b)  The  aggressive  State  would  certainly  resent  such  an 

infringement  of  its  sovereignty  and  struggle  to 
prevent  the  use  of  an  injunction,  and  the  proceed- 
ing would  almost  necessarily  be  so  prolonged, 
particularly  if  the  injunction  is  to  be  the  work  of 
the  whole  Conference,  that  the  interlocutory 
decision  would  hardly  be  reached  sooner  than 
the  final  one,  and  the  mischief  would  have  been 
done; 

(c)  It  may  be  added  that  such  knowledge  as  any  of  the 

members  of  the  Committee  have  of  such  foreign 
jurisprudence  as  is  founded  on  the  Code  de 
Napoleon,   leads   them   to   doubt   whether   the 


"PHILLIMORE  PLAN"  FOR  A  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS       73 

procedure  which  most  nearly  approaches  to  the 
Anglo-American  injunction  has  received  the 
same  development  or  occupies  the  same  position 
of  importance  which  it  has  with  us. 

17.  The  Committee  have,  therefore,  rejected  the  idea  of 
injunction,  and  submit  this  Article  as  a  corrective  for 
hardship  which  might  otherwise  be  worked  by  the  mora- 
torium. 

18.  Article  15  requires  some  observation.  The  scheme 
of  the  British  League  of  Nations  Society  makes  the 
League  a  defensive  alliance  as  against  external  Powers, 
and  requires  all  the  other  Allied  States  to  come  to  the 
assistance  of  any  one  of  them  "which  may  be  attacked  by 
an  outside  Power  which  refuses  to  submit  the  case  to  an 
appropriate  tribunal  or  council";  but  the  American 
League  to  Enforce  Peace  has  omitted  this  provision,  and 
only  one  known  American  speaker  or  writer  has  taken  the 
line  of  the  British  League.  We  have  felt,  therefore,  that 
our  draft  treaty  might  provoke  opposition  if  we  inserted 
a  clause  obliging  the  Allies  to  mutual  defense  against  ex- 
ternal Powers,  and  we  have  substituted  one  which  is 
facultative  only. 

19.  Under  Article  17  we  might  draw  attention  to  the 
suggestion  that  when  the  League  is  once  formed  any 
future  applicant  for  admission  may  have  terms  imposed 
upon  him.  This  would  enable  the  League  to  require 
reparation  for  past  outrages,  or  to  insist  upon  partial 
disarmament  if  the  military  or  naval  forces  of  the  appli- 
cant were  disproportionate  to  those  of  the  States  already 
in  the  League. 

[Signed]  Walter  G.  F.  Phillimore  (Chairman). 
A.  F.  Pollard. 
Julian  Corbett. 
J.  Holland  Rose. 
Eyre  A.  Crowe. 
W.  Tyrrell. 
C.  J.  B.  Hurst. 
A.  R.  Kennedy  (Secretary). 

March  20,  1918. 


74  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

Annex. 
draft  convention. 

[There  will  be  a  Preamble  reciting  that  the  object  of  this 
Convention  is  to  create  a  League  of  Nations  which 
will,  if  possible,  prevent  all  wars  in  the  future.] 

Avoidance  of  War. 

Article  1. — Each  of  the  Allied  States  (being  the 
parties  to  this  Convention)  agrees  with  the  other  Allied 
States  collectively  and  separately  that  it  will  not  go  to 
war  with  another  of  the  Allied  States — 

(a)  without  previously  submitting  the  matter  in  dis- 
pute to  arbitration  or  to  a  Conference  of  the 
Allied  States ;  and 
(6)  until  there  has  been  an  award  or  a  report  by  the 
Conference,  provided  that  in  the  case  mentioned 
in  Article  12  the  observance  of  this  sub-clause 
is  suspended; 
and  also  that  it  will  not  go  to  war — 

(c)  with  another  of  the  x^llied  States  which  complies 
with  the  award  or  with  the  recommendation 
(if  any)  made  by  the  Conference  in  its  report. 
Article  2. — ^If,  which  may  God  avert,  one  of  the  Allied 
States  should  break  the  covenant  contained  in  the  pre- 
ceding Article,  this  State  will  become  ipso  facto  at  war 
with  all  the  other  Allied  States,  and  the  latter  agree  to 
take  and  to  support  each  other  in  taking  jointly  and 
severally  all  such  measures — military,  naval,  financial, 
and  economic — as  will  best  avail  for  restraining  the  breach 
of  covenant.  Such  financial  and  economic  measures 
shall  include  severance  of  all  relations  of  trade  and  finance 
with  the  subjects  of  the  covenant -breaking  State,  pro- 
hibition against  the  subjects  of  the  Allied  States  entering 
into  any  relations  with  the  subjects  of  the  covenant- 
breaking  State,  and  the  prevention,  so  far  as  possible, 
of  the  subjects  of  the  covenant-breaking  State  from  having 
any  commercial  or  financial  intercourse  with  the  subjects 
of  any  other  State  whether  party  to  this  Convention  or  not. 


"PHILLIMORE  PLAN"  FOR  A  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS       75 

For  the  purpose  of  this  Article,  the  Allied  States  shall 
detain  any  ship  or  goods  belonging  to  any  of  the  subjects 
of  the  covenant-breaking  State  or  coming  from  or  destined 
for  any  person  residing  in  the  territory  of  such  state,  and 
shall  take  any  other  similar  steps  which  shall  be  necessary 
for  the  same  purpose. 

Such  of  the  Allied  States  (if  any)  as  cannot  make  an 
effective  contribution  of  military  or  naval  force  shall  at 
the  least  take  the  other  measures  indicated  in  this  Article. 

Pacific  Settlement  of  International  Disputes. 

Article  3. — ^If  a  dispute  should  hereafter  arise  between 
any  of  the  Allied  States  as  to  the  interpretation  of  a 
treaty,  as  to  any  question  of  international  law,  as  to  the 
existence  of  any  fact  which  if  established  would  constitute 
a  breach  of  any  international  obligation,  or  as  to  the 
nature  and  extent  of  the  reparation  to  be  made  for  any 
such  breach,  if  such  dispute  cannot  be  settled  by  negotia- 
tion, arbitration  is  recognized  by  the  Allied  States  as  the 
most  effective  and  at  the  same  time  the  most  equitable 
means  of  settling  the  dispute. 

Article  4. — But  if  the  Allied  States  concerned  do  not 
agree  that  the  dispute  is  suitable  for  reference  to  arbitra- 
tion or  do  not  agree  as  to  the  question  to  be  referred  or 
as  to  the  composition  of  the  tribunal  of  arbitration,  or 
if  for  any  other  reason  a  reference  to  arbitration  should 
prove  impracticable,  any  one  of  the  Allied  States  con- 
cerned may  make  application  to  the  Conference  of  the 
Allied  States  to  take  the  matter  of  the  dispute  into  con- 
sideration. 

Article  5. — ^The  seat  of  the  Conference  shall  be  at  X, 
the  convener  shall  be  the  Sovereign  or  President  of  the 
State  of  X,  and  his  representative  shall  be  president  of 
the  Conferences.  The  Allied  States  shall  be  represented 
at  the  Conference  by  their  diplomatic  representatives 
accredited  to  the  State  of  X.  In  the  event  of  X  being 
one  of  the  States  parties  to  the  dispute,  either  State  may 
communicate  with  the  Sovereign  or  President  of  Y,  who 
thereupon  shall  become  the  Convener  and  shall  fix  the 
seat  of  the  Conference  and  name  its  president. 


76  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

The  provisions  of  this  Article  shall  not  prejudice  the 
right  of  the  Allied  States  to  send  other  representatives  to 
the  Conference,  but  the  Conference  shall  be  under  no 
obligation  to  await  their  arrival. 

Article  6. — ^It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  convener  of  the 
Conference  to  give  notice  of  the  application  to  the  Con- 
ference to  every  State  party  to  the  dispute  and  to  summon 
the  Conference  as  speedily  as  possible. 

Article  7. — ^The  Conference  shall  regulate  its  own 
procedure,  and  may  appoint  Committees  to  enquire  and 
report.  In  all  matters  covered  by  this  Article  the  Con- 
ference may  decide  by  the  votes  of  a  majority  of  the 
Allied  States  represented. 

Article  8. — ^The  function  of  the  Conference  shall  be 
to  ascertain  the  facts  with  regard  to  the  dispute,  and  to 
make  a  recommendation  based  on  the  merits  of  the  case, 
and  calculated  to  ensure  a  just  and  lasting  settlement. 
The  recommendation  shall  not  have  the  force  of  a  decision. 

Article  9. — ^The  Allied  States  agree  to  place  at  the 
disposal  of  the  Conference,  or  of  any  Committee  appointed 
by  the  Conference,  to  the  fullest  possible  extent  com- 
patible with  their  interests,  the  information  in  their  pos- 
session which  bears  upon  the  dispute. 

Article  10. — ^The  recommendation  of  the  Conference 
shall  be  addressed  to  the  parties  to  the  dispute,  and  will 
not  require  their  assent. 

Article  11. — ^In  the  event  of  the  Conference  being 
unable  to  agree  upon  a  recommendation  to  be  addressed 
to  the  parties  to  the  dispute,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the 
representatives  of  such  of  the  Allied  States  attending 
the  Conference  as  shall  be  satisfied  as  to  the  nature  of 
the  recommendation  which  should  be  made — provided 
that  they  represent  not  less  than  a  majority  of  the  Allied 
States  attending  the  Conference — ^to  publish  on  behalf 
of  the  States  which  they  represent  a  statement  setting 
out  what  they  believe  to  be  the  facts  with  regard  to  the  dis- 
pute. They  may  also  add  thereto  the  text  of  the  recom- 
mendation which  they  consider  the  Conference  should 
have  addressed  to  the  parties  to  the  dispute. 

Alternative  Article  11. — If,  in  the  event  of  the  Con- 


"PHILLIMORE  PLAN"  FOR  A  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS       77 

ference  being  unable  to  agree  upon  a  recommendation 
to  be  addressed  to  the  parties  to  the  dispute,  any  State 
or  group  of  States  having  taken  part  in  the  Conference 
issues  a  pubUc  statement  of  the  view  which,  as  a  result 
of  the  deliberations  of  the  Conference,  it  takes  of  the 
dispute,  such  action  shall  not  be  regarded  as  an  unfriendly 
act  by  either  of  the  parties  to  the  dispute. 

Article  12. — ^Any  one  of  the  Allied  States  having  a  dis- 
pute pending  may  apply  to  the  Conference  to  be  relieved 
from  the  moratorium  imposed  by  Article  1  (6)  on  the 
ground  that  there  is  a  continuing  injury,  or  on  the  ground 
that  unless  some  prompt  provision  for  the  reparation  or 
restitution  is  made  the  injury  will  be  irreparable.  The 
Conference  shall,  without  deciding  in  any  way  upon  the 
merits  of  the  dispute,  forthwith  consider  this  applica- 
tion, and  may  relieve  the  applicant  state  from  the  pro- 
visions of  the  moratorium,  or  may  suggest  terms  of  tem- 
porary arrangement  as  a  condition  of  not  relieving  the 
applicant  State  from  the  moratorium,  and  may  from 
time  to  time '  reconsider  the  application  and  the  terms 
which  should  be  imposed.  In  the  event  of  relief  from  the 
provisions  of  the  moratorium  being  granted  under  this 
Article,  any  of  the  Allied  States  may,  notwithstanding 
the  provisions  of  Article  1,  come  to  the  assistance  of  the 
State  so  relieved. 

Relations  between  the  Allied  States  and  States  not  Party 
to  this  Convention. 

Article  13. — ^As  regards  disputes  between  one  of  the 
Allied  States  and  a  State  not  party  to  this  Convention, 
the  Allied  State  shall  endeavor  to  obtain  submission  of 
the  dispute  to  arbitration,  if  it  be  of  a  suitable  nature  for 
arbitration,  and  if  the  dispute  be  not  of  a  nature  suitable 
for  arbitration,  or  if  the  other  State  will  not  agree 
to  submit  it  to  arbitration,  the  Allied  State  shall  bring 
it  before  the  Conference.  In  the  latter  event,  the  con- 
vener of  the  Conference  shall,  in  the  name  of  the  League 
of  Nations,  invite  the  State  not  party  to  this  convention 
to  become  for  this  purpose  a  party  to  the  Conference  and 
to  submit  its  case  to  the  Conference,  and  in  such  case  the 


78  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

provisions  hereinbefore  contained  shall  be  applicable  to 
the  dispute  both  against  and  in  favor  of  such  State  in 
all  respects  as  if  it  were  a  party  to  this  Convention. 

Article  14. — ^If  the  State  not  party  to  this  Convention 
will  not  accept  the  invitation  to  become  ad  hoc  a  party 
to  the  Conference,  the  Conference  may  enquire  into  the 
dispute  ex  parte,  and  may  make  a  recommendation  in  the 
same  way  as  if  both  parties  were  present. 

Article  15. — ^If  the  Allied  State  shall  be  attacked  by 
the  other  State  before  an  award  or  a  report  of  the  Con- 
ference is  made,  or  notwithstanding  the  compliance  of  the 
Allied  State  with  the  award  or  the  recommendation  (if 
any)  made  by  the  Conference  in  its  report,  any  of  the 
Allied  States  may  come  to  its  assistance. 

Article  16. — In  the  case  of  a  dispute  between  States 
none  of  whom  are  parties  to  this  Convention,  any  of  the 
Allied  States  may  bring  the  matter  before  the  Conference 
with  a  view  to  the  Conference  using  its  good  offices  to 
prevent  war. 

Article  17. — ^Any  State  not  party  to  this  Convention 
may  apply  to  the  Conference  for  leave  to  become  a  party. 
The  Conference  will  forthwith  examine  the  application 
favorably,  and  will  determine  whether  it  should  be 
granted  and  whether  it  is  necessary  to  impose  any  terms. 

Conflict  of  Treaties. 

Article  18. — ^A.  The  Allied  States  severally  agree  that 
the  present  Convention  abrogates  all  treaty  obligations 
inter  se  inconsistent  with  the  terms  hereof,  and  that  they 
will  not  enter  into  any  engagements  inconsistent  with 
the  terms  hereof,  and  that  they  will  not  enter  into  any 
engagements  inconsistent  with  the  terms  hereof. 

B.  Where  any  of  the  Allied  States,  before  becoming 
party  to  this  Convention,  shall  have  entered  into  any 
treaty  imposing  upon  it  obligations  inconsistent  with  the 
terms  of  this  Convention,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  such 
State  to  take  immediate  steps  to  procure  its  release  from 
such  obligations. 


Document  9. 

Colonel  House's  proposed  draft  of  a  covenant 
for  the  League  of  Nations  (typewritten  original), 
July  16,  1918,  with  his  letter  of  transmittal  and 
explanation  to  President  Wilson  (autographed). 
The  articles  starred  are  those  checked  by  Presi- 
dent Wilson. 

edward  m.  house. 
The  President, 

The  WTiite  House,  Washington. 

Dear  Governor: 

I  am  enclosing  you  the  draft  for  a  League  of  Nations. 
The  Preamble  and  Articles  1,  2,  and  3  are  the  keystone  of 
the  arch. 

It  is  absolutely  essential  for  the  peoples  of  the  world 
to  realize  that  they  can  never  have  international  peace 
and  order  if  they  permit  their  representatives  to  sanction 
the  unmoral  practices  of  the  past.  Every  large  nation,  as 
you  know,  has  been  guilty.  Bismarck's  forgery  of  a 
telegram  in  order  to  force  a  war  on  France  is  a  notable 
modern  instance.  Roosevelt's  rape  at  Panama  brings  it 
closely  home.  If  these  things  had  been  done  by  private 
individuals  they  would  have  been  classed  as  criminals. 

Articles  1,  2,  and  3  might  well  come  under  the  Preamble. 
The  reason  they  are  segregated  is  that  it  gives  them 
emphasis  and  makes  the  pledge  binding. 

No.  4  was  written  with  the  intention  of  satisfying  those 
who  would  be  distrustful  of  Germany  in  the  event  she 
became  a  signatory  power. 

It  is  necessary  I  think  to  do  away  with  the  abominable 
custom  of  espionage,  but  to  abolish  it  and  leave  some 
dishonorable  nation  free  to  surreptitiously  prepare  for 
war  would  be  a  mistake.  It  is  to  be  remembered  that 
nations  are  even  more  suspicious  of  one  another   than 

79 


80  WOODROW  \^^LSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEIMENT 

individuals,  and  such  suspicions,  as  in  the  case  of  indi- 
viduals, is  nine  times  out  of  ten  unfounded.  Instead  of 
letting  this  condition  grow  there  should  be  some  way  in 
which  the  truth  could  be  openly  arrived  at. 

No.  6  is  taken  largely  from  Article  5  of  the  British 
Draft.  Two  alternatives  are  named  for  the  seat  of  meet- 
ings because  it  is  conceivable  that  there  might  be  trouble 
between  Holland  and  Belgium,  and  if  either  of  them 
represented  X  or  Y  it  might  be  necessary  to  move  the 
conference  to  Z. 

No.  9.  The  first  and  last  sentences  in  this  are  taken 
verbatim  from  Article  7  of  the  British  Draft.  I  inter- 
larded a  sentence  providing  for  a  Secretariat  and  for  the 
funds  to  maintain  it. 

To  all  intents  and  purposes  the  representatives  of  the 
contracting  powers  become  automatically  an  International 
Parliament,  and  I  am  sure  it  will  be  necessary  for  them 
to  be  in  almost  continuous  session.  I  believe  that  it 
will  be  a  place  of  such  power  and  consequence  that  the 
contracting  parties  will  send  their  leading  statesmen  to 
represent  them.  It  will  be  a  greater  honor  to  become 
a  member  of  this  body  than  to  hold  any  other  appointive 
position  in  the  world,  and  it  is  probable  that  ex-Presidents, 
ex-Prime  Ministers  and  ex-Chancellors  will  be  chosen. 

No.  10  provides  for  an  International  Court  to  have  juris- 
diction to  determine  certain  questions  which  are  now 
determined  in  many  countries  in  courts  of  last  resort. 
This  court  should  be  smaller  than  fifteen  members. 

In  the  past  I  have  been  opposed  to  a  court,  but  in  work- 
ing the  matter  out  it  has  seemed  to  me  a  necessary  part 
of  the  machinery.  In  time  the  court  might  well  prove 
the  strongest  part  of  it. 

No.  11  was  written  largely  to  conform  with  the  laws 
and  practices  of  certain  nations,  particularly  the  Latin 
American  Republics. 

No.  12  has  in  mind  the  possibility  of  using,  if  de- 
sired, courts  of  last  resort  now  in  being,  as  a  medium 
for  the  settlement  of  disputes  in  the  event  other  methods 
prescribed  do  not  appeal  to  certain  nations.  I  also  had 
in  mind  that  if  such  a  provision  were  a  part  of  the  Cove- 


COLONEL  HOUSE'S  DRAFT  OF  THE  COVENANT  81 

nant,  it  would  have  a  tendency  to  make  all  courts  of  last 
appeal  broader  and  less  biased  in  passing  upon  inter- 
national questions. 

Nos.  16,  17,  18  and  19  are  obvious  and  in  the  event  that 
it  is  desirable  to  have  a  League  limited  to  the  Great 
Powers,  these  articles  would  force  every  nation  not  a 
member  of  the  League  to  submit  their  disputes  to  the 
League,  or  use  the  forms  of  settlement  prescribed  by  it. 

Articles  13,  14  and  16  of  the  British  Draft  seek  in  a 
measure  to  accomplish  the  same  purpose,  but  in  an  en- 
tirely different  way. 

No.  20  was  written  with  the  thought  that  it  would  not 
do  to  have  territorial  guarantees  inflexible.  It  is  quite 
conceivable  that  conditions  might  so  change  in  the  course 
of  time  as  to  make  it  a  serious  hardship  for  certain  por- 
tions of  one  nation  to  continue  under  the  government  of 
that  nation.  For  instance,  it  is  conceivable  that  Canada 
might  sometime  wish  to  become  a  part  of  the  United 
States.  It  is  also  a  possibility  that  Chihuahua,  Coahuila 
or  Lower  California  might  desire  to  become  a  part  of 
this  country  and  with  the  consent  in  each  instance  of  the 
mother  country. 

No.  22.  The  first  sentence  of  this  article  is  taken  ver- 
batim from  the  British  Article  17.  I  did  not  use  their 
second  sentence  for  the  reason  that  it  seemed  to  point 
to  Germany,  and  I  have  worded  the  second  sentence  of 
No.  22  differently  to  avoid  this. 

No.  23  is  almost  a  verbatim  copy  of  Article  1  of  the 

Affectionately  yours. 

Magnolia,  Massachusetts,        ^^^^^^^     ^'  ^'  ^ouse. 
July  16,  1918. 

Suggestion  for  a 
COVENANT  OF  A  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS. 

Preamble. 

International  civilization  having  proved  a  failure  be- 
cause there  has  not  been  constructed  a  fabric  of  law  to 


82  WOODROW  WILSON  .VXD  ^VORLD  SETTLEMENT 

which  nations  have  yielded  with  the  same  obedience  and 
deference  as  individuals  submit  to  intra-national  laws, 
and  because  public  opinion  has  sanctioned  unmoral  acts 
relating  to  international  affairs,  it  is  the  purpose  of  the 
States  signatory  to  this  Convention  to  form  a  League 
of  Nations  having  for  its  purpose  the  maintenance  through- 
out the  world  of  peace,  security,  progress  and  orderly 
government.     Therefore  it  is  agreed  as  follows: 

Article  1. — ^The  same  standards  of  honor  and  ethics 
shall  prevail  internationally  and  in  affairs  of  nations  as 
in  other  matters.  The  agreement  or  promise  of  a  Power 
shall  be  inviolate.* 

Article  2. — Xo  official  of  a  Power  shall  either  directly 
or  by  indirection  on  behalf  of  his  Government,  be  ex- 
pected or  permitted  to  act  or  communicate  other  than 
consistently  with  the  truth,  the  honor  and  the  obliga- 
tion of  the  power  which  he  represents.* 

Article  3. — ^Any  attempt  by  a  Power,  either  openly 
or  in  secret,  whether  by  propaganda  or  otherwise,  to  in- 
fluence one  Power  or  nation  against  another  shall  be 
deemed  dishonorable.* 

Article  4. — ^Any  open  or  direct  inquiry  regarding  the 
acts  or  purposes  of  a  Power  may  be  made  by  another 
Power  as  of  course,  and  shall  be  regarded  as  an  act  of 
friendship  tending  to  promote  frankness  in  international 
relations,  but  any  secret  inquiry  to  such  end  shall  be 
deemed  dishonorable. 

Article  5. — Any  war  or  threat  of  war  is  a  matter  of 
concern  to  the  League  of  Nations,  and  to  the  Powers, 
members  thereof.* 

Article  6. — ^The  Ambassadors  and  Ministers  of  the 
Contracting  Powers  to  X  and  the  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  of  X  shall  act  as  the  respective  delegates  of  the 
Powers  in  the  League  of  Nations.  The  meetings  of  the 
delegates  shall  be  held  at  the  seat  of  government  of  X,  and 
the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  of  X  shall  be  the  presid- 
ing officer. 

If  the  delegates  deem  it  necessary  or  advisable,  they 
may  meet  temporarily  at  the  seat  of  government  of  Y  or 

*The  articles  starred  are  those  checked  by  President  Wilson. 


COLONEL  HOUSE'S  DRAFT  OF  THE  COVENANT  8:3 

Z,  in  which  case  the  Ambassador  or  Minister  to  X  of 
the  country  in  which  the  meeting  is  held,  shall  be  the  pre- 
siding officer  'pro  tempore* 

Article  7. — ^The  Delegates  shall  meet  in  the  interests  of 
peace  whenever  war  is  rumored  or  threatened,  and  also 
whenever  a  Delegate  of  any  power  shall  inform  the  Dele- 
gates that  a  meeting  in  the  interests  of  peace  is  advisable.* 

Article  8. — ^The  Delegates  shall  also  meet  at  such 
other  times  as  they  shall  from  time  to  time  determine.* 

Article  9. — ^The  Delegates  shall  regulate  their  own 
procedure  and  may  appoint  committees  to  inquire  and 
report.  The  Delegates  shall  constitute  a  Secretariat  and 
fix  the  duties  thereof  and  all  expenses  of  the  Secretariat 
shall  be  paid  by  the  Contracting  Powers  as  the  Delegates 
may  determine.  In  all  matters  covered  by  this  article 
the  Delegates  may  decide  by  the  votes  of  a  majority  of 
the  Contracted  Powers  represented.* 

Article  10. — ^An  International  Court  composed  of  not 
more  than  fifteen  members  shall  be  constituted,  which 
shall  have  jurisdiction  to  determine  any  difference  between 
nations  which  has  not  been  settled  by  diplomacy,  arbitra- 
tion, or  otherwise,  and  which  relates  to  the  existence, 
interpretation,  or  effect  of  a  treaty,  or  which  may  be  sub- 
mitted by  consent,  or  which  relates  to  matters  of  com- 
merce, including  in  such  matter,  the  validity  or  effect 
internationally  of  a  statute  regulation  or  practice.  The 
Delegates  may  at  their  discretion  submit  to  the  Court 
such  other  questions  as  may  seem  to  them  advisable. 

The  judges  of  the  International  Court  shall,  both  origi- 
nally and  from  time  to  time  as  vacancies  may  occur,  be 
chosen  by  the  Delegates.  A  judge  of  the  International 
Court  shall  retire  from  office  when  he  shall  have  reached 
the  age  of  seventy- two  years,  and  may  be  so  retired  at 
any  time  by  a  vote  of  two  thirds  of  the  Delegates,  but 
in  case  of  retirement  of  a  judge  from  office,  the  salary 
paid  to  him  shall  be  continued  to  be  so  paid  during  his 
natural  life. 

A  judge  may  be  removed  by  a  vote  of  two  thirds  of  the 
Delegates.  The  International  Court  shall  formulate  its 
own  rules  of  procedure. 


84  WOODROW  ^YILSON  .\ND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

Article  11. — ^Any  difference  between  nations  relating  to 
matters  of  commerce  and  which  involves  the  validity  or  ef- 
fect internationally  of  a  statute  regulation  or  practice,  shall, 
if  the  Power  having  adopted  such  statute  regulation  or 
practice  so  request,  be  submitted  to  its  highest  national 
court  for  decision,  before  submission  to  the  International 
Court. 

Article  12. — ^The  highest  national  court  of  each  Con- 
tracting Power  shall  have  jurisdiction  to  hear  and  finally 
determine  any  international  dispute  which  may  be  sub- 
mitted by  consent  for  its  decision. 

Article  13. — ^The  Contracting  Powers  agree  that  all 
disputes  between  or  among  them  or  any  of  them  of  any 
nature  whatsoever  which  shall  not  be  settled  by  diplomacy 
and  w^iicli  are  not  within  the  provisions  of  Article  10  shall 
be  referred  for  arbitration  before  three  arbitrators,  one  to 
be  selected  by  each  party  to  the  dispute  and  one  to  be 
chosen  by  two  arbitrators  so  selected,  or  in  the  event  of 
their  failure  to  agree  to  such  choice,  the  third  arbitrator 
shall  be  selected  by  the  Delegates. 

The  decision  of  the  arbitrators  may  be  set  aside  on  the 
appeal  of  a  party  to  the  dispute,  by  a  vote  of  three  fourths 
of  the  Delegates,  if  the  decision  of  the  arbitrators  was 
unanimous,  and  by  a  vote  of  two  thirds  of  the  Delegates 
if  the  decision  of  the  arbitrators  was  not  unanimous,  but 
shall  otherwise  be  finally  binding  and  conclusive. 

\Mien  any  decision  of  the  arbitrators  shall  have  been 
set  aside  by  the  Delegates,  the  dispute  shall  again  be  sub- 
mitted to  arbitration  before  three  arbitrators,  chosen  as 
heretofore  provided,  but  none  of  whom  shall  have  pre- 
viously acted  as  such  and  the  decision  of  the  arbitrators 
upon  the  second  arbitration  shall  be  finally  binding  and 
conclusive  without  right  of  appeal.* 

Article  14. — ^Any  Power  which  the  Delegates  deter- 
mine shall  have  failed  to  submit  to  the  International 
Court  any  dispute  of  which  that  Court  has  jurisdiction 
as  of  course,  or  failed  or  neglected  to  carry  out  any  de- 
cision of  that  Court,  or  of  a  national  court  to  which  a 
dispute  has  been  submitted  by  consent  for  decision,  or 
failed  to  submit  to  arbitration  any  dispute  pursuant  to 


COLONEL  HOUSE'S  DRAFT  OF  THE  COVENANT  85 

I 

Article  13,  hereof,  or  failed  to  carry  out  any  decision  of 
the  arbitrators,  shall  thereupon  lose  and  be  deprived  of 
all  rights  of  commerce  and  intercourse  with  the  Contract- 
ing Powers.* 

Article  15. — If  any  Power  shall  declare  war  or  begin 
hostilities  before  submitting  a  dispute  with  another 
Power  as  the  case  may  be,  either  to  the  International 
Court  or  to  Arbitrators,  as  herein  provided,  or  shall  de- 
clare war  or  begin  hostilities  in  regard  to  any  dispute 
which  has  been  decided  adversely  to  it  by  said  Court  or 
by  Arbitrators  or  pursuant  to  Article  12  hereof,  as  the 
case  may  be,  the  Contracting  Powers  shall  not  only  cease 
all  commerce  and  intercourse  with  that  Power  as  in 
Article  14  provided,  but  shall  also  arrange  to  blockade 
and  close  the  frontiers  of  that  power  to  commerce  and 
intercourse  with  the  world.* 

Article  16. — ^As  regards  disputes  between  one  of  the 
Contracting  Powers  and  a  Power  not  a  party  to  this  Con- 
vention, the  Contracting  Power  shall  endeavor  to  ob- 
tain submission  of  the  dispute  to  judicial  decision  or  to 
arbitration.  If  the  other  state  will  not  agree  to  submit  the 
dispute  to  judicial  decision  or  to  arbitration  the  Con- 
tracting Power  shall  bring  it  before  the  Delegates.  In 
the  latter  event  the  Delegates  shall  in  the  name  of  the 
League  of  Nations  invite  the  state  not  a  party  to  this 
Convention  to  become  ad  hoc  a  party  and  to  submit  its 
case  to  judicial  decision  or  to  arbitration  and  in  such  case 
the  provisions  hereinbefore  contained  shall  be  applicable 
to  the  dispute  both  against  and  in  favor  of  such  state 
in  all  respects  as  if  it  were  a  party  to  this  Convention.* 

Article  17. — ^If  the  state  not  a  party  to  this  Convention 
will  not  accept  the  invitation  to  become  ad  hoc  a  party, 
the  Delegates  shall  inquire  into  the  dispute  and  shall  make 
a  recommendation  in  respect  thereof.* 

Article  18. — ^If  hostilities  shall  be  commenced  against 
the  Contracting  Power  by  the  other  state  before  a  de- 
cision of  the  dispute,  or  before  the  recommendation  made 
by  the  Delegates  in  respect  thereof,  or  contrary  to  such 
recommendation,  the  Contracting  Powers  will  thereupon 
cease  all  commerce  and  intercourse  with  the  other  state 


86  ^YOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

and  will  also  arrange  to  blockade  and  close  the  frontiers  of 
that  state  to  commerce  and  intercourse  with  the  world 
and  any  of  the  Contracting  Powers  may  come  to  the 
assistance  of  the  Contracting  Power  against  which  hos- 
tilities have  been  commenced.* 

Article  19. — ^In  the  case  of  a  dispute  between  states 
not  parties  to  this  Convention,  any  Power  may  bring  the 
matter  before  the  Delegates,  who  shall  tender  the  good 
offices  of  the  League  of  Nations  with  a  view  to  the  peace- 
able settlement  of  the  dispute. 

If  one  of  the  Powers,  party  to  the  dispute,  shall  offer 
and  agree  to  submit  its  interests  and  cause  of  action  in 
regard  thereto  wholly  to  the  control  and  decision  of  the 
League  of  Nations,  that  Power  shall  ad  hoc  be  deemed  a 
Contracting  Power.  If  no  one  of  the  Powers,  parties  to 
such  dispute,  shall  so  offer  and  agree,  the  Delegates  shall 
take  such  action  and  make  such  recommendations  to 
their  Governments  as  will  preserve  peace  and  prevent 
hostilities  and  result  in  the  settlement  of  the  dispute. 

Article  20. — ^The  Contracting  Powers  unite  in  several 
guarantees  to  each  other  of  their  territorial  integrity  and 
political  independence,  subject,  however,  to  such  terri- 
torial modifications,  if  any,  as  may  become  necessary 
in  the  future  by  reason  of  changes  in  present  racial  con- 
ditions and  aspirations,  pursuant  to  the  principle  of 
self-determination  and  as  shall  also  be  regarded  by  three 
fourths  of  the  Delegates  as  necessary  and  proper  for  the 
welfare  of  the  peoples  concerned;  recognizing  also  that 
all  territorial  changes  involve  equitable  compensation  and 
that  the  peace  of  the  world  is  superior  in  importance  and 
interest  to  questions  of  boundary.* 

Article  21. — ^The  Contracting  Powers  recognize  the 
principle  that  permanent  peace  will  require  that  national 
armaments  shall  be  reduced  to  the  lowest  point  consistent 
with  safety,  and  the  Delegates  are  directed  to  formulate 
at  once  a  plan  by  which  such  a  reduction  may  be  brought 
about.  The  plan  so  formulated  shall  not  be  binding  until 
and  unless  unanimously  approved  by  the  Governments 
signatory  to  this  Covenant. 

The   Contracting   Powers   agree   that   munitions   and 


COLONEL  HOUSE'S  DRAFT  OF  THE  COVENANT  87 

implements  of  war  shall  not  be  manufactured  by  private 
enterprise  and  that  publicity  as  to  all  national  armaments 
and  programmes  is  essential.* 

Article  22. — ^Any  Power  not  a  party  to  this  Conven- 
tion may  apply  to  the  Delegates  for  leave  to  become  a 
party.  The  Delegates  may  act  favorably  on  the  applica- 
tion if  they  shall  regard  the  granting  thereof  as  tending  to 
promote  the  peace  and  security  of  the  world.* 

Article  23.— A.  The  Contracting  Powers  severally 
agree  that  the  present  Convention  abrogates  all  treaty 
obligations  inter  se  inconsistent  with  the  terms  thereof, 
and  that  they  will  not  enter  into  any  engagements  in- 
consistent with  the  terms  hereof. 

B.  \\Tiere  any  of  the  Contracting  Powers,  before  be- 
coming party  to  this  Convention,  shall  have  entered  into 
any  treaty  imposing  upon  it  obligations  inconsistent  with 
the  terms  of  this  Convention,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  such 
Power  to  take  immediate  steps  to  procure  its  release  from 
such  obligations.* 


Document  10. 

President  Wilson's  first  draft  of  the  Covenant 
of  the  League  of  Nations  (original  draft  on  his 
own  typewriter). 

COVENANT. 

Preamble. 

In  order  to  secure  peace,  security,  and  orderly  govern- 
ment by  the  prescription  of  open  and  honorable  relations 
between  nations,  by  the  firm  establishment  of  the  un- 
derstandings of  international  law  as  the  actual  rule  of 
conduct  among  governments,  and  by  the  n:aintenance  of 
justice  and  a  scrupulous  respect  of  all  treaty  obligations 
in  the  dealings  of  all  organized  peoples  with  one  another, 
the  Powers  signatory  to  this  covenant  and  agreement 
jointly  and  severally  adopt  this  constitution  of  the 
League  of  Nations. 

Article  I. — ^The  action  of  the  Signatory  Powers  under 
the  terms  of  this  agreement  shall  be  effected  through  the 
instrumentality  of  a  Body  of  Delegates  which  shall 
consist  of  the  ambassadors  and  ministers  of  the  contract- 
ing Powers  accredited  to  H.  and  the  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  of  H.  The  meetings  of  the  Body  of  Delegates 
shall  be  held  at  the  seat  of  government  of  H.  and  the 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  of  H.  shall  be  the  presiding 
officer  of  the  Body. 

Wlienever  the  Delegates  deem  it  necessary  or  advisable, 
they  may  meet  temporarily  at  the  seat  of  government  of 
B.  or  of  S.,  in  which  case  the  Ambassador  or  Minister  to 
H.  of  the  country  in  which  the  meeting  is  held  shall  be 
the  presiding  officer  "pro  tempore. 

Article  II. — ^The  Body  of  Delegates  shall  regulate 
their  own  procedure  and  shall  have  power  to  appoint  such 

88 


WILSON'S  FIRST  DRAFT  OF  THE  COVENANT  89 

committees  as  they  may  deem  necessary  to  inquire  into 
and  report  upon  any  matters  which  he  within  the  field  of 
their  action. 

They  shall  organize  a  Secretariat  to  act  as  their  min- 
isterial agency,  and  the  expense  of  the  maintenance  of  the 
Secretariat  shall  be  borne  as  they  may  prescribe. 

In  all  matters  covered  by  this  Article  the  Body  of 
Delegates  may  decide  by  a  majority  vote  of  the  whole 
Body. 

Article  III. — ^The  Contracting  Powers  unite  in  guar- 
anteeing to  each  other  political  independence  and  terri- 
torial integrity;  but  it  is  understood  between  them  that 
such  territorial  readjustments,  if  any,  as  may  in  the  future 
become  necessary  by  reason  of  changes  in  present  racial 
conditions  and  aspirations  or  present  social  and  political 
relationships,  pursuant  to  the  principle  of  self-determina- 
tion, and  also  such  territorial  readjustments  as  may  in  the 
judgment  of  three-fourths  of  the  Delegates  be  demanded 
by  the  welfare  and  manifest  interest  of  the  peoples  con- 
cerned, may  be  effected,  if  agreeable  to  those  peoples; 
and  that  territorial  changes  may  in  equity  involve 
material  compensation.  The  Contracting  Powers  accept 
without  reservation  the  principle  that  the  peace  of  the 
world  is  superior  in  importance  to  every  question  of 
political  jurisdiction  or  boundary. 

Article  IV. — (H.  21.)  The  Contracting  Powers  rec- 
ognize the  principle  that  the  establishment  and  main- 
tenance of  peace  will  require  the  reduction  of  national 
armaments  to  the  lowest  point  consistent  with  domestic 
safety  and  the  enforcement  by  common  action  of  inter- 
national obligations;  and  the  Delegates  are  directed  to 
formulate  at  once  plans  by  which  such  a  reduction  may 
be  brought  about.  The  plan  so  formulated  shall  be 
binding  when,  and  only  when,  unanimously  approved  by 
the  Governments  signatory  to  this  Covenant. 

The  Contracting  Powers  further  agree  that  munitions 
and  implements  of  war  shall  not  be  manufactured  by 
private  enterprise  or  for  private  profit,  and  that  there  shall 
be  full  and  frank  publicity  as  to  all  national  armaments 
and  military  or  naval  programmes. 


90  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

Article  V. — The  Contracting  Powers  agi'ee  that  all 
disputes  arising  between  or  among  them  of  whatever 
nature,  which  shall  not  be  satisfactorily  settled  by  diplo- 
macy, shall  be  referred  for  arbitration  to  three  arbitra- 
tors, one  of  the  three  to  be  selected  by  each  of  the  parties  to 
the  dispute,  when  there  are  but  two  such  parties,  and 
the  third  by  the  two  thus  selected.  AMien  there  are  more 
than  two  parties  to  the  dispute,  one  arbitrator  shall  be 
named  by  each  of  the  several  parties  and  the  arbitrators 
thus  named  shall  add  to  their  number  others  of  their  own 
choice,  the  number  thus  added  to  be  limited  to  the 
number  which  will  suffice  to  give  a  deciding  voice  to 
the  arbitrators  thus  added  in  case  of  a  tie  vote  among  the 
arbitrators  chosen  by  the  contending  parties.  In  case 
the  arbitrators  chosen  by  the  contending  parties  cannot 
agree  upon  an  additional  arbitrator  or  arbitrators,  the 
additional  arbitrator  or  arbitrators  shall  be  chosen  by  the 
Body  of  Delegates. 

On  the  appeal  of  a  party  to  the  dispute  the  decision  of 
the  arbitrators  may  be  set  aside  by  a  vote  of  three-fourths 
of  the  Delegates,  in  case  the  decision  of  the  arbitrators  was 
unanimous,  or  by  a  vote  of  two-thirds  of  the  Delegates  in 
case  the  decision  of  the  arbitrators  was  not  unanimous, 
but  unless  thus  set  aside  shall  be  finally  binding  and  con- 
clusive. 

AMien  any  decision  of  arbitrators  shall  have  been  thus 
set  aside  the  dispute  shall  again  be  submitted  to  arbitra- 
tors chosen  as  heretofore  provided,  none  of  whom  shall, 
however,  have  previously  acted  as  arbitrators  in  the  dis- 
pute in  question,  and  the  decision  of  the  arbitrators 
rendered  in  this  second  arbitration  shall  be  finally  binding 
and  conclusive  without  right  of  appeal. 

Article  VI. — (H.  14.)  Any  power  which  the  Body  of 
Delegates  shall  declare  to  have  failed  to  submit  any 
dispute  to  arbitration  under  the  terms  of  Article  V  of  this 
Covenant  or  to  have  refused  or  failed  to  carry  out  any 
decision  of  such  arbitration  shall  thereupon  lose  and  be 
deprived  of  all  rights  of  commerce  and  intercourse  witli 
any  of  the  Contracting  Powers. 

Article  VII. — ^If  any  Power  shall  declare  war  or  begin 


WILSON'S  FIRST  DRAFT  OF  THE  COVENANT  91 

hostilities,  or  take  any  hostile  step  short  of  war,  against 
another  Power  before  submitting  the  dispute  involved  to 
arbitrators  as  herein  provided,  or  shall  declare  war  or 
begin  hostilities,  or  take  any  hostile  step  short  of  war,  in 
regard  to  any  dispute  which  has  been  decided  adversely  to 
it  by  arbitrators  chosen  and  empowered  as  herein  provided, 
the  Contracting  Powers  hereby  bind  themselves  not  only 
to  cease  all  commerce  and  intercourse  with  that  Power  but 
also  to  unite  in  blockading  and  closing  the  frontiers  of  that 
power  to  commerce  or  intercourse  with  any  part  of  the 
world  and  to  use  any  force  that  may  be  necessary  to 
accomplish  that  object. 

Article  VIII. — (H.  5,  7,  8.)  Any  war  or  threat  of 
war,  whether  immediately  affecting  any  of  the  Contract- 
ing Powers  or  not,  is  hereby  declared  a  matter  of  concern 
to  the  League  of  Nations  and  to  all  the  Powers  signatory 
hereto,  and  those  Powers  hereby  reserve  the  right  to  take 
any  action  that  may  be  deemed  wise  and  effectual  to  safe- 
guard the  peace  of  nations. 

The  Delegates  shall  meet  in  the  interest  of  peace 
whenever  war  is  rumoured  or  threatened,  and  also  when- 
ever the  Delegate  of  any  Power  shall  inform  the  Delegates 
that  a  meeting  and  conference  in  the  interest  of  peace  is 
advisable. 

The  Delegates  may  also  meet  at  such  other  times  and 
upon  such  other  occasions  as  they  shall  from  time  to  time 
deem  best  and  determine. 

Article  IX. — (H.  16,  17.)  In  the  event  of  a  dispute 
arising  between  one  of  the  Contracting  Powers  and  a 
Power  not  a  party  to  this  Covenant,  the  Contracting 
Power  involved  hereby  binds  itself  to  endeavour  to  obtain 
the  submission  of  the  dispute  to  judicial  decision  or  to 
arbitration.  If  the  other  Power  will  not  agree  to  submit 
the  dispute  to  judicial  decision  or  to  arbitration,  the 
Contracting  Power  shall  bring  the  matter  to  the  attention 
of  the  Body  of  Delegates.  The  Delegates  shall  in  such 
case,  in  the  name  of  the  League  of  Nations,  invite  the 
Power  not  a  party  to  this  Covenant  to  become  ad  hoc  a 
party  and  to  submit  its  case  to  judicial  decision  or  to 
arbitration,  and  if  that  Power  consents  it  is  hereby  agreed 


92       wooDROw  ^^^LSON  and  world  settlement 

that  the  provisions  hereinbefore  contained  and  applicable 
to  the  submission  of  disputes  to  arbitration  shall  be  in 
all  respects  applicable  to  the  dispute  both  in  favour  of 
and  against  such  Power  as  if  it  were  a  party  to  this  Cove- 
nant. 

In  case  the  Power  not  a  party  to  this  Covenant  shall 
accept  the  invitation  of  the  Delegates  to  become  ad  hoc 
a  party,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Delegates  immediately 
to  institute  an  inquiry  into  the  circumstances  and  merits 
of  the  dispute  involved  and  to  recommend  such  joint 
action  by  the  Contracting  Powers  as  may  seem  best  and 
most  effectual  in  the  circumstances  disclosed. 

Article  X. — (H.  18.)  If  hostilities  should  be  begun 
or  any  hostile  action  taken  against  the  Contracting  Power 
by  the  Power  not  a  party  to  this  Covenant  before  a 
decision  of  the  dispute  by  arbitrators  or  before  investiga- 
tion, report,  and  recommendation  by  the  Delegates  in 
regard  to  the  dispute,  or  contrary  to  such  recommenda- 
tion, the  Contracting  Powers  shall  thereupon  cease  all 
commerce  and  communication  with  that  Power  and  shall 
also  unite  in  blockading  and  closing  the  frontiers  of  that 
Power  to  all  commerce  or  intercourse  with  any  part  of  the 
world,  employing  jointly  any  force  that  may  be  necessary 
to  accomplish  that  object.  The  Contracting  Powers  shall 
also  unite  in  coming  to  the  assistance  of  the  Contracting 
Power  against  which  hostile  action  has  been  taken,  com- 
bining their  armed  forces  in  its  behalf. 

Article  XI. — (H.  19.)  In  case  of  a  dispute  between 
states  not  parties  to  this  Covenant,  any  Contracting 
Power  may  bring  the  matter  to  the  attention  of  the  Dele- 
gates, who  shall  thereupon  tender  the  good  offices  of  the 
League  of  Nations  with  a  view  to  the  peaceable  settlement 
of  the  dispute. 

If  one  of  the  states,  a  party  to  the  dispute,  shall  offer 
and  agree  to  submit  its  interests  and  cause  of  action  wholly 
to  the  control  and  decision  of  the  League  of  Nations,  that 
state  shall  ad  hoc  be  deemed  a  Contracting  Power.  If  no 
one  of  the  states,  parties  to  the  dispute,  shall  so  offer  and 
agree,  the  Delegates  shall  of  their  own  motion  take  such 
action  and  make  such  recommendation  to  their  govern- 


WILSON'S  FIRST  DRAFT  OF  THE  COVENANT  93 

ments  as  will  prevent  hostilities  and  result  in  the  settle- 
ment of  the  dispute. 

Article  XII. — (H.  22.)  Any  Power  not  a  party  to 
this  Covenant  may  apply  to  the  Body  of  Delegates  for 
leave  to  become  a  party.  If  the  Delegates  shall  regard 
the  granting  thereof  as  likely  to  promote  the  peace,  order, 
and  security  of  the  World,  they  may  act  favourably  on 
the  application,  and  their  favourable  action  shall  operate 
to  constitute  the  Power  so  applying  in  all  respects  a  full 
signatory  party  to  this  Covenant. 

Article  XIII. — (H.  23.)  The  Contracting  Powers 
severally  agree  that  the  present  Covenant  and  Conven- 
tion is  accepted  as  abrogating  all  treaty  obligations 
inter  se  which  are  inconsistent  with  the  terms  hereof,  and 
solemnly  engage  that  they  will  not  enter  into  any  engage- 
ments inconsistent  with  the  terms  hereof. 

In  case  any  of  the  Powers  signatory  hereto  or  subse- 
quently admitted  to  the  League  of  Nations  shall,  before 
becoming  a  party  to  this  covenant,  have  undertaken  any 
treaty  obligations  which  are  inconsistent  with  the  terms 
of  this  Covenant,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  such  Power  to 
take  immediate  steps  to  procure  its  release  from  such  | 
obligations.  ^ 


Document  11. 

Proposals  made  by  General  Jan  Smuts  for  a 
League  of  Nations.  General  Smuts's  original 
proposals  were  made  in  the  form  of  a  pamphlet 
of  twenty  pages,  dated  December  16,  1918. 
From  this  the  President  had  copied  out  the 
twenty-one  specific  proposals  as  in  the  following 
document.  He  worked  from  this  in  re-drafting 
the  Covenant. 

LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS. 

A. 

1.  That  in  the  vast  multiplicity  of  territorial,  economic, 
and  other  problems  with  which  the  Conference  will  find 
itself  confronted,  it  should  look  upon  the  setting-up  of  a 
League  of  Nations  as  its  primary  and  basic  task,  and  as 
supplying  the  necessary  organ  by  means  of  which  most 
of  those  problems  can  find  their  only  stable  solution.  In- 
deed, the  Conference  should  look  upon  itself  as  the  first 
or  preliminary  meeting  of  the  League,  intended  to  work 
out  its  organization,  functions,  and  programme. 

2.  That,  so  far  at  any  rate  as  the  peoples  and  terri- 
tories formerly  belonging  to  Russia,  Austria-Hungary, 
and  Turkey  are  concerned,  the  League  of  Nations  should 
be  considered  as  the  reversionary  in  the  most  general 
sense,  and  as  clothed  with  the  right  of  ultimate  disposal 
in  accordance  with  certain  fundamental  principles.  The 
reversion  to  the  League  of  Nations  should  be  substituted 
for  any  policy  of  national  annexation. 

3.  These  principles  are:  firstly,  that  there  shall  be  no 
annexation  of  any  of  these  territories  to  any  of  the  vic- 
torious States,  and  secondly,  that  in  the  future  govern- 
ment of  these  territories  and  peoples  the  rule  of  self- 


SMUTS  S  PLAN  FOR  A  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  9.5 

determination,  or  the  consent  of  the  governed  to  their 
form  of  government,  shall  be  fairly  and  reasonably  ap- 
plied. 

4.  That  any  authority,  control,  or  administration 
which  may  be  necessary  in  respect  of  these  territories 
and  peoples,  other  than  their  own  self-determined  auton- 
omy, shall  be  the  exclusive  function  of  and  shall  be  vested 
in  the  League  of  Nations  and  exercised  by  or  on  behalf 
of  it. 

5.  That  it  shall  be  lawful  for  the  League  of  Nations  to 
delegate  its  authority,  control  or  administration  in  respect 
of  any  people  or  territory  to  some  other  State  whom  it  may 
appoint  as  its  agent  or  mandatary,  but  that,  wherever 
possible,  the  agent  or  mandatary  so  appointed  shall  be 
nominated  or  approved  by  the  autonomous  people  or 
territory. 

6.  That  the  degree  of  authority,  control,  or  administra- 
tion exercised  by  the  mandatary  State  shall  in  each  case 
be  laid  down  by  the  League  in  a  special  Act  or  Charter 
which  shall  reserve  to  it  complete  power  of  ultimate 
control  and  supervision  as  well  as  the  right  to  appeal  to 
it  from  the  territory  or  people  affected  against  any  gross 
breach  of  the  mandate  by  the  mandatary  State. 

7.  That  the  mandatary  State  shall  in  each  case  be 
bound  to  maintain  the  policy  of  the  open  door  or  equal 
economic  opportunity  for  all,  and  shall  form  no  military 
forces  beyond  the  standard  laid  down  by  the  League  for 
purposes  of  internal  police. 

8.  That  no  new  State  arising  from  the  old  Empires  be 
recognized  or  admitted  into  the  League  unless  on  con- 
dition that  its  military  forces  and  armaments  shall  con- 
form to  a  standard  laid  down  by  the  League  in  respect 
of  it  from  time  to  time. 

9.  That,  as  the  successor  to  the  Empires,  the  League 
of  Nations  will  directly  and  without  power  of  delegation 
watch  over  the  relations  inter  se  of  the  new  independent 
States  arising  from  the  break-up  of  those  Empires,  and 
will  regard  as  a  very  special  task  the  duty  of  conciliating 
and  composing  differences  between  them  with  a  view  to 
the  maintenance  of  good  order  and  general  peace. 


96  WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

B. 

10.  The  constitution  of  the  League  will  be  that  of  a 
permanent  Conference  between  the  Governments  of  the 
constituent  States  for  the  purpose  of  joint  international 
action  in  certain  defined  respects,  and  will  not  derogate 
from  the  independence  of  those  States.  It  will  consist 
of  a  General  Conference,  a  Council,  and  Courts  of  arbi- 
tration and  conciliation. 

11.  The  General  Conference,  in  which  all  constituent 
States  will  have  equal  voting  power,  will  meet  periodi- 
cally to  discuss  matters  submitted  to  it  by  the  Council. 
These  matters  will  be  general  measures  of  international 
law  or  arrangements  or  general  proposals  for  the  limita- 
tions of  armaments  or  securing  world  peace,  or  any  other 
general  resolutions,  the  discussion  of  which  by  the  Con- 
ference is  desired  by  the  Council  before  they  are  forwarded 
for  the  approval  of  the  constituent  Governments.  Any 
resolutions  passed  by  the  Conference  will  have  the  effect 
of  recommendations  to  the  national  Governments  and 
Parliaments. 

12.  The  Council  will  be  the  executive  committee  of  the 
League,  and  will  consist  of  the  Prime  Ministers  or  Foreign 
Secretaries  or  other  authoritative  representatives  of  the 
Great  Powers,  together  with  representatives  drawn  in 
rotation  from  two  panels  of  the  middle  powers  and  the 
minor  States  respectively,  in  such  a  way  that  the  Great 
Powers  have  a  bare  majority.  A  minority  of  three  or 
more  can  veto  any  action  or  resolution  of  the  Council. 

13.  The  Council  will  meet  periodically  and  will,  in 
addition,  hold  an  annual  meeting  of  Prime  Ministers  or 
Foreign  Secretaries  for  a  general  interchange  of  views 
and  for  a  review  of  the  general  policies  of  the  League. 
It  will  appoint  a  permanent  secretariat  and  staff,  and  will 
appoint  joint  committees  for  the  study  and  coordination 
of  the  international  questions  with  which  the  Council 
deals,  or  questions  likely  to  lead  to  international  dis- 
putes. It  will  also  take  the  necessary  steps  for  keeping  up 
proper  liaison,  not  only  with  the  Foreign  Offices  of  the 
constituent  Governments,  but  also  with  the  mandataries 


SMUTS 'S  PLAN  FOR  A  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  07 

acting  on  behalf  of  the  League  in  various  parts  of  the 
world. 

14.  Its  functions  will  be: — 

(a)  to  take  executive  action  or  control  in  regard  to  the 
matters  set  forth  in  Section  A  or  under  any  international 
arrangements  or  conventions; 

(b)  to  formulate  for  the  approval  of  the  Governments 
general  measures  of  international  law  or  arrangement  or 
for  limitation  of  armaments  or  promotion  of  world  peace. 

(Its  remaining  functions  in  regard  to  world  peace  are 
dealt  with  in  the  following  section  C.) 

C. 

15.  That  all  the  States  represented  at  the  Peace  Con- 
ference shall  agree  to  the  abolition  of  conscription  or 
compulsory  military  service;  and  that  their  future  defence 
forces  shall  consist  of  militia  or  volunteers,  whose  num- 
bers and  training  shall  after  expert  inquiry  be  fixed  by  the 
Council  of  the  League. 

16.  That  while  the  limitation  of  armaments  in  the 
general  sense  is  impracticable,  the  Council  of  the  League 
shall  determine  what  direct  military  equipment  and  arm- 
ament is  fair  and  reasonable  in  respect  of  the  scale  of 
forces  laid  down  under  (15);  and  that  the  limits  fixed  by 
the  Council  shall  not  be  exceeded  without  its  permission. 

17.  That  all  factories  for  the  production  of  direct 
weapons  of  war  shall  be  nationalized  and  their  production 
shall  be  subject  to  the  inspection  of  the  officers  of  the 
Council;  and  that  the  Council  shall  be  furnished  periodi- 
cally with  returns  of  imports  and  exports  of  munitions 
of  war  into  or  from  the  territories  of  its  members,  and  as 
far  as  possible  into  or  from  other  countries. 

18.  That  the  Peace  Treaty  shall  provide  that  the  mem- 
bers of  the  League  bind  themselves  jointly  and  severally 
not  to  go  to  war  with  one  another: — 

(a)  without  previously  submitting  the  matter  in  dispute 
to  arbitration  or  inquiry  by  the  Council  of  the  League; 
and 

(b)  until  there  has  been  an  award  or  a  report  by  the 
Council;  and 


98       ^vooDRO^v  ^^^LSON  and  world  settlement 

(c)  not  even  then,  as  against  a  member  which  compHes 
with  the  award  or  recommendation  (if  any)  made  by  the 
Council  in  its  report. 

19.  That  the  Peace  Treaty  shall  provide  that  if  any 
member  of  the  League  breaks  its  covenant  under  para- 
graph (18),  it  shall  ipso  facto  become  at  war  with  all  the 
other  members  of  the  League,  which  shall  subject  it  to 
complete  economic  and  financial  boycott,  including  the 
severance  of  all  trade  and  financial  relations  and  the  pro- 
hibition of  all  intercourse  between  their  subjects  and  the 
subjects  of  the  covenant-breaking  State,  and  the  pre- 
vention, as  far  as  possible,  of  the  subjects  of  the  covenant- 
breaking  State  from  having  any  commercial  or  financial 
intercourse  with  the  subjects  of  any  other  State,  whether 
a  member  of  the  League  or  not. 

While  all  the  members  of  the  League  are  obliged  to 
take  the  above  measures,  it  is  left  to  the  Council  to  decide 
what  effective  naval  or  military  force  the  members  shall 
contribute,  and,  if  advisable,  to  absolve  the  smaller  mem- 
bers of  the  League  from  making  such  contribution. 

The  covenant-breaking  State  shall,  after  the  restora- 
tion of  peace,  be  subject  to  perpetual  disarmament  and 
to  the  peaceful  regime  established  for  new  States  under 
paragraph  (8). 

20.  That  the  Peace  Treaty  shall  further  provide  that 
if  a  dispute  should  arise  between  any  members  of  the 
League  as  to  the  interpretation  of  a  treaty,  or  as  to  any 
question  of  international  law,  or  as  to  any  fact  which  if 
established  would  constitute  a  breach  of  any  international 
obligation,  or  as  to  anj^  damage  alleged  and  the  nature  and 
measure  of  the  reparation  to  be  made  thereto,  and  if  such 
dispute  cannot  be  settled  by  negotiation,  the  members 
bind  themselves  to  submit  the  dispute  to  arbitration  and 
to  carry  out  any  award  or  decision  which  may  be  rendered. 

21.  That  if  on  any  ground  it  proves  impracticable  to 
refer  such  dispute  to  arbitration,  either  party  to  the  dis- 
pute may  apply  to  the  Council  to  take  the  matter  of 
the  dispute  into  consideration.  The  Council  shall  give 
notice  of  the  application  to  the  other  party  and  make  the 
necessary  arrangements  for  the  hearing  of  the  dispute. 


SMUTS  S  PLAN  FOR  A  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  99 

The  Council  shall  ascertain  the  facts  with  regard  to  the 
dispute  and  make  recommendations  based  on  the  merits 
and  calculated  to  secure  a  just  and  lasting  settlement. 
Other  members  of  the  League  shall  place  at  the  disposal  of 
the  League  all  information  in  their  possession  which  bears 
on  the  dispute.  The  Council  shall  do  its  utmost  by 
mediation  and  conciliation  to  induce  the  disputants  to 
agree  to  a  peaceful  settlement.  The  recommendations 
shall  be  addressed  to  the  disputants  and  shall  not  have 
the  force  of  decisions.  If  either  party  threatens  to  go  to 
war  in  spite  of  the  recommendations,  the  Council  shall 
publish  its  recommendations.  If  the  Council  fails  to 
arrive  at  recommendations,  both  the  majority  and  the 
minority  on  the  Council  may  publish  statements  of  the 
respective  recommendations  they  favour,  and  such  publi- 
cations shall  not  be  regarded  as  an  unfriendly  act  by 
either  of  the  disputants. 


Document  12. 

President  Wilson's  second  draft  (first  printed 
draft)  of  the  Covenant,  distributed  January  10, 
1919. 

COVENANT. 

Preamble. 

In  order  to  secure  peace,  security,  and  orderly  govern- 
ment by  the  prescription  of  open,  just,  and  honorable 
relations  between  nations,  by  the  firm  establishment  of 
the  understandings  of  international  law  as  the  actual  rule 
of  conduct  among  governments,  and  by  the  maintenance 
of  justice  and  a  scrupulous  respect  for  all  treaty  obliga- 
tions in  the  dealings  of  organized  peoples  with  one  another, 
the  Powers  signatory  to  this  covenant  and  agreement 
jointly  and  severally  adopt  this  constitution  of  the 
League  of  Nations. 

Article  I. — The  action  of  the  Signatory  Powers  under 
the  terms  of  this  agreement  shall  be  effected  through  the 
instrumentahty  of  a  Body  of  Delegates  which  shall  consist 
of  the  ambassadors  and  ministers  of  the  contracting  Powers 
accredited  to  H.  and  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  of  H. 
The  meetings  of  the  Body  of  Delegates  shall  be  held  at 
the  seat  of  govermnent  of  H.  and  the  Minister  for  Foreign 
affairs  of  H.  shall  be  the  presiding  officer  of  the  Bodj-. 

Whenever  the  Delegates  deem  it  necessary  or  advisable, 
they  may  meet  temporarily  at  the  seat  of  government  of 
B.  or  of  S.,  in  which  case  the  Ambassador  or  ^Minister  to 
H.  of  the  country  in  which  the  meeting  is  held  shall  be 
the  presiding  officer  pro  tempore. 

It  shall  be  the  privilege  of  any  of  the  contracting  Powers 
to  assist  its  representative  in  the  Body  of  Delegates  by  any 
method  of  conference,  counsel,  or  advice  that  may  seem 

100 


WILSON'S  SECOND  DRAFT  OF  THE  COVENANT         101 

best  to  it,  and  also  to  substitute  upon  occasion  a  special 
representative  for  its  regular  diplomatic  representative 
accredited  to  H. 

Article  II. — The  Body  of  Delegates  shall  regulate 
their  own  procedure  and  shall  have  power  to  appoint  such 
committees  as  they  may  deem  necessary  to  inquire  into 
and  report  upon  any  matters  that  lie  within  the  field  of 
their  action. 

It  shall  be  the  right  of  the  Body  of  Delegates,  upon  the 
initiative  of  any  member,  to  discuss,  either  publicly  or 
privately  as  it  may  deem  best,  any  matter  lying  within 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  League  of  Nations  as  defined  in  this 
Covenant,  or  any  matter  likely  to  affect  the  peace  of  the 
world;  but  all  actions  of  the  Body  of  Delegates  taken  in  the 
exercise  of  the  functions  and  powers  granted  to  them  under 
this  Covenant  shall  be  first  formulated  and  agreed  upon 
by  an  Executive  Council,  which  shall  act  either  by  refer- 
ence or  upon  its  own  initiative  and  which  shall  consist 
of  the  representatives  of  the  Great  Powers  together  with 
representatives  drawn  in  annual  rotation  from  two  panels, 
one  of  which  shall  be  made  up  of  the  representatives  of 
the  States  ranking  next  after  the  Great  Powers  and  the 
other  of  the  representatives  of  the  minor  States  (a  classi- 
fication which  the  Body  of  Delegates  shall  itself  establish 
and  may  from  time  to  time  alter),  such  a  number  being 
drawn  from  these  panels  as  will  be  but  one  less  than  the 
representatives  of  the  Great  Powers;  and  three  or  more 
negative  votes  in  the  Council  shall  operate  as  a  veto  upon 
any  action  or  resolution  proposed. 

All  resolutions  passed  or  actions  taken  by  the  Bodj^  of 
Delegates  upon  the  recommendation  of  the  Executive 
Council,  except  those  adopted  in  execution  of  any  direct 
powers  herein  granted  to  the  Body  of  Delegates  them- 
selves, shall  have  the  effect  of  recommendations  to  the 
several  governments  of  the  League. 

The  Executive  Council  shall  appoint  a  permanent 
Secretariat  and  staff  and  may  appoint  joint  committees 
chosen  from  the  Body  of  Delegates  or  consisting  of 
specially  qualified  persons  outside  of  that  Body,  for  the 
study  and  systematic  consideration  of  the  international 


102         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEjNIENT 

questions  with  which  the  Council  may  have  to  deal,  or  of 
questions  likely  to  lead  to  international  complications  or 
disputes.  It  shall  also  take  the  necessary  steps  to 
establish  and  maintain  proper  liaison  both  with  the  foreign 
offices  of  the  signatory  powers  and  with  any  governments 
or  agencies  which  may  be  acting  as  mandatories  of  the 
League  of  Nations  in  any  part  of  the  world. 

Article  III. — The  Contracting  Powers  unite  in  guar- 
anteeing to  each  other  political  independence  and  terri- 
torial integrity;  but  it  is  understood  between  them  that 
such  territorial  readjustments,  if  any,  as  may  in  the  future 
become  necessary  by  reason  of  changes  in  present  racial 
conditions  and  aspirations  or  present  social  and  political 
relationships,  pursuant  to  the  principle  of  self-determina- 
tion, and  also  such  territorial  readjustments  as  may  in  the 
judgment  of  three-fourths  of  the  Delegates  be  demanded 
by  the  welfare  and  manifest  interest  of  the  peoples  con- 
cerned, may  be  effected  if  agreeable  to  those  peoples;  and 
that  territorial  changes  may  in  equity  involve  material 
compensation.  The  Contracting  Powers  accept  without 
reservation  the  principle  that  the  peace  of  the  world  is 
superior  in  importance  to  every  question  of  Political 
jurisdiction  or  boundary. 

Article  IV.^ — The  Contracting  Powers  recognize  the 
principle  that  the  establishment  and  maintenance  of 
p)eace  will  require  the  reduction  of  national  armaments 
to  the  lowest  point  consistent  with  domestic  safety  and 
the  enforcement  by  common  action  of  international 
obligations;  and  the  Delegates  are  directed  to  formulate 
at  once  plans  by  which  such  a  reduction  may  be  brought 
about.  The  plan  so  formulated  shall  be  binding  when, 
and  only  when,  unanimously  approved  by  the  Govern- 
ments signatorj^  to  this  Covenant. 

As  the  basis  for  such  a  reduction  of  armaments,  all  the 
Powers  subscribing  to  the  Treaty  of  Peace  of  which  this 
Covenant  constitutes  a  part  hereby  agree  to  abolish 
conscription  and  all  other  forms  of  compulsory  military 
service,  and  also  agree  that  their  future  forces  of  defence 
and  of  international  action  shall  consist  of  militia  or 
volunteers,  whose  numbers  and  methods  of  training  shall 


WILSON  S  SECOND  DRAFT  OF  THE  COVENANT  103 

be  fixed,  after  expert  inquiry,  by  the  agreements  with 
regard  to  the  reduction  of  armaments  referred  to  in  the 
last  preceding  paragraph. 

The  Body  of  Delegates  shall  also  determine  for  the 
consideration  and  action  of  the  several  governments  what 
direct  military  equipment  and  armament  is  fair  and 
reasonable  in  proportion  to  the  scale  of  forces  laid  down 
in  the  programme  of  disarmament;  and  these  limits,  when 
adopted,  shall  not  be  exceeded  without  the  permission  of 
the  Body  of  Delegates. 

The  Contracting  Powers  further  agree  that  munitions 
and  implements  of  war  shall  not  be  manufactured  by 
private  enterprise  or  for  private  profit,  and  that  there  shall 
be  full  and  frank  publicity  as  to  all  national  armaments 
and  military  or  naval  programmes. 

Article  V. — The  Contracting  Powers  jointly  and 
severally  agree  that,  should  disputes  or  difiiculties  arise 
between  or  among  them  which  cannot  be  satisfactorily 
settled  or  adjusted  by  the  ordinary  processes  of  diplomacy, 
they  will  in  no  case  resort  to  armed  force  without  pre- 
viously submitting  the  questions  and  matters  involved 
either  to  arbitration  or  to  inquiry  by  the  Executive 
Council  of  the  Body  of  Delegates  or  until  there  has  been  an 
award  by  the  arbitrators  or  a  decision  by  the  Executive 
Council ;  and  that  they  will  not  even  then  resort  to  armed 
force  as  against  a  member  of  the  League  of  Nations  who 
complies  with  the  award  of  the  arbitrators  or  the  decision 
of  the  Executive  Council. 

The  Powers  signatory  to  this  Covenant  imdertake  and 
agree  that  whenever  any  dispute  or  difficulty  shall  arise 
between  or  among  them  with  regard  to  any  question  of  the 
law  of  nations,  with  regard  to  the  interpretation  of  a 
treaty,  as  to  any  fact  which  would,  if  established, 
constitute  a  breach  of  international  obligation,  or  as  to 
any  alleged  damage  and  the  nature  and  measure  of  the 
reparation  to  be  made  therefor,  if  such  dispute  or  diffi- 
culty cannot  be  satisfactorily  settled  by  the  ordinary 
processes  of  negotiation,  to  submit  the  whole  subject 
matter  to  arbitration  and  to  carry  out  in  full  good  faith 
any  award  or  decision  that  may  be  rendered. 


104         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

In  case  of  arbitration,  the  matter  or  matters  at  issue 
shall  be  referred  to  three  arbitrators,  one  of  the  three  to 
be  selected  by  each  of  the  parties  to  the  dispute,  when 
there  are  but  two  such  parties,  and  the  third  by  the  two 
thus  selected.  AVhen  there  are  more  than  two  parties  to 
the  dispute,  one  arbitrator  shall  be  named  by  each  of  the 
several  parties  and  the  arbitrators  thus  named  shall  add 
to  their  number  others  of  their  own  choice,  the  number 
thus  added  to  be  limited  to  the  number  which  will  suffice  to 
give  a  deciding  voice  to  the  arbitrators  thus  added  in  case 
of  tie  vote  among  the  arbitrators  chosen  by  the  contending 
parties.  In  case  the  arbitrators  chosen  by  the  contending 
parties  cannot  agree  upon  an  additional  arbitrator  or 
arbitrators,  the  additional  arbitrator  or  arbitrators  shall 
be  chosen  by  the  Body  of  Delegates. 

On  the  appeal  of  a  party  to  the  dispute  the  decision  of 
the  arbitrators  may  be  set  aside  by  a  vote  of  three-fourths 
of  the  Delegates,  in  case  the  decision  of  the  arbitrators  was 
unanimous,  or  by  a  vote  of  two-thirds  of  the  Delegates  in 
case  the  decision  of  the  arbitrators  was  not  unanimous, 
but  unless  thus  set  aside  shall  be  finally  binding  and  con- 
clusive. 

When  any  decision  of  arbitrators  shall  have  been  thus 
set  aside,  the  dispute  shall  again  be  submitted  to  arbitra- 
tors chosen  as  heretofore  provided,  none  of  whom  shall, 
however,  have  previously  acted  as  arbitrators  in  the 
dispute  in  question,  and  the  decision  of  the  arbitrators 
rendered  in  this  second  arbitration  shall  be  finally  binding 
and  conclusive  without  right  of  appeal. 

If  for  any  reason  it  should  prove  impracticable  to  refer 
any  matter  in  dispute  to  arbitration,  the  parties  to  the 
dispute  shall  apply  to  the  Executive  Council  to  take  the 
matter  under  consideration  for  such  mediatory  action  or 
recommendation  as  it  may  deem  wise  in  the  circumstances. 
The  Council  shall  immediately  accept  the  reference  and 
give  notice  to  the  other  part}^  or  parties  and  shall  make  the 
necessary  arrangements  for  a  full  hearing,  investigation, 
and  consideration.  It  shall  ascertain  all  the  facts  involved 
in  the  dispute  and  shall  make  sucJi  recommendations  as  it 
may  deem  wise  and  practicable  based  on  the  merits  of  the 


WILSON'S  SECOND  DRAFT  OF  THE  CO\"ENANT         105 

controversy  and  calculated  to  secure  a  just  and  lasting 
settlement.  Other  members  of  the  League  shall  place 
at  the  disposal  of  the  Executive  Council  any  and  all 
information  that  may  be  in  their  possession  which  in  any 
way  bears  upon  the  facts  or  merits  of  the  controversy; 
and  the  Executive  Council  shall  do  everything  in  its 
power  by  way  of  mediation  or  conciliation  to  bring  about 
a  peaceful  settlement.  The  decisions  of  the  Executive 
Council  shall  be  addressed  to  the  disputants,  and  shall 
not  have  the  force  of  a  binding  verdict.  Should  the 
Executive  Council  fail  to  arrive  at  any  conclusion,  it  shall 
be  the  privilege  of  the  members  of  the  Executive  Council 
to  publish  their  several  conclusions  or  recommendations; 
and  such  publications  shall  not  be  regarded  as  an  un- 
friendly act  by  either  or  any  of  the  disputants. 

Article  VI. — Should  any  contracting  Power  break  or 
disregard  its  covenants  under  Article  V,  it  shall  there- 
by ipso  facto  become  at  war  with  all  the  members  of  the 
League,  which  shall  immediately  subject  it  to  a  complete 
economic  and  financial  boycott,  including  the  severance  of 
all  trade  or  financial  relations,  the  prohibition  of  all  inter- 
course between  their  subjects  and  the  subjects  of  the 
covenant-breaking  State,  and  the  prevention,  so  far  as 
possible,  of  all  financial,  commercial,  or  personal  inter- 
course between  the  subjects  of  the  covenant-breaking 
State  and  the  subjects  of  any  other  State,  whether  a 
member  of  the  League  of  Nations  or  not. 

It  shall  be  the  privilege  and  duty  of  the  Executive 
Council  of  the  Body  of  Delegates  in  such  a  case  to  recom- 
mend what  effective  military  or  naval  force  the  members 
of  the  League  of  Nations  shall  severally  contribute,  and 
to  advise,  if  it  should  think  best,  that  the  smaller  members 
of  the  League  be  excused  from  making  any  contribution 
to  the  armed  forces  to  be  used  against  the  covenant-break- 
ing State. 

The  covenant-breaking  State  shall,  after  the  restora- 
tion of  peace,  be  subject  to  perpetual  disarmament  and 
to  the  regulations  with  regard  to  a  peace  establishment 
provided  for  new  States  under  the  terms  Supplementary 
Article  3. 


106      wooDROw  ^^aLSON  and  world  settlement 

Article  VII. — If  any  Power  shall  declare  war  or  begin 
hostilities,  or  take  any  hostile  step  short  of  war,  against 
another  Power  before  submitting  the  dispute  involved 
to  arbitrators  or  consideration  l)y  the  Executive  Council 
as  herein  provided,  or  shall  declare  war  or  begin  hostilities, 
or  take  any  hostile  step  short  of  war,  in  regard  to  any 
dispute  which  has  been  decided  adversely  to  it  by  arbitra- 
tors chosen  and  empowered  as  herein  provided,  the  Con- 
tracting Powers  hereby  bind  themselves  not  only  to  cease 
all  commerce  and  intercourse  with  that  Power  but  also  to 
unite  in  blockading  and  closing  the  frontiers  of  that 
Power  to  commerce  or  intercourse  with  any  part  of  the 
world  and  to  use  any  force  that  may  be  necessary  to 
accomplish  that  object. 

Article  \  III.^ — Any  war  or  threat  of  war,  whether 
immediately  affecting  any  of  the  Contracting  Powers  or 
not,  is  hereby  declared  a  matter  of  concern  to  the  League 
of  Nations  and  to  all  the  Powers  signatory  hereto,  and 
those  Powers  hereby  reserve  the  right  to  take  any  action 
that  may  be  deemed  wise  and  effectual  to  safeguard  the 
peace  of  nations. 

It  is  hereby  also  declared  and  agreed  to  be  the  friendly 
right  of  each  of  the  nations  signatory  or  adherent  to  this 
Covenant  to  draw  the  attention  of  the  Body  of  Delegates 
to  any  circumstances  anywhere  which  threaten  to  disturb 
international  peace  or  the  good  understanding  between 
nations  upon  which  peace  depends. 

The  Delegates  shall  meet  in  the  interest  of  peace  when- 
ever war  is  rumored  or  threatened,  and  also  whenever 
the  Delegate  of  any  Power  shall  inform  the  Delegates 
that  a  meeting  and  conference  in  the  interest  of  peace  is 
advisable. 

The  Delegates  may  also  meet  at  such  other  times  and 
upon  such  other  occasions  as  they  shall  from  time  to  time 
deem  best  and  determine. 

Article  IX. — In  the  event  of  a  dispute  arising  between 
one  of  the  Contracting  Powers  and  a  Power  not  a  party 
to  this  Covenant,  the  Contracting  Power  involved  hereby 
binds  itself  to  endeavor  to  obtain  the  submission  of  the 
dispute  to  judicial  decision  or  to  arbitration.     If  the  other 


WILSON  S  SECOND  DRAFT  OF  THE  COVENANT  107 

Power  will  not  agree  to  submit  the  dispute  to  judicial 
decision  or  to  arbitration,  the  Contracting  Power  shall 
bring  the  matter  to  the  attention  of  the  Body  of  Delegates. 
The  Delegates  shall  in  such  a  case,  in  the  name  of  the 
League  of  Nations,  invite  the  Power  not  a  party  to  this 
Covenant  to  become  ad  hoc  a  party  and  to  submit  its  case 
to  judicial  decision  or  to  arbitration,  and  if  that  Power 
consents  it  is  hereby  agreed  that  the  provisions  hereinbe- 
fore contained  and  applicable  to  the  submission  of  disputes 
to  arbitration  or  discussion  shall  be  in  all  respects  appli- 
cable to  the  dispute  both  in  favour  of  and  against  such 
Power  as  if  it  were  a  party  to  this  Covenant. 

In  case  the  Power  not  a  party  to  this  Covenant  shall 
not  accept  the  invitation  of  the  Delegates  to  become 
ad  hoc  a  party,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Executive 
Council  immediately  to  institute  an  inquiry  into  the 
circumstances  and  merits  of  the  dispute  involved  and  to 
recommend  such  joint  action  by  the  Contracting  Powers 
as  may  seem  best  and  most  effectual  in  the  circumstances 
disclosed. 

Article  X. — If  hostilities  should  be  begun  or  any 
hostile  action  taken  against  the  Contracting  Power  by 
the  Power  not  a  party  to  this  Covenant  before  a  decision 
of  the  dispute  by  arbitrators  or  before  investigation,  re- 
port and  recommendation  by  the  Executive  Council  in 
regard  to  the  dispute,  or  contrary  to  such  recommenda- 
tion, the  Contracting  Powers  shall  thereupon  cease  all 
commerce  and  communication  with  that  Power  and  shall 
also  unite  in  blockading  and  closing  the  frontiers  of  that 
Power  to  all  commerce  or  intercourse  with  any  part  of 
the  world,  employing  jointly  any  force  that  may  be  nec- 
essary to  accomplish  that  object.  The  Contracting 
Powers  shall  also  unite  in  coming  to  the  assistance  of  the 
Contracting  Power  against  which  hostile  action  has  been 
taken,  combining  their  armed  forces  in  its  behalf. 

Article  XL — In  case  of  a  dispute  between  states  not 
parties  to  this  Covenant,  any  Contracting  Power  may  bring 
the  matter  to  the  attention  of  the  Delegates,  who  shall 
thereupon  tender  the  good  offices  of  the  League  of  Nations 
with  a  view  to  the  peaceable  settlement  of  the  dispute. 


108         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

If  one  of  the  states,  a  party  to  the  dispute,  shall  offer 
and  agree  to  submit  its  interests  and  cause  of  action  wholly 
to  the  control  and  decision  of  the  League  of  Nations,  that 
state  shall  ad  hoc  be  deemed  a  Contracting  Power.  If  no 
one  of  the  states,  parties  to  the  dispute,  shall  so  offer  and 
agree,  the  Delegates  shall,  through  the  Executive  Council, 
of  their  own  motion  take  such  action  and  make  such  recom- 
mendation to  their  governments  as  will  prevent  hostilities 
and  result  in  the  settlement  of  the  dispute. 

Article  XII. — Any  power  not  a  party  to  this  Covenant, 
whose  government  is  based  upon  the  principle  of  popular 
self-government,  may  apply  to  the  Body  of  Delegates  for 
leave  to  become  a  party.  If  the  Delegates  shall  regard 
the  granting  thereof  as  likely  to  promote  the  peace,  order, 
and  security  of  the  World,  they  may  act  favorably  on 
the  application,  and  their  favorable  action  shall  operate 
to  constitute  the  Power  so  applying  in  all  respects  a  full 
signatory  party  to  this  Covenant.  This  action  shall 
require  the  affirmative  vote  of  two-thirds  of  the  Delegates. 

Article  XIII. — The  Contracting  Powers  severally 
agree  that  the  present  Covenant  and  Convention  is  ac- 
cepted as  abrogating  all  treaty  obligations  ititer  se  which 
are  inconsistent  with  the  terms  hereof,  and  solemnly 
engage  that  they  will  not  enter  into  any  engagements 
inconsistent  w^ith  the  terms  hereof. 

In  case  any  of  the  Powers  signatory  hereto  or  subse- 
quently admitted  to  the  League  of  Nations  shall,  before 
becoming  a  party  to  this  Covenant,  have  undertaken  any 
treaty  obligations  which  are  inconsistent  with  the  terms 
of  this  Covenant,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  such  Power  to 
take  immediate  steps  to  procure  its  release  from  such 
obligations. 

Supplementary  Agreements.  I. — In  respect  of  the 
peoples  and  territories  which  formerly  belonged  to  Austria- 
Hungary,  and  to  Turkey,  and  in  respect  of  the  colonies 
formerly  under  the  dominion  of  the  German  Empire,  the 
League  of  Nations  shall  be  regarded  as  the  residuary 
trustee  with  sovereign  right  of  ultimate  disposal  or  of 
continued  administration  in  accordance  with  certain  fun- 
damental principles  hereinafter  set  forth;  and  this  re- 


WILSON'S  SECOND  DRAFT  OF  THE  COVENANT         109 

version  and  control  shall  exclude  all  rights  or  privileges 
of  annexation  on  the  part  of  any  Power. 

These  principles  are,  that  there  shall  in  no  case  be  any 
annexation  of  any  of  these  territories  by  any  State  either 
within  the  League  or  outside  of  it,  and  that  in  the  future 
government  of  these  peoples  and  territories  the  rule  of 
self-determination,  or  the  consent  of  the  governed  to  their 
form  of  government,  shall  be  fairly  and  reasonably  applied 
and  all  policies  of  administration  or  economic  develop- 
ment be  based  primarily  upon  the  well-considered  interests 
of  the  people  themselves. 

II. — Any  authority,  control,  or  administration  which 
may  be  necessary  in  respect  of  these  peoples  or  territories 
other  than  their  own  self-determined  and  self-organized 
autonomy  shall  be  the  exclusive  function  of  and  shall  be 
vested  in  the  League  of  Nations  and  exercised  or  under- 
taken by  or  on  behalf  of  it. 

It  shall  be  lawful  for  the  League  of  Nations  to  delegate 
its  authority,  control,  or  administration  of  any  such 
people  or  territory  to  some  single  State  or  organized 
agency  which  it  may  designate  and  appoint  as  its  agent 
or  mandatory;  but  whenever  or  wherever  possible  or 
feasible  the  agent  or  mandatory  so  appointed  shall  be 
nominated  or  approved  by  the  autonomous  people  or 
territory. 

III. — The  degree  of  authority,  control,  or  administra- 
tion to  be  exercised  by  the  mandatary  State  or  agency 
shall  in  each  case  be  explicitly  defined  by  the  League  in 
a  Special  Act  or  Charter  which  shall  reserve  to  the  League 
complete  power  of  supervision  and  of  intimate  control, 
and  which  shall  also  reserve  to  the  people  of  any  such 
territory  or  governmental  unit  the  right  to  appeal  to  the 
League  for  the  redress  or  correction  of  any  breach  of 
the  mandate  by  the  mandatary  State  or  agency  or  for  the 
substitution  of  some  other  State  or  agency,  as  mandatary. 

The  mandatary  State  or  agency  shall  in  all  cases  be 
bound  and  required  to  maintain  the  policy  of  the  open 
door,  or  equal  opportunity  for  all  the  signatories  to  this 
Covenant,  in  respect  of  the  use  and  development  of  the 
economic  resources  of  such  people  or  territory. 


no        WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

The  mandatary  State  or  agency  shall  in  no  case  form 
or  maintain  any  military  or  naval  force  in  excess  of  defi- 
nite standards  laid  down  by  the  League  itself  for  the 
purposes  of  internal  police. 

IV. — No  new  State  arising  or  created  from  the  old 
Empires  of  Austria-Hungary,  or  Turkey  shall  be  recog- 
nized by  the  League  or  admitted  into  its  membership 
except  on  condition  that  its  military  and  naval  forces  and 
armaments  shall  conform  to  standards  prescribed  by  the 
League  in  respect  of  it  from  time  to  time. 

As  successor  to  the  Empires,  the  League  of  Nations  is 
empowered,  directly  and  without  right  of  delegation,  to 
watch  over  the  relations  inter  se  of  all  new  independent 
States  arising  or  created  out  of  the  Empires,  and  shall 
assume  and  fulfil  the  duty  of  conciliating  and  composing 
differences  between  them  wath  a  view  to  the  maintenance 
of  settled  order  and  the  general  peace. 

V.^ — The  Powers  signatory  or  adherent  to  this  Cove- 
nant agree  that  they  will  themselves  seek  to  establish  and 
maintain  fair  hours  and  humane  conditions  of  labour  for 
all  those  within  their  several  jurisdictions  who  are  engaged 
in  manual  labour  and  that  they  will  exert  their  influence 
in  favour  of  the  adoption  and  maintenance  of  a  similar 
policy  and  like  safeguards  wherever  their  industrial  and 
commercial  relations  extend. 

VI. — The  League  of  Nations  shall  require  all  new 
States  to  bind  themselves  as  a  condition  precedent  to 
their  recognition  as  independent  or  autonomous  States, 
to  accord  to  all  racial  or  national  minorities  within  their 
several  jurisdictions  exactly  the  same  treatment  and 
security,  both  in  law  and  in  fact,  that  is  accorded  the 
racial  or  national  majority  of  their  people. 


Document  13. 

Memorandum  of  Major-General  Tasker  H. 
Bliss  for  President  Wilson,  January  14,  1919, 
criticizing  the  Draft  of  the  Covenant  (auto- 
graphed original). 

AMERICAN  COMMISSION  TO  NEGOTIATE  PEACE. 

Hotel  de  Crillon,  Paris, 
January  14,  1919. 

Suggestions  in  Regard  to  the  Draft  of  the 
COVENANT. 

1.  Preamble — There  are  some  people  who  may  be 
frightened  at  the  use  of  the  words  "in  order  to  secure 
.  .  .  an  orderly  government".  They  may  regard 
this  as  a  suggestion  of  the  possible  use  of  the  League  of 
Nations  to  put  down  internal  disorders  wherever  they 
occur.  As  the  one  essential  object  of  the  League  of 
Nations  is  to  prevent  international  war,  and  as  the  pre- 
vention of  such  war  will  be  secured  by  the  doing  of  the 
things  set  forth  in  the  preamble,  and  as  the  prevention  of 
such  war  results  in  security  and  will  have  the  greatest 
tendency  to  produce  orderly  government,  it  is  suggested 
for  consideration  that  the  first  line  of  the  preamble  might 
read  as  follows: 

"In  order  to  prevent  future  international  wars  by  the 
prescription  of,"  etc.,  etc. 

2.  The  idea  in  the  word  "Covenant"  is  so  good  that 
it  is  suggested  that  it  be  adhered  to  in  the  subsequent 
phraseology,  notwithstanding  the  repetition  that  will 
necessarily  result.  Thus,  it  is  suggested,  that  the  words, 
"Contracting  Powers"  be  made  to  read  "Covenanting 

111 


112         WOODROW  \\1LS0N  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

Powers";  and  that,  wherever  the  word  "agreement" 
(referring  to  the  constitution  of  the  League  of  Nations) 
is  used,  it  be  replaced  by  the  word  "covenant." 

3.  It  is  suggested  that  there  should  be  a  positive  dec- 
laration to  provide  against  secret  treaties.  In  no  other 
way  can  the  League  be  assured  that  an  alliance  may  not 
be  formed  within  itself,  with  a  tendency  adverse  to  the 
peace  of  the  world.  It  is  suggested  that  the  right  of  the 
League  to  scrutinize  individual  treaties  should  be  confined 
to  the  object  of  determining  whether  the  treaty  is  for  the 
purpose  of  effecting  a  private  alliance. 

4.  Article  III. — In  the  second  line,  after  the  word 
"integrity,"  insert  the  words  "as  against  external  ag- 
gression." 

Do  the  words,  which  appear  in  Article  III,  "and  also 
such  territorial  readjustments  as  may  in  the  judgment 
of  ^ths  of  the  Delegates  be  demanded  by  the  welfare 
and  manifest  interest  of  the  peoples  concerned,"  con- 
template the  possibility  of  the  League  of  Nations  being 
called  upon  to  consider  such  questions  as  the  independence 
of  Ireland,  of  India,  etc.,  etc.? 

5.  Article  IV. — It  does  not  seem  that  so  important  a 
matter  as  the  reduction  of  national  armaments  should  be 
liable  to  a  veto  by  the  action  of,  possibly,  one  small  power. 
All  hope  of  disarmament  consists  in  the  action  of  the  Great 
Powers.  Until  they  agree  to  some  disarmament  there  is 
no  use  in  talking  about  the  matter.  When  they  should 
agree  to  disarm,  they  might  well  be  permitted  to  exercise 
such  pressure  as  they,  in  agreement,  should  think  prac- 
ticable in  order  to  compel  general  disarmament. 

6.  Article  V. — It  would  seem  that  some  time  limit, — 
say  one  year, — might  well  be  fixed,  within  which  an 
award  by  the  arbitrators  or  a  decision  by  the  Executive 
Council  must  be  rendered. 

In  clause  4  of  Article  V,  should  there  not  be  some  limits 
imposed  on  the  right  of  appeal? 

In  the  first  sentence  of  clause  6  of  Article  V  appear  the 
words,  "the  parties  to  the  dispute  shall  apply  to  the  Ex- 
ecutive Council,"  etc.,  etc.  In  the  second  sentence  of 
the  same  clause  appear  the  words,  "the  Council  shall 


GENERAL  BLISS  CRITICIZES  THE  COVENANT  113 

immediately  accept  the  reference  and  give  notice  to  the 
other  party  or  parties,"  etc.,  etc.  It  appears  that  a  change 
in  these  wordings  is  necessary. 

7.  Article  VI. — Is  it  the  intent  of  tliis  article  to  provide 
two  steps,  instead  of  one,  in  order  to  bring  about  the  full 
status  of  international  war?  Is  it  intended  that,  first 
of  all,  there  shall  be  a  complete  diplomatic,  economic  and 
financial  pressure  exerted,  and  that  only  in  case  this  fails 
in  attaining  its  object  there  shall  be  a  resort  to  hostile 
acts  of  war  as  contemplated  in  the  second  clause  of  Article 
\I?  If  the  latter  be  the  intent,  it  is  to  be  noted  that  the 
breaching  Power,  being  at  war  with  the  League,  may 
immediately  use  its  land  and  naval  forces  against  the 
League,  while  the  latter  must  wait  for  a  recommendation 
from  the  Executive  Council  before  the  several  members 
of  the  League  know  what  military  and  naval  forces  they 
are  to  contribute. 

In  the  third  clause  of  Article  VI,  omit  the  words  "to 
perpetual  disarmament  and";  and  change  the  figure  3  to 
the  figure  4. 

8.  In  regard  to  Articles  VI  and  VII,  it  is  again  sug- 
gested that  a  careful  consideration  be  given  to  seeing 
whether  a  form  of  words  cannot  be  used  that  will  largely 
accomplish  the  object  in  view,  without  appearing,  in  the 
mind  of  anyone,  to  yield  (with  respect  to  the  United 
States)  to  the  League  of  Nations  powers  which  are  vested 
in  the  American  Congress. 

9.  Article  X. — This  article  relates  to  a  dispute  between 
a  Contracting  Power  and  a  Power  which  is  not  a  party  to 
this  Covenant.  The  Article  provides  for  action  only  in 
the  case  when  the  Power  not  a  party  to  this  Covenant 
"takes  hostile  action  against  one  of  the  Contracting 
Powers  before  a  decision  of  the  dispute  by  arbitrators 
or  before  investigation,  report  and  recommendation  by 
the  Executive  Council  in  regard  to  the  dispute,  or  con- 
trary to  such  recommendation."  There  is  no  assumption 
that  the  Contracting  Power  itself  may  be  in  the  wrong, 
and  it  is  provided  that  all  of  the  other  Contracting  Powers 
shall  come  to  the  assistance  of  the  Contracting  Powers 
against  which  hostile  action  has  been  taken.     How  shall 


114         WOODROW  ^VILSON  ^VND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

we  provide  for  the  case  where  the  enhghtened  sense  of 
the  w^orld  holds  the  Contracting  Power  itself  to  be  in  the 
wrong? 

It  would  seem  that  careful  note  should  be  taken  of  the 
possibility  of  a  "Dred  Scott"  decision  being  made  by  the 
tribunal  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

10.  Article  XL — Under  the  second  clause  of  Article 
XI,  there  is  the  same  possibility  of  the  difficulty  which 
maj'^  occur  under  Article  X,  Two  nations  not  Covenant- 
ing Powers  may  have  a  dispute.  One  of  them,  which  is 
in  the  wrong,  offers  to  submit  its  interests  to  the  decision 
of  the  League  of  N^ations.  This  State  immediately  be- 
comes, for  the  purposes  of  the  dispute,  one  of  the  Con- 
tracting Powders;  and  as  such,  the  League  is  bound  to 
support  it,  right  or  wrong,  as  would  be  the  case  under 
Article  X. 

11.  Article  XII. — Change  the  word  "may"  at  the  end 
of  the  fourth  line  of  this  Article  to  the  word  "shall." 

SUPPLEMENTARY  AGREEMENTS. 

1.  Article  I. — It  would  seem  desirable  to  avoid  phrase- 
ology that  would  give  color  to  the  idea  that  the  proposed 
League  of  N^ations  has  for  one  of  its  principal  objects  the 
control  of  situations  growing  out  of  the  present  war.  If 
it  is  possible  to  avoid  the  use  of  the  names  "Austria- 
Hungary"  and  "Turkey"  and  "the  German  Empire" 
it  is  believed  that  it  would  be  better. 

2.  Under  the  Supplementary  Agreements,  is  it  ob- 
ligatory upon  one  of  the  Covenanting  Powers  to  accept 
the  functions  of  "agent  or  mandatory"  appointed  by  the 
League  of  Nations,  or  may  it  decline  to  exercise  this 
function? 

3.  What  financial  obligations  are  imposed  upon  a 
mandatory  which  accepts  its  functions  as  such?  It  is 
evident  that  a  mandatory  must  establish  a  quasi  super- 
vising government  of  its  own.  It  must  appoint  someone 
who  will  be  its  local  director,  and  this  latter  must  have 
a  large  staff  of  assistants.  If  the  people  of  the  L'nited 
States  accept  this  general  proposition,  they  will  have  an 
interest  in  knowing  the  expense  to  which  they  may  be 


GENERAL  BLISS  CRITICIZES  THE  COVENANT  115 

subjected.  It  is  easily  possible  that  the  representative 
or  agent  of  the  mandatory  cannot  perform  his  functions 
without  the  support  of  a  powerful  military  force.  Will 
the  United  States,  for  example,  be  expected  to  maintain 
in  some  foreign  country  an  armed  force  of  their  own  in 
order  to  perform  their  functions  as  mandatory? 

The  sole  object  of  the  proposition  of  General  Smuts 
is  to  bring  the  United  States  into  line  with  Great  Britain 
in  exercising  supervisory  control  over  certain  areas  of 
the  earth.  The  people  of  the  United  States  will  under- 
stand that  a  great  burden  is  contemplated  to  be  thrust 
upon  them  by  this  plan.  It  is  believed  that  to  secure 
good  chance  of  acceptance  by  the  United  States  these 
things  should  be  made  clear,  or  else  it  should  be  made 
clear  that  no  state  can  be  made  a  mandatory  without  its 
own  cordial  consent. 

In  the  third  clause  of  Article  III,  it  should  be  made 
clear  that  the  mandatory  state  is  not  to  maintain  a  mili- 
tary force,  of  native  troops,  in  the  state  of  which  it  is  the 
mandatory,  in  excess  of  the  standard  laid  down  by  the 
League.  This  provision  in  General  Smuts's  plan  is  evi- 
dently to  prevent  a  nation,  acting  as  mandatory  over  a 
densely  populated  area,  from  there  raising  a  great  military 
force  under  the  guise  of  internal  police,  which  might  be 
used  by  the  mandatory  in  case  of  a  war  outside  of  this 
area. 

4.  In  the  first  clause  of  Article  IV,  the  provision  with 
respect  to  conformity  to  certain  standards  as  to  military 
and  naval  forces  might  well  be  made  to  apply  to  all 
states  entering  the  League  after  the  date  of  its  creation, 
instead  of  making  them  simply  apply  to  territories  of  the 
former  empires  of  Austria-Hungary  and  of  Turkey.  This 
will  assist  in  avoiding  the  giving  to  the  League  of  Nations 
the  appearance  of  being  a  new  form  of  the  old  Holy 
Alliance. 

It  is  not  improbable  that  before  the  League  of  Nations 
can  become  an  accomplished  fact,  it  may  be  quite  as 
desirable  "to  watch  over  the  relations  inter  se  of  all  new 
and  independent  states  arising  or  created  out  of  the 
empires  of  Russia  and  Germany  as  it  is  to  do  so  over  the 


116         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

states  created  out  of  Austria-Hungary  or  Turkey.  It 
would  seem  that  this  may  be  an  additional  reason  for 
ornitting,  if  possible,  reference  to  any  existing  or  formerly 
existing  state  by  name. 

[Signed]  Tasker  H.  Bliss. 


Document  14. 

Third  draft  of  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of 
Nations  made  by  President  Wilson.  This  was 
intended  to  form  the  basis  of  the  discussion  in 
the  League  of  Nations  commission,  but  owing  to 
the  pressure  on  President  Wilson's  time  he  was 
unable  to  complete  it  to  his  satisfaction,  and 
therefore  accepted  the  compromise  Hurst-Miller 
draft  as  the  basis  of  discussion. 

COVENANT. 

PREAMBLE. 

In  order  to  secure  international  peace  and  security  by 
the  prescription  of  open,  just,  and  honorable  relations 
between  nations,  by  the  firm  establishment  of  the  under- 
standings of  international  law  as  the  actual  rule  of  con- 
duct among  governments,  and  by  the  maintenance  of 
justice  and  a  scrupulous  respect  for  all  treaty  obligations 
in  the  dealings  of  organized  peoples  with  one  another,  and 
in  order  to  promote  international  cooperation,  the  Powers 
signatory  to  this  covenant  and  agreement  jointly  and 
severally  adopt  this  constitution  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

Article  I. — The  action  of  the  Signatory  Powers  under 
the  terms  of  this  covenant  shall  be  effected  through  the 
instrumentality  of  a  Body  of  Delegates  which  shall 
consist  of  the  ambassadors  and  ministers  of  the  contracting 
Powers  accredited  to  H.  and  the  Minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs  of  H.  The  meetings  of  the  Body  of  Delegates 
shall  be  held  at  the  seat  of  government  of  H.  and  the 
Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  of  H.  shall  be  the  presiding 
officer  of  the  Body. 

Whenever  the  Delegates  deem  it  necessary  or  advisable, 
they  may  meet  temporarily  at  the  seat  of  government  of 

117 


118         WOODROW  WTLSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

B.  or  of  S.,  in  which  case  the  Ambassador  or  Minister 
to  H.  of  the  country  in  which  the  meeting  is  held  shall  be 
the  presiding  officer  pro  tempore. 

It  shall  be  the  privilege  of  any  of  the  contracting  Powers 
to  assist  its  representative  in  the  Body  of  Delegates  by 
any  method  of  conference,  counsel,  or  advice  that  may 
seem  best  to  it,  and  also  to  substitute  upon  occasion  a 
special  representative  for  its  regular  diplomatic  representa- 
tive accredited  to  H. 

Article  II. — The  Body  of  Delegates  shall  regulate 
their  own  procedure  and  shall  have  power  to  appoint  such 
committees  as  they  may  deem  necessary  to  inquire  into 
and  report  upon  any  matters  that  he  within  the  field  of 
their  action. 

It  shall  be  the  right  of  the  Body  of  Delegates,  upon  the 
initiative  of  any  member,  to  discuss,  either  publicly  or 
privately  as  it  may  deem  best,  any  matter  lying  within 
the  jurisdiction  of  the  League  of  Nations  as  defined  in 
this  covenant,  or  any  matter  likely  to  affect  the  peace  of 
the  world ;  but  all  actions  of  the  Body  of  Delegates  taken 
in  the  exercise  of  the  functions  and  powers  granted  to 
them  under  this  Covenant  shall  be  formulated  and  agreed 
upon  by  an  Executive  Council,  which  shall  act  either  by 
reference  or  upon  its  own  initiative  and  which  shall  con- 
sist of  the  representatives  of  the  Great  Powers,  together 
with  representatives  drawn  in  annual  rotation  from  two 
panels,  one  of  which  shall  be  made  up  of  the  representa- 
tives of  the  States  ranking  next  after  the  Great  Powers  and 
the  other  of  the  representatives  of  the  minor  States  (a 
classification  w^hich  the  Body  of  Delegates  shall  itself 
establish  and  may  from  time  to  time  alter) ,  such  a  number 
being  drawn  from  these  panels  as  will  be  but  one  less  than 
the  representatives  of  the  Great  Powers;  and  three  or 
more  negative  votes  in  the  Council  shall  operate  as  a 
veto  upon  any  action  or  resolution  proposed. 

All  resolutions  passed  or  actions  taken  by  the  Executive 
Council,  except  those  adopted  in  execution  of  any  direct 
powers  herein  granted  to  the  Body  of  Delegates  them- 
selves, shall  have  the  effect  of  recommendations  to  the 
several  governments  of  the  League. 


WILSON'S  THIRD  DRAFT  OF  THE  COVENANT  119 

The  Executive  Council  shall  appoint  a  permanent 
Secretariat  and  staff  and  may  appoint  joint  committees, 
chosen  from  the  Body  of  Delegates  or  consisting  of 
specially  qualified  persons  outside  of  that  Body,  for  the 
study  and  systematic  consideration  of  the  international 
questions  with  which  the  Council  may  have  to  deal,  or  of 
questions  likely  to  lead  to  international  complications  or 
disputes.  It  shall  also  take  the  necessary  steps  to  estab- 
lish and  maintain  proper  liaison  both  with  the  foreign 
offices  of  the  signatory  powers  and  with  any  governments 
or  agencies  which  may  be  acting  as  mandatories  of  the 
League  of  Nations  in  any  part  of  the  world. 

Article  III. — The  Contracting  Powers  unite  in  guar- 
anteeing to  each  other  political  independence  and  terri- 
torial integrity  as  against  external  aggression;  but  it  is 
understood  between  them  that  such  territorial  readjust- 
ments, if  any,  as  may  in  the  future  become  necessary  by 
reason  of  changes  in  present  racial  conditions  and  aspira- 
tions or  present  social  and  political  relationships,  pursuant 
to  the  principle  of  self-determination,  and  also  such 
territorial  readjustments  as  may  in  the  judgment  of 
three-fourths  of  the  Delegates  be  demanded  by  the  welfare 
and  manifest  interest  of  the  peoples  concerned,  may  be 
effected  if  agreeable  to  those  peoples  and  to  the  States  from 
which  the  territory  is  separated  or  to  which  it  is  added;  and 
that  territorial  changes  may  in  equity  involve  material 
compensation.  The  Contracting  Powers  accept  without 
reservation  the  principle  that  the  peace  of  the  world  is 
superior  in  importance  to  every  question  of  Political 
jurisdiction  or  boundary. 

Article  IV. — The  Contracting  Powers  recognize  the 
principle  that  the  establishment  and  maintenance  of 
peace  will  require  the  reduction  of  national  armaments  to 
the  lowest  point  consistent  with  domestic  safety  and  the 
enforcement  by  common  action  of  international  obliga- 
tions; and  the  Executive  Council  is  directed  to  formulate 
at  once  plans  by  which  such  a  reduction  may  be  brought 
about.  The  plan  so  formulated  shall  be  binding  when, 
and  only  when,  unanimously  approved  by  the  Govern- 
ments signatory  to  this  Covenant. 


120      ^^ooDROw  wilson  and  world  settlement 

As  the  basis  for  such  a  reduction  of  armaments,  all  the 
Powers  subscribing  to  the  Treaty  of  Peace  of  which  this 
Covenant  constitutes  a  part  hereby  agree  to  abolish  con- 
scription and  all  other  forms  of  compulsory  military 
service,  and  also  agree  that  their  future  forces  of  defense 
and  of  international  action  shall  consist  of  militia  or 
volunteers,  whose  numbers  and  methods  of  training  shall 
be  fixed,  after  expert  inquiry,  by  the  agreements  with 
regard  to  the  reduction  of  armaments  referred  to  in  the 
last  preceding  paragraph. 

The  Executive  Council  shall  also  determine  for  th^e 
consideration  and  action  of  the  several  governments  what 
direct  military  equipment  and  armament  is  fair  and 
reasonable  in  proportion  to  the  scale  of  forces  laid  down 
in  the  programme  of  disarmament;  and  these  limits,  when 
adopted,  shall  not  be  exceeded  without  the  permission  of 
the  Body  of  Delegates. 

The  Contracting  Powers  further  agree  that  munitions 
and  implements  of  war  shall  not  be  manufactured  by 
private  enterprise  or  for  private  profit,  and  that  there  shall 
be  full  and  frank  publicity  as  to  all  national  armaments 
and  military  or  naval  programmes. 

Article  V. — The  Contracting  Powers  jointly  and 
severally  agree  that  should  disputes  or  difficulties  arise 
between  or  among  them  which  cannot  be  satisfactorily 
settled  or  adjusted  by  the  ordinary  processes  of  diplomacy, 
they  will  in  no  case  resort  to  armed  force  without  pre- 
viously submitting  the  questions  and  matters  involved 
either  to  arbitration  or  to  inquiry  by  the  Executive 
Council  of  the  Body  of  Delegates  or  until  there  has  been  an 
award  by  the  arbitrators  or  a  decision  by  the  Executive 
Council;  and  that  they  will  not  even  then  resort  to  armed 
force  as  against  a  member  of  the  League  of  Nations  who 
complies  with  the  award  of  the  arbitrators  or  the  decision 
of  the  Executive  Council. 

The  Powers  signatory  to  this  Covenant  undertake  and 
agree  that  whenever  any  dispute  or  difficulty  shall  arise 
between  or  among  them  with  regard  to  any  question  of 
the  law  of  nations,  with  regard  to  the  interpretation  of  a 
treaty,  as  to  any  fact  which  would,  if  established,  con- 


WILSON'S  THIRD  DRAFT  OF  THE  COVENANT  121 

stitute  a  breach  of  international  obligation,  or  as  to  any 
alleged  damage  and  the  nature  and  measure  of  the  rep- 
aration to  be  made  therefor,  if  such  dispute  or  difficulty 
cannot  be  satisfactorily  settled  by  the  ordinary  processes 
of  negotiation,  to  submit  the  whole  subject  matter  to 
arbitration  and  to  carry  out  in  full  good  faith  any  award 
or  decision  that  may  be  rendered. 

In  case  of  arbitration,  the  matter  or  matters  at  issue 
shall  be  referred  to  three  arbitrators,  one  of  the  three  to 
be  selected  by  each  of  the  parties  to  the  dispute,  from  out- 
side their  own  nations,  when  there  are  but  two  such 
parties,  and  the  third  by  the  two  thus  selected.  When 
there  are  more  than  two  parties  to  the  dispute,  one  arbitra- 
tor shall  be  named  by  each  of  the  several  parties  and  the 
arbitrators  thus  named  shall  add  to  their  number  others 
of  their  own  choice,  the  number  thus  added  to  be  limited 
in  case  of  a  tie  vote  among  the  arbitrators  chosen  by  the 
contending  parties.  In  case  the  arbitrators  chosen  by 
the  contending  parties  cannot  agree  upon  an  additional 
arbitrator  or  arbitrators,  the  additional  arbitrator  or 
arbitrators  shall  be  chosen  by  the  Executive  Council. 

On  the  appeal  of  a  party  to  the  dispute  the  decision  of 
the  arbitrators  may  be  set  aside  by  a  vote  of  three-fourths 
of  the  Delegates,  in  case  the  decision  of  the  arbitrators  was 
unanimous,  or  by  a  vote  of  two-thirds  of  the  Delegates  in 
case  the  decision  of  the  arbitrators  was  not  unanimous, 
but  unless  thus  set  aside  shall  be  finally  binding  and  con- 
clusive. 

When  any  decision  of  arbitrators  shall  have  been  thus  set 
aside,  the  dispute  shall  again  be  submitted  to  arbitrators 
chosen  as  heretofore  provided,  none  of  whom  shall,  how- 
ever, have  previously  acted  as  arbitrators  in  the  dispute  in 
question,  and  the  decision  of  the  arbitrators  rendered  in 
this  second  arbitration  shall  be  finally  binding  and  con- 
clusive without  right  of  appeal. 

If  for  any  reason  it  should  prove  impracticable  to  refer 
any  matter  in  dispute  to  arbitration,  the  parties  to  the 
dispute  shall  apply  to  the  Executive  Council  to  take  the 
matter  under  consideration  for  such  mediatory  action  or 
recommendation  as  it  may  deem  wise  in  the  circumstances. 


Ui         WOODROW  ^^TLSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

The  Council  shall  immediately  accept  the  reference  and 
give  notice  to  the  parties,  and  shall  make  the  necessary 
arrangements  for  a  full  hearing,  investigation,  and  con- 
sideration. It  shall  ascertain  and  as  soon  as  possible 
make  public  all  the  facts  involved  in  the  dispute  and  shall 
make  such  recommendations  as  it  may  deem  wise  and 
practicable  based  on  the  merits  of  the  controversy  and 
calculated  to  secure  a  just  and  lasting  settlement.  Other 
members  of  the  League  shall  place  at  the  disposal  of  the 
Executive  Council  any  and  all  information  that  may  be  in 
their  possession  which  in  any  w^ay  bears  upon  the  facts 
or  merits  of  the  controversy;  and  the  Executive  Council 
shall  do  everything  in  its  power  by  way  of  mediation  or 
conciliation  to  bring  about  a  peaceful  settlement.  The 
decisions  of  the  Executive  Council  shall  be  addressed  to 
the  disputants,  and  shall  not  have  the  force  of  a  binding 
verdict.  Should  the  Executive  Council  fail  to  arrive  at 
any  conclusion,  it  shall  be  the  privilege  of  the  members  of 
the  Executive  Council  to  publish  their  several  conclusions 
or  recommendations;  and  such  publications  shall  not  be 
regarded  as  an  unfriendly  act  by  either  or  any  of  the 
disputants. 

Every  award  by  arbitrators  and  every  decision  by  the 
Executive  Council  upon  a  matter  in  dispute  betw^een 
States  must  be  rendered  within  twelve  months  after 
formal  reference. 

Article  VI. — Should  any  contracting  powder  break  or 
disregard  its  covenants  under  Article  V,  it  shall  thereby 
ipso  facto  be  deemed  to  have  committed  an  act  of  war 
against  all  the  members  of  the  League,  which  shall  im- 
mediately subject  it  to  a  complete  economic  and  financial 
boycott,  including  the  severance  of  all  trade  or  financial 
relations,  the  prohibition  of  all  intercourse  between  their 
subjects  and  the  subjects  of  the  covenant-breaking  State, 
and  the  prevention,  so  far  as  possible,  of  all  financial, 
commercial,  or  personal  intercourse  between  the  subjects 
of  the  covenant-breaking  State  and  the  subjects  of  any 
other  State,  whether  a  member  of  the  League  of  Nations  or 
not. 

It  shall  be  the  privilege  and  duty  of  the  Executive 


WILSON'S  THIRD  DRAFT  OF  THE  COVENANT  123 

Council  of  the  Body  of  Delegates  in  such  a  case  to  recom- 
mend what  effective  military  or  naval  force  the  members 
of  the  League  of  Nations  shall  severally  contribute,  and  to 
advise,  if  it  should  think  best,  that  the  smaller  members  of 
the  League  be  excused  from  making  any  contribution  to 
the  armed  forces  to  be  used  against  the  covenant-break- 
ing State. 

The  covenant-breaking  State  shall,  after  the  restora- 
tion of  peace,  be  subject  to  the  regulations  with  regard  to 
a  peace  establishment  provided  for  new  States  under  the 
terms  Supplementary  Article  IV. 

Article  VII. — If  any  Power  shall  declare  war  or  begin 
hostilities,  or  take  any  hostile  step  short  of  war,  against 
another  Power  before  submitting  the  dispute  involved 
to  arbitrators  or  consideration  by  the  Executive  Council 
as  herein  provided,  or  shall  declare  war  or  begin  hostilities, 
or  take  any  hostile  step  short  of  war,  in  regard  to  any 
dispute  which  has  been  decided  adversely  to  it  by  arbitra- 
tors chosen  and  empowered  as  herein  provided,  the 
Contracting  Powers  hereby  engage  not  only  to  cease  all 
commerce  and  intercourse  with  that  Power  but  also  to 
unite  in  blockading  and  closing  the  frontiers  of  that 
Power  to  commerce  or  intercourse  with  any  part  of  the 
world  and  to  use  any  force  that  may  be  necessary  to 
accomplish  that  object. 

Article  VIII. — Any  war  or  threat  of  war,  whether 
immediately  effecting  any  of  the  Contracting  Powers  or 
not,  is  hereby  declared  a  matter  of  concern  to  the  League 
of  Nations  and  to  all  the  Powers  signatory  hereto,  and 
those  Powers  hereby  reserve  the  right  to  take  any  action 
that  may  be  deemed  wise  and  effectual  to  safeguard  the 
peace  of  nations. 

It  is  hereby  also  declared  and  agreed  to  be  the  friendly 
right  of  each  of  the  nations  signatory  or  adherent  to  this 
Covenant  to  draw  the  attention  of  the  Body  of  Delegates 
or  of  the  Executive  Council  to  any  circumstances  anywhere 
which  threaten  to  disturb  international  peace  or  the  good 
understanding  between  nations  upon  w^hich  peace  depends. 

The  Delegates  and  the  Executive  Council  shall  meet  in 
the  interest  of  peace  whether  war  is  rumored  or  threatened, 


124         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

and  also  whether  the  Delegates  of  any  Power  shall  inform 
the  Delegates  that  a  meeting  and  conference  in  the  in- 
terest of  peace  is  advisable. 

The  Delegates  may  also  meet  at  such  other  times  and 
upon  such  other  occasions  as  they  shall  from  time  to  time 
deem  best  and  determine. 

Article  IX. — In  the  event  of  a  dispute  arising  between 
one  of  the  Contracting  Powers  and  a  Power  not  a  party 
to  this  Covenant,  the  Contracting  Power  involved  hereby 
binds  itself  to  endeavor  to  obtain  the  submission  of  the 
dispute  to  judicial  decision  or  to  arbitration.  If  the 
other  Power  will  not  agree  to  submit  the  dispute  to 
judicial  decision  or  to  arbitration,  the  Contracting  Power 
shall  bring  the  matter  to  the  attention  of  the  Executive 
Council.  The  Delegates  shall  in  such  a  case,  in  the  name 
of  the  League  of  Nations,  invite  the  Power  not  a  party  to 
this  Covenant  to  become  ad  hoc  a  party  and  to  submit  its 
case  to  judicial  decision  or  to  arbitration,  and  if  that 
Power  consents  it  is  hereby  agreed  that  the  provisions 
hereinbefore  contained  and  applicable  to  the  submission  of 
disputes  to  arbitration  or  discussion  shall  be  in  all  respects 
applicable  to  the  dispute  both  in  favor  of  and  against 
such  Power  as  if  it  were  a  party  to  this  Covenant. 

In  case  the  Power  not  a  party  to  this  Covenant  shall  not 
accept  the  invitation  of  the  Executive  Council  to  become 
ad  hoc  a  party,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Executive 
Council  immediately  to  institute  an  inquiry  into  the  cir- 
cumstances and  merits  of  the  dispute  involved  and  to 
recommend  such  joint  action  by  the  Contracting  Powers 
as  may  seem  best  and  most  effectual  in  the  circumstances 
disclosed. 

Article  X. — ^If  hostilities  should  be  begun  or  any 
hostile  action  taken  against  the  Contracting  Power  by  the 
Power  not  a  party  to  this  Covenant  before  a  decision  of  the 
dispute  by  arbitration  or  before  investigation,  report  and 
recommendation  by  the  Executive  Council  in  regard  to  the 
dispute,  or  contrary  to  such  recommendation,  the  Con- 
tracting Powers  engage  thereupon  to  cease  all  commerce 
and  communication  with  that  Power  and  also  to  unite  in 
blockading  and  closing  the  frontiers  of  that  Power  to  all 


WILSON'S  THIRD  DRAFT  OF  THE  COVENANT  125 

commerce  or  intercourse  with  any  part  of  the  world,  and 
to  employ  jointly  any  force  that  may  be  necessary  to 
accomplish  that  object.  The  Contracting  Powers  also 
undertake  to  unite  in  coming  to  the  assistance  of  the 
Contracting  Power  against  which  hostile  action  has  been 
taken,  and  to  combine  their  armed  forces  in  its  behalf. 

Article  XI. — ^In  case  of  a  dispute  between  states  not 
parties  to  this  Covenant,  any  Contracting  Power  may 
bring  the  matter  to  the  attention  of  the  Delegates  or  the 
Executive  Council,  who  shall  thereupon  tender  the  good 
offices  of  the  League  of  Nations  with  a  view  to  the  peace- 
able settlement  of  the  dispute. 

If  one  of  the  states,  a  party  to  the  dispute,  shall  offer  and 
agree  to  submit  its  interests  and  cause  of  action  wholly  to 
the  control  and  decision  of  the  League  of  Nations,  that 
State  shall  ad  hoc  be  deemed  a  Contracting  Power.  If  no 
one  of  the  states,  parties  to  the  dispute,  shall  so  offer  and 
agree,  the  Delegates  shall,  through  the  Executive  Council, 
of  their  own  motion  take  such  action  and  make  such 
recommendation  to  their  governments  as  will  prevent 
hostilities  and  result  in  the  settlement  of  the  dispute. 

Article  XII. — ^Any  Power  not  a  party  to  this  Cove- 
nant, whose  government  is  based  upon  the  principle  of 
popular  self-government,  may  apply  to  the  Body  of 
Delegates  for  leave  to  become  a  party.  If  the  Delegates 
shall  regard  the  granting  thereof  as  likely  to  promote  the 
peace,  order,  and  security  of  the  World,  they  shall  act 
favorably  on  the  application,  and  their  favorable  action 
shall  operate  to  constitute  the  Power  so  applying  in  all 
respects  a  full  signatory  party  to  this  Covenant.  This 
action  shall  require  the  affirmative  vote  of  two-thirds  of 
the  Delegates. 

Article  XIII. — ^The  Contracting  Powers  severally 
agree  that  the  present  Covenant  and  Convention  is 
accepted  as  abrogating  all  treaty  obligations  inter  se 
which  are  inconsistent  with  the  terms  hereof,  and  sol- 
emnly engage  that  they  will  not  enter  into  any  engagements 
inconsistent  with  the  terms  hereof. 

In  case  any  of  the  Powers  signatory  hereto  or  subse- 
quently admitted  to  the  League  of  Nations  shall,  before 


126         WOODROW  WILSON  .\]SiD  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

becoming  a  party  to  this  Covenant,  have  undertaken  any 
treaty  obhgations  which  are  inconsistent  with  the  terms  of 
this  Covenant,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  such  Power  to  take 
immediate  steps  to  procure  its  release  from  such  obliga- 
tions. 

SUPPLEMENTARY   AGREEMENTS. 

I. — In  respect  of  the  peoples  and  territories  which 
formerly  belonged  to  Austria-Hungary,  and  to  Turkey,  and 
in  respect  of  the  colonies  formerly  under  the  dominion  of 
the  German  Empire,  the  League  of  Nations  shall  be  re- 
garded as  the  residuary  trustee  with  the  right  of  oversight 
or  administration  in  accordance  with  certain  fundamental 
principles  hereinafter  set  forth;  and  this  reversion  and 
control  shall  exclude  all  rights  or  privileges  of  annexation 
on  the  part  of  any  Power. 

These  principles  are,  that  there  shall  in  no  case  be  any 
annexation  of  any  of  these  territories  by  any  State  either 
within  the  League  or  outside  of  it,  and  that  in  the  future 
government  of  these  peoples  and  territories  the  rule  of 
self-determination,  or  the  consent  of  the  governed  to  their 
form  of  government,  shall  be  fairly  and  reasonably  applied, 
and  all  policies  of  administration  or  economic  develop- 
ment be  based  primarily  upon  the  well-considered  in- 
terests of  the  people  themselves. 

II. — ^Any  authority,  control,  or  administration  which 
may  be  necessary  in  respect  of  these  peoples  or  territories 
other  than  their  own  self-determined  and  self -organized 
autonomy  shall  be  the  exclusive  functions  of  and  shall  be 
vested  in  the  League  of  Nations,  and  exercised  or  under- 
taken by  or  on  behalf  of  it. 

It  shall  be  lawful  for  the  League  of  Nations  to  delegate 
its  authority,  control,  or  administration  of  any  such 
people  or  territory  to  some  single  State  or  organized 
agency  which  it  may  designate  and  appoint  as  its  agent 
or  mandatory;  but  whenever  or  wherever  possible  or 
feasible  the  agent  or  mandatory  so  appointed  shall  be 
nominated  or  approved  by  the  autonomous  people  or 
territory. 

III. — ^The  degree  of  authority,  control,  or  administra- 


WILSON'S  THIRD  DRAFT  OF  THE  COVENANT  127 

tion  to  be  exercised  by  the  mandatory  State  or  agency  shall 
in  each  case  be  explicitly  defined  by  the  Executive  Council 
in  a  special  Act  or  Charter  which  shall  reserve  to  the 
League  complete  power  of  supervision,  and  which  shall 
also  reserve  to  the  people  of  any  such  territory  or  govern- 
mental unit  the  right  to  appeal  to  the  League  for  the  re- 
dress or  correction  of  any  breach  of  the  mandate  by  the 
mandatory  State  or  agency  or  for  the  substitution  of  some 
other  State  or  agency,  as  mandatory. 

The  mandatory  State  or  agency  shall  in  all  cases  be 
bound  and  required  to  maintain  the  policy  of  the  open 
door,  or  equal  opportunity  for  all  the  signatories  to  this 
Covenant,  in  respect  of  the  use  and  development  of  the 
economic  resources  of  such  people  or  territory. 

The  mandatory  State  or  agency  shall  in  no  case  form  or 
maintain  any  military  or  naval  force,  native  or  other,  in 
excess  of  definite  standards  laid  down  by  the  League  itself 
for  the  purposes  of  internal  police. 

Any  expense  the  mandatory  State  or  agency  may  be  put 
to  in  the  exercise  of  its  functions  under  the  mandate,  so  far 
as  they  cannot  be  borne  by  the  resources  of  the  people  or 
territory  under  its  charge  upon  a  fair  basis  of  assessment 
and  charge,  shall  be  borne  by  the  several  signatory  Powers, 
their  several  contributions  being  assessed  and  determined 
by  the  Executive  Council  in  proportion  to  their  several 
national  budgets,  unless  the  mandatory  State  or  agency  is 
willing  itself  to  bear  the  excess  costs;  and  in  all  cases  the 
expenditures  of  the  mandatory  Power  or  agency  in  the 
exercise  of  the  mandate  shall  be  subject  to  the  audit  and 
authorization  of  the  League. 

The  object  of  all  such  tutelary  oversight  and  administra- 
tion on  the  part  of  the  League  of  Nations  shall  be  to 
build  up  in  as  short  a  time  as  possible  out  of  the  people 
or  territory  under  its  guardianship  a  political  unit  which 
can  take  charge  of  its  own  affairs,  determine  its  own  con- 
nections, and  choose  its  own  policies.  The  League  may 
at  any  time  release  such  a  people  or  territory  from  tutelage 
and  consent  to  its  being  set  up  as  an  independent  unit. 
It  shall  also  be  the  right  and  privilege  of  any  people  or 
territory  to  petition  the  League  to  take  such  action,  and 


128         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

upon  such  petition  being  made  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the 
League  to  take  the  petition  under  full  and  friendly  con- 
sideration with  a  view  to  determining  the  best  interests 
of  the  people  or  territory  in  question  in  view  of  all  the 
circumstances  of  their  situation  and  development. 

IV. — No  new  State  shall  be  recognized  by  the  League 
or  admitted  into  its  membership  except  on  condition  that 
its  military  and  naval  forces  and  armaments  shall  conform 
to  standards  prescribed  by  the  League  in  respect  of  it  from 
time  to  time. 

The  League  of  Nations  is  empowered,  directly  and 
without  right  of  delegation,  to  watch  over  the  relations 
inter  se  of  all  new  independent  States  arising  or  created 
and  shall  assume  and  fulfil  the  duty  of  conciliating  and 
composing  differences  between  them  with  a  view  to  the 
maintenance  of  settled  order  and  the  general  peace. 

V. — ^The  Powers  signatory  or  adherent  to  this  Covenant 
agree  that  they  will  themselves  seek  to  establish  and 
maintain  fair  hours  and  humane  conditions  of  labor  for  all 
those  within  their  several  jurisdictions  who  are  engaged  in 
manual  labor  and  that  they  will  exert  their  influence  in 
favor  of  the  adoption  and  maintenance  of  a  similar  policy 
and  like  safeguards  wherever  their  industrial  and  com- 
mercial relations  extend. 

VI. — ^The  League  of  Nations  shall  require  all  new 
States  to  bind  themselves  as  a  condition  precedent  to  their 
recognition  as  independent  or  autonomous  States  and  the 
Executive  Council  shall  exact  of  all  States  seeking  admis- 
sion to  the  League  of  Nations  the  promise,  to  accord  to  all 
racial  or  national  minorities  within  their  several  jurisdic- 
tions exactly  the  same  treatment  and  security,  both  in 
law  and  in  fact,  that  is  accorded  the  racial  or  national 
majority  of  their  people. 

VIL — Recognizing  religious  persecution  and  intolerance 
as  fertile  sources  of  war,  the  Powers  signatory  hereto  agree, 
and  the  League  of  Nations  shall  exact  from  all  new  States 
and  all  States  seeking  admission  to  it  the  promise  that  they 
will  make  no  law  prohibiting  or  interfering  with  the  free 
exercise  of  religion,  and  that  they  will  in  no  way  discrirni- 
nate,  either  in  law  or  in  fact,  against  those  who  practise 


WILSON  S  THIRD  DRAFT  OF  THE  COVENANT  129 

any  particular  creed,  religion,  or  belief  whose  practices  are 
not  inconsistent  with  public  order  or  public  morals. 

VIII. — ^The  rights  of  belligerents  on  the  high  seas  out- 
side territorial  waters  having  been  defined  by  international 
convention,  it  is  hereby  agreed  and  declared  as  a  funda- 
mental covenant  that  no  Power  or  combinations  of  Powers 
shall  have  a  right  to  overstep  in  any  particular  the  clear 
meaning  of  the  definitions  thus  established;  but  that  it 
shall  be  the  right  of  the  League  of  Nations  from  time  to 
time  and  on  special  occasion  to  close  the  seas  in  whole  or  in 
part  against  a  particular  Power  or  particular  Powers  for  the 
purpose  of  enforcing  the  international  covenants  here 
entered  into. 

IX. — It  is  hereby  covenanted  and  agreed  by  the  Powers 
signatory  hereto  that  no  treaty  entered  into  by  them, 
either  singly  or  jointly,  shall  be  regarded  as  valid,  binding, 
or  operative  until  it  shall  have  been  published  and  made 
known  to  all  the  other  signatories. 

X. — ^It  is  further  covenanted  and  agreed  by  the  signa- 
tory Powers  that  in  their  fiscal  and  economic  regulations 
and  policy  no  discrimination  shall  be  made  between  one 
nation  and  another  among  those  with  which  they  have 
commercial  and  financial  dealings. 


Document  15. 

British  draft  of  Covenant  for  the  League  of 
Nations  (printed),  dated  January  20,  1919,  with 
letter  of  transmittal  of  the  same  date  from  Lord 
Robert  Cecil  (autograph)  to  President  Wilson. 

Confidential. 

(Seal)  BRITISH  DELEGATION,  PARIS. 

SO  Jan:  1919. 
Dear  Mr.  President 

I  send  you  in  accordance  with  my  promise  a  copy  of 
the  Draft  Convention  prepared  by  the  British  League 
of  Nations  Section.  It  has  not  yet  been  considered  by 
the  Cabinet  though  in  its  general  lines  it  has  been  ap- 
proved by  them.  It  would  have  reached  you  some  days 
ago  but  for  difficulties  in  printing. 

Yours  very  sincerely, 
[Signed]  Robert  Cecil. 

Secret. 

January  20,  1919. 

League  of  Nations. 

DRAFT   CONVENTION. 

Chapter  I. 

functions  and  organisation  of  the  league. 

1.  Impressed  by  the  horrors  of  the  late  War,  and  con- 
vinced that  another  war  of  the  same  kind  would  be  pro- 
ductive of  still  greater  disasters  to  humanity  and  civili- 
sation, the  High  Contracting  Parties^  unite  in  constituting 
a  League  of  Nations. 

'Hereinafter  referred  to  as  the  H.C.P. 

130 


BRITISH  DRAFT  OF  THE  COVENANT  131 

The  primary  object  of  the  League  is  the  promotion  of 
peace  among  the  nations  of  the  world.  With  this  intent 
the  H.C.P.  solemnly  pledge  themselves  to  co-operate  in 
the  League  for  the  prevention  of  war  by  eliminating,  so  far 
as  possible,  the  causes  of  international  disputes,  by  pro- 
viding for  the  pacific  settlement  of  such  disputes  should 
they  arise,  and  by  encouraging  a  general  system  of  inter- 
national co-operation  for  promoting  the  peaceful  progress 
of  mankind. 

(1)  For  achieving  these  ends  the  H.C.P.  adopt  the  fol- 
lowing measures: — 

(i)  They  enter  into  the  obUgations  intended  to  secure 
the  avoidance  of  war  which  are  contained  in  Chap- 
ter II  of  this  Convention. 
(ii)  They  undertake  to  respect  the  territorial  integrity 
of    all    States    members    of    the    League,    and   to 
protect   them   from   foreign    aggression,  and  they 
agree  to  prevent   any   attempts    by  other   States 
forcibly  to  alter  the  territorial  settlement  existing 
at   the   date   of,   or   established    by,   the   present 
treaties  of  peace. 
(iii)  They  recognise  the  duty  incumbent  upon  the  more 
advanced   members    of  the  family   of  nations  to 
render  help  and  guidance,  under  the  sanction  of 
the  League,  in  the  development  of  the  administra- 
tion of  States  and  territories  which  have  not  yet 
attained  to  stable  government. 
(iv)  They    entrust  to   the  League   the  general   super- 
vision of  the  trade  in  arms  and  ammunition  with 
the  countries  in  which  the  control  of  this  traffic  is 
necessary  in  the  common  interest. 
(v)  They  will  endeavor  to  secure  and  maintain  free- 
dom of  transit  and  just  treatment  for  the  commerce 
of  all  States  members  of  the  League. 
(vi)  They    appoint  commissions  to  study  and  report 
to  the  League  on  economic,   sanitary,  and  other 
similar    problems    of    international    concern,    and 
they  authorize    the   League  to    recommend  such 
action  as  these  reports  may  show  to  be  necessary. 
(vii)  They  appoint   a  commission  to  study  conditions 


132         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

of  industry  and  labor  in  their  international  aspects, 
and  to  make  recommendations  thereon,  including 
the  extension  and  improvement  of  existing  con- 
ventions. 
Stipulations  for  securing  the  above  objects  are  embodied 
in  separate  Conventions  annexed  hereto  or  in  the  general 
treaties  of  peace. 

(2)  The  H.C.P.  place  under  the  control  of  the  League 
all  international  bureaux  established  by  general  treaties 
and  now  located  elsewhere  if  the  parties  to  such  treaties 
consent.  Furthermore,  they  agree  that  all  such  interna- 
tional bureaux  to  be  constituted  in  future  shall  be  placed 
under  the  supervision  of  the  League  and  shall  be  located 
at  the  capital  of  the  League. 

2.  If  at  any  time  it  should  appear  that  the  boundaries 
of  any  State  guaranteed  by  Article  I  (i),  (ii)  do  not 
conform  to  the  requirements  of  the  situation,  the  League 
shall  take  the  matter  under  consideration  and  may  rec- 
ommend to  the  parties  affected  any  modification  which 
it  may  think  necessary.  If  such  recommendation  is  re- 
jected by  the  parties  affected,  the  States  members  of  the 
League  shall,  so  far  as  the  territory  in  question  is  con- 
cerned, cease  to  be  under  the  obligation  to  protect  the 
territory  in  question  from  forcible  aggression  by  other 
States,  imposed  upon  them  by  the  above  provision. 

3.  The  H.C.P.  agree  to  accept  as  the  basis  of  the  or- 
ganization of  the  League  the  provisions  contained  in 
the  following  articles. 

4.  A  General  Conference  of  the  League  shall  be  held 
within  six  months  of  the  date  when  the  present  Conven- 
tion comes  into  force,  and  similar  conferences  shall  be 
held  from  time  to  time  as  occasion  may  require,  and  in 
any  case  at  intervals  of  not  more  than  four  years. 

A  General  Conference  of  the  League  shall  be  composed 
of  responsible  representatives  of  the  States  members  of 
the  League. 

The  meetings  of  the  General  Conference  of  the  League 
are  referred  to  in  the  present  Convention  as  the  Confer- 
ence of  the  League. 

5.  The  H.C.P.  appoint  the  following  States  members 


BRITISH  DRAFT  OF  THE  COVENANT  133 

of  the  League  to  constitute  the  Council  of  the  League: 
France,  Great  Britain,  Italy,  Japan,  and  the  United 
States  of  America.  The  Council  may  at  any  time  co-opt 
additional  members.  Except  as  provided  hereafter,  no 
State  shall  be  represented  at  any  meeting  of  the  Council 
by  more  than  two  members. 

Meetings  of  the  Council  shall  be  held  from  time  to 
time  as  occasion  may  require,  and  in  any  case  at  intervals 
of  not  more  than  one  year. 

6.  The  Council  of  the  League  will  be  responsible  for 
ensuring  the  successful  working  of  the  League  of  Nations, 
and  for  seeing  that  it  secures  the  harmonious  co-operation 
of  all  the  States  members  of  the  League. 

In  particular,  it  is  charged  with  the  duty  of  watching 
over  the  development  of  the  new  States  which  may  be 
recognized  by  the  general  treaties  of  peace,  and  of  settling 
all  differences  which  may  arise  between  them  connected 
with  the  arrangements  effected  by  those  treaties. 

7.  The  Council  shall  invite  any  State  member  of  the 
League  to  send  representatives  to  any  meeting  of  the 
Council  at  which  matters  affecting  that  State  will  be 
under  discussion. 

No  decision  on  any  matter  directly  affecting  the  inter- 
ests of  a  State  member  of  the  League  which  is  not  repre- 
sented on  the  Council  will  be  binding  upon  any  such  State 
unless  its  representatives  have  been  invited  to  the  meeting 
when  the  decisions  in  question  were  taken. 

8.  The  Conference  of  the  League  shall  regulate  its  own 
procedure,  and  may  appoint  committees  for  any  purpose 
it  may  deem  convenient.  In.  all  matters  covered  by  this 
Article  the  Conference  may  decide  by  a  majority  of  the 
representatives  present  at  any  meeting.  The  provisions 
of  this  Article  apply  also  to  the  Council  of  the  League. 

9.  There  shall  be  established  a  permanent  international 
secretariat  of  the  League.  The  secretariat  shall  be  under 
the  general  control  and  direction  of  the  Chancellor  of  the 
League,  who  shall  hold  office  during  the  pleasure  of  the 
Council.  The  first  Chancellor  of  the  League  shall  be 
the  person  named  in  the  Protocol  hereto.  Any  successor 
shall  be  appointed  by  the  Council. 


134         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

10.  The  Chancellor  of  the  League  shall  be  assisted  by 
such  number  of  assistant  secretaries  as  he  may  find  it 
necessary  to  appoint  and  such  further  staff  as  he  may 
think  necessary  within  the  limits  of  the  expenditure  which 
may  be  authorized. 

11.  The  Chancellor  shall  act  as  the  Secretary  of  the 
Conference  of  the  League  and  of  the  Council  of  the  League, 
and  will  be  responsible  to  them  for  such  duties  as  may 
be  entrusted  to  him. 

12.  Representatives  of  the  States  members  of  the  League 
attending  meetings  of  the  League,  the  representatives 
of  the  H.C.P.  at  the  capital  of  the  League,  the  Chancellor 
and  the  members  of  the  permanent  secretariat  of  the 
League,  and  the  members  of  any  judicial  or  administra- 
tive organ  or  of  any  commission  of  enquiry  working  under 
the  sanction  of  the  League,  shall  enjoy  diplomatic  privi- 
leges and  immunities  while  they  are  engaged  in  the 
business  of  the  League. 

All  buildings  occupied  by  the  League,  or  by  any  or- 
ganization placed  under  the  control  of  the  League,  or 
by  any  of  its  officials,  or  by  the  representatives  of  the 
H.C.P.  at  the  capital  of  the  League  shall  enjoy  the  benefits 
of  extra -territoriality. 

13.  The  Secretariat  of  the  League  shall  be  established 
at  .  This  City  shall  constitute  the  capital 
of  the  League.  The  meetings  of  the  Conference  of  the 
League  and  of  the  Council  of  the  League  shall  be  held 
at  the  capital  of  the  League,  or  in  such  other  place  as 
may  be  determined. 

14.  Each  of  the  H.C.P.  may  maintain  a  representative 
at  the  capital  of  the  League. 

15.  The  expenses  of  the  League,  other  than  those 
occasioned  by  meetings  of  the  Council  of  the  League, 
shall  be  borne  by  the  States  members  of  the  League,  in 
accordance  with  the  distribution  among  the  members  of 
the  Postal  Union  of  the  expenses  of  the  International 
Postal  Bureau.  The  expenses  occasioned  by  the  meetings 
of  the  Council  of  the  League  shall  be  divided  equally 
among  the  States  represented  on  the  Council. 

16.  The   H.C.P.    recognize    the   right    of   the    British 


BRITISH  DRAFT  OF  THE  COVENANT  135 

Empire  to  separate  representation  in  respect  of  the  Do- 
minions of  the  British  Empire,  including  India,  at  meet- 
ings of  the  Conference  of  the  League,  and  also  at  meetings 
of  the  Council,  at  which  matters  affecting  any  particular 
Dominion  are  under  discussion. 

Chapter  II. 
avoidance  of  war. 

1.  Each  of  the  States  members  of  the  League  agrees 
that  it  will  not,  except  in  accordance  with  Article  12,  go 
to  war  with  another  State  member  of  the  League : — 

(a)  without   submitting   the   matter   in  dispute   to  a 

Court  of  International  Law  or  to  the  Conference 
or  the  Council  of  the  League;  and 

(b)  until  the  Court  or  the  Conference  or  the  Council 
of  the  League  has  had  reasonable  time  to  render 
its  decision  or  report  on  the  matter,  provided  that 
in  the  case  of  the  Conference  or  of  the  Council 
the  time  shall  not  exceed  months;  and 

(c)  within  a  period  of  three  months  after  the  render- 

ing of  the  decision  or  the  report,  including  for  this 
purpose  a  majority  report,  or  after  the  expiration 
of  the  reasonable  period  referred  to  in  (b) ; 
and  also  that  it  will  not  go  to  war  with  another  State 
member  of  the  League  which  complies  with  the  decision 
of  the  Court  or,  subject  to  Article  9,  with  the  recom- 
mendations of  the  Conference  or  of  the  Council. 

2.  If  there  should  arise  between  States  members  of  the 
League  any  dispute  likely  to  lead  to  a  rupture,  which 
both  parties  agree  to  refer  to  the  decision  of  a  court  of 
international  law,  or  which  under  some  convention  be- 
tween them  either  party  is  entitled  to  claim  as  of  right 
should  be  referred  to  the  decision  of  a  court  of  inter- 
national law,  the  parties  or  party  as  the  case  may  be 
shall  inform  the  Chancellor  of  the  League,  who  shall 
forthwith  make  all  necessary  arrangements  for  bringing 
the  dispute  before  the  Court  accordingly.  All  questions 
of  procedure  shall,  if  not  settled  by  agreement  between 
the  parties,  be  decided  by  the  Court,  and,  pending  the 


136         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

assembly  of  the  Court,  may  be  decided  by  the  Chancel- 
lor. 

3.  Pending  the  creation  of  a  permanent  court  of  inter- 
national justice,  the  court  of  international  law  to  which 
the  case  is  referred  under  the  preceding  article  shall  be 
the  court  agreed  on  by  the  parties  or  stipulated  in  the 
convention  existing  between  them. 

4.  If  there  should  arise  between  two  States  members 
of  the  League  any  dispute  likely  to  lead  to  a  rupture 
which  is  not  submitted  to  a  court  of  international  law 
under  Article  2,  it  shall  be  open  to  either  of  them  to  de- 
mand the  reference  of  the  matter  to  the  League.  The 
object  of  the  League  in  dealing  with  the  matter  shall  be 
to  effect  a  just  and  lasting  settlement  of  the  difference. 
The  Chancellor  of  the  League  shall  in  that  case  convoke 
a  meeting  of  the  Council  of  the  League  at  such  place  as 
may  be  deemed  most  convenient  under  the  circumstances, 
and  the  Council  shall  forthwith  proceed  with  the  inves- 
tigation of  the  dispute. 

5.  In  the  event  of  any  State  represented  on  the  Council 
or  of  any  party  to  the  dispute  notifying  the  Chancellor 
within  a  period  of  14  days  after  the  demand  for  reference 
to  the  League  that  in  its  opinion  the  dispute  is  one  which 
should  be  referred  to  the  Conference,  the  Chancellor  shall 
convoke  a  meeting  of  the  Conference.  Pending  the 
assembly  of  the  Conference,  the  investigation  of  the  dis- 
pute by  the  Council  shall  continue. 

6.  The  party  upon  whose  demand  the  matter  has  been 
referred  to  the  League  shall  file  with  the  Chancellor  of  the 
League  a  statement  of  its  case  with  all  the  facts  and  papers 
relevant  to  the  dispute.  The  party  against  whom  the  com- 
plaint is  made  shall  be  invited  by  the  Chancellor  to  file  a 
statement  of  its  case  with  all  relevant  facts  and  papers. 

The  Chancellor  shall  forthwith  publish  the  statements 
of  the  parties. 

The  H.C.P.  agree  that,  in  the  case  of  the  reference  of 
any  dispute  to  the  League  under  Article  4,  they  will  each, 
whether  parties  to  the  dispute  or  not,  place  at  the  dis- 
posal of  the  Conference  or  the  Council  to  the  fullest 
possible  extent  compatible  with  their  interests  all  the  in- 


BRITISH  DRAFT  OF  THE  COVENANT  137 

formation    in    their    possession    which    bears    upon    the 
questions  under  discussion.  ,  ^    i     u       u 

7.  WTiere  the  Conference  or  the  Council  finds  that  the 
dispute  can  with  advantage  be  submitted  to  a  court  of 
international  law,  or  that  any  particular  question  m- 
volved  in  the  dispute  can  with  advantage  be  referred  to 
a  court  of  international  law,  it  may  submit  the  dispute 
or  the  particular  question  accordingly,  and  may  formulate 
the  questions  for  decision,  and  may  give  such  directions 
as  to  procedure  as  it  may  think  desirable.  In  such  case, 
the  decision  of  the  Court  shall  have  no  force  or  effect 
unless  it  is  confirmed  by  the  Report  of  the  Conference 

or  Council.  . 

Pending  the  creation  of  a  permanent  court  ot  inter- 
national justice,  the  court  of  international  law  referred  to 
in  this  article  shall  be  a  tribunal  of  arbitration  nominated 
by  the  Conference  or  the  Council  from  among  the  members 
of  the  Permanent  Court  created  by  the  Convention  for  the 
Pacific  Settlement  of  International  Disputes. 

8.  W'liere  the  dispute  is  under  investigation  by  the 
Council,  the  Council  shall,  after  considering  the  merits  of 
the  dispute,  and  the  decision  of  a  court  under  Article  7, 
make  a  report  to  the  H.C.P. 

9.  \^liere  the  efforts  of  the  Conference  or  of  the  Council 
have  led  to  the  settlement  of  the  dispute,  a  statement 
shall  be  prepared  for  publication  indicating  the  nature  of 
the  dispute  and  the  terms  of  settlement,  together  with 
such  explanations  as  may  be  appropriate. 

If  the  dispute  has  not  been  settled,  the  report  of  the 
Council  to  the  H.C.P.,  or  a  similar  report  by  the  Confer- 
ence, shall  be  published.  This  report  shall  set  forth,  with 
all  necessary  facts  and  explanations,  the  recommendations 
which  the  Council  or  Conference  think  just  and  proper 
for  the  settlement  of  the  dispute.  If  the  Report  is  unani- 
mously agreed  to  by  the  members  of  the  Conference  or 
Council,  other  than  the  parties  to  the  dispute,  the  H.C.P. 
hereby  agree  that  none  of  them  will  go  to  war  with  any 
party  which  complies  with  its  provisions  and  that  they 
will  take  all  the  measures  described  in  Articles  12  and  13 
to  prevent  any  other  Power  going  to  war  with  such  party. 


138        WOODROW  \\^LSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

If  no  unanimous  report  can  be  made  it  shall  be  the  duty 
of  the  majority  to  issue  a  report  indicating  what  they 
believe  to  be  the  facts  and  containing  the  recommenda- 
tions which  they  consider  just  and  proper. 

10.  The  Council  may  at  any  time  in  the  course  of  its 
investigation  of  a  dispute,  or  within  a  period  of  three 
months  after  the  making  of  its  report,  convoke  a  meeting 
of  the  Conference  and  transfer  to  it  the  consideration  of 
the  dispute. 

11.  Where  any  dispute  arises  between  any  States, 
whether  members  of  the  League  or  not,  which,  in  the 
opinion  of  the  Council,  may  lead  to  a  rupture,  the  Council 
may  take  the  dispute  into  consideration,  and  may  deal 
with  it  as  though  it  had  been  referred  to  the  League  under 
Article  4,  or  in  such  other  way  as  will  in  their  opinion  best 
conduce  to  the  peace  of  the  world. 

12.  The  H.C.P.  agree  that,  in  the  event  of  any  State 
member  of  the  League  committing  a  breach  of  Article  1, 
it  will  become,  ipso  facto,  at  war  with  all  the  other  States 
members  of  the  League;  they  will  all  regard  each  other  as 
co-belligerents,  and  will  take  and  support  each  other  in 
taking  all  such  naval,  military  or  economic  measures  as 
will  best  avail  for  restraining  the  breach  of  covenant. 

In  particular,  they  shall  each  forthwith  take  all  meas- 
ures necessary  to  suspend  financial,  commercial,  postal, 
and  telegraphic  relations  with  such  state,  and,  as  far  as 
possible,  shall  prevent  that  State  from  having  any  such 
relations  with  any  other  Power. 

13.  For  the  above  purposes,  each  of  the  H.C.P.  agrees 
that  it  will  detain  all  ships  and  goods  within  its  juris- 
diction belonging  to  any  person  resident  in  that  State; 
it  will  prohibit  all  vessels  flying  the  flag  of  its  mercantile 
marine  from  entering  the  ports  of  that  State;  it  will  pro- 
hibit all  exports  to  or  imports  from,  and  all  financial  trans- 
actions direct  or  indirect,  with  any  person  in  the  territory 
of  such  State;  and  it  will  also  take  such  further  economic 
and  commercial  measures  as  the  League  may  deem  nec- 
essary. 

Furthermore,  each  of  the  H.C.P.  agrees  that,  if  it 
cannot  make  an  effective  contribution  of  naval,  military, 


BRITISH  DRAFT  OF  THE  COVENANT  139 

or  aerial  force,  it  will  co-operate  to  the  utmost  of  its  power 
in  the  naval  and  military  measures  which  may  be  taken. 
The  naval,  military,  and  economic  operations  under- 
taken in  pursuance  of  this  article  and  of  the  immediately 
preceding  article  shall  be  carried  out  without  regard  to 
any  limitations  hitherto  imposed  on  belligerent  States  by 
any  convention  or  rule  of  international  law. 

14.  The  H.C.P.  agree,  further,  that  they  will  mutually 
support  one  another  in  the  financial  and  economic  meas- 
ures which  they  are  bound  to  take  under  the  preceding 
article  in  order  to  minimise  the  loss  and  inconvenience  re- 
sulting therefrom,  and  that  they  will  mutually  support 
one  another  in  resisting  any  special  measures  aimed  at 
one  of  their  number  by  the  State  wdth  which  relations 
have  been  broken  off,  and  that  they  will  afford  passage 
through  their  territory  to  the  armed  forces  of  any  of  the 
H.C.P.  who  are  co-operating  to  resist  the  breach  of  Article  1 . 

15.  The  H.  C.  P.  agree  that,  as  part  of  the  terms  of 
peace  imposed  upon  the  State  which  has  violated  the 
provisions  of  Article  1 ,  it  shall  be  called  upon  to  restore  all 
contracts  existing  at  the  date  of  the  outbreak  of  hostilities 
between  their  nationals  and  the  nationals  of  the  enemy 
State  which  their  nationals  wish  to  maintain,  and  also  to 
provide  without  reciprocity  security  for  the  payment  of  all 
debts  owing  at  that  date  to  nationals  of  the  co-operating 
States  members  of  the  League. 

16.  In  the  event  of  disputes  between  one  State  member 
of  the  League  and  another  State  which  is  not  a  member  of 
the  League  or  between  two  States  neither  of  which  is  a 
member  of  the  League,  the  H.  C.  P.  agree  that  the  State  or 
States  not  members  of  the  League  shall  be  invited  to 
become  members  of  the  League  ad  hoc,  and  the  above 
provisions  shall  be  applied  with  such  modifications  as 
may  be  necessary. 

Chapter  III. 

GENERAL. 

1.  The  H.  C.  P.  agree  that  the  provisions  of  this  Con- 
vention   shall   override   any   previously    existing   treaty 


UO         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

stipulations  which  may  be  inconsistent  by  which  they  may 
be  bound  to  any  other  members  of  the  League.  Further- 
more, they  agree  that  they  will  not  enter  into  treaty 
engagements  in  future  which  are  inconsistent  with  it. 

2.  Powers  not  represented  at  the  present  Conference 
may  be  invited  to  become  parties  to  the  present  Conven- 
tion. These  invitations  will  be  conveyed  by  the  Chancel- 
lor of  the  League. 

3.  Powers  not  invited  to  become  parties  to  the  present 
Convention  may  apply  for  leave  to  become  parties.  The 
League  shall  in  such  case  decide  whether  the  Power  so 
applying  can  be  relied  on  to  observe  the  terms  of  the 
Conventions,  and,  if  not,  the  League  may  refuse  the 
application,  or,  alternatively,  may  impose  upon  such 
Power  such  further  conditions  as  it  may  deem  necessary. 

4.  The  provisions  of  this  Convention  shall  come  into 
effect  so  soon  as  it  has  been  ratified  by  Great  Britain,  the 
United  States  of  America,  France,  Italy,  and  Japan. 

NOTES  ON  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  DRAFT  CONVENTION. 

Note  to  Chapter  I. 

The  Conventions  to  be  annexed  to  the  Covenant  will  be, 
roughly,  the  following: 

(a)  Conventions  defining  territorial  settlements; 

(b)  Conventions  defining  the  responsibilities  of  manda- 
tory States; 

(c)  Conventions     dealing    with    arms     traffic,    liquor 

traffic,  and  other  tutelage  of  backward  races; 

(d)  Conventions  defining  general  economic  policy  (e.  g., 
transit,  air,  trade  conditions) ; 

(e)  Conventions  dealing  with  international  labor  con- 

ditions; 

(f)  Conventions  establishing  the  legal  machinery  of  the 

League; 

(g)  Conventions  dealing  with  standard  international 
activities  of  a  more  scientific  or  technical  character 
(e.  g..  Health); 

and  establishing  in  each  case  the  international  organs, 
whether  Commissions  of  Enquiry  or  Administrative  or 


BRITISH  DRAFT  OF  THE  COVENANT  141 

semi-Administrative  Commissions,  required  to  carry  out 
the  terms  of  each  Convention. 

These  Conventions  will  probably  include  not  only  new 
Conventions  signed  at  Paris;  but  a  number  of  existing, 
agreements  which  the  League  will  take  over  (e.  g.,  existing 
agreements  under  (g),  such  as  the  Postal  Union). 

Note  to  Chapter  /,  Article  10. 

The  duties  of  the  Chancellor  should  be  somewhat  as 
follows,  and  directions  to  that  effect  might  be  given  to  him 
by  the  States  composing  the  Council  in  the  protocol. 

(a)  He  should  convene  the  meetings  of  the  Conference 
and  the  Council,  prepare  the  work  of  these  meet- 
ings, and  record  the  business  transacted  at  them. 

(b)  He  should  facilitate  and  register  the  results  of  the 
work  of  the  various  international  organs  indicated 
in  the  Note  to  Chapter  I,  and,  in  this  connection, 
he  should  carry  out  the  provisions  of  Chapter  I, 
article  1  (2)  of  the  Convention. 

(c)  He  should  take  the  action  required  of  him  in  con- 

nection with  international  disputes,  as  provided  in 
Chapter  II. 

(d)  He  should  register  all  international  treaties  brought 
to  the  cognisance  of  the  League. 

(e)  In  general,  he  should  collect,  for  the  information  of 
the  Council  and  the  Conference,  all  facts  affecting 
the  purposes  and  obligations  of  the  League. 

(f)  The  Conference  and  Council  of  the  League  should 

correspond  through  him,  as  the  sole  responsible 
channel,  with  the  member  States,  with  the  inter- 
national bodies  indicated  under  (b)  and  with  any 
court  of  international  law  or  conciliation  operating 
in  pursuance  of  this  Convention. 

(g)  He  should  maintain  current  relations  at  the  capital 
of  the  League  with  any  official  representatives 
whom  the  member  States  may  accredit  to  the 
League. 

(h)  He  should,  at  the  request  of  two  or  more  member 
States,  make  arrangements  for  any  official  inter- 
State  meetings  which  it  may  be  desired  to  hold. 


142         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

(i)  He  should  make  similar  arrangements  for  any 
unofficial  meetings  of  an  international  character 
which  he,  as  the  representative  of  the  Council, 
may  consider  it  advisable  to  invite  to  the  capital 
of  the  League. 

Note  to  Chapter  7,  Article  11. 

It  might  be  well  to  agree  in  a  protocol  that  the  Council 
shall,  in  the  first  instance,  direct  the  Chancellor  to  select 
the  secretariat  in  a  particular  way.  Such  a  protocol, 
signed  by  the  States  composing  the  Council,  might 
stipulate  that  the  Chancellor  shall  appoint  ten  permanent 
secretaries  at  his  discretion,  subject  to  the  following 
provisions : — 

He  shall  choose  one  national  of  each  of  the  States 
members  of  the  Council,  two  nationals  of  two 
European  States  not  members  of  the  Council,  one 
national  of  one  of  the  States  of  America  other  than 
the  United  States,  and  two  nationals  of  any  States 
members  of  the  League  at  his  discretion.  Before 
appointing  a  national  of  any  State,  the  Chancellor 
ought,  however,  to  secure  the  approval  of  the 
Government  of  such  State,  and  the  Council  should 
have  the  right  to  veto  any  given  appointment  by 
unanimous  vote. 

Note  to  Chapter  III,  Articles  1  and  2. 

1.  On  the  assumption,  as  a  matter  of  procedure,  that 
the  Convention  will  in  the  first  instance  be  negotiated 
and  initialled  by  the  States  forming  the  Council  of  the 
League,  and  that  it  will  then  be  offered  for  signature, 
during  the  Conference  of  Peace,  to  all  the  other  States 
represented  at  that  Conference  (except  the  enemy 
Powers) ,  it  is  suggested  that  a  protocol  should  be  annexed 
to  the  Convention,  as  originally  initialled,  naming  the 
States  to  whom  invitations  should  be  issued  as  soon  as 
the  Convention  is  finally  signed  by  the  States  represented 
at  the  Conference.  It  is  suggested  that  invitations 
should  be  issued  as  follows: 

(a)  to  any  States  at  war  with  Germany,  or  having 


BRITISH  DRAFT  OF  THE  COVENANT  148 

broken  off  diplomatic  relations  with  her,  which 
may  not  be  represented  at  the  Conference. 
(N.  B. — ^It  is  possible  that  the  United  States  may 
advise  against  the  inclusion  of  some  Latin-Amer- 
ican State  coming  within  this  category,  e.  g., 
Costa  Rica.) 

(b)  To    European    neutrals,    i.  e.,    Sweden,    Norway, 
Denmark,  Holland,  Switzerland,  and  Spain; 

(c)  to  Latin-American  States  not  represented  at  the 

present  Peace  Conference,  except  Mexico,  Hayti, 
San  Domingo,  and  any  other  State  which,  in  the 
opinion  of  the  United  States,  may  be  considered 
unready  for  membership  (without  prejudice  to  the 
right  of  such  State  to  apply  for  membership  under 
Article  17). 

(d)  to  Persia. 

2.  The  protocol  should  further  set  out  that  invitations 
should  be  issued  to  new  States  recognized  as  sovereign 
and  independent  by  the  Peace  Conference.  Jugo-Slavia 
would  be  included  in  this  class  of  States,  unless  it  were 
organically  united  to  Serbia. 

3.  The  policy  with  regard  to  the  admission  to  the 
League  of  enemy  Powers,  i.  e.,  Germany,  Austria,  Hun- 
gary, Bulgaria,  and  Turkey,  remains  to  be  decided.  On 
the  whole,  it  might  be  well  to  state  in  a  protocol  that  they 
will  be  invited  to  apply,  under  Article  17,  "when  they 
have  given  proof  of  their  genuine  acceptance  of  the 
present  Convention,  of  the  treaties  and  agreements 
annexed  thereto,  and  of  the  present  general  treaties  of 
peace,  and  of  their  determination  to  abide  by  these  obliga- 
tions." 

Russia  cannot  probably  be  invited  to  adhere,  but  it 
may  be  advisable  to  state  in  a  protocol  the  reasons  for 
this  omission. 


Document  16. 

Hurst -Miller  compromise  draft  of  the  League 
of  Nations  Covenant  used  as  the  basis  of  dis- 
cussion in  the  League  of  Nations  Commission. 
Introduced  at  first  meeting,  February  3,  1919 
(printed  as  annex  to  minutes  of  the  Commission). 

DRAFT  COVENANT. 

PREAMBLE. 

In  order  to  secure  international  peace  and  security  by 
the  acceptance  of  obhgations  not  to  resort  to  the  use  of 
armed  force,  by  the  prescription  of  open,  just  and  hon- 
orable relations  between  nations,  by  the  firm  estabhsh- 
ment  of  the  understandings  of  international  law  as  the 
actual  rule  of  conduct  among  governments,  and  by  the 
maintenance  of  justice  and  a  scrupulous  respect  for  all 
treaty  obligations  in  the  dealings  of  organised  peoples 
with  one  another,  and  in  order  to  promote  international 
co-operation,  the  Powers  signatory  to  this  Covemint  adopt 
this  constitution  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

Article  1. — ^The  action  of  the  High  Contracting 
Parties  under  the  terms  of  this  Covenant  shall  be  effected 
through  the  instrumentality  of  meetings  of  Delegates 
representing  the  High  Contracting  Parties,  of  meetings  at 
more  frequent  intervals  of  an  Executive  Council  rep- 
resenting the  States  more  immediately  concerned  in  the 
matters  under  discussion,  and  of  a  permanent  Inter- 
national Secretariat  to  be  established  at  the  capital  of  the 
League. 

Article  2. — ^Meetings  of  the  Body  of  Delegates  shall 
be  held  from  time  to  time  as  occasion  may  require  for  the 
purpose  of  dealing  with  matters  within  the  sphere  of 
action  of  the  League. 

144 


HURST-MILLER  DRAFT  OF  THE  COVENANT  145 

Meetings  of  the  Body  of  Delegates  shall  be  held  at  the 
capital  of  the  League,  or  at  such  other  place  as  may  be 
found  convenient,  and  shall  consist  of  not  more  than  two 
representatives  of  each  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties. 

An  Ambassador  or  Minister  of  one  of  the  High  Contract- 
ing Parties  shall  be  competent  to  act  as  its  representative. 

All  matters  of  procedure  at  meetings  of  the  Body  of 
Delegates,  including  the  appointment  of  committees  to 
investigate  particular  matters,  shall  be  regulated  by  the 
Body  of  Delegates,  and  may  be  decided  by  a  majority 
of  those  present  at  the  meeting. 

Article  3. — The  representatives  of  the  States,  mem- 
bers of  the  League  directly  affected  by  matters  within  the 
sphere  of  action  of  the  League,  will  meet  as  an  Executive 
Council  from  time  to  time  as  occasion  may  require. 

The  United  States  of  America,  Great  Britain,  France, 
Italy,  and  Japan  shall  be  deemed  to  be  directly  affected 
by  all  matters  within  the  sphere  of  action  of  the  League. 
Invitations  will  be  sent  to  any  Power  whose  interests  are 
directly  affected,  and  no  decision  taken  at  any  meeting  will 
be  binding  on  a  State  which  was  not  invited  to  be  rep- 
resented at  the  meeting. 

Such  meetings  will  be  held  at  whatever  place  may  be 
decided  on,  or,  failing  any  such  decision,  at  the  capital  of 
the  League,  and  any  matter  affecting  the  interests  of  the 
League,  or  relating  to  matters  within  its  sphere  of  action 
or  likely  to  affect  the  peace  of  the  world,  may  be  dealt 
with. 

Article  4. — ^The  permanent  Secretariat  of  the  League 
shall   be   established   at  which   shall   constitute 

the  capital  of  the  League.  The  Secretariat  shall  com- 
prise such  secretaries  and  staff  as  may  be  required,  under 
the  general  direction  and  control  of  a  Chancellor  of  the 
League,  by  whom  they  shall  be  appointed. 

The  Chancellor  shall  act  as  Secretary  at  all  meetings  of 
the  Body  of  Delegates  or  of  the  Executive  Council. 

The  expenses  of  the  Secretariat  shall  be  borne  by  the 
States  members  of  the  League  in  accordance  with  the  dis- 
tribution among  members  of  the  Postal  Union  of  the  ex- 
penses of  the  International  Postal  Union. 


146         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

Article  5. — Representatives  of  the  High  Contracting 
Parties  and  officials  of  the  League  when  engaged  on  the 
business  of  the  League  shall  enjoy  diplomatic  privileges 
and  immunities,  and  the  buildings  occupied  by  the  League 
or  its  officials  or  by  representatives  attending  its  meetings 
shall  enjoy  the  benefits  of  extra-territoriality. 

Article  6. — ^Admission  to  the  League  of  States  who  are 
not  signatories  of  this  Covenant  requires  the  assent  of  not 
less  than  two-thirds  of  the  Body  of  Delegates. 

No  State  shall  be  admitted  to  the  League  except  on 
condition  that  its  military  and  naval  forces  and  armaments 
shall  conform  to  standards  prescribed  by  the  League  in 
respect  of  it  from  time  to  time. 

Article  7. — The  High  Contracting  Parties  undertake 
to  respect  and  preserve  as  against  external  aggression  the 
territorial  integrity  and  existing  political  independence  of 
all  States  members  of  the  League. 

Article  8. — ^The  High  Contracting  Parties  recognize 
the  principle  that  the  maintenance  of  peace  will  require  the 
reduction  of  national  armaments  to  the  lowest  point  con- 
sistent with  domestic  safety  and  the  enforcement  by 
common  action  of  international  obligations;  and  the 
Executive  Council  shall  formulate  plans  for  effecting  such 
reduction.  It  shall  also  enquire  into  the  feasibility  of 
abolishing  compulsory  military  service,  and  the  substitu- 
tion therefor  of  forces  enrolled  upon  a  voluntary  basis, 
and  into  the  military  and  naval  equipment  which  it  is 
reasonable  to  maintain. 

The  High  Contracting  Parties  further  agree  that  there 
shall  be  full  and  frank  publicity  as  to  all  national  arma- 
ments and  military  or  naval  programmes. 

Article  9. — ^Any  war  or  threat  of  war,  whether  im- 
mediately affecting  any  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties 
or  not,  is  hereby  declared  a  matter  of  concern  to  the 
League,  and  the  High  Contracting  Parties  reserve  the 
right  to  take  any  action  that  may  be  deemed  wise  and 
effectual  to  safeguard  the  peace  of  nations. 

It  is  hereby  also  declared  and  agreed  to  be  the  friendly 
right  of  each  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  to  draw  the 
attention  of  the  Body  of  Delegates,  or  of  the  Executive 


HURST-MILLER  DRAFT  OF  THE  COVENANT  147 

Council,  to  any  circumstances  anywhere  which  threaten 
to  disturb  international  peace,  or  the  good  understanding 
between  nations  upon  which  peace  depends. 

Article  10. — ^The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree  that 
should  disputes  arise  between  them  which  cannot  be 
adjusted  by  the  ordinary  processes  of  diplomacy,  they 
will  in  no  case  resort  to  armed  force  without  previously 
submitting  the  questions  and  matters  involved  either  to 
arbitration  or  to  enquiry  by  the  Executive  Council,  and 
until  three  months  after  the  award  by  the  arbitrators,  or 
a  recommendation  by  the  Executive  Council;  and  that 
they  will  not  even  then  resort  to  armed  force  as  against 
a  member  of  the  League  which  complies  with  the  award 
of  the  arbitrators,  or  the  recommendation  of  the  Executive 
Council. 

Article  11. — The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree  that 
whenever  any  dispute  or  difficulty  shall  arise  between 
them  which  they  recognise  to  be  suitable  for  submission  to 
arbitration,  and  which  cannot  be  satisfactorily  settled 
by  diplomacy,  they  will  submit  the  whole  subject-matter 
to  arbitration,  and  will  carry  out  in  full  good  faith  any 
award  or  decision  that  may  be  rendered. 

Article  12. — The  Executive  Council  will  formulate 
plans  for  the  establishment  of  a  Permanent  Court  of 
International  Justice,  and  this  Court  will  be  competent 
to  hear  and  determine  any  matter  which  the  parties  rec- 
ognise as  suitable  for  submission  to  it  for  arbitration  under 
the  foregoing  Article. 

Article  13. — ^If  there  should  arise  between  States 
members  of  the  League  any  dispute  likely  to  lead  to  a 
rupture,  which  is  not  submitted  to  arbitration  as  above, 
the  High  Contracting  Parties  agree  that  they  will  refer  the 
matter  to  the  Executive  Council;  either  party  to  the  dis- 
pute may  give  notice  to  the  Chancellor  of  the  existence  of 
the  dispute,  and  the  Chancellor  will  make  all  necessary 
arrangements  for  a  full  investigation  and  consideration 
thereof.  For  the  purpose  the  parties  agree  to  communi- 
cate to  the  Chancellor  statements  of  their  case  with  all  the 
relevant  facts  and  papers. 

WTiere  the  efforts  of  the  Council  lead  to  the  settlement 


148        WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

of  the  dispute,  a  statement  shall  be  prepared  for  publica- 
tion indicating  the  nature  of  the  dispute  and  the  terms  of 
settlement,  together  with  such  explanations  as  may  be 
appropriate.  If  the  dispute  has  not  been  settled,  a  report 
by  the  Council  shall  be  published,  setting  forth  with  all 
necessary  facts  and  explanations  the  recommendations 
which  the  Council  think  just  and  proper  for  the  settlement 
of  the  dispute.  If  the  report  is  unanimously  agreed  to  by 
the  members  of  the  Council,  other  than  the  parties  to  the 
dispute,  the  High  Contracting  Parties  agree  that  none  of 
them  will  go  to  war  with  any  party  w^hich  complies  with 
its  recommendations.  If  no  such  unanimous  report  can 
be  made,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  majority  to  issue  a 
statement  indicating  what  they  believe  to  be  the  facts  and 
containing  the  recommendations  which  they  consider  to 
be  just  and  proper. 

The  Executive  Council  may  in  any  case  under  this 
article  refer  the  dispute  to  the  Body  of  Delegates.  The 
dispute  shall  be  so  referred  at  the  request  of  either  party 
to  the  dispute.  In  any  case  referred  to  the  Body  of 
Delegates  all  the  provisions  of  this  Article  relating  to  the 
action  and  powers  of  the  Executive  Council  shall  apply  to 
the  action  and  powers  of  the  Body  of  Delegates. 

Article  14. — Should  any  of  the  High  Contracting 
Parties  be  found  by  the  League  to  have  broken  or  dis- 
regarded its  covenants  under  Article  10,  it  shall  thereby 
ipso  facto  be  deemed  to  have  committed  an  act  of  war 
against  all  the  other  members  of  the  League,  which  shall 
immediately  subject  it  to  the  severance  of  all  trade  or 
financial  relations,  the  prohibition  of  all  intercourse  be- 
tween their  nationals  and  the  nationals  of  the  covenant- 
breaking  State,  and  the  prevention,  so  far  as  possible,  of  all 
financial,  commercial,  or  personal  intercourse  between  the 
nationals  of  the  covenant-breaking  State  and  the  nationals 
of  any  other  State,  whether  a  member  of  the  League  or  not. 

It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Executive  Council  in  such 
a  case  to  recommend  what  effective  military  or  naval 
force  the  members  of  the  League  shall  severally  contrib- 
ute to  the  armed  forces  to  be  used  to  protect  the  cove- 
nants of  the  League. 


HURST-MILLER  DRAFT  OF  THE  COVENANT  149 

The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree,  further,  that  they 
will  mutually  support  one  another  in  the  financial  and 
economic  measures  which  are  taken  under  this  article  in 
order  to  minimise  the  loss  and  inconvenience  resulting 
from  the  above  measures,  and  that  they  will  mutually 
support  one  another  in  resisting  any  special  measures 
aimed  at  one  of  their  number  by  the  covenant-breaking 
State,  and  that  they  will  afford  passage  through  their 
territory  to  the  forces  of  any  of  the  High  Contracting 
Parties  who  are  co-operating  to  protect  the  covenants  of 
the  League. 

Article  15. — ^In  the  event  of  disputes  between  one 
State  member  of  the  League  and  another  State  which  is 
not  a  member  of  the  League,  or  between  States  not  mem- 
bers of  the  League,  the  High  Contracting  Parties  agree 
that  the  State  or  States  not  members  of  the  League  shall 
be  invited  to  become  ad  hoc  members  of  the  League,  and 
upon  acceptance  of  any  such  invitation,  the  above  provi- 
sions shall  be  applied  with  such  modifications  as  may  be 
deemed  necessary  by  the  League. 

Upon  such  invitation  being  given  the  Executive  Council 
shall  immediately  institute  an  enquiry  into  the  circum- 
stances and  merits  of  the  dispute  and  recommend  such 
action  as  may  seem  best  and  most  effectual  in  the  circum- 
stances. 

In  the  event  of  a  Power  so  invited  refusing  to  become 
ad  hoc  a  member  of  the  League,  and  taking  any  action 
against  a  State  member  of  the  League,  which  in  the  case 
of  a  State  member  of  the  League  would  constitute  a 
breach  of  Article  10,  the  provisions  of  Article  14  shall  be 
applicable  as  against  the  State  taking  such  action. 

If  both  parties  to  the  dispute  when  so  invited  refuse  to 
become  ad  hoc  members  of  the  League,  the  Executive 
Council  may  take  such  action  and  make  such  recommenda- 
tions as  will  prevent  hostilities,  and  will  result  in  the 
settlement  of  the  dispute. 

Article  16. — ^The  High  Contracting  Parties  entrust 
to  the  League  the  general  supervision  of  the  trade  in  arms 
and  amnmnition  with  the  countries  in  which  the  control  of 
this  traffic  is  necessary  in  the  common  interest. 


150        WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

Article  17. — ^Tlie  High  Contracting  Parties  agree 
that  in  respect  of  territories  which  formerly  belonged  to 
the  German  Empire  or  to  Turkey,  and  which  are  inhabited 
by  peoples  unable  at  present  to  secure  for  themselves  the 
benefits  of  a  stable  administration,  the  well-being  of  these 
peoples  constitutes  a  sacred  trust  for  civilisation,  and 
imposes  upon  the  States  members  of  the  League  the 
obligation  to  render  help  and  guidance  in  the  development 
of  the  administration.  They  recognise  that  all  policies  of 
administration  or  economic  development  should  be  based 
primarily  upon  the  well-considered  interests  of  the  peoples 
themselves,  upon  the  maintenance  of  the  policy  of  the 
open  door,  and  of  equal  opportunity  for  all  the  High 
Contracting  Parties  in  respect  of  the  use  and  development 
of  the  economic  resources  of  the  territory.  No  military 
or  naval  forces  shall  be  formed  among  the  inhabitants  of 
territories  in  excess  of  those  required  for  purposes  of 
defence  and  of  internal  police. 

Article  18. — ^The  High  Contracting  Parties  will  work 
to  establish  and  maintain  fair  hours  and  humane  conditions 
of  labour  for  all  those  within  their  several  jurisdictions, 
and  they  will  exert  their  influence  in  favour  of  the  adop- 
tion and  maintenance  of  a  similar  policy  and  like  safe- 
guards wherever  their  industrial  and  commercial  relations 
extend.  Also  they  will  appoint  commissions  to  study 
conditions  of  industry  and  labour  in  their  international 
aspects,  and  to  make  recommendations  thereon,  including 
the  extension  and  improvement  of  existing  conventions. 

Article  19. — ^The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree 
that  they  will  make  no  law  prohibiting  or  interfering  with 
the  free  exercise  of  religion,  and  that  they  will  in  no  way 
discriminate,  either  in  law  or  in  fact,  against  those  who 
practice  any  particular  creed,  religion,  or  belief  whose 
practices  are  not  inconsistent  with  public  order  or  public 
morals. 

Article  20. — ^The  High  Contracting  Parties  will  agree 
upon  provisions  intended  to  secure  and  maintain  freedom 
of  transit  and  just  treatment  for  the  commerce  of  all 
States  members  of  the  League. 

Article  21. — ^The    High    Contracting    Parties    agree 


HURST-MILLER  DRAFT  OF  THE  COVENANT  151 

that  any  treaty  or  international  engagement  entered  into 
between  States  members  of  the  League  shall  be  forthwith 
registered  with  the  Chancellor,  and  as  soon  as  possible 
published  by  him. 

Article  22. — ^The  High  Contracting  Parties  severally 
agree  that  the  present  Covenant  is  accepted  as  abrogating 
all  obligations  inter  se  which  are  inconsistent  with  the 
terms  hereof,  and  solemnly  engage  that  they  will  not 
hereafter  enter  into  any  engagements  inconsistent  with 
the  terms  hereof. 

In  case  any  of  the  Powers  signatory  hereto,  or  subse- 
quently admitted  to  the  League  shall,  before  becoming  a 
party  to  this  Covenant,  have  undertaken  any  obligations 
which  are  inconsistent  with  the  terms  of  this  Covenant,  it 
shall  be  the  duty  of  such  Power  to  take  immediate  steps 
to  procure  its  release  from  such  obligations. 


Document  17. 

Official  French  plan  for  a  League  of  Nations 
(printed  as  annex  to  minutes  of  the  Commission) . 

Annex  2  to  Minutes  of  First  Meeting,  League  of  Nations 

Coumiission. 

DRAFT  ADOPTED   BY  THE   FRENCH  MINIS- 
TERIAL COMMISSION  FOR  THE  LEAGUE 
OF   NATIONS. 

{Translation.)  1. 

Statement  of  the  Principles  to  Be  taken  as  Basis 
OF  THE  League  of  Nations. 

The  problem  of  the  League  of  Nations  is  one  which 
forces  itself  upon  the  consideration  of  every  Government. 
Historically,  the  idea  is  a  very  old  one,  which  took  shape 
when  the  civilized  States  assembled  at  the  two  Hague 
Conferences  in  1899  and  1907.  Practically,  during  the 
present  war,  it  has  been  taken  up  afresh  under  various 
forms  by  the  Allied  Governments  in  their  official  declara- 
tions, by  President  Wilson  in  his  note  of  December,  1916, 
and  even  by  our  enemies  in  their  replies  to  the  Papal  Note 
of  the  16th  August,  1917.  It  is,  therefore,  impossible  to 
avoid  the  study  of  the  question;  it  can  and  must  be  con- 
sidered quite  apart  from  the  questions  which  form  the 
subject  proper  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace. 

1.  In  declaring  that  a  sense  of  justice  and  honor 
compelled  them  to  carry  on  the  war  thrust  upon  them  by 
the  aggressive  action  of  the  Central  Powers  until  a  joint 
and  decisive  victory  had  been  gained,  the  Allies  intend 
to  convey  that  one  of  the  results  of  that  victory  should 
be  (a)  to  protect  the  world  in  future  against  any  recur- 

152 


FRENCH  PLAN  FOR  A  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  153 

rence  of  the  employment  of  brute  force  and  attempts  on 
the  part  of  any  nation  to  obtain  universal  supremacy, 
and  (b)  to  establish  the  reign  of  justice  on  sure  founda- 
tions throughout  the  world. 

They  declare  that,  in  order  to  secure  conditions  which 
will  exclude  the  existence  of  a  mere  dangerous  truce  and 
guarantee  real  peace,  it  is  necessary  to  provide  for  the 
contractual  and  permanent  organization  of  international 
relations,  by  the  constitution  between  States  of  the  as- 
sociation to  which  universal  public  opinion  has  given  the 
name  of  "the  League  of  Nations." 

2.  The  object  of  the  League  of  Nations  shall  not  be  to 
establish  an  international  political  State.  It  shall  merely 
aim  at  the  maintenance  of  peace  by  substituting  Right 
for  Might  as  the  arbiter  of  disputes.  It  will  thus  guar- 
antee to  all  States  alike,  whether  small  or  great,  the  ex- 
ercise of  their  sovereignty. 

3.  The  scope  of  the.  League  of  Nations  is  universal,  but, 
by  its  very  nature,  it  can  only  extend  to  those  nations 
which  will  give  each  other  all  necessary  guarantees  of  a 
practical  and  legal  nature,  and  which,  in  loyal  fulfillment  of 
their  given  word,  solemnly  undertake  to  be  bound  by 
certain  rules  in  order  to  maintain  peace  by  respecting 
Right,  and  to  guarantee  the  free  development  of  their 
national  life. 

Consequently,  no  nations  can  be  admitted  to  the 
League  other  than  those  which  are  constituted  as  States 
and  provided  with  representative  institutions  such  as 
will  permit  their  being  themselves  considered  responsible 
for  the  acts  of  their  own  Governments. 

4.  The  League  of  Nations  shall  be  represented  by  an 
international  body,  composed  of  the  responsible  heads  of 
Governments  or  of  their  delegates. 

This  international  body  shall  have  the  following  powers : 

(1)  It  shall  organize  an  international  tribunal. 

(2)  It  shall  effect  the  amicable  settlement  of  disputes 
between  the  States  members  of  the  League  by 
means  of  mediation,  preceded,  if  necessary,  by  an 
enquiry  in  the  terms  of  The  Hague  Convention  of 
1907. 


loi         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

(3)  In  the  event  of  an  amicable  settlement  proving 
impossible,  it  will  refer  the  matter  to  the  Inter- 
national Tribunal,  if  the  question  at  issue  is  open 
to  a  legal  decision;  otherwise  it  shall  itself  decide 
the  matter. 

(4)  It  shall  enforce  the  execution  of  its  decisions  and 
those  of  the  International  Tribunal;  at  its  de- 
mand every  nation  shall  be  bound,  in  agreement 
with  the  other  nations,  to  exert  its  economic, 
naval,  and  military  power  against  any  recalcitrant 
nation. 

(5)  Every  nation  shall  likewise  be  bound,  at  the  demand 
of  the  International  Body,  to  exert,  in  common 
accord  with  the  other  nations,  its  economic,  naval, 
and  military  power  against  any  nation  which,  not 
having  become  a  member  of  the  League  of  Nations, 
shall  attempt,  by  any  means  whatsoever,  to  impose 
its  will  on  another  nation. 

5.  The  International  Tribunal  shall  pronounce  on  all 
questions  submitted  to  it,  either  by  the  International 
Body  or  by  a  State  having  any  dispute  with  another. 

It  shall  decide  and  pronounce  upon  questions  of  law 
at  issue  between  States,  on  the  basis  of  custom  or  of 
international  conventions,  as  well  as  of  theory  and  juris- 
prudence. 

In  cases  of  violation  of  such  law,  it  shall  order  the 
necessary  reparation  and  sanctions. 

II. 

Diplomatic,  Legal,  and  Economic  Sanctions. 

(1)  diplomatic   sanctions. 

These  sanctions,  the  result  of  which  will  be  to  place  the 

delinquent  State  for  a  shorter  or  longer  period  under  the 

ban  of  the  member  nations,  fall  under  three  headings : 

(a)  The  suspension  or  breaking  off  of  the  diplomatic 

relations  existing  up  to  that  period  between  such 

State  and  other  member  States  of  the  League  of 

Nations; 


FRENCH  PLAN  FOR  A  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  155 

(b)  The  withdrawal  of  the  exequatur  granted  to  the 
consuls  of  such  State; 

(c)  The  exclusion  of  the  State  in  question  from  the 

benefit  of  any  international  conventions  to  which 
it  may  be  a  party. 

(2)    LEGAL    SANCTIONS. 

On  the  other  hand,  certain  sanctions  of  a  legal  nature 
will  enable  the  League  of  Nations,  according  to  circum- 
stances, to  enforce  respect  of  the  principles  which  it  is 
called  upon  to  protect. 

(a)  Thus  offences  committed,  encouraged,  or  tolerated 
by  one  of  the  member  States  may  render  it  liable 
to  pecuniary  sanctions  which  will  be  applied  to  it 
by  the  International  Court  of  Justice,  in  accordance 
with  the  general  principle  laid  down  by  Article  3 
of  The  Hague  Convention  of  the  18th  October, 
1907,  as  to  the  laws  and  customs  of  war. 

(b)  There  are,  moreover,  other  sanctions  of  a  legal 
nature  which,  without  entailing  the  direct  pecuniary 
responsibility  of  the  State  concerned,  will  exert  a 
very  marked  and  immediate  influence  on  the  atti- 
tude and  decisions  of  its  representatives,  by  reason 
of  the  sacrifices  it  will  impose  on  the  private  in- 
terests of  the  citizens  themselves.  There  will  be 
no  question  of  depriving  the  latter  of  the  advan- 
tages of  common  law,  or  of  punishing  them  for  acts 
for  which  they  are  not  directly  answerable;  but 
that  national  unity  which  confers  responsibilities 
as  well  as  benefits,  will  doubtless  permit  of  the 
temporary  withdrawal  from  them  of  the  exercise 
of  a  faculty  which,  although  not  indispensable  to 
existence,  nevertheless  tends  to  facilitate  it. 

The  following  may  be  instanced  as  particularly  effica- 
cious measures  from  this  point  of  view:  the  suspension,  as 
regards  subjects  of  the  recalcitrant  State,  of  all  Articles 
of  Association,  conventions  relating  to  the  protection  of 
author's  copyright  and  of  industrial  property,  and  con- 
ventions under  private  international  law  concluded  be- 
tween that  State  and  the  other  States,  members  of  the 


156        WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

League  of  Nations;  the  exclusion  of  nationals  of  the 
recalcitrant  State  from  recourse  to  the  Courts  of  Law  in 
the  countries  members  of  the  League;  the  refusal  to  grant 
the  exequatur  in  the  said  countries  as  to  the  execution  of 
judgments  pronounced  by  its  Courts  in  favour  of  the 
nationals;  the  seizure  and  sequestration  of  real  estate  or 
movable  property  belonging  to  its  nationals  in  the  said 
countries;  the  prohibition  of  commercial  relations,  and 
even,  if  necessary,  of  any  agreement  of  a  private  nature 
with  subjects  of  the  States  belonging  to  the  League  of 
Nations. 

The  foregoing  to  be  without  prejudice  to  any  legal 
sanctions  applicable  under  the  ordinary  rules  of  criminal 
jurisdiction  to  the  individual  whose  outrages  upon  law  or 
whose  actions  may  have  endangered  the  maintenance  of 
peace,  or  to  the  subsidiary  measures  which  the  League 
of  Nations  may  think  well  to  take  in  order  to  secure  con- 
viction, in  case  it  is  not  ensured  by  the  Government  to  the 
jurisdiction  of  which  the  criminal  is  subject. 

(3)    ECONOMIC  SANCTIONS. 

Other  sanctions  of  an  economic  nature  can  be  employed 
by  the  League  of  Nations,  by  which  it  will  be  enabled  to 
exercise  an  efficient  control  over  the  recalcitrant  State,  by 
various  measures  which  may  extend  to  placing  it  under  an 
absolute  commercial,  industrial,  or  financial  ban. 

The  principal  measures  in  question  are: 

(a)  Blockade,  consisting  in  the  prevention  by  force  of 
any  commercial  intercourse  with  the  territory  of 
the  State  in  question. 

(b)  Embargo,  i.  e.,  the  seizure  and  temporary  se- 
questration, in  the  ports  and  territorial  waters  of 
the  member  States,  of  ships  and  cargoes  belonging 
to  the  delinquent  State  and  its  nationals,  as  also 
the  seizure  of  all  goods  destined  for  such  State. 

(c)  Prohibition   of  the  supply  of  raw  materials   and 

foodstuffs  indispensable  to  its  economic  existence. 

(d)  Prohibition  of  the  issue  by  such  State  of  public 
loans  in  the  territories  of  the  member  States;  re- 
fusal to  allow  stock  issued  elsewhere  to  be  quoted 


FRENCH  PLAN  FOR  A  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  157 

on  the  official  Exchange,  and  even  withdrawal  of 
any  previous  permission  for  the  quotation  of  the 
stock  of  such  State. 
The  sanctions  thus  provided  will  be  all  the  more  effica- 
cious and  their  application  will  be  all  the  more  prompt,  in 
that  the  member  States  will  have  previously  arranged  to 
protect  themselves  against  any  reprisals  to  their  prejudice, 
by  means  of  an  economic  organization  adapted  to  facilitate 
their  cooperation  and  mutual  assistance. 

This  rough  outline  will  show  that  the  League  of  Nations 
will  not  be  without  weapons  with  which  to  enforce  its 
decisions,  and  to  impose  on  any  disturbing  elements  that 
"Peace  by  Justice,"  the  maintenance  of  which  will  be  its 
raison  d'etre. 

III. 

Military  Sanctions. 

(i)  international  forces. 

The  execution  of  the  military  sanctions  on  land  or  at  sea 
shall  be  entrusted  either  to  an  international  force,  or  to  one 
or  more  Powers  members  of  the  League  of  Nations,  to 
whom  a  mandate  in  that  behalf  shall  have  been  given. 

The  International  Body  shall  have  at  its  disposal  a 
military  force  supplied  by  the  various  member  States  of 
sufficient  strength: 

(1)  to  secure  the  execution  of  its  decision  and  those  of 
the  International  Tribunal; 

(2)  to  overcome,  in  case  of  need,  any  forces  which  may 
be  opposed  to  the  League  of  Nations  in  the  event 
of  armed  conflict. 

(ii)    STRENGTH    OF    INTERNATIONAL   CONTINGENTS. 

The  International  Body  shall  determine  the  strength  of 
the  international  force  and  fix  the  contingents  which  must 
be  held  at  its  disposal. 

Each  of  the  member  States  shall  be  free  to  settle  as  it 
deems  best  the  conditions  under  which  its  contingent  shall 
be  recruited. 


1.58         WOODROW  ^VILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

The  question  of  the  hmitation  of  armaments  in  each  of 
the  member  States  will  be  dealt  with  elsewhere. 

(iii)    PERMANENT     STAFF. 

A  permanent  international  Staff  shall  investigate  all 
military  questions  affecting  the  League  of  Nations. 
Each  State  shall  appoint  the  officer  or  officers  who  shall 
represent  it,  in  a  proportion  to  be  determined  later. 

The  Chief  and  Deputy  Chiefs  of  Staff  shall  be  appointed 
for  a  period  of  three  years  by  the  International  Body,  from 
a  list  submitted  by  the  member  States. 

(iv)    FUNCTIONS    OF   THE    PERMANENT    STAFF. 

It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  permanent  International 
Staff  to  deal,  under  the  supervision  of  the  International 
Body,  with  everything  relating  to  the  organization  of  the 
joint  forces  and  the  eventual  conduct  of  military  opera- 
tions. It  will  in  particular  be  charged  with  the  task  of 
inspecting  international  forces  and  armaments  in  agree- 
ment W'ith  the  military  authorities  of  each  State,  and  of 
proposing  any  improvements  it  may  deem  necessary, 
either  in  the  international  military  organization  or  in  the 
constitution,  composition ^  and  methods  of  recruiting  of  the 
forces  of  each  State. 

The  Staff  shall  report  the  result  of  its  inspections,  either 
as  a  matter  of  routine  or  at  the  request  of  the  Inter- 
national Body.  Military  instructions  shall  be  given  in 
each  member  State  in  accordance  with  rules  designed 
to  procure,  as  far  as  possible,  uniformity  in  the  arma- 
ments and  training  of  the  troops  destined  to  act  in  con- 
cert. 

The  International  Body  shall  be  entitled,  at  any  time,  to 
require  that  the  member  States  introduce  any  alteration 
into  their  national  system  of  recruiting  which  the  Staff 
may  report  to  be  necessary. 

(v)   COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF   AND    CHIEF  OF  GENERAL   STAFF. 

When  circumstances  shall  so  require,  the  International 
Body  shall  appoint,  for  the  duration  of  the  operations  to 


FRENCH  PLAN  FOR  A  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  159 

be  undertaken,  a  Commander-in-chief  of  the  international 
forces. 

Upon  his  appointment,  the  Commander-in-chief  shall 
nominate  his  Chief  of  General  Staff  and  the  officers  who  are 
to  assist  him. 

The  powers  of  the  Commander-in-chief  and  his  Chief  of 
General  Staff  shall  cease  when  circumstances  become  such 
that  an  armed  conflict  is  no  longer  to  be  feared,  or  when  the 
object  of  the  military  operations  has  been  attained. 

In  either  case,  the  date  at  which  the  powers  of  the 
Commander-in-chief  and  the  General  Staff  shall  cease 
shall  be  fixed  by  a  decision  of  the  International  Body. 

IV. 

Scope  and  Functions  of  the  International  Body. 

Public  opinion  among  civilized  nations,  which  regards 
The  Hague  Conferences  as  a  step  towards  the  recognition 
and  application  of  the  principles  of  justice  and  equity  as 
guarantees  of  the  security  of  States  and  the  well-being 
of  their  peoples,  is  unanimously  demanding  a  fresh  effort 
in  the  same  direction.  Although  it  has  seen  arbitration 
applied  in  cases  of  ever-increasing  importance,  and  like- 
wise the  creation  of  an  international  judicial  organization 
and  the  institution  of  a  system  of  enquiry  and  mediation, 
it  still  considers  as  indispensable  the  establishment  of 
more  concrete  guarantees,  in  order  that  peace  may  be 
secured  by  the  reign  of  organized  justice. 

The  question  thus  arises  of  the  institution  of  a  per- 
manent International  Body  to  carry  into  effect  the  real 
aims  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

There  is  no  question  of  making  the  League  of  Nations 
a  super-State,  or  even  a  Confederation.  Any  such  idea 
is  rendered  impossible  by  respect  for  the  sovereignty  of 
States,  by  the  diversity  of  national  traditions  and  of 
political  and  judicial  standards,  by  the  differences  in 
systems  of  administration  and  opposition  of  economic 
interests;  but  public  opinion  among  the  free  nations  would 
be  disappointed  if  the  result  of  the  present  crisis  were  not 
to  be  the  institution  of  an  International  Body  capable  of 


160        WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLE^IENT 

contributing,  by  constant  vigilance  and  the  exercise  of 
sufficient  autliority,  to  tlie  maintenance  of  peace. 

In  conformity  witli  the  statement  of  principles  adopted 
by  the  Commission  on  the  18th  January,  this  body,  con- 
stituted in  the  form  of  an  International  Council,  will 
derive  its  authority  from  the  reciprocal  undertaking  given 
by  each  of  the  member  nations  to  use  its  economic,  naval, 
and  military  power  in  conjunction  with  the  other  members 
of  the  League  against  any  nation  contravening  the  Cove- 
nant of  the  League. 

(i)    MAINTENANCE   OF    PEACE   BETWEEN    THE   MEMBER 

NATIONS. 

The  Council  shall  devise  and  apply  all  means  for  the 
prevention  of  international  disputes. 
To  this  intent— 

1.  The  International  Council  shall  maintain  and  develop 
the  international  legal  institutions  created  at  The  Hague 
and  call  for  international  decisions  to  supplement  them 
as  may  be  required. 

2.  The  International  Council  shall,  either  at  the  demand 
of  the  parties  or  at  the  instance  of  a  third  State,  effect  an 
amicable  settlement  of  differences  menacing  peace  between 
the  member  States;  in  default  of  any  such  demand,  it 
shall  be  bound  to  take  the  initiative  as  regards  such  settle- 
ment. 

3.  It  shall,  in  the  first  place,  proceed  either  by  means  of 
good  offices  and  of  mediation  (preceded,  if  necessary,  by 
an  enquiry  in  the  terms  of  the  First  Hague  Convention  of 
1907),  or  by  reminding  the  disputant  States  that  the 
permanent  Court  is  open  to  them. 

4.  Should  no  amicable  settlement  be  thus  obtained,  the 
International  Council  shall  consider  whether  the  question 
is  of  a  legal  nature,  in  which  case  it  shall  order  the  dis- 
putant States  to  submit  their  difference  to  the  Court  of 
International  Jurisdiction,  which  is  competent  to  deal 
with  the  matter  in  the  terms  of  Section  1\  of  the  First 
Hague  Convention;  in  default  of  a  compromise  being 
effected  by  agreement  between  the  parties,  the  Court  of 
The  Hague  shall  be  competent  to  draw  up  such  com- 


FRENCH  PLAN  FOR  A  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS  161 

promise  by  extension  of  Article  53  of  the  said  Conven- 
tion; 

5.  The  International  Council  shall  ensure  the  execution 
of  the  decisions  of  the  International  Court,  if  necessary,  by 
resorting  to  the  application  of  diplomatic,  legal,  economic, 
and  military  sanctions. 

6.  Should  the  International  Council  consider  that  the 
matter  is  not  of  a  nature  to  be  finally  settled  by  a  legal 
decision,  it  shall  deal  with  the  question  direct. 

It  shall  in  the  first  instance  attempt  to  promote  an 
amicable  settlement,  and,  should  it  not  itself  be  successful 
in  so  doing,  it  shall  define  the  terms  according  to  which  the 
dispute  shall  be  settled  in  a  manner  which  shall  respect 
the  rights  of  each  State  and  the  maintenance  of  peace. 

This  decision  shall  be  notified  to  the  States  concerned,  it 
being  intimated  to  them  that  as  from  such  date  no  dispute 
exists  between  the  contestant  States,  but  between  the 
entirety  of  the  member  States  and  the  State  which,  by 
refusing  to  accept  such  decision,  violates  the  very  prin- 
ciples of  the  League.  Should  the  State  concerned  refuse 
to  accept  the  decision  after  having  been  summoned  to  do 
so,  the  International  Council  shall  notify  to  it  the  coer- 
cive measures  of  a  diplomatic,  legal,  economic,  or  military 
nature  to  be  taken  against  it  within  a  specified  time. 

(ii)    DEFENCE   AGAINST   NON-MEMBER    STATES. 

Should  a  non-member  State  attempt  to  impose  its  will 
on  any  member  State  upon  any  pretext  whatsoever,  the 
International  Council  shall,  after  having  employed  all 
possible  means  of  conciliation,  decide  upon  the  steps  to  be 
taken  and  shall  cause  all  legal,  diplomatic  and  military 
action  at  the  disposal  of  member  States  to  be  employed 
against  such  State. 

(iii)    PRECAUTIONARY   MEASURES   AGAINST   THE   SPREAD   OF 
ANY  CONFLICT  BETWEEN  NON-MEMBER  STATES. 

Should  conflict  threaten  to  break  out  between  two  na- 
tions who  are  not  members  of  the  League  of  Nations,  the 
International  Council  shall  be  bound  to  prevent  any  risk 
of  its  extension  in  such  a  manner  as  to  concern  member 


162        WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

States,  and  to  use  all  means  in  its  power  to  arrive  at  a 
peaceful  settlement. 

V. 

Composition  of  the  International  Council  and  of 
THE  Permanent  Delegation. 

The  International  Council  representing  all  the  nations 
subscribing  to  the  Covenant  for  securing  peace  by  or- 
ganized legislation  shall  be  constituted  as  follows: 

1.  Each  member  State  shall  be  represented  by  the  head 
of  its  Government,  or  by  a  representative  of  such  Govern- 
ment having  sufficient  power  to  bind  the  liability  of  his 
State. 

2.  A  plenary  meeting  of  the  International  Council  alone 
shall  be  empowered  to  decide  questions  coming  within 
its  jurisdiction.  It  shall  make  known  the  rulings  given 
in  the  case  of  disputes  between  States,  and,  should  any 
such  State  refuse  to  accept  the  ruling,  it  shall  cause  the 
(corresponding)  sanctions  to  be  carried  into  effect  by  the 
governments  of  the  member  States. 

3.  The  International  Council  shall  hold  its  ordinary 
meeting  once  a  year.  The  date  and  place  of  the  following 
meeting  shall  be  settled  at  each  such  meeting. 

4.  The  members  of  the  International  Council  shall  agree 
inter  se  concerning  the  appointment  of  members  of  the  Per- 
manent Delegation  which  shall,  between  the  meetings, 
receive  all  communications  destined  for  the  said  Council, 
prepare  its  reports,  etc.,  keep  its  archives  in  safe  custody, 
and,  in  cases  of  emergency,  send  out  notices  to  members 
of  the  Council  and  propose  the  calling  of  a  special  meeting. 

5.  The  Permanent  Delegation  shall  consist  of  15  mem- 
bers. Their  term  of  office  shall  be  years,  and  they 
shall  be  eligible  for  reelection. 

6.  The  International  Council  shall  define  the  powers  of 
its  Permanent  Delegation. 

7.  The  International  Council  shall  call  an  extraordinary 
meeting  at  the  suggestion  of  the  Permanent  Delegation 
(see  paragraph  4  hereof) ,  or  at  the  request  of  one  or  more 
of  the  member  states. 

June  8,  1918. 


Document  18. 

Text  of  the  Covenant  as  adopted  at  the 
Plenary  Session  of  February  14  and  taken  by 
President  Wilson  to  America  (printed). 


r 


COVENANT. 

Preamble. 


In  order  to  promote  international  cooperation  and  to 
secure  international  peace  and  security  by  the  acceptance 
of  obHgations  not  to  resort  to  war,  by  the  prescription  of 
open,  just  and  honourable  relations  between  nations,  by  the 
firm  establishment  of  the  understandings  of  international 
law  as  the  actual  rule  of  conduct  among  governments,  and 
by  the  maintenance  of  justice  and  a  scrupulous  respect 
for  all  treaty  obligations  in  the  dealings  of  organized 
peoples  with  one  another,  the  Powers  signatory  to  this 
Covenant  adopt  this  constitution  of  the  League  of  Na- 
tions. 

Article  I. — The  action  of  the  High  Contracting 
Parties  under  the  terms  of  this  Covenant  shall  be  effected 
through  the  instrumentality  of  meetings  of  a  Body  of 
Delegates  representing  the  High  Contracting  Parties,  of 
meetings  at  more  frequent  intervals  of  an  Executive 
Council,  and  of  a  permanent  international  Secretariat  to 
be  established  at  the  Seat  of  the  League. 

Article  II.— Meetings  of  the  Body  of  Delegates  shall 
be  held  at  stated  intervals  and  from  time  to  time  as  occa- 
sion may  require  for  the  purpose  of  dealing  with  matters 
within  the  sphere  of  action  of  the  League.  Meetings  of 
the  Body  of  Delegates  shall  be  held  at  the  Seat  of  the 
League  or  at  such  other  place  as  may  be  found  convenient 
and  shall  consist  of  representatives  of  the  High  Contract- 
ing Parties.     Each  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  shall 

163 


164        WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

have  one  vote  but  may  have  not  more  than  three  repre- 
sentatives. 

Article  III. — ^The  Executive  Council  shall  consist  of 
representatives  of  the  United  States  of  America,  the  Brit- 
ish Empire,  France,  Italy,  and  Japan,  together  with  repre- 
sentatives of  four  other  States,  members  of  the  League. 
The  selection  of  these  four  States  shall  be  made  by  the 
Body  of  Delegates  on  such  principles  and  in  such  manner 
as  they  think  fit.  Pending  the  appointment  of  these  rep- 
resentatives of  the  other  States,  representatives  of 
shall  be  members  of  the  Executive  Council. 

Meetings  of  the  Council  shall  be  held  from  time  to  time 
as  occasion  may  require  and  at  least  once  a  year  at  what- 
ever place  may  be  decided  on,  or  failing  any  such  decision 
at  the  Seat  of  the  League,  and  any  matter  within  the 
sphere  of  action  of  the  League  or  affecting  the  peace  of  the 
world  may  be  dealt  with  at  such  meetings. 

Invitations  shall  be  sent  to  any  Power  to  attend  a  meet- 
ing of  the  Council  at  which  matters  directly  affecting  its 
interests  are  to  be  discussed  and  no  decision  taken  at 
any  meeting  will  be  binding  on  such  Power  unless  so 
invited. 

Article  IV. — ^AU  matters  of  procedure  at  meetings  of 
the  Body  of  Delegates  or  the  Executive  Council  including 
the  appointment  of  Committees  to  investigate  particular 
matters  shall  be  regulated  by  the  Body  of  Delegates  or  the 
Executive  Council  and  may  be  decided  by  a  majority  of 
the  States  represented  at  the  meeting. 

The  first  meeting  of  the  Body  of  Delegates  and  of  the 
Executive  Council  shall  be  summoned  by  the  President  of 
the  United  States  of  America. 

Article  V. — ^The  permanent  Secretariat  of  the  League 
shall  be  established  at  which  shall  constitute 

the  Seat  of  the  League.  The  Secretariat  shall  comprise 
such  secretaries  and  staff  as  may  be  required,  under  the 
general  direction  and  control  of  a  Secretary-General  of 
the  League,  who  shall  be  chosen  by  the  Executive  Coun- 
cil; the  Secretariat  shall  be  appointed  by  the  Secretary- 
General  subject  to  confirmation  by  the  Executive  Council. 

The  Secretary-General  shall  act  in  that  capacity  at  all 


TEXT  OF  THE  COVENANT  OF  FEBRUARY  14  165 

meetings  of  the  Body  of  Delegates  or  of  the  Executive 
Council. 

The  expenses  of  the  Secretariat  shall  be  borne  by  the 
States  members  of  the  League  in  accordance  with  the 
apportionment  of  the  expenses  of  the  International  Bureau 
of  the  Universal  Postal  Union. 

Article  VI. — ^Representatives  of  the  High  Contracting 
Parties  and  officials  of  the  League  when  engaged  on  the 
business  of  the  League  shall  enjoy  diplomatic  privileges 
and  immunities,  and  the  buildings  occupied  by  the  League 
or  its  officials  or  by  representatives  attending  its  meetings 
shall  enjoy  the  benefits  of  extraterritoriality. 

Article  VII. — ^Admission  to  the  League  of  States  not 
signatories  to  the  Covenant  and  not  named  in  the  Proto- 
col hereto  as  States  to  be  invited  to  adhere  to  the  Cove- 
nant requires  the  assent  of  not  less  than  two-thirds  of  the 
States  represented  in  the  Body  of  Delegates,  and  shall  be 
limited  to  fully  self-governing  countries  including  Domin- 
ions and  Colonies. 

No  State  shall  be  admitted  to  the  League  unless  it  is 
able  to  give  effective  guarantees  of  its  sincere  intention  to 
observe  its  international  obligations,  and  unless  it  shall 
conform  to  such  principles  as  may  be  prescribed  by  the 
League  in  regard  to  its  naval  and  military  forces  and  arma- 
ments. 

Article  VIII. — ^The  High  Contracting  Parties  recog- 
nize the  principle  that  the  maintenance  of  peace  will  re- 
quire the  reduction  of  national  armaments  to  the  lowest 
point  consistent  with  national  safety  and  the  enforcement 
by  common  action  of  international  obligations,  having 
special  regard  to  the  geographical  situation  and  circum- 
stances of  each  State;  and  the  Executive  Council  shall 
formulate  plans  for  effecting  such  reduction.  The  Execu- 
tive Council  shall  also  determine  for  the  consideration  and 
action  of  the  several  governments  what  military  equip- 
ment and  armament  is  fair  and  reasonable  in  proportion 
to  the  scale  of  forces  laid  down  in  the  programme  of  dis- 
armament; and  these  limits,  when  adopted,  shall  not  be 
exceeded  without  the  permission  of  the  Executive  Council. 

The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree  that  the  manufac- 


166         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

ture  by  private  enterprise  of  munitions  and  implements 
of  war  lends  itself  to  grave  objections,  and  direct  the 
Executive  Council  to  advise  how  the  evil  effects  attendant 
upon  such  manufacture  can  be  prevented,  due  regard 
being  had  to  the  necessities  of  those  countries  which  are 
not  able  to  manufacture  for  themselves  the  munitions  and 
implements  of  war  necessary  for  their  safety. 

The  High  Contracting  Parties  undertake  in  no  w^ay  to 
conceal  from  each  other  the  condition  of  such  of  their 
industries  as  are  capable  of  being  adapted  to  war-like  pur- 
poses or  the  scale  of  their  armaments  and  agree  that  there 
shall  be  full  and  frank  interchange  of  information  as  to 
their  military  and  naval  programmes. 

Article  IX. — ^A  permanent  Commission  shall  be  con- 
stituted to  advise  the  League  on  the  execution  of  the  pro- 
visions of  Article  VIII  and  on  military  and  naval  questions 
generally. 

Article  X. — ^The  High  Contracting  Parties  undertake 
to  respect  and  preserve  as  against  external  aggression  the 
territorial  integrity  and  existing  political  independence  of 
all  States  members  of  the  League.  In  case  of  any  such 
aggression  or  in  case  of  any  threat  or  danger  of  such  ag- 
gression the  Executive  Council  shall  advise  upon  the 
means  by  which  this  obligation  shall  be  fulfilled. 

Article  XI. — ^Any  war  or  threat  of  war,  whether  im- 
mediately affecting  any  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties 
or  not,  is  hereby  declared  a  matter  of  concern  to  the 
League,  and  the  High  Contracting  Parties  reserve  the 
right  to  take  any  action  that  may  be  deemed  wise  and 
effectual  to  safeguard  the  peace  of  nations. 

It  is  hereby  also  declared  and  agreed  to  be  the  friendly 
right  of  each  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  to  draw  the 
attention  of  the  Body  of  Delegates  or  of  the  Executive 
Council  to  any  circumstances  affecting  international  in- 
tercourse which  threaten  to  disturb  international  peace 
or  the  good  understanding  between  nations  upon  which 
peace  depends. 

Article  XII. — ^The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree 
that  should  disputes  arise  between  them  which  cannot  be 
adjusted  by  the  ordinary  processes  of  diplomacy,  they  will 


TEXT  OF  THE  COVENANT  OF  FEBRUARY  14  167 

in  no  case  resort  to  war  without  previously  submitting  the 
questions  and  matters  involved  either  to  arbitration  or 
to  inquiry  by  the  Executive  Council  and  until  three 
months  after  the  award  by  the  arbitrators  or  a  recom- 
mendation by  the  Executive  Council;  and  that  they  will 
not  even  then  resort  to  war  as  against  a  member  of  the 
League  which  complies  with  the  award  of  the  arbitrators 
or  the  reconmiendation  of  the  Executive  Council. 

In  any  case  under  this  Article,  the  award  of  the  arbi- 
trators shall  be  made  within  a  reasonable  time,  and  the 
recommendation  of  the  Executive  Council  shall  be  made 
within  six  months  after  the  submission  of  the  dispute. 

Article  XIII. — The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree 
that  whenever  any  dispute  or  difficulty  shall  arise  between 
them  which  they  recognize  to  be  suitable  for  submission 
to  arbitration  and  which  cannot  be  satisfactorily  settled 
by  diplomacy,  they  will  submit  the  whole  subject  mat- 
ter to  arbitration.  For  this  purpose  the  Court  of  arbitra- 
tion to  which  the  case  is  referred  shall  be  the  court  agreed 
on  by  the  parties  or  stipulated  in  any  Convention  existing 
between  them.  The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree  that 
they  will  carry  out  in  full  good  faith  any  award  that  may 
be  rendered.  In  the  event  of  any  failure  to  carry  out 
the  award,  the  Executive  Council  shall  propose  what  steps 
can  best  be  taken  to  give  effect  thereto. 

Article  XIV. — The  Executive  Council  shall  formulate 
plans  for  the  establishment  of  a  Permanent  Court  of  Inter- 
national Justice  and  this  Court  shall,  when  established, 
be  competent  to  hear  and  determine  any  matter  which 
the  parties  recognize  as  suitable  for  submission  to  it  for 
arbitration  under  the  foregoing  Article. 

Article  XV. — If  there  should  arise  between  States 
members  of  the  League  any  dispute  likely  to  lead  to  a 
rupture,  which  is  not  submitted  to  arbitration  as  above, 
the  High  Contracting  Parties  agree  that  they  will  refer 
the  matter  to  the  Executive  Council;  either  party  to  the 
dispute  may  give  notice  of  the  existence  of  the  dispute 
to  the  Secretary-General,  who  will  make  all  necessary 
arrangements  for  a  full  investigation  and  consideration 
thereof.     For  this  purpose  the  parties  agree  to  communi- 


168         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

cate  to  the  Secretary-General,  as  promptly  as  possible, 
statements  of  their  case  with  all  the  relevant  facts  and 
papers,  and  the  Executive  Council  may  forthwith  direct 
the  publication  thereof. 

Where  the  efforts  of  the  Council  lead  to  the  settlement 
of  the  dispute,  a  statement  shall  be  published  indicating 
the  nature  of  the  dispute  and  the  terms  of  settlement, 
together  with  such  explanations  as  may  be  appropriate. 
If  the  dispute  has  not  been  settled,  a  report  by  the  Council 
shall  be  published,  setting  forth  with  all  necessary  facts 
and  explanations  the  recommendation  which  the  Council 
think  just  and  proper  for  the  settlement  of  the  dispute. 
If  the  report  is  unanimously  agreed  to  by  the  members 
of  the  Council  other  than  the  parties  to  the  dispute,  the 
High  Contracting  Parties  agree  that  they  will  not  go  to 
war  with  any  party  which  complies  with  the  recommen- 
dation and  that,  if  any  party  shall  refuse  so  to  comply, 
the  Council  shall  propose  the  measures  necessary  to  give 
effect  to  the  recommendation.  If  no  such  unanimous 
report  can  be  made,  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  majority 
and  the  privilege  of  the  minority  to  issue  statements  in- 
dicating what  they  believe  to  be  the  facts  and  containing 
the  recommendations  which  they  consider  to  be  just  and 
proper. 

The  Executive  Council  may  in  any  case  under  this  Arti- 
cle refer  the  dispute  to  the  Body  of  Delegates.  The  dis- 
pute shall  be  so  referred  at  the  request  of  either  party  to 
the  dispute,  provided  that  such  request  must  be  made 
within  fourteen  days  after  the  submission  of  the  dispute. 
In  any  case  referred  to  the  Body  of  Delegates  all  the  pro- 
visions of  this  Article  and  of  Article  XII  relating  to  the 
action  and  powers  of  the  Executive  Council  shall  apply 
to  the  action  and  powers  of  the  Body  of  Delegates. 

Article  XVI. — Should  any  of  the  High  Contracting 
Parties  break  or  disregard  its  covenants  under  Article 
XII,  it  shall  thereby  ipso  facto  be  deemed  to  have  com- 
mitted an  act  of  war  against  all  the  other  members  of  the 
League,  which  hereby  undertake  immediately  to  subject 
it  to  the  severance  of  all  trade  or  financial  relations,  the 
prohibition  of  all  intercourse  between  their  nationals  and 


TEXT  OF  THE  COVENANT  OF  FEBRUARY  14  160 

the  nationals  of  the  covenant-breaking  State,  and  the 
prevention  of  all  financial,  commercial,  or  personal  inter- 
course between  the  nationals  of  the  covenant-breaking 
State  and  the  nationals  of  any  other  State,  whether  a 
member  of  the  League  or  not. 

It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Executive  Council  in  such 
case  to  recommend  what  effective  military  or  naval  force 
the  members  of  the  League  shall  severally  contribute 
to  the  armed  forces  to  be  used  to  protect  the  covenants  of 
the  League. 

The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree,  further,  that  they 
will  mutually  support  one  another  in  the  financial  and 
economic  measures  which  are  taken  under  this  Article, 
in  order  to  minimize  the  loss  and  inconvenience  resulting 
from  the  above  measures,  and  that  they  will  mutually 
support  one  another  in  resisting  any  special  measures 
aimed  at  one  of  their  number  by  the  covenant-breaking 
State,  and  that  they  will  afford  passage  through  their 
territory  to  the  forces  of  any  of  the  High  Contracting 
Parties  who  are  cooperating  to  protect  the  covenants  of 
the  League. 

Article  XVIL — In  the  event  of  disputes  between 
one  State  member  of  the  League  and  another  State  which 
is  not  a  member  of  the  League,  or  between  States  not 
members  of  the  League,  the  High  Contracting  Parties 
agree  that  the  State  or  States  not  members  of  the  League 
shall  be  invited  to  accept  the  obligations  of  membership 
in  the  League  for  the  purposes  of  such  dispute,  upon  such 
conditions  as  the  Executive  Council  may  deem  just,  and 
upon  acceptance  of  any  such  invitation,  the  above  provi- 
sions shall  be  applied  with  such  modifications  as  may  be 
deemed  necessary  by  the  League. 

Upon  such  invitation  being  given  the  Executive  Council 
shall  immediately  institute  an  inquiry  into  the  circum- 
stances and  merits  of  the  dispute  and  recommend  such 
action  as  may  seem  best  and  most  effectual  in  the  circum- 
stances. 

In  the  event  of  a  Power  so  invited  refusing  to  accept 
the  obligations  of  membership  in  the  League  for  the  pur- 
poses of  such  dispute,  and  taking  any  action  against  a 


170        WOODROW  AMLSON  AND  WORLD  SEl  TLEMENT 

State  member  of  the  League  which  in  the  case  of  a  State 
member  of  the  League  would  constitute  a  breach  of  Article 
XII,  the  provisions  of  Article  XVI  shall  be  applicable  as 
against  the  State  taking  such  action. 

If  both  parties  to  the  dispute  when  so  invited  refuse  to 
accept  the  obligations  of  membership  in  the  League  for 
the  purposes  of  such  dispute,  the  Executive  Council  may 
take  such  action  and  make  such  recommendations  as  will 
prevent  hostilities  and  will  result  in  the  settlement  of  the 
dispute. 

Article  XVIII. — ^The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree 
that  the  League  shall  be  entrusted  with  the  general  super- 
vision of  the  trade  in  arms  and  ammunition  with  the  coun- 
tries in  which  the  control  of  this  traffic  is  necessary  in  the 
common  interest. 

Article  XIX. — ^To  those  colonies  and  territories  which 
as  a  consequence  of  the  late  war  have  ceased  to  be  under 
the  sovereignty  of  the  States  which  formerly  governed 
them  and  which  are  inhabited  by  peoples  not  yet  able  to 
stand  by  themselves  under  the  strenuous  conditions  of  the 
modern  world,  there  should  be  applied  the  principle  that 
the  well-being  and  development  of  such  peoples  form  a 
sacred  trust  of  civilization  and  that  securities  for  the  per- 
formance of  this  trust  should  be  embodied  in  the  constitu- 
tion of  the  League. 

The  best  method  of  giving  practical  effect  to  this  prin- 
ciple is  that  the  tutelage  of  such  peoples  should  be 
entrusted  to  advanced  nations  who  by  reason  of  their  re- 
sources, their  experience  or  their  geographical  position, 
can  best  undertake  this  responsibility,  and  that  this  tute- 
lage should  be  exercised  by  them  as  mandataries  on  behalf 
of  the  League. 

The  character  of  the  mandate  must  differ  according  to 
the  stage  of  the  development  of  the  people,  the  geographi- 
cal situation  of  the  territory,  its  economic  conditions,  and 
other  similar  circumstances. 

Certain  communities  formerly  belonging  to  the  Turkish 
Empire  have  reached  a  stage  of  development  where  their 
existence  as  independent  nations  can  be  provisionally 
recognized   subject   to   the   rendering   of   administrative 


TEXT  OF  THE  COVENANT  OF  FEBRUARY  14  171 

advice  and  assistance  by  a  mandatory  power  until  such 
time  as  they  are  able  to  stand  alone.  The  wishes  of  these 
communities  must  be  a  principal  consideration  in  the  se- 
lection of  the  mandatory  power. 

Other  peoples,  especially  those  of  Central  Africa,  are 
at  such  a  stage  that  the  mandatary  must  be  responsible 
for  the  administration  of  the  territory  subject  to  condi- 
tions which  will  guarantee  freedom  of  conscience  or  re- 
ligion, subject  only  to  the  maintenance  of  public  order  and 
morals,  the  prohibition  of  abuses  such  as  the  slave  trade, 
the  arms  traffic,  and  the  liquor  traffic,  and  the  prevention 
of  the  establishment  of  fortifications  or  military  and  naval 
bases  and  of  military  training  of  the  natives  for  other 
than  police  purposes  and  the  defense  of  territory,  and  wdll 
also  secure  equal  opportunities  for  the  trade  and  com- 
merce of  other  members  of  the  League. 

There  are  territories,  such  as  Southwest  Africa  and 
certain  of  the  South  Pacific  Islands,  which,  owing  to  the 
sparseness  of  their  population,  or  their  small  size,  or  their 
remoteness  from  the  centres  of  civilization,  or  their  geo- 
graphical contiguity  to  the  mandatory  state,  and  other 
circumstances,  can  be  best  administered  under  the  laws 
of  the  mandatory  state  as  integral  portions  thereof,  sub- 
ject to  the  safeguards  above-mentioned  in  the  interests  of 
the  indigenous  population. 

In  every  case  of  mandate,  the  mandatory  state  shall 
render  to  the  League  an  annual  report  in  reference  to  the 
territory  committed  to  its  charge. 

The  degree  of  authority,  control,  or  administration  to 
be  exercised  by  the  mandatory  State  shall  if  not  previously 
agreed  upon  by  the  High  Contracting  Parties  in  each  case 
be  explicitly  defined  by  the  Executive  Council  in  a  special 
Act  or  Charter. 

The  High  Contracting  Parties  further  agree  to  establish 
at  the  seat  of  the  League  a  Mandatory  Commission  to 
receive  and  examine  the  annual  reports  of  the  Mandatory 
Powers,  and  to  assist  the  League  in  ensuring  the  observ- 
ance of  the  terms  of  all  Mandates. 

Article  XX. — ^The  High  Contracting  Parties  will  en- 
deavor to  secure  and  maintain  fair  and  humane  conditions 


172         WOODROW  ^\1LS0N  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

of  labor  for  men,  women,  and  children  both  in  their  own 
countries  and  in  all  countries  to  which  their  commercial 
and  industrial  relations  extend;  and  to  that  end  agree  to 
establish  as  part  of  the  organization  of  the  League  a  per- 
manent Bureau  of  Labor. 

Article  XXI. — ^The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree 
that  provision  shall  be  made  through  the  instrumentality 
of  the  League  to  secure  and  maintain  freedom  of  transit 
and  equitable  treatment  for  the  commerce  of  all  States 
members  of  the  League,  having  in  mind,  among  other 
things,  special  arrangements  with  regard  to  the  necessities 
of  the  regions  devastated  during  the  war  of  1914-1918. 

Article  XXIL — ^The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree 
to  place  under  the  control  of  the  League  all  international 
bureaux  already  established  by  general  treaties  if  the 
parties  to  such  treaties  consent.  Furthermore,  they  agree 
that  all  such  international  bureaux  to  be  constituted  in 
future  shall  be  placed  under  the  control  of  the  League. 

Article  XXIII. — ^The  High  Contracting  Parties  agree 
that  every  treaty  or  international  engagement  entered 
into  hereafter  by  any  State  member  of  the  League,  shall 
be  forthwith  registered  with  the  Secretary-General  and 
as  soon  as  possible  published  by  him,  and  that  no  such 
treaty  or  international  engagement  shall  be  binding  until 
so  registered. 

Article  XXIV. — ^It  shall  be  the  right  of  the  Body  of 
Delegates  from  time  to  time  to  advise  the  reconsideration 
by  States  members  of  the  League,  of  treaties  which  have 
become  inapplicable,  and  of  international  conditions,  of 
which  the  continuance  may  endanger  the  peace  of  the 
world. 

Article  XXV. — ^The  High  Contracting  Parties  sever- 
ally agree  tliat  the  present  Covenant  is  accepted  as  abro- 
gating all  obligations  inter  se  which  are  inconsistent  with 
the  terms  thereof,  and  solemnly  engage  that  they  will  not 
hereafter  enter  into  any  engagements  inconsistent  with  the 
terms  thereof. 

In  case  any  of  the  Powers  signatory  hereto  or  subse- 
quently admitted  to  the  League  shall,  before  becoming 
a  party  to  this  Covenant,  have  undertaken  any  obligations 


TEXT  OF  THE  COVENANT  OF  FEBRUARY  14     173 

which  are  inconsistent  with  the  terms  of  this  Covenant, 
it  shall  be  the  duty  of  such  Power  to  take  immediate  steps 
to  procure  its  release  from  such  obligations. 

Article  XXVI. — Amendments  to  this  Covenant  will 
take  effect  when  ratified  by  the  States  whose  representa- 
tives compose  the  Executive  Council  and  by  three-fourths 
of  the  States  whose  representatives  compose  the  Body  of 
Delegates. 


'J 


Document  19. 

Text  of  letter  from  U.  S.  Senator  G.  M. 
Hitchcock  of  Nebraska  to  President  Wilson, 
dated  March  4,  1919,  containing  his  suggestions 
for  amendment  to  the  Covenant  as  originally 
adopted  (typewritten  copy). 

March  4,  1919. 
My  dear  Mr.  President: 

A  number  of  republican  Senators  who  signed  Lodge's 
manifesto  on  the  league  of  nations  constitution  will,  in  my 
opinion,  vote  for  it  nevertheless  if  it  is  a  part  of  the  peace 
treaty.  A  still  larger  number  will  give  it  support  if  cer- 
tain amendments  are  made.  The  following  I  would  men- 
tion as  likely  to  influence  votes  in  the  order  given : 

First,  a  reservation  to  each  high  contracting  party  of 
its  exclusive  control  over  domestic  subjects. 

Second,  a  reservation  of  the  Monroe  doctrine. 

Third,  some  provision  by  which  a  member  of  the  league 
can,  on  proper  notice,  withdraw  from  membership. 

Fourth,  the  settlement  of  the  ambiguity  in  Article  15. 

Fifth,  the  insertion  on  the  next  to  the  last  line  of  first 
paragraph  of  Article  8,  after  the  word  "adopted,"  of  the 
words  "by  the  several  governments." 

Sixth,  the  definite  assurance  that  it  is  optional  with  a 
nation  to  accept  or  reject  the  burdens  of  a  mandatory. 

I  wish  you  a  safe  journey. 

Yours  truly, 

[sd]  G.  M.  Hitchcock. 
The  President, 

The  White  House. 


174 


Document  20. 

Final  text  of  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of 
Nations  as  it  appears  in  the  Treaty  of  Versailles. 

THE  COVENANT  OF  THE  LEAGUE  OF  NATIONS. 

The  High  Contracting  Parties, 

In  order  to  promote  international  cooperation  and  to 
achieve  international  peace  and  security 

by  the  acceptance  of  obligations  not  to  resort  to  war, 
by  the  prescription  of  open,  just  and  honourable  re- 
lations between  nations, 
by  the  firm  establishment  of  the  understandings  of 
international  law  as  the  actual  rule  of  conduct 
among  Governments,  and 
by  the  maintenance  of  justice  and  a  scrupulous  re- 
spect for  all  treaty  obligations  in  the  dealings  of 
organised  peoples  with  one  another, 
Agree  to  this  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

Article  1. — ^The  original  Members  of  the  League  of 
Nations  shall  be  those  of  the  Signatories  which  are  named 
in  the  Annex  to  this  Covenant  and  also  such  of  those  other 
States  named  in  the  Annex  as  shall  accede  without  reserva- 
tion to  this  Covenant.  Such  accession  shall  be  effected 
by  a  Declaration  deposited  with  the  Secretariat  within 
two  months  of  the  coming  into  force  of  the  Covenant. 
Notice  thereof  shall  be  sent  to  all  other  Members  of  the 
League. 

Any  fully  self-governing  State,  Dominion  or  Colony 
not  named  in  the  Annex  may  become  a  Member  of  the 
League  if  its  admission  is  agreed  to  by  two-thirds  of  the 
Assembly,  provided  that  it  shall  give  effective  guarantees 
of  its  sincere  intention  to  observe  its  international  obliga- 
tions, and  shall  accept  such  regulations  as  may  be  pre- 

175 


176         WOODROW  \\TLSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

scribed  by  th^  League  in  regard  to  its  military,  naval,  and 
air  forces  and  armaments. 

Any  Member  of  the  League  may,  after  two  years'  notice 
of  its  intention  so  to  do,  withdraw  from  the  League,  pro- 
vided that  all  its  international  obligations  and  all  its  obli- 
gations under  this  Covenant  shall  have  been  fulfiUed  at  the 
time  of  its  withdrawal. 

Article  2. — ^The  action  of  the  League  under  this 
Covenant  shall  be  effected  through  the  instrumentality  of 
an  Assembly  and  of  a  Council,  with  a  permanent  Secre- 
tariat. 

Article  3. — ^The  Assembly  shall  consist  of  Represent- 
atives of  the  Members  of  the  League. 

The  Assembly  shall  meet  at  stated  intervals  and  from 
time  to  time  as  occasion  may  require  at  the  Seat  of  the 
League  or  at  such  other  place  as  may  be  decided  upon. 

The  Assembly  may  deal  at  its  meetings  with  any  matter 
within  the  sphere  of  action  of  the  League  or  affecting  the 
peace  of  the  world. 

At  meetings  of  the  Assembly  each  Member  of  the 
League  shall  have  one  vote,  and  may  have  not  more  than 
three  Representatives. 

Article  4. — ^The  Council  shall  consist  of  Representa- 
tives of  the  Principal  Allied  and  Associated  Powers,  to- 
gether with  Representatives  of  four  other  Members  of  the 
League.  These  four  ^lembers  of  the  League  shall  be 
selected  by  the  Assembly  from  time  to  time  in  its  discre- 
tion. Until  the  appointment  of  the  Representatives  of 
the  four  Members  of  the  League  first  selected  by  the 
Assembly,  Representatives  of  Belgium,  Brazil,  Spain,  and 
Greece  shall  be  members  of  the  Council. 

With  the  approval  of  the  majority  of  the  Assembly,  the 
Council  may  name  additional  Members  of  the  League 
whose  Representatives  shall  always  be  members  of  the 
Council;  the  Council  with  like  approval  may  increase 
the  number  of  Members  of  the  League  to  be  selected  by  the 
Assembly  for  representation  on  the  Council. 

The  Council  shall  meet  from  time  to  time  as  occasion 
may  require,  and  at  least  once  a  year,  at  the  Seat  of  the 
League,  or  at  such  other  place  as  may  be  decided  upon. 


FINAL  TEXT  OF  THE  COVENANT  177 

The  Council  may  deal  at  its  meetings  with  any  matter 
within  the  sphere  of  action  of  the  League  or  affecting  the 
peace  of  the  world. 

Any  Member  of  the  League  not  represented  on  the 
Council  shall  be  invited  to  send  a  Representative  to  sit 
as  a  member  at  any  meeting  of  the  Council  during  the 
consideration  of  matters  specially  affecting  the  interests  of 
that  Member  of  the  League. 

At  meetings  of  the  Council,  each  Member  of  the  League 
represented  on  the  Council  shall  have  one  vote,  and  may 
have  not  more  than  one  Representative. 

Article  5. — Except  where  otherwise  expressly  pro- 
vided in  this  Covenant  or  by  the  terms  of  the  present 
Treaty,  decisions  at  any  meeting  of  the  Assembly  or  of 
the  Council  shall  require  the  agreement  of  all  the  Members 
of  the  League  represented  by  the  meeting. 

All  matters  of  procedure  at  meetings  of  the  Assembly 
or  of  the  Council,  including  the  appointment  of  Commit- 
tees to  investigate  particular  matters,  shall  be  regulated 
by  the  Assembly  or  by  the  Council  and  may  be  decided 
by  a  majority  of  the  Members  of  the  League  represented 
at  the  meeting. 

The  first  meeting  of  the  Assembly  and  the  first  meeting 
of  the  Council  shall  be  summoned  by  the  President  of  the 
United  States  of  America. 

Article  6. — The  permanent  Secretariat  shall  be  estab- 
lished at  the  Seat  of  the  League.  The  Secretariat  shall 
comprise  a  Secretary  General  and  such  secretaries  and 
staff'  as  may  be  required. 

Tlie  first  Secretary  General  shall  be  the  person  named  in 
the  Annex;  thereafter  the  Secretary  General  shall  be  ap- 
pointed by  the  Council  with  the  approval  of  the  majority 
of  the  Assembly. 

The  secretaries  and  staff  of  the  Secretariat  shall  be 
appointed  by  the  Secretary  General  with  the  approval  of 
the  Council. 

The  Secretary  General  shall  act  in  that  capacity  at  all 
meetings  of  the  Assembly  and  of  the  Council. 

The  expenses  of  the  Secretariat  shall  be  borne  by  the 
Members  of  the  League  in  accordance  with  the  appor- 


178         WOODROW  AVILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

tionment  of  the  expenses  of  the  International  Bureau  of 
the  Universal  Postal  Union. 

Article  7. — The  Seat  of  the  League  is  established  at 
Geneva. 

The  Council  may  at  any  time  decide  that  the  Seat  of 
the  League  shall  be  established  elsewhere. 

All  positions  under  or  in  connection  with  the  League, 
including  the  Secretariat,  shall  be  open  equally  to  men 
and  women. 

Representatives  of  the  Members  of  the  League  and 
officials  of  the  League  when  engaged  on  the  business  of 
the  League  shall  enjoy  diplomatic  privileges  and  im- 
munities. 

The  buildings  and  other  property  occupied  by  the 
League  or  its  officials  or  by  Representatives  attending 
its  meetings  shall  be  inviolable. 

Article  8. — The  Members  of  the  League  recognise 
that  the  maintenance  of  peace  requires  the  reduction  of 
national  armaments  to  the  lowest  point  consistent  with 
national  safety  and  the  enforcement  by  common  action  of 
international  obligations. 

The  Council,  taking  account  of  the  geographical  situa- 
tion and  circumstances  of  each  State,  shall  formulate 
plans  for  such  reduction  for  the  consideration  and  action 
of  the  several  Governments. 

Such  plans  shall  be  subject  to  reconsideration  and  revi- 
sion at  least  every  ten  years. 

After  these  plans  shall  have  been  adopted  by  the  several 
Governments,  the  limits  of  armaments  therein  fixed  shall 
not  be  exceeded  without  the  concurrence  of  the  Council. 

The  Members  of  the  League  agree  that  the  manufacture 
by  private  enterprise  of  munitions  and  implements  of  war 
is  open  to  grave  objections.  The  Council  shall  advise 
how  the  evil  effects  attendant  upon  such  manufacture  can 
be  prevented,  due  regard  being  had  to  the  necessities  of 
those  Members  of  the  League  which  are  not  able  to  manu- 
facture the  munitions  and  implements  of  war  necessary 
for  their  safety. 

The  Members  of  the  League  undertake  to  interchange 


FINAL  TEXT  OF  THE  COVENANT  178 

full  and  frank  information  as  to  the  scale  of  their  arma- 
ments, their  military,  naval  and  air  programmes  and  the 
condition  of  such  of  their  industries  as  are  adaptable  to 
war-like  purposes. 

Article  9. — A  permanent  Commission  shall  be  con- 
stituted to  advise  the  Council  on  the  execution  of  the 
provisions  of  Articles  1  and  8  and  on  military,  naval,  and 
air  questions  generally. 

Article  10. — The  Members  of  the  League  undertake 
to  respect  and  preserve  as  against  external  aggression  the 
territorial  integrity  and  existing  political  independence  of 
all  Members  of  the  League.  In  case  of  any  such  aggres- 
sion or  in  case  of  any  threat  or  danger  of  such  aggression 
the  Council  shall  advise  upon  the  means  by  which  this 
obligation  shall  be  fulfilled. 

Article  IL — ^Any  war  or  threat  of  war,  whether  im- 
mediately affecting  any  of  the  Members  of  the  League 
or  not,  is  hereby  declared  a  matter  of  concern  to  the  whole 
League,  and  the  League  shall  take  any  action  that  may 
be  deemed  wise  and  effectual  to  safeguard  the  peace  of 
nations.  In  case  any  such  emergency  should  arise  the 
Secretary  General  shall  on  the  request  of  any  Member  of 
the  League  forthwith  summon  a  meeting  of  the  CounciL 

It  is  also  declared  to  be  the  friendly  right  of  each  Mem- 
ber of  the  League  to  bring  to  the  attention  of  the  Assembly 
or  of  the  Council  any  circumstance  whatever  affecting 
international  relations  which  threatens  to  disturb  inter- 
national peace  or  the  good  understanding  between  nations 
upon  which  peace  depends. 

Article  12. — ^The  Members  of  the  League  agree  that 
if  there  should  arise  between  them  any  dispute  likely  to 
lead  to  a  rupture,  they  will  submit  the  matter  either  to 
arbitration  or  to  inquiry  by  the  Council,  and  they  agree 
in  no  case  to  resort  to  w^ar  until  three  months  after  the 
award  by  the  arbitrators  or  the  report  by  the  Council. 

In  any  case  under  this  Article  the  award  of  the  arbitra- 
tors shall  be  made  within  a  reasonable  time,  and  the  report 
of  the  Council  shall  be  made  within  six  months  after  the 
submission  of  the  dispute. 

Article  13. — ^The  Members  of  the  League  agree  that 


180         WOODROW  ^ATLSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

whenever  any  dispute  shall  arise  between  them  which 
they  recognise  to  be  suitable  for  submission  to  arbitration 
and  which  cannot  be  satisfactorily  settled  by  diplomacy, 
they  will  submit  the  whole  subject-matter  to  arbitration. 

Disputes  as  to  the  interpretation  of  a  treaty,  as  to  any 
question  of  international  law,  as  to  the  existence  of  any 
fact  which  if  established  would  constitute  a  breach  of  any 
international  obligation,  or  as  to  the  extent  and  nature  of 
the  reparation  to  be  made  for  any  such  breach,  are  de- 
clared to  be  among  those  which  are  generally  suitable  for 
submission  to  arbitration. 

For  the  consideration  of  any  such  dispute  the  court  of 
arbitration  to  which  the  case  is  referred  shall  be  the  court 
agreed  on  by  the  parties  to  the  dispute  or  stipulated  in 
any  convention  existing  between  them. 

The  Members  of  the  League  agree  that  they  will  carry- 
out  in  full  good  faith  any  award  that  may  be  rendered,  and 
that  they  will  not  resort  to  war  against  a  Member  of  the 
League  which  complies  therewith.  In  the  event  of  any 
failure  to  carry  out  such  an  award,  the  Council  shall  pro- 
pose what  steps  should  be  taken  to  give  effect  thereto. 

Article  14. — ^The  Council  shall  forinulate  and  submit 
to  the  Members  of  the  League  for  adoption  plans  for  the 
establishment  of  a  Permanent  Court  of  Liternational  Jus- 
tice. The  Court  shall  be  competent  to  hear  and  deter- 
mine any  dispute  of  an  international  character  which  the 
parties  thereto  submit  to  it.  The  Court  may  also  give 
an  advisory  opinion  upon  any  dispute  or  question  referred 
to  it  by  the  Council  or  by  the  Assembly. 

Article  15. — ^If  there  should  arise  between  Members 
of  the  League  any  dispute  likely  to  lead  to  a  rupture, 
which  is  not  submitted  to  arbitration  in  accordance  with 
Article  13,  the  INIembers  of  the  League  agree  that  they 
will  submit  the  matter  to  the  Council.  Any  party  to  the 
dispute  may  effect  such  submission  by  giving  notice  of 
the  existence  of  the  dispute  to  the  Secretary  General,  who 
will  make  all  necessary  arrangements  for  a  full  investiga- 
tion and  consideration  thereof. 

For  this  purpose  the  parties  to  the  dispute  will  commu- 
nicate to  the  Secretary  General,  as  promptly  as  possible. 


FINAL  TEXT  OF  THE  COVENiVNT  181 

statements  of  their  case  with  all  the  relevant  facts  and 
papers,  and  the  Council  may  forthwith  direct  the  publica- 
tion thereof. 

The  Council  shall  endeavour  to  effect  a  settlement  of 
the  dispute,  and  if  such  efforts  are  successful,  a  statement 
shall  be  made  public  giving  such  facts  and  explanations 
regarding  the  dispute  and  the  terms  of  settlement  thereof 
as  the  Council  may  deem  appropriate. 

If  the  dispute  is  not  thus  settled,  the  Council  either 
unanimously  or  by  a  majority  vote  shall  make  and  publish 
a  report  containing  a  statement  of  the  facts  of  the  dispute 
and  the  recommendations  which  are  deemed  just  and 
proper  in  regard  thereto. 

Any  Member  of  the  League  represented  on  the  Council 
may  make  public  a  statement  of  the  facts  of  the  dispute 
and  of  its  conclusions  regarding  the  same. 

If  a  report  by  the  Council  is  unanimously  agreed  to 
by  the  Members  thereof  other  than  the  Representatives 
of  one  or  more  of  the  parties  to  the  dispute,  the  Members 
of  the  League  agree  that  they  will  not  go  to  war  with  any 
party  to  the  dispute  which  complies  with  the  recommenda- 
tions of  the  report. 

If  the  Council  fails  to  reach  a  report  which  is  unani- 
mously agreed  to  by  the  Members  thereof,  other  than  the 
representatives  of  one  or  more  of  the  parties  to  the  dis- 
pute, the  Members  of  the  League  reserve  to  themselves  the 
right  to  take  such  action  as  they  shall  consider  necessary 
for  the  maintenance  of  right  and  justice. 

If  the  dispute  between  the  parties  is  claimed  by  one  of 
them,  and  is  found  by  the  Council,  to  arise  out  of  a  matter 
which  by  international  law  is  solely  within  the  domestic 
jurisdiction  of  that  party,  the  Council  shall  so  report,  and 
shall  make  no  recommendation  as  to  its  settlement. 

The  Council  may  in  any  case  under  this  Article  refer  the 
dispute  to  the  Assembly.  The  dispute  shall  be  so  referred 
at  the  request  of  either  party  to  the  dispute,  provided  that 
such  request  be  made  within  fourteen  days  after  the  sub- 
mission of  the  dispute  to  the  Council. 

In  any  case  referred  to  the  Assembly,  all  the  provisions 
of  this  Article  and  of  Article  12  relating  to  the  action  and 


184         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

powers  of  the  Council  shall  apply  to  the  action  and  powers 
of  the  Assembly,  provided  that  a  report  made  by  the 
Assembly,  if  concurred  in  by  the  Representatives  of  those 
Members  of  the  League  represented  on  the  Council  and  of 
a  majority  of  the  other  INIembers  of  the  League,  exclusive 
in  each  case  of  the  Representatives  of  the  parties  to  the 
dispute,  shall  have  the  same  force  as  a  report  by  the 
Council  concurred  in  by  all  the  members  thereof  other 
than  the  Representatives  of  one  or  more  of  the  parties  to 
the  dispute. 

Article  16. — Should  any  Member  of  the  League  resort 
to  war  in  disregard  of  its  covenants  under  Articles  12,  13 
or  15,  it  shall  ipso  facto  be  deemed  to  have  committed  an 
act  of  war  against  all  other  Members  of  the  League,  which 
hereby  undertake  immediately  to  subject  it  to  the  sever- 
ance of  all  trade  or  financial  relations,  the  prohibition  of  all 
intercourse  between  their  nationals  and  the  nationals  of 
the  covenant-breaking  State,  and  the  prevention  of  all 
financial,  commercial  or  personal  intercourse  between  the 
nationals  of  the  covenant-breaking  State  and  the  nationals 
of  any  other  State,  whether  a  Member  of  the  League  or 
not. 

It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Council  in  such  case  to  rec- 
ommend to  the  several  Governments  concerned  what  ef- 
fective military,  naval  or  air  force  the  Members  of  the 
League  shall  severally  contribute  to  the  armed  forces  to  be 
used  to  protect  the  covenants  of  the  League. 

The  Members  of  the  League  agree,  further,  that  they 
will  mutually  support  one  another  in  the  financial  and 
economic  measures  which  are  taken  under  this  article,  in 
order  to  minimise  the  loss  and  inconvenience  resulting 
from  the  above  measures,  and  that  they  will  mutually 
support  one  another  in  resisting  any  special  measures 
aimed  at  one  of  their  number  by  the  covenant-breaking 
State,  and  that  they  will  take  the  necessary  steps  to 
afford  passage  through  their  territory  to  the  forces  of  any 
of  the  Members  of  the  League  which  are  cooperating  to 
protect  the  covenants  of  the  League. 

Any  member  of  the  League  which  has  violated  any 
covenant  of  the  League  may  be  declared  to  be  no  longej- 


FINAL  TEXT  OF  THE  COVENANT  183 

a  Member  of  the  League  by  a  vote  of  the  Council  con- 
curred in  by  the  Representatives  of  all  the  other  Members 
of  the  League  represented  thereon. 

Article  17. — In  the  event  of  a  dispute  between  a 
Member  of  the  League  and  a  State  which  is  not  a  Member 
of  the  League,  or  between  States  not  Members  of  the 
League,  the  State  or  States  not  Members  of  the  League 
shall  be  invited  to  accept  the  obligations  of  membership  in 
the  League  for  the  purposes  of  such  dispute,  upon  such 
conditions  as  the  Council  may  deem  just.  If  such  invita- 
tion is  accepted,  the  provisions  of  Articles  12  to  16  in- 
clusive shall  be  applied  with  such  modifications  as  may  be 
deemed  necessary  by  the  Council. 

Upon  such  invitation  being  given  the  Council  shall 
immediately  institute  an  inquiry  into  the  circumstances  of 
the  dispute  and  recommend  such  action  as  may  seem  best 
and  most  effectual  in  the  circumstances. 

If  a  State  so  invited  shall  refuse  to  accept  the  obligations 
of  membership  in  the  League  for  the  purposes  of  such 
dispute,  and  shall  resort  to  war  against  a  Member  of  the 
League,  the  provisions  of  Article  16  shall  be  applicable  as 
against  the  State  taking  such  action. 

If  both  parties  to  the  dispute  when  so  invited  refuse  to 
accept  the  obligations  of  membership  in  the  League  for 
the  purposes  of  such  dispute,  the  Council  may  take  such 
measures  and  make  such  recommendations  as  will  prevent 
hostilities  and  will  result  in  the  settlement  of  the  dispute. 

Article  18. — ^Every  treaty  or  international  engage- 
ment entered  into  hereafter  by  any  Member  of  the  League 
shall  be  forthwith  registered  with  the  Secretariat  and  shall 
as  soon  as  possible  be  published  by  it.  No  such  treaty  or 
international  engagement  shall  be  binding  until  so  regis- 
tered. 

Article  19. — ^The  Assembly  may  from  time  to  time 
advise  the  reconsideration  by  Members  of  the  League  of 
treaties  which  have  become  inapplicable  and  the  considera- 
tion of  international  conditions  whose  continuance  might 
endanger  the  peace  of  the  world. 

Article  20. — The  Members  of  the  League  severally 
agree  that  this  Covenant  is  accepted  as  abrogating  all 


184        WOODROW  WILSON  .VND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

obligations  or  understandings  inter  se  which  are  inconsist- 
ent with  the  terms  thereof,  and  solemnly  undertake  that 
they  will  not  hereafter  enter  into  any  engagements  in- 
consistent with  the  terms  thereof. 

In  case  any  Member  of  the  League  shall,  before  becom- 
ing a  Member  of  the  League,  have  undertaken  any  ob- 
ligations inconsistent  with  the  terms  of  this  Covenant, 
it  shall  be  the  duty  of  such  Member  to  take  immediate 
steps  to  procure  its  release  from  such  obligations. 

Article  2L — Nothing  in  this  Covenant  shall  be 
deemed  to  affect  the  validity  of  international  engage- 
ments, such  as  treaties  of  arbitration  or  regional  under- 
standings like  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  for  securing  the 
maintenance  of  peace. 

Article  22. — To  those  colonies  and  territories  which 
as  a  consequence  of  the  late  war  have  ceased  to  be  under 
the  sovereignty  of  the  States  which  formerly  governed 
them  and  which  are  inhabited  by  peoples  not  yet  able  to 
stand  by  themselves  under  the  strenuous  conditions  of  the 
modern  world,  there  should  be  applied  the  principle  that 
the  well-being  and  development  of  such  peoples  form 
a  sacred  trust  of  civilisation  and  that  securities  for  the 
performance  of  this  trust  should  be  embodied  in  this 
Covenant. 

The  best  method  of  giving  practical  effect  to  this 
principle  is  that  the  tutelage  of  such  peoples  should  be 
entrusted  to  advanced  nations  who  by  reason  of  their 
resources,  their  experience  or  their  geographical  position 
can  best  undertake  this  responsibility,  and  who  are  willing 
to  accept  it,  and  that  this  tutelage  should  be  exercised  by 
them  as  Mandatories  on  behalf  of  the  League. 

The  character  of  the  mandate  must  differ  according  to 
the  stage  of  the  development  of  the  people,  the  geograph- 
ical situation  of  the  territory,  its  economic  conditions,  and 
other  similar  circumstances. 

Certain  communities  formerly  belonging  to  the  Turkish 
Empire  have  reached  a  stage  of  development  where  their 
existence  as  independent  nations  can  be  provisionally 
recognised  subject  to  the  rendering  of  administrative 
advice  and  assistance  by  a  Mandatory  until  such  time  as 


FINAL  TEXT  OF  THE  COVENANT  185 

they  are  able  to  stand  alone.  The  wishes  of  these  com- 
munities must  be  a  principal  consideration  in  the  selection 
of  the  Mandatory. 

Other  peoples,  especially  those  of  Central  Africa,  are  at 
such  a  stage  that  the  Mandatory  must  be  responsible  for 
the  administration  of  the  territory  under  conditions  which 
will  guarantee  freedom  of  conscience  and  religion,  subject 
only  to  the  maintenance  of  public  order  and  morals,  the 
prohibition  of  abuses  such  as  the  slave  trade,  the  arms 
traffic  and  the  liquor  traffic,  and  the  prevention  of  the 
establishment  of  fortifications  or  military  and  naval  bases 
and  of  military  training  of  the  natives  for  other  than 
police  purposes  and  the  defence  of  territory,  and  will  also 
secure  equal  opportunities  for  the  trade  and  commerce  of 
other  Members  of  the  League. 

There  are  territories,  such  as  South- West  Africa  and 
certain  of  the  South  Pacific  Islands,  which,  owing  to  the 
sparseness  of  their  population,  or  their  small  size,  or  their 
remoteness  from  the  centres  of  civilisation,  or  their  geo- 
graphical contiguity  to  the  territory  of  the  Mandatory,  and 
other  circumstances,  can  be  best  administered  under  the 
laws  of  the  Mandatory  as  integral  portions  of  its  territory 
subject  to  the  safeguards  above  mentioned  in  the  interests 
of  the  indigenous  population. 

In  every  case  of  mandate,  the  Mandatory  shall  render  to 
the  Council  an  annual  report  in  reference  to  the  territory 
committed  to  its  charge. 

The  degree  of  authority,  control,  or  administration  to 
be  exercised  by  the  Mandatory  shall,  if  not  previously 
agreed  upon  by  the  Members  of  the  League,  be  explicitly 
defined  in  each  case  by  the  Council. 

A  permanent  Commission  shall  be  constituted  to 
receive  and  examine  the  annual  reports  of  the  Mandatories 
and  to  advise  the  Council  on  all  matters  relating  to  the 
observance  of  the  mandates. 

Article  23. — Subject  to  and  in  accordance  with  the 
provisions  of  international  conventions  existing  or  here- 
after to  be  agreed  upon,  the  Members  of  the  League: 

(a)  will  endeavour  to  secure  and  maintain  fair  and 
humane  conditions  of  labour  for  men,  women. 


186        WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

and  children,  both  in  their  own  countries  and  in 
all  countries  to  which  their  commercial  and 
industrial  relations  extend,  and  for  that  purpose 
will  establish  and  maintain  the  necessary  inter- 
national organizations; 

(b)  undertake  to  secure  just  treatment  of  the  native 
irdiabitants  of  territories  under  their  control; 

(c)  will  entrust  the  League  with  the  general  super- 

vision over  the  execution  of  agreements  with 
regard  to  the  traffic  in  women  and  children,  and 
the  traffic  in  opium  and  other  dangerous  drugs; 

(d)  will  entrust  the  League  with  the  general  super- 
vision of  the  trade  in  arms  and  ammunition  with 
the  countries  in  which  the  control  of  this  traffic 
is  necessary  in  the  common  interest; 

(e)  will  make  provision  to  secure  and  maintain 
freedom  of  communications  and  of  transit  and 
equitable  treatment  for  the  commerce  of  all 
Members  of  the  League.  In  this  connection, 
the  special  necessities  of  the  regions  devastated 
during  the  war  of  1914-1918  shall  be  borne  in 
mind; 

(f)  will  endeavour  to  take  steps  in  matters  of  inter- 
national concern  for  the  prevention  and  control 
of  disease. 

Article  24. — There  shall  be  placed  under  the  direction 
of  the  League  all  international  bureaux  already  established 
by  general  treaties  if  the  parties  to  such  treaties  consent. 
All  such  international  bureaux  and  all  commissions  for  I  he 
regulation  of  matters  of  international  interest  hereafter 
constituted  shall  be  placed  under  the  direction  of  the 
League. 

In  all  matters  of  international  interest  which  are 
regulated  by  general  conventions  but  which  are  not 
placed  under  the  control  of  international  bureaux  or 
commissions,  the  Secretariat  of  the  League  shall,  subject 
to  the  consent  of  the  Council  and  if  desired  by  the  parties, 
collect  and  distribute  all  relevant  information  and  shall 
render  any  other  assistance  which  may  be  necessary  or 
desirable. 


FINAL  TEXT  OF  THE  COVENANT  187 

The  Council  may  include  as  part  of  the  expenses  of  the 
Secretariat  the  expenses  of  any  bureau  or  commission 
which  is  placed  under  the  direction  of  the  League. 

Article  25. — The  Members  of  the  League  agree  to 
encourage  and  promote  the  establishment  and  cooperation 
of  duly  authorised  voluntary  national  Red  Cross  organisa- 
tions having  as  purposes  the  improvement  of  health,  the 
prevention  of  disease  and  the  mitigation  of  suffering 
throughout  the  world. 

Article  26. — Amendments  to  this  Covenant  will  take 
effect  when  ratified  by  the  Members  of  the  League  whose 
Representatives  compose  the  Council  and  by  a  majority 
of  the  Members  of  the  League  whose  Representatives 
compose  the  Assembly. 

No  such  amendment  shall  bind  any  Member  of  the 
League  which  signifies  its  dissent  therefrom,  but  in  that    '1 
case  it  shall  cease  to  be  a  Member  of  the  League.  ! 

Annex. 

i.  original  members  of  the  league  of  nations 
signatories  of  the  treaty  of  peace. 

United  States  of  America    Hedjaz 

Belgium  Honduras 

Bolivia  Italy 

Brazil  Japan 

British  Empire  Liberia 

Canada  Nicaragua 

Australia  Panama 

South  Africa  Peru 

New  Zealand  Poland 

India  Portugal 

China  Roumania 

Cuba  Serb-Croat-Slovene 
Ecuador  State 

France  Siam 

Greece  Czecho-Slovakia 

Guatemala  Uruguay 
Haiti 


188        WOODROW  ^^^LSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

states  invited  to  accede  to  the  covenant. 

Argentine  Republic  Persia 

Chili  Salvador 

Colombia  Spain 

Denmark  Sweden 

Netherlands  Switzerland 

Norway  Venezuela 
Paraguay 

ii.  first  secretary  general  of  the  league  of  nations. 

The  Honourable  Sir  James  Eric  Drummond, 
K.  C.  M.  G.,  C.  B. 


Document  21. 

Text  of  the  so-called  "Loucheur  Report "  from 
Appendix  B  to  Secret  Minutes,  Council  of  Ten, 
February  7  (mimeograph). 

APPENDIX  B  TO  MINUTES  OF  COUNCIL  OF  TEN. 

February  7,  1919. 
1557. 
(Secret.) 

Report  by  the  Committee  appointed  by  the  Su- 
preme War  Council  at  the  Meeting  of  the  24th 
January,  1919.     (Morning.) 

The  Committee  consisting  of 

Monsieur  Loucheur,  as  President  (France) 

Marshal  Foch,  Commander-in-Chief 

of  the  Allied  Forces. 
General  Bliss  (America) 

General  Sir  Henry  Wilson  (Great  Britain) 

(acting  for  Mr.W'inston  Churchill) 
General  Sir  Frederick  Sykes  (Royal  Air  Force) 

H.   E.   General  Diaz,   Chief  of  the 

Staff,  Italian  Army. 

Assembled  on  the  27th  January,  2nd  and  5th  February. 

From  an  examination  of  the  Reports  made  by  the  Sub- 
Committees  and  from  the  discussion  which  followed  it 
appeared  that — 

1.  There  is  some  uncertainty  regarding  the  strength  of 
the  existing  German  Army,  and  the  resources  in  war 
material  of  all  kinds  at  its  disposal,  but  both  are  still  con- 
siderable. 

2.  There  is  similar  uncertainty  regarding  the  war  ma- 
terial and  stocks  of  munitions  in  the  interior  of  Germany, 

189 


100         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

both  in  proof  and  in  course  of  manufacture,  also  regarding 
the  means  of  production  of  such  materials,  but  these  stocks 
and  the  means  of  production  also  are  certainly  still  con- 
siderable in  quantity. 

Any  serious  reduction  in  the  effective  strength  of  the 
Allied  Army  of  Occupation  must  depend  on  the  carrying 
out  of  certain  necessary  measures,  the  execution  of  which 
must  be  controlled.  To  this  end  the  Committee  recom- 
mends the  following  arrangements : 

War  material  actually  in  possession  of  the  German 
Armies. 

x\n  approximate  estimate  of  such  war  material  is  set 
forth  in  Annex  No.  1. 

The  Committee  therefore  considers  that  the  Allied 
Governments  should  fix  definitely  the  number  of  troops 
and  the  amount  of  war  material  of  certain  categories  to 
be  left  in  the  hands  of  the  German  Armies,  which  it  pro- 
poses should  be  reduced  to  a  strength  of  25  Infantry  Divi- 
sions and  5  Cavalry  Divisions,  and  recommends  that  all 
material  in  excess  should  be  handed  over. 

All  the  war  material  to  be  surrendered  by  the  Germans, 
all  stock  of  asphyxiating  gas  and  gas  masks,  must  be  given 
up  at  places  selected  by  agreement,  to  Committees  of 
Allied  officers  who  will  carry  out  the  removal,  or  the  de- 
struction, or  the  putting  out  of  action  of  the  surrendered 
war  material,  according  to  circumstances. 

As  regards  destruction  and  putting  out  of  action,  cer- 
tain detailed  measures  have  been  considered;  these  will 
be  carried  out  by  the  above-mentioned  Allied  officers  if 
the  general  principles  are  accepted. 

Manufacture  of  war  material. 

Similarly  it  is  necessary  that  the  German  Government 
should  pledge  itself  not  to  continue  the  manufacture  of 
war  material  during  the  period  of  the  armistice,  in  order 
that  she  may  not  rearm  in  secrecy. 

The  most  certain  method  of  ensuring  the  correct  execu- 
tion of  the  above  undertaking  would  consist  in  controlling 
certain  German  munition  factories  but  not  necessarily  all 


THE  "LOUCHEUR  REPORT"  191 

of  them  and  in  removing  or  destroying  special  machinery  as 
indicated  in  the  Report  of  the  Technical  Sub-Committee 
(Annex  2).  This  control  could  be  exercised  by  a  compara- 
tively small  number  of  Allied  experts. 

It  is,  however,  necessary  to  provide  for  the  possibility 
that,  after  the  Allies  have  reduced  the  Army  of  occupa- 
tion, Germany  may  put  obstacles  in  the  way  of  such  con- 
trol and  resume  the  production  of  war  material. 

The  Committee,  therefore,  calls  attention  to  the  fact 
that  a  form  of  guarantee  less  comprehensive,  but  suffi- 
ciently efficacious,  provided  that  the  delivery  of  existing 
material  has  taken  place,  could  be  found  in  the  establish- 
ment of  absolute  control  by  military  occupation  of  the 
area  extending  to  the  east  of  the  Rhine  for  an  average 
depth  of  about  50  kilometres  from  Cologne  to  15  kilo- 
metres to  the  north  of  Duisberg,  in  such  a  way  as  to 
embrace  Essen  and  the  principal  Krupp  establishments, 
the  greater  part  of  the  Rheinish-Westphalian  coal-fields 
and  the  metallic  industries  which  depend  on  these.  A 
map  has  been  sent  to  Marshal  Foch  showing  this  zone. 

The  importance  of  this  region  from  the  point  of  view 
of  war  in  industries  is  so  great  that  it  would  be  practically 
impossible  for  Germany  once  disarmed  to  take  up  arms  if 
she  had  not  free  disposal  of  it. 

Further,  the  prevention  of  exportation  to  the  unoc- 
cupied German  territories  of  the  general  products  of  this 
area  would  have  the  most  serious  consequences  from  an 
economic  point  of  view.  If  the  general  munition  control  is 
interfered  with  or  if  unauthorized  production  is  found  to 
be  going  on,  trade  between  the  occupied  territory  and  the 
unoccupied  territory  would  be  prohibited. 

These  results  can  be  looked  for  as  a  consequence  of  ne- 
gotiating with  the  enemy,  or  they  can  be  enforced  upon 
him  as  a  condition  of  the  renewal  of  the  Armistice.  In  the 
latter  case  the  text  of  the  agreement  might  be  that  of  the 
appended  draft. 

General  Bliss  has  drawn  up  a  Note  (Annex  3)  dealing 
with  certain  reservations  he  wishes  to  make  on  the  subject 
matter  of  the  above  paragraphs. 

General  Diaz  brought  to  notice  the  importance,  in  case 


192         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

German  Austria  should  be  joined  to  Germany,  of  foresee- 
ing the  necessity  of  taking  analogous  measures  as  regards 
factories  in  which  war  material  is  manufactured  in  that 
region,  where  there  are  many  of  importance. 

(Attached  is  an  additional  clause  to  the  Armistice  con- 
ditions compiled  in  accordance  with  the  above-mentioned 
idea.) 

To  this  Report  are  annexed  the  following  documents : — 

Annex  1.  Report  dated  1st  February,  1919,  of  the 
Military  Sub-Committees. 

Annex  2.  Report  dated  2nd  February,  1919,  of  the 
Technical  Sub-Committee. 

Annex  S.  Memorandum  by  General  Bliss,  United 
States  Army. 

Annex  ^.  Paper  by  General  Groves  devoted  to  aero- 
nautics. 

Annex  5.     Normal  allowance  of  arms  for  German  units. 

ADDITIONAL    CLAUSE    TO    THE    ARMISTICE    CONDITIONS. 

1.  It  is  hereby  agreed  that  provided  Germany  renounces 
definitely  any  intention  to  resume  hostilities  and  carries 
out  the  following  conditions  as  a  guarantee  of  such  renun- 
ciation, the  Allied  and  Associated  Governments  will  re- 
duce the  financial  burden  imposed  upon  Germany  by  the 
Allied  occupation. 

2.  The  reduction  of  the  burden  of  occupation  must  be 
preceded  by  the  adoption  of  the  measures  mentioned 
below,  the  execution  of  which  will  show  clearly  the  wish 
of  Germany  not  to  resume  hostilities  and  to  cease  the  man- 
ufacture of  war  material. 

3.  Germany  undertakes  to  reduce  the  effective  person- 
nel of  her  Armies  to  such  numbers  as  are  strictly  necessarj^ 
for  the  garrison  of  their  frontier  and  the  maintenance  of 
order  in  the  interior,  that  is  to  say 

25  Divisions* 
5  Cavalry  Divisions* 

4.  Germany  consequently  undertakes  to  reduce  the 
quantity  of  war  material  to  be  maintained  to  the  following 
figures : — 

*The  establishment  of  a  Division  is  shown  in  Annex  5, 


THE  "LOUCHEUR  REPORT"  193 

Note:  General  Weygand  wishes  to  give  further 
consideration  to  these  figures  before  accep- 
ting them. 

Heavy  Guns 1,000 

Field  Guns 1,575 

Machine  Guns 3,825 

Automatic  Rifles 4,500 

Rifles 412,500 

Aeroplanes see  para.  5  bis. 

Trench  Mortars 1,400 

5.  Consequently  all  war  material  of  the  above  natures 
in  excess  of  these  figures  will  be  delivered  at  places  to  be 
fixed  by  agreement,  either  in  occupied  or  non-occupied 
portions  of  Germany  or  outside  Germany,  to  Commissions 
of  Allied  ofl5cers  who  will  be  appointed  for  this  purpose. 
These  surrenders  will  apply  to  the  whole  of  the  war  ma- 
terial existing  either  with  the  Armies  or  in  the  interior  in 
parks,  depots,  factories,  etc.,  whether  finished,  underproof, 
or  in  course  of  construction  or  repair.  The  Allied  officers 
will  carry  out  according  to  circumstances  the  removal  or 
the  destruction  or  the  putting  out  of  action  of  the  war 
material  so  surrendered. 

5.  bis.  Aircraft.  With  regard  to  aircraft,  Germany  to 
surrender  the  following: — 

(a)  5,000  engines  of  types  to  be  selected  by  the  Allies. 

(b)  450  German  marine  aircraft  (i.  e.,  aeroplanes,  sea- 
planes and  flying  boats)  to  be  selected  by  the  Allies. 

(c)  15  airships  to  be  selected  by  the  Allies. 

(d)  All  aircraft  will  be  complete  with  all  war  equipment 
and  armament  and  to  be  flown  by  German  personnel  to 
places  to  be  specified  by  the  Allies  before  a  date  to  be 
fixed  by  the  Allies. 

(e)  6  Rigid  Airship  Sheds  over  800  feet  long,  with  the 
complete  hydrogen-producing  plant  for  each  of  the  airship- 
sheds,  will  also  be  surrendered  in  an  efficient  condition. 

Note:  It  is  considered  important  that  the 
question  of  the  ultimate  destination  or  des- 
truction of  all  aircraft  and  aircraft  material 
surrendered  by  Germany  shall  be  settled  by 


194         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

the  Supreme  War  Council  when  a  decision 
as  to  the  amount  to  be  deUvered  has  been 
arrived  at. 
C.  All  tanks  (all  gas  masks)  and  stocks  of  mustard  and 
arsenical  gases  with  projectors  and  cylinders  will  be  sur- 
rendered. 

7.  Germany  will,  in  addition,  bind  herself  expressly  to 
stop  all  manufacture  of  war  material  of  every  kind,  except 
that  strictly  necessary  for  the  upkeep  of  material  of  which 
the  existence  is  authorized. 

8.  To  ensure  the  loyal  and  complete  execution  of  the 
pledges  undertaken  by  Germany  as  laid  down  in  paras. 
1,  3,  4,  5,  5  bis.,  6  and  7,  the  Allied  Governments  will 
maintain  in  Germany  a  Mission  of  technical  experts  and 
officers  who  will  control  the  factories,  workshops,  and 
building  yards  engaged  in  the  manufacture  of  the  classes 
of  war  material  mentioned  in  pars.  4,  5  bis.,  and  6  and 
munition  parks  and  magazines  of  all  kinds. 

This  mission  shall  be  authorized  to  inspect  factories  and 
to  remove  or  destroy  such  specialized  machinery  engaged 
in  the  production  of  the  above-mentioned  claims  of  war 
material  as  they  may  consider  necessary  to  ensure  the 
cessation  of  output  as  aforesaid. 

The  civil  and  military  German  authorities  will  supply 
these  experts  with  the  whole  of  the  information  which 
they  will  need  to  carry  out  their  mission  and  will  furnish 
them  with  all  the  necessary  material  means,  and  all  the 
necessary  authorizations  to  complete  it,  without  allowing 
any  obstacle  to  be  placed  in  their  way. 

9.  In  the  event  of  Germany  not  agreeing  to  the  fore- 
going proposals,  or  in  the  event  of  her  not  carrying  them 
out  after  having  agreed  to  them  the  Allied  Governments 
will  proceed  to  the  military  occupation  of  the  Westphalian 
basin  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Rhine,  the  territory  painted 
red  on  the  map  which  is  annexed. 

General 
Military  Section,  C.  I.  G.  S. 

British  Delegation. 
5th  February  1919. 

[Five  annexes  omitted.] 


PART  IV 
STRUGGLE  FOR  LIMITATION  OF  ARMAMENTS 


Document  22. 

Letter  to  President  Wilson,  March  14,  1919, 
from  Rear-Admiral  W.  S.  Benson  (autographed 
original),  submitting  memorandum,  dated 
March  13,  of  United  States  Naval  Advisory  Staff 
on  "Disposition  of  German  and  Austrian  Vessels 
of  War"  (typewritten  original). 

AMERICAN   COMMISSION   TO    NEGOTIATE   PEACE. 

14  March,  1919. 

My  dear  Mr.  President: 

Realizing  the  tremendous  importance  of  the  final  dis- 
position of  the  enemy  war  vessels,  we  have  given  the  sub- 
ject most  earnest  and  careful  thought  and  study,  and  our 
views  are  as  concisely  and  clearly  expressed  in  the  attached 
paper  as  we  can  put  them. 

Due  to  the  importance  of  this  subject,  I  hope  you  will 
pardon  me  for  strongly  urging  upon  you  the  advisability 
of  reading  this  entire  paper,  as  we  have  tried  to  make  it 
cover  every  single  point  involved  in  this  question. 

Should  there  be  any  doubt  in  your  mind,  or  should 
you  wish  to  ascertain  what  I  believe  to  be  the  professional 
opinions  of  the  officers  of  the  foreign  Navies  with  whom  I 
have  been  associated  in  the  various  conferences  in  Paris,  I 
would  appreciate  very  much  the  opportunity  of  discussing 
this  matter  personally  with  you. 

I  fully  appreciate  the  value  of  your  time  and  have  there- 
fore tried  to  make  the  paper  as  short  as  possible  consistent 
with  clearness  and  completeness. 

Sincerely  yours, 
[Sigtied]  W.  S.  Benson. 

The  President  of  the  United  States. 

197 


198         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  AVORLD  SETTLEMENT 

(Confidential.) 

U.  S.   NAVAL  ADVISORY  STAFF,  PARIS. 

Memorandum  No.  XXIV 

Subject:     Disposition    of    Geraian    and    Austrian 

Vessels  of  War. 
Copies  to: 

Mr.  Lansing 

Colonel  House 

General  Bliss 

Mr.  White 

Navy  Department 

Files 

MEMORANDUM. 

The  following  naval  vessels  are,  by  the  proposed  naval 
terms  of  peace,  to  be  surrendered  to  the  Allies  and  the 
United  States — 


13  March,  1919. 


Battleships 
Battle  Cruisers   . 
Light  Cruisers     . 
Destroyers 
Submarines  (about) 


21  (  3  Austrian) 
6 

19  (  3  Austrian) 
101  (  9  Austrian) 
135  (15  Austrian) 


There  is  now  under  consideration  by  the  Peace  Con- 
ference two  methods  of  disposing  of  these  vessels: — 

(1)  Destruction. 

(2)  Distribution  among  the  great  Powers. 

REASON    FOR   DESTRUCTION. 

(a)  The  covenant  for  a  League  of  Nations,  Article  VIII, 
states  "The  High  Contractmg  Parties  recognise  the  prin- 
ciple that  the  maintenance  of  peace  will  require  the  reduc- 
tion of  national  armaments  to  the  lowest  point  consistent 
with  national  safety." 

The  destruction  of  the  German- Austrian  vessels  would 
be  a  practical  demonstration  to  the  world  of  the  sincerity 
of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  in  their  determination 
to  reduce  armaments.     The  distribution  of  the  German- 


DISPOSITION  OF  GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  SHIPS       199 

Austrian  vessels  would  increase  the  strength  of  the  naval 
armaments  of  the  great  Powers  about  30  per  cent.  Great 
Britain,  the  United  States,  Japan,  France,  and  Italy  have 
now  85  dreadnoughts  and  battle  cruisers.  The  German- 
Austrian  dreadnoughts  and  battle  cruisers  awaiting  dis- 
position number  27. 

(b)  The  fact  that  the  menace  of  German- Austrian  naval 
power  is  removed  renders  unnecessary  any  increase  in  the 
strength  of  the  navies  of  the  European  Powers.  On  the 
contrary,  the  logical  result  of  the  elimination  of  this 
menace  should  be  a  reduction  in  European  naval  arma- 
ments. 

(c)  The  addition  of  German- Austrian  ships  to  the  navy 
of  any  European  power  would  be  an  increased  economic 
burden  to  that  power.  As  the  United  States  is  called 
upon  to  assist  financially  the  great  powers  of  Europe 
which  are  already  heavily  in  our  debt  and  now  nearly 
bankrupt,  it  is  to  our  financial  interest  to  oppose  any  un- 
necessary increase  of  their  financial  obligations. 

(d)  The  distribution  of  German-Austrian  vessels  would 
arouse  dissatisfaction  and  jealousy  between  states  that 
were  not  satisfied  with  their  respective  shares  and  would 
tend  to  stimulate  armament  construction  to  restore  for- 
mer relative  naval  strength.  It  is  physically  impossible 
to  make  an  equitable  distribution  of  the  German  Navy 
among  the  great  Powers.  The  ships  are  of  a  variety  of 
types  of  greatly  varying  value,  so  that  it  is  not  a  question 
of  numbers,  but  rather  a  vastly  intricate  naval  question. 
We  consider  it  dangerous  to  permit  this  question  to  be 
opened  at  all,  since  the  problems  presented  by  it  cannot 
be  solved  without  compelling  some  of  the  Powers  to  accept 
semi-obsolete  vessels,  thus  giving  them  grounds  for  future 
bitterness. 

(e)  The  United  States  should  not  participate  in  the 
distribution.  America  is  proud  to  claim  that  she  came 
into  this  war  with  clean  hands  and  will  come  out  with 
empty  hands.  We  cannot  stultify  our  position  by  accept- 
ing any  spoils  of  war. 

(f)  It  is  essential  that  the  United  States  have  a  navy 
as  large  as  that  of  Great  Britain.     The  League  of  Nations 


200        WOODROW  AMLSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

must  be  strong  enough  to  restrain,  if  necessary,  its  strong- 
est member. 

No  international  navy  made  up  of  ships  of  heteroge- 
neous tj'pes,  training,  language,  custom  and  command 
could  hope  to  cope  with  the  British  fleet.  There  must  exist 
in  such  an  international  force  a  single  unit  of  the  same 
nationality  of  equal  strength  to  the  navy  of  Great  Britain. 
Such  a  unit  with  the  assistance  of  the  forces  of  the  League 
would  be  able  to  enforce  the  mandates  of  the  League 
against  any  power.  The  United  States  has  its  ambitions 
satisfied  and  can  be  relied  upon  to  support  loyally  the 
League  of  Nations.  The  nations  of  the  world  know  this 
and  have  faith  in  us.  Should  we  ever  fail  in  our  interna- 
tional obligations  there  would  exist  the  forces  of  the  League 
with  the  fleet  of  Great  Britain  to  apply  the  remedy. 

Any  distribution  of  the  German-Austrian  ships  on  the 
basis  of  losses  or  of  naval  effort  in  the  war  would  give 
the  lion's  share  to  Great  Britain,  which  would  mean  that 
the  American  taxpayer  must  pay  hundreds  ^f  rniUions  of 
dollars  to  restore  equality  of  strength. 

(g)  The  German  capital  ships  were  built  for  a  special 
purpose — to  oppose  the  British  fleet.  They  are  of  short 
steaming  radius,  built  to  fight  near  home  and  are  un- 
suitable for  overseas  operations.  They  have  German 
guns,  German  equipment  and  depend  on  German  shops 
and  yards  for  replacements  and  upkeep.  They  would  be 
uneconomical  and  inefficient  as  a  part  of  a  foreign  navy. 
They  are  inferior  in  type  to  the  later  British  and  American 
ships  and  will  soon  be  obsolete.  Any  country  that  gets 
them  will  find  the  cost  of  maintenance  out  of  proportion 
to  their  value.  Great  Britain  alone  might  afford  to  keep 
them  as  a  reenforcement  to  her  Channel  fleet,  thereby 
releasing  her  own  modern  types  for  operations  abroad. 

(h)  There  are  in  the  world  but  two  great  Powers  whose 
existence  depends  on  naval  strength.  These  are  Great 
Britain  and  Japan.  In  the  past  Great  Britain  built  with 
the  exclusive  idea  of  keeping  a  safe  superiority  over  the 
German  fleet.  In  the  future  her  sole  naval  rival  wifl  be^ 
the  United  States,  and  every  ship  built  or  acquired  by 
Great  Britain  can  have  in  mind  only  the  American  fleets 


DISPOSITION  OF  GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  SHIPS       301 

Japan  has  no  rival  in  the  Pacific  except  America.\ 
Every  ship  built  or  acquired  by  Japan  can  have  in  mind  ) 
only  opposition  to  American  naval  strength  in  the  Pacific./ 

The  United  States,  in  its  desire  to  maintain  the  peacd\ 
of  the  world  and  to  help  all  nations,  must  not  forget  i 
the  necessity  of  national  safety.     Any  reduction  in  our 
relative  naval  strength  will  weaken  our  influence  in  the 
world  and  will  limit  our  ability  to  serve  the  League  of/ 
Nations.  '' 

While  distribution  of  the  German-Austrian  vessels  to 
other  Powers  than  Great  Britain  or  Japan  would  not  be  so 
serious  for  us,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  Great  Britain 
is  in  a  position  in  Europe  to  compel,  if  necessary,  a  naval 
alliance  that  would  add  these  ships  to  her  fleet. 

(i)  There  is  no  means  of  guaranteeing  that  once  the 
distribution  was  made  on  an  agreed  basis,  participating 
Powers  would  not  sell  or  exchange  their  vessels  or  others 
which  they  replace  to  some  other  Power  and  thereby 
affect  the  relative  naval  strength  of  states  in  a  manner  not 
contemplated  in  their  distribution. 

(j)  The  German- Austrian  submarines   should   not   be'^ 
distributed — ^they  should  be  destroyed.     Not  only  should  "^ 
these  submarines  be  destroyed,  but  all  submarines  in  the  '^ 
world  should  be  destroyed,  and  their  future  possession  by 
any  Power  forbidden.     They  serve  no  useful  purpose  in 
time  of  peace.     They  are  inferior  to  surface  craft  in  time 
of  war  except  in  ability  to  treacherously  attack  merchant 
ships.     In  the  present  war,  99  per  cent,   of  submarine 
attacks  were  illegal  attacks  on  merchant  ships.     Civiliza- 
tion demands  that  naval  war  be  placed  on  a  higher  plane 
and    confined    to    combatant    vessels.     So    long   as    the 
submarine  exists  it  will  be  used  in  the  stress  of  war  toj 
attack  neutral  trade.     High  officers  of  the  British  Ad-' 
miralty  have  justified  the  unrestricted  use  of  submarines 
by  Germany  on  the  ground  of  military  necessity. 

REASONS    FOR   DISTRIBUTION. 

(a)  The  chief  reason  advanced  for  not  destroying  the 
German- Austrian  vessels  is  that  it  is  unsound  to  destroy 
good  vessels  already  built  that  cost  millions  of  dollars. 


202         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

while  naval  Powers  are  spending  money  to  build  new  ships. 
The  soundness  of  this  argument  is  more  apparent  than 
real.  The  distribution  of  the  German-Austrian  ships 
would  so  disturb  the  relative  naval  strength  of  the  Powers 
that  it  would  necessitate  a  building  programme  greater 
than  any  now  necessary  or  contemplated,  and  in  the  end 
would  only  add  the  burden  of  the  upkeep  of  the  new  ships 
to  those  acquired  by  the  distribution.  This  result  would 
particularly  affect  the  United  States  who  would  be  com- 
pelled to  bear  the  brunt  of  matching  the  increased  naval 
strength  of  Great  Britain. 

(b)  The  particular  desire  on  the  part  of  France  for 
distribution  of  the  German-Austrian  ships  is  based  on  the 
claim  that  while  naval  Powers  like  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  were  enabled  by  their  war  effort  to  increase 
the  power  of  their  fleets,  France  was  compelled  to  devote 
all  her  effort  to  the  manufacture  of  materials  for  land 
warfare,  which  leaves  her  at  the  end  of  the  war  in  an  un- 
fair position  relative  to  other  naval  powers  whose  chief 
effort  was  on  the  seas. 

The  justice  of  this  claim  must  be  admitted  at  once, 
but  it  is  not  admitted  that  the  distribution  of  German- 
Austrian  ships  would  in  any  way  serve  as  a  compensation. 
The  financial  condition  of  France  does  not  warrant  any 
addition  to  her  armament  burdens.  The  elimination  of 
the  fleet  of  her  ancient  enemy  renders  any  addition  to  her 
fleet  unnecessary.  Aside  from  these  reasons,  even  though 
a  very  real  benefit  would  come  to  France  from  this  dis- 
tribution, such  benefit  to  a  single  nation  should  not  out- 
weigh the  interests  of  the  rest  of  the  w^orld. 

The  following  table  illustrates  the  result  of  a  distribution 
of  the  German-Austrian  capital  ships  as  affecting  the 
relative  naval  strength  of  the  five  great  naval  Powers.  It 
is  assumed  that  mmor  types  would  be  distributed  in  the 
same  proportion. 

Two  assumptions  are  made — (1)  that  distribution 
would  take  place  on  a  basis  of  relative  naval  effort  in  the 
war,  in  which  case  the  least  favorable  treatment  of  Great 
Britain  would  demand  that  her  share  should  be  twice  as 


DISPOSITION  OF  GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  SHIPS       203 

great  as  that  of  any  other  Power  (the  United  States  not 
participating);  or  (2)  that  the  distribution  should  be  on 
the  basis  of  absolute  naval  losses  in  the  war,  in  which  case 
the  share  of  Great  Britain  would  be  still  greater. 


I 

II 

III 

Before  distribution 

After  distribution  on  2 

to   1   basis,   U.   S.   not 

participating 

After    distribution   on 
basis  of  absolute  losses 

Great  Britain  . 
United  States  . 
France  .... 
Japan   .... 
Italy     .... 

43 
17 

7 

I'i 

5 

53 
17 
13 

18 
11 

63 
17 
12 
13 

7 

To  be  noted  in  connection  with  Column  I: 

(a)  With  the  German  Navy  wiped  out  and  before  any 
distribution  takes  place,  Great  Britain  has  43 
capital  ships;  all  other  great  Powers  together  have 
42  capital  ships.  (Great  Britain  has  also  a 
corresponding  superiority  in  destroyers  and  sub- 
marines.) 

(b)  The  United  States  must  build  26  more  capital  ships 
than  Great  Britain  does  in  an  equal  period  of  time 
in  order  to  have  a  navy  equal  to  Great  Britain's. 

To  be  noted  in  connection  ivith  Column  II: 

(c)  If  the  German  Navy  is  distributed  on  a  2  to  1  basis, 

the  United  States  not  participating,  Great  Britain 
will  have  53  capital  ships.  All  other  great  Powers 
together  will  have  59  capital  ships. 

(d)  The  United  States  will  have  to  build  36  more 
capital  ships  than  Great  Britain  does  in  an  equal 
period  of  time  in  order  to  have  a  navy  equal  to 
Great  Britain's. 

To  be  noted  in  connection  ivith  Column  HI: 

(e)  In  case  the  German  Navy  is  distributed  on  the 

basis  of  absolute  losses.  Great  Britain  will  have  63 
capital  ships;  all  other  great  Powers  together  will 
have  49  capital  ships. 

(f)  The  United  States  will  have  to  build  46  more 
capital  ships  than  Great  Britain  does  in  an  equal 


204         WOODROW  ^VILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

period  of  time  in  order  to  have  a  navy  equal  to 
Great  Britain's. 
(g)  If  a  distribution  of  the  German  Navy  is  made,  the 
naval  armaments  requiring  to  be  supported  by 
the  five  great  Powers  will  be  increased  immediately 
from  85  capital  ships  to  112  capital  ships,  and  this 
at  a  time  when  we  are  talking  disarmament  and 
when  the  world  is  burdened  with  a  debt  that  it 
cannot  pay. 
Should  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  participate 

in  the  distribution  but  sink  their  respective  shares,  the 

result  would  be  as  follows — 


I 

II 

III 

Before  distribution 

After  distribution  on  2 
to   1   basis 

After    distribution   on 
basis  of  absolute  losses 

Great  Britain  . 
United  States  . 
France  .... 
Japan   .... 
Italy     .... 

43 
17 

7 

13 

5 

43 
17 
11 
17 
9 

43 
17 
12 
13 

7 

Note:  A  distribution  on  this  2  to  1  basis  would  leave  Japan  with  the  same  number 
of  capital  ships  as  the  United  States. 

We  believe  it  to  be  essential  that  the  disposition  of  the 
German -Austrian  vessels  be  settled  at  once  and  by  the 
terms  of  the  Peace  Treaty.  Unless  the  matter  is  decided 
now  as  a  part  of  the  peace  terms  there  will  be  an  in- 
evitable loss  of  interest  in  this  vital  matter  and  an  in- 
creasing difficulty  in  reaching  a  unanimity  of  agreement 
that  may  in  the  end  result  in  a  disposition  of  these  vessels 
that  will  be  favorable  to  the  strongest  naval  Power  and 
vitally  affect  our  relative  naval  strength. 

Since,  so  far  as  known,  there  will  be  but  one  treaty 
and  that  with  Germany,  and  since  the  disposition  of  the 
German-Austrian  ships  is  one  of  the  principal  points  to  be 
decided  by  that  treaty,  if  the  disposition  of  these  vessels 
is  not  definitely  stated  in  that  treaty  there  will  be  no 
binding  provision  between  the  Allies  and  the  United 
States  that  will  determine  the  final  disposition  of  the 
German-Austrian  fleets. 


DISPOSITION  OF  GERMAN  AND  AUSTRIAN  SHIPS       206 

The  controlling  reasons  why  the  German -Austrian 
vessels  of  war  should  not  be  distributed  may  be  sum- 
marised briefly  as  follows: 

The  covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations  requires  reduc- 
tion of  armaments.  Distribution  increases  the  naval 
armaments  of  the  great  Powers  by  over  30  per  cent. 

A  stable  League  of  Nations  requires  two  equally  great 
navies.  Distribution  makes  it  impossible  during  many 
years  to  come  for  the  American  Navy  to  overtake  the 
British  Navy. 

World  conditions  demand  taxation  be  reduced.  Dis- 
tribution will  increase  taxation. 

World  conditions  demand  the  removal  of  sources  of 
friction.  Distribution  will  be  an  endless  source  of  friction 
and  ill-feeling,  not  only  on  the  part  of  Germany,  but 
among  the  Allies. 

World  interests  demand  that  no  single  power  may  rule 
the  sea  against  all  comers.  Distribution  will  establish  a 
single  power  more  firmly  than  ever  in  a  position  that 
dominates  the  sea  completely. 

The  morale  of  the  world  requires  a  dramatic  herald  of 
better  days.  Distribution  will  herald  preparations  for  a 
continuance  of  warlike  measures. 

American  interests  in  the  League  of  Nations  compel  her 
to  accept  the  burden  of  a  navy  equal  to  Great  Britain's. 
Distribution  makes  that  burden  too  great. 

France  wants  Distribution.  All  other  countries  want 
destruction. 


CONCLUSION. 

We  conclude  that — 

(1)  The  disposition  of  the  German-Austrian  vessels  of 

war  should  be  incorporated  in  the  peace  treaty. 

(2)  In  order  that  the  disposition  may  be  carried  out  as 

agreed  upon,  the  disposition  should  be  stated  in 
the  terms  submitted  to  Germany  and  Austria. 

(3)  That  the  terms  of  the  peace  treaty  signed  by  Ger- 

many and  Austria  should  provide  for  the  destruc- 
tion of  the  German-Austrian  vessels  of  war. 


Document  23. 

Letter  to  President  Wilson,  April  9, 1919,  from 
Rear-Admiral  W.  S.  Benson  (autographed  orig- 
inal), submitting  memorandum  dated  April  7, 
of  United  States  Naval  Advisory  btatt  on 
''United  States  Naval  Policy"  (typewritten 
original) . 

AMERICAN    COMMISSION    TO    NEGOTIATE    PEACE. 

Paris, 
April  9,  1919. 

My  DEAR  Mr.  President: 

I  am  sending  you  herewith  a  paper  which  we  have  pre- 
pared after  much  thought  and  study. 

If  I  may  presume  to  say  so,  I  urge  you  to  read  it,  as  it 
will  undoubtedly  assist  you  in  forming  definite  conclusions 
on  this  most  important  subject  without  consuming  the 
time  that  would  otherwise  be  necessary  for  independent 

investigation.  .  ^  i      4.  x 

My  own  opinion  is  that  the  necessity  for  at  least  two 
approximatelv  equal  naval  powers  is  absolute  in  order  to 
stabilize  the  "^League  of  Nations.  This  fact  should  be 
recognized,  and  the  United  States  should  give  it  as  a  reason 
for  building  up  and  maintaining  its  Navy. 

Sincerely  yours, 
[Signed]  W.  S.  Benson. 

The  President  of  the  United  States. 


BENSON  ON  'UNITED  STATES  NAVAL  POLICY"         207 

7  April,  1919. 
(Confidential.) 

U.    S.    NAVAL   ADVISORY    STAFF,   PARIS. 

Memorandum  No.  XXV. 

Subject:  United  States  Naval  Policy. 

There  is  no  subject  in  connection  with  the  League  of  Na- 
tions that  has  caused  so  much  perplexit3%  both  at  liome  and 
abroad,  as  the  apparent  inconsistency  of  the  Ignited  States 
in  advocating  a  general  reduction  of  armaments,  while  it- 
self undertaking  an  intensified  Naval  Building  programme. 

It  is  natural  that  a  hostile  foreign  press  should  seize 
upon  this  apparent  inconsistency  as  an  evidence  of  hypoc- 
risy on  the  part  of  the  American  Government,  which  is 
accused  of  aiming  to  obtain  an  advantage  over  other 
Towers  by  inducing  them  to  trust  in  the  ideal  strength 
of  an  unarmed  League,  while  continuing  itself  to  rely  on 
the  practical  strength  of  an  armed  nation.  We  hope  that 
the  following  examination  of  the  subject  will  make  clear 
to  all  that  American  aims  are  legitimate  aims,  and  that 
the  step  xVmerica  is  taking  is  one  demanded  by  world 
interest,  and  one  that  menaces  the  just  aspirations  of  no 
Power  whatever. 

Every  great  change  in  world  conditions  makes  it  incum- 
bent on  each  of  the  several  States  of  the  world  to  reexam- 
ine its  special  situation,  and  to  determine  from  this 
examination  the  policies  that  will  enable  it  best  to  fulfil 
its  duties  to  the  world  and  to  itself.  Such  a  change  in 
world  conditions  has  come  and  such  a  duty  now  falls  upon 
us  as  Americans.  There  are  many  interrelated  external 
policies  which  America  must  determine,  but  this  paper 
deals  with  naval  policy  only.  Naval  policy  is  a  means 
to  an  end,  a  means  designed  to  assist  the  State  in  the  at- 
tainment of  its  international  mission.  This  mission  for 
the  United  States  is  twofold — a  duty  to  itself  and  a  duty 
to  the  world. 

L     To  promote  and  guard  the  interests  of  the  Ignited 
States  in  every  way  consonant  with  justice. 


208        WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

II.     To  assist  in  promoting  the  welfare  of  the  world. 

We  can  make  no  progress  in  promoting  our  international 
interests,  or  in  promoting  the  welfare  of  the  world,  except 
through  international  relations.  Whenever  we  enter  into 
such  relations  we  meet  with  other  national  aims,  with 
other  national  desires  for  the  advancement  of  the  interests 
of  other  nations.  The  result  is  in  part  a  system  of  ex- 
change of  advantages  between  States.  If  all  international 
relations  were  but  systems  of  exchange  of  advantages  and 
concessions,  and  if  no  advantages  were  sought  by  any 
State  except  on  the  basis  of  equal  exchange,  there  might 
be  no  occasion  for  the  use  of  force  in  international  rela- 
tions, but  such  is  not  the  case. 

The  growth  of  populations,  the  development  of  national 
character,  changes  in  national  life,  all  introduce  at  times 
insistent  demands  on  other  nations  that  are  not  consonant 
with  the  interests  of  those  nations.  As  our  principle  is 
the  promotion  of  national  interests  and  world  interests  in 
harmony  with  justice,  we  have  to  consider  how  extraor- 
dinary international  demands  may  be  resisted  where  they 
are  not  just. 

Just  and  friendly  relations  are  stimulated  when  national 
aims  may  be  attained  through  the  reciprocal  granting  of 
advantages  on  an  equitable  basis.  The  aim,  of  course, 
on  either  side  of  a  negotiation  is  profit  in  some  form  or 
other.  The  natural  aim  is  toward  the  maximum  profit. 
This  is  as  true  in  international  negotiation  as  in  private 
negotiation,  so  there  is  a  constant  tendency  for  nations  to 
devise  means  for  obtaining  by  negotiation  advantages  as 
great  as  possible.  The  negotiations  of  individuals  and  of 
corporations  are  governed  by  written  law,  which  has  a 
distinctly  limiting  influence  on  attempts  to  obtain  unjust 
profits.  When  States  negotiate,  they  are  free  from  the 
restraining  influence  of  law  and  may  exact  every  advan- 
tage which  their  position  makes  it  possible  for  them  to 
exact.  On  minor  questions  we  expect  them  to  apply 
equitable  principles  in  their  negotiations,  but  when  ques- 
tions of  great  national  importance  are  at  issue,  expediency 
rather  than  principle  governs. 

The  question  then  becomes  not  so  much  a  question  of 


BENSON  ON  "UNITED  STATES  NAVAL  POLICY"        209 

exchange  of  advantages  as  the  acceptance  by  the  weaker 
state  of  demands  made,  rather  than  submission  to  the 
penalties  that  otherwise  would  be  inflicted  by  the  more 
powerful  State.  In  other  words,  the  attention  of  the 
negotiators  is  shifted  from  the  principle  of  exchange  to  the 
principle  of  power,  the  decisions  are  arrived  at  by  an  esti- 
mate of  relative  power,  and  this  whether  force  be  used  or 
not. 

If  Liberia  cannot  prevent  occasional  crimes 
within  her  borders,  she  is  compelled  to  yield 
territory  to  neighbouring  colonies  as  compensa- 
tion, the  alternative  being  still  more  drastic 
action. 

If  Japan  cannot  get  from  China  the  concessions 
she  desires,  she  presents  China  with  twenty-one 
demands  and  intimates  that  the  exchange  China 
has  to  make  is  the  granting  of  those  demands  in 
return  for  the  non-infliction  on  her  of  the  alter- 
native penalties  of  war  measures.  Potential 
military  force  slips  in  and  closes  the  bargain  that 
China  maintains  is  an  unjust  bargain. 

If  England  cannot  get  by  the  mild  terms  of 
diplomatic  notes  the  decisions  she  desires  regard- 
ing equal  rights  in  the  use  of  the  Panama  Canal, 
she  presents  a  note  that  uncovers  the  idea  of  a 
military  superiority  suflScient  to  enforce  what 
she  considers  a  just  decision. 

When  we  examine  our  own  world  situation  in  the  new 
order  of  things,  we  realize  that  all  of  our  important  inter- 
national relations  and  all  of  our  important  international 
questions  hinge  upon  matters  relating  to  the  sea  and  sea 
communications.  We  cannot  advance  our  external  in- 
terests, nor  can  we  influence  world  policy,  except  by  way 
of  the  sea.  Practically  all  of  our  great  commerce  is  sea 
commerce.  If  any  foreign  State  desires  to  bring  military 
pressure  to  bear  upon  us,  it  must  be  a  pressure  based  upon 
possible  operations  by  way  of  the  sea.  The  attack  of  our 
Colonies,  of  our  commerce,  of  our  frontiers,  depends  first 
of  all  upon  what  happens  at  sea.     Conversely  if  we  desire 


'7 


210        WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

to  retaliate  or  to  exert  opposing  military  pressure,  we  must 
base  our  efforts  upon  our  sea  power. 

In  the  past  our  naval  position  has  derived  great  strength 
from  the  potential  hostility  of  the  British  and  German 
fleets.  Neither  the  German  nor  the  British  fleet  could 
venture  abroad  without  grave  risk  that  the  other  would 
seize  the  opportunity  thus  presented  to  crush  a  rival. 
This  condition  gave  to  America  a  position  of  special 
strength  both  in  council  and  in  decision,  because  her  navy 
was  so  strong  that  no  other  navy  could  neglect  its  influ- 
ence. All  that  is  now  changed.  The  German  fleet  has 
ceased  to  exist,  with  the  result  that  we  suddenly  find  the 
British  Navy  in  a  position  of  unparalleled  strength.  No 
navy  is  left  in  Europe  capable  of  offering  any  real  resist- 
ance to  the  British  Navy. 

Under  present  conditions  the  British  Navy,  with  its 
world-wide  supporting  organization,  is  strong  enough  to 
dominate  the  seas  in  whatever  quarter  of  the  globe  that 
domination  may  be  required.  We  do  not  consider  this  a 
condition  calculated  to  advance  either  our  own  just  in- 
terests or  the  welfare  of  the  world.  A  power  so  absolute 
that  it  may  disregard  other  powers  with  impunity,  is  less 
apt  to  act  with  justice  than  if  there  be  a  balancing  influence 
of  force  as  well  as  of  world  opinion  to  oppose  it.  This  is 
true  within  a  league  of  nations  as  well  as  without  a  league 
of  nations. 

Even  when  force  is  not  applied,  the  knowledge  of  its 
readiness  is  always  an  asset  in  negotiation.  The  smooth 
and  leisurely  phrases  of  diplomacy  derive  their  pungency 
from  a  vision  of  the  force  in  readiness  that  lies  behind  them. 
Governments  are  influenced  less  by  words  than  by  ma- 
terial facts.  We  are  conscious  of  this  in  every  phase  of 
the  proceedings  of  the  Peace  Conference  now  in  progress. 
Everj^one,  except  ourselves,  looks  to  British  Naval  Repre- 
sentatives for  suggestions  in  naval  matters  and  to  French 
Military  Representatives  for  suggestions  in  military  mat- 
ters. This  phenomenon  is  the  unavoidable  tendency  of 
the  strong  to  dominate,  and  of  the  weak  to  accept  domi- 
nation. 

Since  we  are  considering  naval  policy  as  affecting  x\mer- 


^ 


BENSON  ON  "UNITED  STATES  NAVAL  POLICY"         211 

lean  interests,  and  since  the  British  Navy  is  the  only  navy 
in  existence  that  can  threaten  the  American  Navy,  British 
pohcies  have  a  pecuhar  interest  for  us. 

Every  great  commercial  rival  of  the  British  Empire  has 
eventually  found  itself  at  war  with  Great  Britain — and  has 
been  defeated.  Every  such  defeat  has  strengthened  the  com- 
mercial position  of  Great  Britain. 

The  constant  effort  of  Great  Britain  through  centuries  has 
been  to  acquire  control  of  the  foci  of  the  sea  commerce  of  the 
ivorld. 

A  present  governing  policy  of  Great  Britain  is  the  control 
and  monopoly,  so  far  as  possible,  of  international  communi- 
cations.    These  include — 

Submarine  Telegraph  Cables, 
Radio  Systems, 
Commercial  Aircraft, 
Merchant  Shipping, 
Fuelling  Facilities, 
Fuel  Deposits. 
The  British  negotiations  at  the  Peace  Conference  are 
conducted  with  these  objects  frankly  in  view.     Their  at- 
tainment is  possible  largely  through  British  strength  at 
sea.     No  one  can  contend  that  such  monopolies  represent 
the  promotion  of  interests  that  are  just  to  all  the  world. 

The  possibility  of  future  war  is  never  absent  from  the 
minds  of  statesmen,  so  we  see  in  the  British  negotiations 
a  very  careful  attention  to  the  preservation  of  their 
present  military  domination  of  the  sea.  Among  the 
measures  they  contend  for  are — 

1.  The  distribution  of  the  German  and  Austrian  fleets. 
Comment.  Great  Britain  now  has  more  than 
half  of  all  the  dreadnoughts  of  the  world;  if  the 
German  and  Austrian  ships  are  distributed  on  the 
most  probable  basis  of  losses  during  the  present  war, 
the  United  States  would  have  to  add  to  its  navy 
double  the  number  of  dreadnoughts  it  already 
possesses,  or  else  remain  an  inferior  naval  power. 
In  any  case  this  perfectly  logical  policy  of  Great 
Britain,  if  carried  out,  will  place  her  in  a  position 
of  supremacy  for  many  years  to  come. 


212        WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

2.  The  razing  of  foHifications  commanding  waterways 

that  Great  Britain  does  not  control. 

Comment.  This  is  a  natural  policy  of  a  great 
sea  power.  Its  object  is  to  give,  in  time  of  war, 
the  maximum  possible  freedom  to  that  Power 
whose  navy  controls  the  sea.  It  is  put  forward  as 
being  a  policy  in  the  interest  of  freedom  of  the 
seas,  but  the  true  object  is  that  given  above. 

3.  The  most  liberal  possible  interpretation  of  belligerent 

rights  on  the  High  Seas. 

Comment.     Very  few  people  realize  how  reluc- 
tant the  British  are  to  codify  maritime  international 
law.     They  naturally  prefer  the  absence  of  law 
in  order  that  during  war  their  Navy  may  have 
complete  freedom  of  action.     The  absence  of  Mari- 
time Law  during  the  present  war  has  led  to  an 
expansion  of  so-called  belligerent  rights  that  cer- 
tainly would  never  be  accepted  by  an  International 
Congress.     As  an  example,  if  Canada  should  at- 
tempt to  gain  her  independence  from  Great  Britain 
by  force,  and  if  the  United  States  remained  neutral, 
it  is  the  British  contention  that  Great  Britain 
could  blockade  every  port  of  the  United  States  and 
could  so  regulate  our  imports  that  we  could  spare 
none  for  exportation  to  Canada.     This  is  not  In- 
ternational Law,  but  an  application  of  the  law  of 
force  to  neutrals.     The  only  reply  is  the  presence 
of  a  potential  force  that  will  secure  the  abandon- 
ment of  the  contention. 
These  proposals  take  on  a  special  significance  because  of 
a  recent  pronouncement.     At  a  time  when  all  the  world 
is  seeking   to  form  a  league  of  nations  that  will  secure 
justice  to  great  and  small  nations  alike,  the  British  Prime 
Minister  announces  that  the  British  alliance  with  France 
will  continue  for  ever.     In  the  Far  East,  Japan  remains 
within  the  British  alliance.     We  look  in  vain  for  any  pro- 
vision of  the  League  Covenant  that  forbids  such  alliances. 
Such  combinations  seem  to  us  to  contain  elements  of  grave 
danger  and  to  demand  of  us  extraordinary  measures. 
Our  own  present  and  prospective  world  position  needs 


BENSON  ON  "UNITED  STATES  NAVAL  POLICY"        213 

special  consideration.  We  are  setting  put  to  be  the 
greatest  commercial  rival  of  Great  Britain  on  the  seas. 
We  know  that  increase  of  population,  the  development 
of  our  great  national  resources,  and  our  lack  of  real  de- 
pendence on  the  rest  of  the  world,  spread  before  us  the 
promise  of  a  greater  future  than  any  other  Power  may 
expect.  The  gradual  realization  of  this  promise  is  bound 
to  excite  enmity  and  to  cause  unjust  opposition  to  our 
expanding  world  interests.  Heretofore  we  have  lived 
apart,  but  now  we  are  to  live  in  constant  and  intimate 
relation  with  the  rest  of  the  world.  We  must  be  able  to 
enter  every  world  conference  with  the  confidence  of  equal- 
ity. We  can  have  this  confidence  in  but  one  way  and 
that  is  by  actually  being  equal  to  the  greatest.  The 
equality  that  counts  in  conferences  as  well  as  in  conflicts 
is  the  equality  of  power,  and  specially  for  us  the  equality 
of  sea  power.  Given  that  equality,  our  superiority  of 
motive  will  attract  to  us  a  following  that  will  mean  better 
days  in  the  world.  But  while  we  are  weak  we  may  expect 
the  powers  of  the  world  to  group  themselves  about 
strength  rather  than  about  the  promise  of  a  distant  jus- 
tice. 

So  far  we  have  been  considering  the  question  of  naval 
policy  more  particularly  from  the  standpoint  of  our  just 
interests,  but  there  is  a  higher  standpoint  still — ^the  pro- 
motion of  the  welfare  of  the  world,  that  demands  with 
special  insistence  that  the  American  Navy  equal  the  most 
powerful  navy  in  the  world.  At  present  the  great  inter- 
national ideal  is  the  League  of  Nations  for  the  mainte- 
nance of  international  justice.  The  League  is  to  operate 
through  the  association  of  the  Powers.  Its  decisions  are 
to  be  arrived  at  by  conferences  of  representatives  of  the 
Powers.  It  is  unavoidable  that  in  those  conferences  mili- 
tary and  naval  power  will  speak  with  a  special  author- 
ity. America  stands  for  high  ideals  and  desires,  above  all 
to  promote  those  ideals.  The  possession  of  power,  and 
especially  of  the  kind  of  power  that  is  most  effective  in 
our  international  relations,  sea  power,  will  give  to  her  pro- 
posals an  importance  and  a  probability  of  acceptance  far 
greater  than  we  could  expect  otherwise. 


~) 


211         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

Whatever  may  be  the  eventual  form  of  the  Covenant 
of  the  League  of  Nations  as  adopted,  it  will  undoubtedly 
contain  as  a  fundamental  idea  the  duty  of  the  League  to 
restrain,  if  necessary,  by  the  use  of  armed  force,  any  re- 
calcitrant member  that  endangers  the  peace  of  the  world. 
It  is  obvious  that  the  Covenant  cannot  be  accepted  as 
just,  even  in  principle,  unless  it  contemplates  that  the 
will  of  the  League  shall  be  imposed  upon  the  strong  as 
well  as  upon  the  weak.  When  we  think  of  a  recalcitrant 
member,  we  are  too  apt  to  think  of  Albania  instead  of 
one  of  the  Great  Powers,  but  the  soundness  of  the  League 
as  a  practicable  working  scheme  must  stand  the  test  of  its 
ability  to  restrain,  if  necessary,  its  strongest  member.  This 
cannot  be  done  by  a  heterogeneous  combination  of  naval 
craft  assembled  by  the  nations  of  the  League,  unless  in 
that  assemblage  there  is  one  group  of  a  single  nationality 
that  is  equal  in  strength  to  the  strongest  navy.  It  hap- 
pens now  that  that  navy  is  the  British  Navy,  but  the 
principle  does  not  depend  upon  nationality.  Given  that 
single  group  of  vessels,  that  navy  of  a  single  nationality 
equal  in  strength  to  the  strongest,  and  we  may  be  sure 
that  the  minor  Powers  of  the  League  will  furnish  the  ad- 
ditional force  to  swing  the  League  to  the  side  of  justice 
against  the  efforts  of  a  navy  as  powerful  as  any,  whether 
that  Navy  be  our  own  or  the  British  Navy. 

We  want  the  world  League  to  be  secure,  to  endure,  and 
to  establish  a  new  order — ^the  reign  of  law  among  nations. 
This  cannot  be  brought  about  if  some  one  Power  is  to 
dominate  the  decisions  of  the  League  by  a  world-wide  pre- 
dominance of  naval  strength.  We  do  not  need  to  argue 
that  whoever  dominates  the  sea  exercises  more  control 
over  world  policies  than  any  other  Power  may  do.  As 
the  interdependence  of  nations  increases  this  dominance 
of  sea  power  over  world  policies  will  become  more  and 
more  complete.  It  is  contrary  to  human  experience  to 
expect  srnall  weak  nations,  whose  own  immediate  interests 
are  not  vitally  concerned,  to  place  themselves  in  military 
opposition  to  a  strong  power,  even  within  a  league  of 
nations,  for  the  sake  of  principle,  unless  by  so  doing  they 
find  themselves  ranged  with  another  strong  Power.     li 


BENSON  ON  "UNITED  STATES  NAVAL  POLICY"        215 

they  depend  upon  sea  communications  to  a  special  extent 
they  will  be  governed  by  interest  and  side  with  the  Power 
that  can  crush  them  the  easiest. 

As  long  as  Great  Britain  insists  on  retaining  her  over- 
whelming naval  force,  the  only  answer  for  the  purposes 
of  the  League  is  the  building  of  an  equal  force  by  some  na- 
tion capable  of  constructing  and  maintaining  a  fleet  of 
equal  strength  and  efliciency.  The  United  States  is  the 
only  power  that  is  to-day  financially  and  physically  capa- 
ble of  building  such  a  fleet,  or  of  undertaking  a  future 
building  competition  with  Great  Britain. 

It  is  not  believed,  however,  that  any  competition  in 
armaments  is  necessary.  Once  the  principle  of  two  equal 
naval  Powers  within  the  League  is  made  clear  to  our  own 
I)eople  and  to  the  British  public,  a  means  will  be  found  to 
mamtain  a  parity  of  the  two  fleets  with  the  minimum  of 
burden  to  the  taxpayer.  Equality  of  the  two  fleets  can 
be  brought  about  by  the  destruction  of  the  German  fleet, 
the  bulk  of  which  would  go  to  Great  Britain  on  any  prob- 
able scheme  of  distribution,  and  by  a  further  reduction 
of  the  British  fleet  that,  while  leaving  Great  Britain  ample 
strength  to  protect  lier  world  commerce  and  colonies, 
would  still  make  it  possible  for  the  United  States  with  a 
reasonable  increase  of  its  fleet,  to  equal  the  size  of  the 
British  fleet. 

It  may  be  asked  what  would  happen  if  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  combined  against  the  League. 
We  need  not  be  disturbed  by  this  question.  With  satis- 
fied ambitions  the  future  interests  of  the  United  States 
demand  only  the  continuation  of  world  peace.  Should  we 
forget  our  ideals  and  attempt  some  day  to  support  with 
arms  the  cause  of  injustice,  it  is  highly  improbable  that 
our  mterests  would  march  with  those'  of  Great  Britain, 
and  there  would  remain  an  equal  force  within  the  League 
to  bring  us  to  our  senses. 

The  example  of  the  United  States  in  this  war,  and  its 
present  attitude  toward  nations  dependent  upon  us  for 
financial  and  economic  support,  can  be  relied  upon  to 
absolve  us  in  the  eyes  of  the  world  from  the  charge  of 
Pharisaism  when  we  assert  our  confident  belief  that  the 


216        ^^OODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

League  of  Nations  will  never  have  anything  to  fear  from 
tlic  Ignited  States. 

With  two  navies  of  equal  strength,  the  world  would 
breathe  free  from  the  fear  of  a  naval  domination  that  has 
the  power  at  any  moment  of  threatening  the  economic  life 
of  any  nation.  The  resulting  mutual  respect  of  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States  would  go  further  than  any- 
thing else  toward  the  establishment  of  just  maritime  law 
upon  the  high  seas  both  in  peace  and  in  war. 

The  success  of  the  League  of  Nations  will  rest  in  large 
part  on  the  honesty,  integrity  and  strength  of  the  United 
States.  The  political  and  economic  weakness  of  Europe  as 
a  result  of  the  World  War  have  thrust  upon  us  the  burden 
of  imparting  vital  force  to  a  Covenant  that  attempts  to 
reconcile  the  conflicting  interests  of  the  world. 

Our  ability  to  sustain  the  League  in  its  formative  period 
and  establish  it  eventually  on  a  secure  foundation  will 
depend  chiefly  on  the  strength  we  give  it  to  resist  the  dom- 
ination of  any  single  Power,  We  ourselves  have  no  desire 
to  dominate  the  League,  but  we  believe  it  to  be  our  duty 
to  the  world  to  make  our  counsels  heard  as  attentively 
as  the  counsels  of  any  other  Power. 

CONCLUSION. 

As  one  of  an  unorganized  society  of  nations  we  need  a 
navy  equal  to  the  greatest — 

1.  To  guard  our  great  and  greatly  growing  interests. 

2.  To  give  our  voice  in  the  councils  of  the  world  the 

w^eight  our  world  position  warrants. 

3.  To  give  our  ideals  full  expression  and  to  obtain  for 

them  a  just  recognition  in   the  development   of 
the  world  organization  that  is  about  to  be  under- 
taken. 
As  a  member  of  the  League  of  Nations  we  need  a  navy 
equal  to  the  greatest — 

1.  So  that  there  may  be  within  the  League  a  power 

strong   enough  to  restrain  any  Power  whatever 
seeking  unjust  advantage  by  force. 

2.  So  that  the  League  may  be  relieved  from  the  domi- 

nance of  any  single  Power,  and  thereby  ensure  to  it 


BENSON  ON  "UNITED  STATES  NAVAL  POLICY"        217 

a  greater  stability  and  a  greater  probability  of  just 

administration. 
We  believe  that  a  better  way  in  which  to  obtain  two 
equal  navies  in  the  world  is  for  the  British  Navy  to  be 
reduced  in  strength,  and  for  (ireat  Britain  and  America  to 
determine  jointly  from  time  to  time  what  the  strength  of 
the  two  fleets  shall  be. 


Document  24. 

Confidential  report  of  Major  General  F.  J. 
Kernan,  chief  American  representative  on  the 
Inter-Allied  Commission  to  Poland,  to  President 
Wilson,  dated  April  11,  giving  his  views  of 
conditions  in  central  Europe  (autographed  orig- 
inal).      ,,,^„- 

.    AMERICAN  COMMISSION  TO  NEGOTIATE  PEACE. 

gm^gH^mm  Paris,  France 

11  April,  1919. 

Confidential  jNlemoranduni  for  The  American  Commission 
to  Negotiate  Peace — 

Subject :  Suspension  of  Arms  between  Poles  and  Ukrain- 
ians in  Eastern  Galicia,  and  some  general  observa- 
tions on  conditions  in  Poland. 


On  March  20th,  last,  the  Great  Powers  sent  identical 
telegrams  to  the  Ukrainian  and  Polish  Commanders  in 
Eastern  Galicia  requesting,  in  substance,  that  a  suspension 
of  arms  should  be  forthwith  effected,  following  the  lines 
of  the  former  one,  dated  February  24th,  1919,  this  to  be 
followed  by  a  formal  armistice  to  be  arranged  preferably 
in  Paris  under  the  direct  supervision  of  the  Peace  Com- 
mission. A  copy  of  this  identical  telegram  was  furnished 
the  undersigned  with  instructions  to  see  that  it  reached  the 
hands  of  each  of  the  Commanding  Generals  in  Eastern 
Galicia,  together  with  a  second  explanatory  telegram. 
As  directed  I  delivered  these  telegrams  personally  to 
General  Jwaszkiewricz,  Polish  Commander  at  Przemysl 
on  March  24th,  and  on  March  25th  I  met  General  Pav- 
lenko,  the  Ukrainian  Commander,  at  Sambor  and  de- 
livered the  same  messages  to  him.     These  had  alreadv 


220         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

tice  such  as  the  Poles  were  proposing.  They  added  that 
they  were  wilHng  to  abide  by  whatever  armistice  terms 
their  delegates  agreed  to  in  Paris.  Since  the  Polish 
delegation  was  without  authority  to  modify  their  demands 
the  meeting  broke  up. 

Before  leaving  the  Polish  Headquarters  at  Przemysl 
the  following  day  I  addressed  to  the  Polish  Commander  a 
letter  outlining  what  I  thought  should  be  the  substance 
and  nature  of  a  brief  convention  establishing  a  suspension 
of  arms.  On  arrival  in  Warsaw  I  enclosed  a  copy  of  this 
letter  to  Mr.  Paderewski,  the  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
indicating  my  views  of  what  the  Polish  Government 
should  do  in  order  to  comply  with  the  clear  and  earnest 
desire  of  the  Great  Powers.  Copies  of  these  letters  are 
attached  hereto,    marked  "A.  " 

While  en  route  to  Paris  with  the  other  members  of  the 
Inter-Allied  Commission,  I  received  a  message  from  the 
Peace  Commission  directing  me  to  proceed  again  to 
the  Ukrainian  front  and  to  make  a  further  effort  to  bring 
about  a  suspension  of  arms.  I  did  so  and  found  that  the 
Polish  Commanding  General  was  powerless  to  make  a 
truce  except  upon  the  terms  already  stated  above.  He 
told  me  that  the  matter  was  not  in  his  hands,  but  in  the 
hands  of  higher  authority  and  that  he  could  do  nothing. 
In  this  state  of  affairs,  and  knowing  that  the  head  of  the 
Polish  Government  was  en  route  to  Paris,  I  left  Przemysl 
and  proceeded  to  this  city  where  I  arrived  yesterday, 
April  10th. 

The  distinct  impression  I  brought  away  from  Eastern| 
Galicia  was  that  the  Ukrainians  were  exceedingly  anxious 
for  a  truce  and  that  their  leaders  were  intelligent  men  by 
no  means  Bolshevik  and  sincerely  desirous  of  building  up  a 
great  Ukrainian  Republic.  General  Pavlenko  was  quite 
frank  and  stated  that  the  Russian  Soviet  forces  were 
pressing  the  Ukrainians  on  the  East  and  that  his  govern- 
ment was  anxious  to  secure  a  truce  on  the  Polish  side  in 
order  to  bring  as  strong  a  Ukrainian  force  as  possible  into 
action  against  the  Russian  Soviets.  Besides  my  own 
observations  I  talked  with  quite  a  number  of  disinterested 
observers  who  had  been  travelling  through  The  Ukraine 


CONFIDENTIAL  REPORT  OF  GENERAL  KERNAN        219 

een  received  directly  by  wireless  and  both  parties  had, 
3  I  was  informed,  accepted  the  proposition  of  the  Great 
'owers  and  the  two  Commanding  Generals  were  in 
ommunication  with  each  other  for  the  purpose  of  ar- 
mging  a  meeting  between  delegates.  Both  parties 
^quested  me  to  be  present  at  this  meeting  and  left  me 
)  designate  the  place.  Pursuant  to  this  arrangement 
ve  delegates  from  each  side  met  on  the  afternoon  of 
larch  27th  at  Chyrow,  just  within  the  Polish  lines. 
I  had  suggested  to  each  party  the  advisability  of  going 
)  the  Conference  with  a  prepared  draft  for  the  convention 
nd  this  course  was  followed.  Before  the  actual  meeting 
P  the  delegates,  each  side  read  to  me  their  propositions, 
'he  Polish  proposition  contained  an  article  providing 

i  lat  the  Poles  should  have  the  right  to  denounce  the 
ispension  of  arms  at  the  end  of  three  days  unless,  within 

'  lat  period,  the  Ukrainian  authorities  had  accepted  in 
)to  the  armistice  terms  drawn  up  February  28th,  1919, 
y  Dr.  Lord,  General  Berthelemy  and  General  DeWiatt 
f  the  Inter-Allied  Mission  to  Poland.  This  armistice 
ad  been  rejected  by  the  Ukrainian  authorities  and  it 
as  practically  certain  that  their  injection  into  the  new 
rfort  to  bring  about  a  cessation  of  hostilities  meant  the 
lilure  of  that  effort.  I  told  the  Polish  delegates  this, 
nd  also  pointed  out  that  the  procedure  they  were 
)llowing  did  not  conform  to  the  request  of  the  Great 
owers,  as  accepted  by  them;  that  is  to  say,  instead  of 
ttempting  to  make  a  simple  suspension  of  arms,  leaving 
le  formal  armistice  for  subsequent  arrangements,  they 
ere  tacking  the  one  to  the  other  and  so  defeating  both, 
'hey  replied  that  their  instructions  had  come  from  their 
overnment  and  that  they  had  no  power  to  abate  the 
Dnditions  respecting  the  armistice  as  written  in  their 
raft.  The  Ukrainians  had  drawn  up  a  simple  plan  for 
suspension  of  arms,  each  party  remaining  on  the  ground 
ccupied,  and  with  the  necessary  stipulations  for  securing 

:.s  execution.     When  the  delegates  met  and  the  Polish 

i  3rms  were  unfolded,  the  Ukrainians  at  once  stated  that 
ley  had  come  to  make  a  suspension  of  arms  merely,  in 
greement  with  their  promise  to  Paris,  and  not  an  armis- 


CONFIDENTIAL  REPORT  OF  GENERAL  KERNAN        221 

quite  recently  and  as  a  result  I  am  convinced  that  the 
present  Ukrainian  Government  and  the  Ukrainians  in  the 
mass  are  by  no  means  Bolshevik.  It  must,  however,  be 
realized  that  some  of  that  spirit  has  penetrated  at  least 
into  the  eastern  fringe  of  The  Ukraine  and  that  the  failure 
of  the  present  government  might  result  in  Soviet  as- 
cendency. The  Ukrainians  are  wholly  isolated  from 
Europe  and  they  have,  I  believe,  been  misrepresented 
in  a  large  degree  to  the  world,  it  being  the  policy  of  their 
enemies  to  denounce  them  as  bandits  and  Bolsheviks. 
Reiterated  statements  of  this  kind  have  their  effect, 
however  groundless  they  may  be. 

I  travelled  more  than  two  thousand  miles  in  Poland  by 
automobile,  from  Posen  on  the  West  to  Slonin  on  the 
East,  southward  through  Brest-Litovsk  to  a  point  beyond 
Lemberg  and  back  by  w^ay  of  Cracow  to  Warsaw.  I  was 
approximately  two  months  in  Poland  and  talked  with  a 
great  many  people.  From  this  experience  I  have  drawn 
the  following  conclusions: 

(a)    food  AND  ECONOMIC  CONDITIONS. 

Want  of  the  extremest  character  prevails  in  the  large 
cities,  in  the  industrial  centres,  and  in  the  territory  lying 
between  Grodno  and  Brest-Litovsk.  There  is,  I  believe, 
enough  food  in  Poland  to  tide  the  population  over  until 
the  next  harvest,  assuming  the  American  food  supplies 
to  continue  flowing  into  Poland  at  the  present  rate.  The 
supply  is  not  evenly  distributed  but  an  effort  is  being 
made  by  the  Polish  authorities  in  connection  with  our 
Food  Mission  to  overcome  this  difficulty.  If  raw  ma- 
terials go  into  Poland  and  public  works  are  started  by  the 
Government  so  that  employment  can  be  given  to  those 
not  engaged  in  agriculture,  much  of  the  dire  distress  will 
be  done  away  with.  When  the  Russians  made  their 
great  retreat  they  drove  the  people  out  of  a  vast  area 
of  agricultural  land  which  remains  practically  without 
population  to-day  and  which  for  several  years  has  been  a 
solitude  outside  of  the  larger  towns.  No  acre  of  ground  has 
been  ploughed,  no  seed  planted,  no  domestic  animals  are 
there,  and  practically  no  population.     It  is  a  vast  area 


222         WOODROW  WILSON  .VND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

and  it  is  nearly  a  desert  to-day.  Manifestly  no  crops  can 
be  sowed  there  this  year,  but  the  wretched  inhabitants  are 
straggling  back  slowly,  many  on  foot,  shoeless,  clothed 
in  rags,  their  whole  worldly  possessions  carried  on  their 
backs.  The  agricultural  villages  show  here  and  there  a 
sign  of  life,  and  undoubtedly  more  of  the  former  in- 
habitants will  return  as  the  summer  goes  on.  Since  they 
can  raise  no  crops  this  year,  manifestly  they  must  be  fed 
from  outside.  It  is  in  this  region  that  the  greatest 
desolation  and  extremest  want  prevail.  This  was  Russian 
Poland.  In  their  best  days  the  lives  of  this  agricultural 
population  must  have  approximated  that  of  the  animals 
which  they  worked.  These  squalid  villages  explain  the 
spread  of  Bolshevism  better  than  any  other  thing  which 
has  fallen  under  my  observation. 

(b)    BOLSHEVISM. 

Although  the  common  report  and  the  common  talkjn 
Poland  constantly  spoke  of  Bolshevik  aggression  against 
Poland,  I  could  get  no  evidence  to  that  effect  whatever. 
On  the  contrary,  I  am  satisfied  that  the  desultory  sEir^ 
mishing  along  the  Eastern  frontiers  of  Poland  represents 
an  aggressive  effort  of  the  Poles  to  extend  their  militarv 
occupation  as  far  as  possible  and  as  quickly  as  possible 
into  Russia.  The  ease  with  which  they  have  done  this 
proves  conclusively  that  no  strong  organized  Soviet  force 
has  been  opposing  the  Poles.  My  belief  is  that  as  an 
aggressive  military  crusade,  undertaking  to  spread  its 
propaganda  by  violence  from  Russia  as  a  centre,  the 
Bolshevik  or  Soviet  movement  has  come  to  a  halt.  It 
may  be  stirred  into  life  again  by  aggressive  action  directed 
against  it  from  without,  a  dangx^r  to  be  feared  from  Poland 
or  from  other  States.  This  view  may  seem  to  be  con- 
tradicted by  recent  happenings  about  Archangel  and  in 
the  region  of  Odessa.  But  it  must  be  remembered  that 
the  Soviet  government  claims  sovereignty  over  those 
areas  and  its  military  operations  there  can  be  accounted 
for  on  the  ground  of  national  defense  and  wholly  apart 
from  any  schemes  of  forcible  propaganda.  Communistic 
views  are  not   a  new   thing.     The  terrific   outburst  in 


CONFIDENTIAL  REPORT  OF  GENERAL  KERNAN        223 

Russia  and  the  more  recent  happenings  in  other  parts  of 
Central  Europe  signify  an  extraordinary  condition  of  the 
masses  brought  about  by  generations  of  misgovernment 
and  suddenly  intensified  beyond  further  endurance  by 
nearly  five  years  of  war.  In  this  view,  the  great  cause  of 
the  apparent  spread  of  Bolshevism  in  Europe  is  to  be 
found  in  the  despairing  and  wretched  condition  of  its 
masses.  It  is  not  progressing  in  these  days  by  force  of 
arms  but  through  propaganda  falling  upon  ground  pre- 
pared by  long  years  of  misery  and  culminating  in  the 
hardships  of  the  great  war.  Therefore,  if  the  normal 
life  of  the  world  can  be  restored,  accompanied  by  such 
bettered  living  conditions  as  will  enable  the  masses  to  have 
not  merely  enough  bread  to  keep  body  and  soul  together 
but  some  little  share  in  the  ordinary  happiness  of  mankind, 
Bolshevism  will  be  stopped. 

(c)    MILITARISM. 

In  Central  Europe  the  French  uniform  is  everywhere  in 
evidence,  officers  and  men.  There  is  a  concerted,  dis- 
tinct effort  being  made  by  these  agents  to  foster  the 
military  spirit  in  Poland,  Czecho-Slovakia,  and,  I  believe, 
in  Roumania.  The  imperialistic  idea  has  seized  upon  the 
French  mind  like  a  kind  of  madness  and  the  obvious 
effort  is  to  create  a  chain  of  States,  highly  militarized, 
organized  as  far  as  possible  under  French  guidance,  and 
intended  to  be  future  allies  of  France.  I  have  no  doubt 
whatever  of  this  general  plan  and  it  is  apparently  meeting 
with  great  success.  Poland  is  endeavoring  to  raise  an 
army  of  approximately  600,000,  the  Czechs  are  striving 
to  raise  an  army  of  about  250,000,  and  Roumania  is 
struggling  under  a  very  extensive  military  burden.  All 
of  this  means  that  these  people  have  no  belief  in  the 
efficacy  of  the  League  of  Nations  to  protect  them  and  that 
under  the  guidance  of  the  French  a  strong  military  com- 
bination is  being  built  up  capable,  perhaps,  of  dominating 
Europe.  This  purpose  of  course  is  not  avowed.  The 
claim  is  that  this  chain  of  strong  military  states  is  essential 
to  hold  back  the  tide  of  Russian  Bolshevism.  I  regard 
this  largely  as  camouflage.     Each  of  the  three  States 


224         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

named  has  aggressive  designs  upon  the  surrounding 
territory  and  each  is  determined  to  get  by  force,  if  need 
be,  as  large  an  area  as  possible.  Nobody  is  attacking 
Poland  to-day.  Quite  the  contrarj^;  and  it  seems  deplor- 
able that  in  a  country  where  so  much  distress  prevails 
and  where  the  energies  of  the  Government  and  its  re- 
sources should  be  devoted  to  bettering  the  conditions  of  its 
people  and  to  organizing  an  efficient  state  administration, 
tliis  rampant  military  spirit  should  have  taken  possession. 
It  presents  to-day  more  danger  to  the  future  of  Poland 
than  Bolshevism  does.  Bolshevism  can  be  eradicated  by 
good  Government  and  equal  opportunity  for  all  citizens, 
but  the  .military  disease,  once  fastened  upon  the  State,  is 
going  to  be  difficult  to  eradicate.  With  the  arrival  of 
Haller's  Army  it  is  to  be  feared  that  aggressive  military 
action  will  be  taken  against  the  Russian,  the  Lithuanian, 
and  the  Ukrainian  fronts  unless  the  Great  Powers  can  find 
effective  means  of  checking  the  outburst  of  intoxicated 
nationalism  already  existent  and  becoming  stronger  every 
day. 

I  advise  strongly  against  Inter-Allied  Missions  where 
information  or  concrete  results  are  sought.  Send  Amer- 
icans alone  upon  such  tasks. 

[Signed]  F.  J.  Kernan 
Major  General,  U.  S.  Army. 
(2  Ends.) 


PART  V 
THE  DARK  PERIOD:  THE  FRENCH  CRISIS 


Document  25. 

Memorandum  of  Marshal  Foch,  dated  Jan- 
uary 10,  1919,  presenting  the  French  demand  for 
the  mihtary  frontier  of  the  Rhine  (carbon 
copy,  translation,  autographed).  Letter  of  Mar- 
shal Foch,  March  14,  1919,  transmitting  this 
memorandum  to  President  Wilson  (original 
autographed  letter) . 

LE   MARECHAL    FOCH 

Le  14  Mars  1919. 
Monsieur  le  President, 

Avec  I'expression  de  mon  regret  pour  le  retard  qu'elle 
met  a  vous  parvenir,  j'ai  I'honneur  de  vous  addresser 
ci-joint  la  Note  que  j'ai  fait  etablir  sur  la  frontiere  mili- 
taire  de  I'ALLEMAGNE. 

Recevez,  Monsieur  le  President,  I'assurance  de  ma  re- 
spectueuse  consideration. 

[Signed]  F.  Foch. 

G.  Q.  G.  A.  10th  January,  1919. 
C-in-C.  Allied  Armies. 

The  following  memorandum,  laid  by  the  Marshal 
Commanding-in-Chief  of  the  Allied  Armies  before  the 
Plenipotentiaries,  states,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
military  security  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers, 
the  problem  of  the  German  Western  Frontiers. 

The  question  of  the  frontiers,  special  to  France  and 
Belgium,  is  not  examined,  but  only  the  European  collec- 
tive and  international  guarantees  necessary  for  the  whole 
mass  of  States,  which,  after  having  fought  for  right, 
freedom,  and  justice,  intend  to  prepare,  on  new  bases, 

227 


228         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

inspired  by  these  three  ideas,  the  relations  between  Na- 
tions. 

Memorandum. 

Without  any  doubt,  we  may  rely,  in  an  uncertain  future, 
on  a  development  of  civilization  and  of  the  moral  sense  of 
nations,  such  that  it  will  be  possible  to  find  in  a  Society 
or  League  of  Nations,  strongly  organized,  an  efficient 
l)arrier  to  wars  of  conquest.  But,  in  order  that  this  rising 
society  should  acquire  an  authority  so  strong,  that  it  may 
be  by  itself  a  guarantee  of  the  preservation  of  peace,  it  is 
necessary  that  this  society  should  receive,  at  once,  a  suffi- 
ciently secure  basis  and  an  especial  strength  that  will 
ensure  its  development.  Therefore  we  must  know  the 
past  situation  of  nations,  so  as  to  settle  the  future,  in 
starting  from  the  situation  of  to-day,  and  also  take  into 
account  the  peace  securities,  which  a  costly  victory  has 
put  in  the  hands  of  the  Allied  Nations,  thanks  to  their 
perfect  cooperation,  and  which  could  not  be  given  up, 
without  endangering  in  the  future  the  preservation  of 
peace. 


Germany  of  1914  is  the  result  of  a  steady  work  150  years 
long,  begun  by  Frederick  II,  methodically  continued  by 
his  successors,  and  which  had  led  to  the  prussification  of 
Germany. 

From  the  very  outset  the  Hohenzollern  have  based  the 
Prussian  power  upon  an  exaggerated  militarism,  for  in- 
stance, the  keeping  up  of  an  army,  whose  strength  was 
much  larger  than  would  be  consistent  with  the  total  of 
jjopulation.  Thanks  to  this  inflated  military  organization 
Prussia  played  an  important  part  in  the  wars  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  realized  important  territorial  expan- 
sion, and  took  an  important  part  in  the  wars  of  1813,  1814 
and  1815.  In  the  same  way,  she  soon  secured,  among 
European  Powers,  a  rank  very  superior  to  the  one  which 
should  have  been  allotted  to  her  on  account  of  her  natural 
means,  population,  trade,  industrj^ 

In  fact,  the  investment  of  its  resources  in  a  strong  army. 


MEMORANDUM  OF  FOCH,  JANUARY  10,  1919  229 

produced  by  personal  and  compulsory  service  and  the 
practice  of  war  as  an  industry  of  national  conquests  have 
given  to  Prussia  serious  profits.  She  was  going  to  apply 
them  to  a  triumph  of  her  policy. 

Thus,  in  1866,  by  the  victory  of  Sadowa,  she  expelled 
Austria  from  the  German  territory,  upset  the  German 
Confederation,  and  took  control  of  reorganised  Germany, 
so  as  to  militarise  it,  according  to  the  Prussian  model  and 
under  Prussian  hands. 

Thus,  in  1871,  in  the  days  which  followed  a  victorious 
campaign,  she  created  the  Empire,  in  view  of  making  of 
Germany  a  stronger  unity,  more  in  Prussian  hands,  always 
on  the  same  basis  of  compulsory  service,  and  of  Hohen- 
zollern  command. 

But,  at  the  same  time,  Prussian  activity  exercised  itself 
far  beyond  purely  military  ground.  All  classes,  all  re- 
sources of  action  or  production,  all  associations  as  well  as 
all  individuals  were  drilled,  centralized  and  militarised. 
An  ingenious  State  monopoly  system,  applied  by  a  covet- 
ous and  despotic  monarchy,  was  always  backed  by  a 
strong  aristocracy  and  making  use  of  an  undenied  military 
superiority  and  of  profitable  wars,  that  is,  the  supremacy 
of  might.  Public  education  was  soon  imbued  with  the 
same  principles,  and  compulsory  schools,  a  fairly  old  in- 
stitution in  this  country,  found,  thanks  to  an  acute  man- 
agement, the  means  of  spreading  these  principles,  and  of 
creating  a  German  state  of  mind,  "Kultur,"  with  its  own 
morals.  The  rule  is  that  might  is  above  right.  Might 
creates  right,  for  its  benefit.  Lastly  Germany  more  and 
more  believed  in  a  superior  nature,  in  a  special  fate  and 
mission,  which  justified  the  most  unjust  doings,  the  most 
cruel  methods,  provided  that  they  led  to  German  victory. 
Morals  are  summed  up  in  a  word:  "Deutschland  Uber 
Alles."  The  German  ideal  and  the  driving  power, 
which  justifies  its  existence,  are  to  dominate  the  world  for 
the  Germans'  benefit. 

Besides,  the  centralised  authority  of  the  King  of  Prussia, 
who  has  concentrated  in  his  hands  all  the  forces  thus  cre- 
ated, so  as  to  apply  them,  at  the  time  he  chooses,  to  the 
development   of   Germany  by    war,    has   given   by   the 


230         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLE^IENT 

"Rights  of  the  Native,"  a  privileged  situation  to  each  of 
his  subjects.  The  Bavarian,  the  Saxon,  the  Wtirttem- 
berger,  the  inhabitant  of  Baden  is  above  all  a  German 
subject.  He  is  protected  and  claimed  by  the  Empire, 
interested  therefore  in  the  preservation  and  greatness  of 
the  Empire.  Once  more,  on  the  physical  and  moral  power 
of  Germany  the  King  of  Prussia  laid  his  hand  and  used 
it  as  a  buttress  for  his  system. 

All  this  explains  the  irresistible,  unanimous  and  blind 
rising  of  1914,  called  by  William  II. 

After  having,  at  the  highest  degree,  exaggerated  the 
military  organization  so  as  to  make  of  it  a  war  machine 
ready  for  conquests,  after  having  strained  the  morale  of 
his  people,  and  roused,  in  appealing  to  his  interest,  the 
devotion  of  the  individual  to  the  Prussian  Emperor's 
cause,  it  is  on  the  whole  an  army  of  scientific  and  con\TJiced 
hooligans,  which  prussified  Germany  has  turned  out, 
against  all  treaties,  on  the  peaceful  population,  and  even 
on  the  countries  of  Europe  vowed  to  neutrality,  and  lastly, 
on  the  seas  of  the  world. 

It  is  against  this  whole  fabric  of  forces,  result  of  a  hun- 
dred years'  continuous  drilling,  that  the  Entente  has  taken 
up  the  struggle,  without  being  prepared,  in  the  name  of 
the  principles  of  Right,  and  Liberty  of  Peoples,  and  soon 
followed  in  the  fight  by  a  mass  of  nations,  urged  by  the 
same  principles,  the  United  States  in  the  first  rank. 

Thanks  to  the  efi'ort  of  all,  and  at  the  price  of  a  victory, 
which  has  been  costly,  especially  for  the  first  nations  en- 
gaged in  the  fight,  the  crisis  is  now  at  an  end,  but  it  may 
start  again. 

V.  II. 

So  as  to  prevent  it  from  being  renewed,  it  shall  not  be 
enough,  without  any  doubt,  to  change  the  form  of  the 
German  Government.  Now  that  the  Hohenzollerns  have 
left,  under  conditions  which  are  of  specially  disqualifying 
character  for  this  dynasty,  and  for  all  military  monarchies, 
the  reinstalment  of  the  Imperial  system  appears  to  be 
improbable  at  least  for  some  time.  But  a  Republic,  built 
on  the  same  principles  of  centralised  authority  and  mill- 


MEMORANDUM  OF  FOCH,  JANUARY  10,  1919  231 

tarism,  taking  in  hand  the  whole  of  Germany,  will  be  as 
dangerous,  and  remain  as  threatening  for  European  peace. 
It  might  be  perhaps  easily  realized^  in  a  country,  imbued 
with  the  Prussian  spirit,  Prussian  methods,  militarist 
theories,  and  where,  as  much  on  account  of  the  natural 
characters  as  of  historical  traditions,  reveals  in  a  supreme 
way  the  principle  of  authority  and  of  centralisation. 
Moreover,  a  German  republic,  freed  from  the  hindrance 
due  without  any  doubt  to  the  existing  small  principalities, 
has  a  chance  of  finding  a  surplus  of  forces  in  her  unity 
thus  completely  achieved,  and  also  in  the  vitality  and 
activity,  specially  on  economic  grounds,  of  a  country  now 
more  in  touch  with  its  government. 

It  is  only  in  so  straightening  minds,  brought  back  by 
defeat  and  free  discussion  to  a  more  correct  conception  of 
right  and  justice,  and  by  the  sharing  in  a  large  proportion  of 
the  control  of  executive  power,  that  may  be  brought  about 
a  democratic  working  of  institutions,  in  appearance  repub- 
lican, which  should  have  otherwise  all  the  strength  of  a 
despotic  authority.  We  shall  not  see  the  coming  out  of 
such  an  evolution  without  some  time,  a  long  time,  with- 
out any  doubt,  as  we  are  decided  not  to  quicken  the  work 
of  persuasion  by  using  force,  not  to  interfere  in  the  internal 
working  of  German  affairs.  But  then,  full  of  respect  for 
German  tenure,  can  we  be  so  over-confident  as  to  endanger 
our  principles  of  Liberty  and  Justice,  even  our  existence,  by 
a  shifting  opinion  and  by  a  reactionary  force  which  may 
take  place  on  the  other  side  of  the  Rhine,  and  can  im- 
mediately throw  into  a  new  war  regimental  staffs  and 
numerous  classes  of  well-drilled  soldiers,  that  is,  a  very 
strong  Army? 

Thus  Germany  remains,  for  yet  a  long  time,  until  the 
achievement  of  its  political  and  philosophical  change,  a 
dangerous  menace.  Therefore,  the  Entente,  embryo  of  a 
Society  of  Nations,  is  absolutely  compelled  by  mere  pru- 

^To  create  the  Empire  in  1871,  it  has  only  been  necessary  to  include  in  the  Northern 
Confederation  the  Southern  States  and  to  replace,  in  the  Constitution,  the  word  "Bund" 
by  "Reich"  and  the  word  "Praesidium"  by  "Kaiser."  A  move  in  the  contrary 
direction,  which  should  replace  in  the  Imperial  Constitution,  the  word  "Reich"  by 
"Bund"  and  the  word  "Kaiser"  by  "Praesidium"  would  have  for  result  to  main- 
tain, under  a  form  only  republican  in  appearance,  all  the  power  embodied  in  the  Empire. 


232        WOODROW  ^\TLSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

dence  to  take  towards  Germany  systematic  measures  of  a 
purely  defensive  character,  first  emergency  precautions. 
At  the  same  time,  these  will  be  plain  enough,  so  as  to  show 
that  the  Allies  have  well  made  up  their  mind  to  reach  the 
goal,  peace,  and  make  it  impossible  for  Germany  to  start 
again  a  war  of  conquest,  to  take  up  once  more  her  plan  of 
armed  domination. 

In  view  of  this  lasting  threat,  what  forces  can  we  call 
out.? 

III. 

During  a  great  part  of  the  war,  which  is  coming  to  an 
end,  Russia,  with  her  large  armies,  has  detained  a  fair 
number  of  the  German  forces.  Thus,  in  1915,  1916  and 
even  during  the  greater  part  of  1917,  the  Allied  powders 
have  been  superior  in  numbers  on  the  Western  front. 

To-day,  the  future  of  Russia  is  uncertain,  probably  for 
many  years.  Therefore,  Western  Europe,  cradle  of  and 
necessary  guarantees  of  the  future  organisation  of  nations, 
can  rely  only  on  her  own  strength  for  studying,  preparing 
and  ensuring  her  prospects  towards  Germany,  and  in  case 
of  a  possible  attack. 

To  play  this  part.  Western  Europe  cannot  have  a  su- 
periority of  numbers.  In  fact,  whichever  type  of  political 
organisation  should  be  agreed  to  in  the  near  future  by  the 
people  on  the  other  side  of  the  Rhine,  there  will  always 
remain,  on  the  eastern  bank  of  the  river,  a  German  popula- 
tion of  64  to  15  millions  of  inhabitants^  naturally  bound 
together  by  common  language,  and  therefore  by  common 
ideas,  as  by  common  interest. 

To  these  German  forces,  Belgium,  Luxembourg,  Alsace- 
Lorraine  and  France  can  oppose  only  a  total  of  49  millions 
of  inhabitants.  Only  with  the  cooperation  of  the  coun- 
tries on  the  other  side  of  the  sea,  can  they  reach  the  level 

'German  Empire,  1914  68,000,000 

German  Provinces  of  Austria  7,000,000 

German  Poland  2,100,000 

Alsace-Lorraine  1,900,000 

Rhine-Lands  of  the  Western  Bank  5,400,000 

Schleswig-Holstein  1,600,000 

„.  ^^^r.  11,000,000        75,000,000 

Balance,  64,000,000 


MEMORANDUM  OF  FOCH,  JANUARY  10,  1919  233 

of  the  enemy's  figures,  as  they  did  in  1914-1918,  and  yet 
this  help  must  be  waited  for,  and  for  how  long,  especially 
for  the  United  States? 

Now  then,  what  has  been  the  cause  of  the  present  ca- 
lamity? Above  all  the  fact  that  Germany  was  tempted 
by  the  possibility  of  striking,  with  one  blow,  only  in 
stretching  the  fist,  our  vital  parts.  Without  this  convic- 
tion, she  certainly  would  have  hesitated.  Impressed  with 
that  conviction,  she  did  not  even  look  for  pretexts.  *'We 
can't  wait,"  said  Bethmann-Hollweg. 

Therefore,  to  put  an  end  to  the  encroachments  on  the 
West  of  Germany,  which  has  always  been  warlike  and 
covetous  of  others'  property,  which  lately  had  been  pre- 
pared and  trained  for  conquering  by  force,  against  all 
right,  and  with  methods  the  most  inconsistent  with  law, 
which  can  start  without  delay  a  terrific  war — if  we  want 
at  least  to  postpone  the  decisive  battle — we  must  first  of 
all  appeal  to  the  help  of  nature.  Nature  has  provided  a 
barrier  on  the  road  to  invasion,  but  only  one:  the  Rhine. 
The  Rhine  must  be  used  and  defended,  and  therefore  occu- 
pied and  organised  since  peace  time.  Without  this  fun- 
damental precaution.  Western  Europe  remains  deprived 
of  her  natural  frontier  and  open,  as  in  the  past,  to  the  dan- 
ger of  an  invasion,  which  may  be  stronger.  Without  this 
precaution,  the  industrial  and  peaceful  countries  of  N.  W. 
Europe  are  immediately  drowned  under  the  flow  of  bar- 
barous wars,  which  no  dike  checks. 

The  Rhine,  in  itself  a  serious  obstacle,  renders  especially 
diflScult  the  crossing  at  a  time  when  the  machine  guns  of 
the  defence  compel  the  assailant  to  resort  to  the  use  of 
tanks.  From  Switzerland  to  Holland,  on  a  front  of  more 
than  six  hundred  kilometres,  this  continuous  obstacle 
covers  the  allied  countries,  without  possibility  of  being 
outflanked. 

Further,  on  account  of  fortified  towns,  by  which  it  is 
reinforced,  the  means  of  communication  (roads  and  rail- 
ways) which  converge  on  it,  or  run  laterally  along  it,  it  is 
a  magnificent  basis  of  manoeuvre  for  a  counter-offensive. 

Mayence,  Coblenz,  Cologne  are  only  at  three  days' 
march  from  each  other.     Any  attempt  by  the  enemy  to 


234         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

effect  a  crossing  between  these  towns  would  be  threatened 
in  flank  and  in  the  rear,  on  both  banks  of  the  river,  as  each 
bridge-liead,  which  we  are  in  possession  of,  on  the  Rhine, 
flanks  its  neighbors  and  enables  such  an  offensive  to  be 
dealt  with  in  the  flank  or  from  behind. 

Marshal  von  iVloItke  considered  the  Rhine  to  be  the 
German  military  frontier,  and  concluded  certain  studies 
of  his  by  writing:  "  The  extraordinary  strength  of  our  centre 
of  operations  on  the  Rhine  cannot  be  ignored.  It  could  only 
he  compromised,  should  ice  undertake  a  premature  offensive 
on  the  left  hank,  with  insufficient  forces''  And  farther: 
"  The  defensive  front  of  Prussia  against  France  is  made  up 
by  the  Rhine  and  its  fortresses.  This  line  is  so  strong  that 
it  should  be  far  from  requiring  all  the  forces  of  the  Monarchy.'' 
The  situation  is  to-day  reversed  for  the  benefit  of  the  coali- 
tion. She  can't  give  up  the  advantage  thus  secured  and 
abandon  the  defensive  shield  in  this  area — the  Rhine — 
without  seriously  endangering  its  future.  "Wacht  am 
Rhein"  must  be  its  rallying  word. 

Henceforward,  the  Rhine  ought  to  be  the  western  mili- 
tary frontier  of  the  German  countries.  Henceforward 
Germany  ought  to  be  deprived  of  all  entrance  and  assem- 
bling ground,  that  is,  of  all  territorial  sovereignty  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  river,  that  is,  of  all  facilities  for  invading 
quickly,  as  in  1914,  Belgium,  Luxembourg,  for  reaching 
the  coast  of  the  North  Sea  and  threatening  the  United 
Kingdom,  for  outflanking  the  natural  defences  of  France, 
the  Rhine,  Meuse,  conquering  the  Northern  provinces  and 
entering  upon  the  Parisian  area. 

This  is  for  the  time  being,  in  the  near  future,  an  indis- 
pensable guarantee  of  peace,  on  account  of: 

1.  The  material  and  moral  situation  of  Germany. 

2.  Her  numerical  superiority  over  the  democratic  coun- 

tries of  Western  Europe. 

IV. 

The  Rhine,  military  frontier,  without  which  cannot 
be  maintained  the  peace  aimed  at  by  the  coalition,  is  not 
a  territorial  benefit  for  any  country.  It  is  not  a  question, 
in  fact,  of  annexing  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  of  increas- 


MEMORANDUM  OF  FOCH,  JANUARY  10,  1919  235 

ing  France  or  Belgium's  territory,  or  of  the  protection 
against  German  revindication,  but  to  hold  securely  on  the 
Rhine,  the  common  barrier  of  security  necessary  to  the 
League  of  Democratic  Nations.  It  is  not  a  question  of 
confiding  to  a  single  power  the  guarding  of  this  common 
barrier,  but  to  ensure  by  the  cooperation,  either  moral  or 
material,  of  all  the  democratic  powers,  the  defence  of  their 
existence  and  of  their  future,  by  forbidding  Germany  once 
for  all  from  carrying  war  and  its  influence  of  domination 
across  the  river. 

It  must  be  understood  that  it  will  be  for  the  treaty  of 
peace  to  lay  down  the  status  of  the  populations  of  the  left 
bank  of  the  Rhine,  not  included  within  French  or  Belgian 
frontiers. 

But  this  organization,  whatever  form  it  may  take,  must 
take  into  account  the  essential  military  factor  stated 
above,  as  follows: 

1.  The  total  prevention  of  German  Military  access  to 

and  political  propaganda  in  the  territories  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Rhine;  perhaps  even  the  covering 
of  these  territories  by  military  neutral  zones  on  the 
right  bank. 

2.  The  ensuring  of  the  military  occupation  of  the  terri- 

tories of  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine  by  Allied  forces. 

3.  The  guaranteeing  to  the  territories  on  the  left  bank 

of  the  Rhine  the  outlets  necessary  for  their  eco- 
nomic activities,  in  uniting  them  with  the  other 
Western  States  by  a  common  system  of  customs. 
Under  these  conditions,  and  in  conformity  with  the 
principles,  admitted  by  all,  of  the  liberty  of  peoples,  it  is 
possible  to  conceive  the  constitution  on  the  left  bank  of 
the  Rhine  of  new  autonomous  States,  administering  them- 
selves under  the  reservations  stated  above,  a  constitution 
which,  with  the  assistance  of  a  strong  natural  frontier, 
the  Rhine,  will  be  the  only  means  capable  of  securing  peace 
to  Western  Europe. 

V. 

To  sum  up,  the  Powers  of  the  Coalition,  France,  in  spite 
of  her  legitimate  claims  and  her  ever-present  rights,  Bel- 


236         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  ^YORLD  SETTLEMENT 

gium  controlled  by  neutrality,  Great  Britain  in  her  insular 
position,  never  prepared  an  offensive  against  Germany, 
but  in  1914  were  brutally  assailed  by  this  State.  For  a 
certain  time,  the  situation  may  again  arise.  If  in  1914, 
1915,  1916  and  1917,  these  Powers  were  able  to  resist 
Germany,  to  give  time  to  Great  Britain  to  develop  fully 
lier  Armies,  notably  by  her  compulsory  service  and  other 
improvised  measures,  and  to  enable  the  United  States  to 
arrive  with  her  decisive  support,  it  was  because  Russia 
was  fighting  on  their  side,  and  on  this  account  they  were 
able  to  maintain  during  a  certain  period  numerical  su- 
periority on  the  Western  front.  Russia  is  no  longer  of  as- 
sistance, for  a  time  which  it  is  impossible  to  foresee.  It 
becomes  necessary,  therefore,  that  the  Western  barrier 
against  German  invasion  should  be  more  strongly  con- 
stituted than  in  the  past,  and  that  the  Powers  of  the 
Entente,  which  are  geographically  in  the  front  row  of  the 
defenders  of  civilization,  be  organized  henceforth  on  a 
military  basis  to  render  possible  the  timely  intervention 
of  the  other  States  which  are  the  defenders  of  civilization. 

The  organization  defensively  of  the  Coalition  is  there- 
fore essential. 

This  defensive  organization  involves,  before  all,  a  nat- 
ural frontier;  the  first  barrier  placed  to  withstand  the 
German  invasion.  Only  one  exists:  the  Rhine.  It  must 
until  further  orders  be  held  by  the  forces  of  the  Coalition. 

VI. 

The  object  of  this  decision,  which  is  purely  defensive 
and  to  be  adopted  at  once,  is  to  withstand  an  attack  by 
Germany  and  to  answer  the  first  needs  created  thereby. 
It  is  an  essential  organization,  for  war,  as  soon  as  it  breaks, 
lives  only  on  realities,  on  material  forces  brought  into  play 
under  definite  conditions  of  time:  natural  lines  of  defence 
or  defensive  organization,  numbers,  armament.  These 
are  the  conditions  laid  down  above  as  necessary.  They 
could  be  carried  out,  as  has  here  been  seen,  under  the  su- 
pervision and  patronage  of  the  Nations  founding  the 
league  of  Nations  of  Right:  Belgium,  England,  United 
States  and  France. 


MEMORANDUM  OF  FOCH,  JANUARY  10,  1919  237 

Under  the  protection  of  these  defensive  measures,  and 
to  provide  them  with  a  moral  support,  the  League  of 
Nations,  securely  established,  would  be  strengthened  by 
those  Nations  which  have  come  to  defend  the  same  prin- 
ciples of  Right  and  Justice,  and  it  would  establish  definite 
statutes,  henceforward  practicable  of  execution. 

The  League  once  thus  founded,  with  its  statutes  and 
powers  of  coercion,  could  progressively  develop  into  the 
League  of  Nations,  by  the  successive  adhesion  of  other 
Nations;  neutral  Nations  first,  enemy  nations  afterwards. 
The  results  aimed  at,  once  achieved,  would  be  of  such  a 
nature  as  to  diminish  by  degrees  the  military  burdens  of 
the  nations  of  which  the  League  will  be  composed. 

That  is  an  ideal  to  be  realized  in  a  future,  which  is  neces- 
sarily indefinite. 

It  will  he  possible  of  achievement  under  the  protection  of 
the  defensive  measures  explained  above,  without  ivhich  civili- 
zation will  be  placed  in  danger  by  a  new  German  attack,  which 
this  time  it  would  not  be  possible  to  stop  in  time. 

The  fortune  of  war  has  placed  the  line  of  the  Rhine  in 
our  hands,  thanks  to  a  combination  of  circumstances  and 
a  cooperation  of  Allied  Forces,  which  cannot  for  a  long 
time  be  reproduced.  The  abandonment  to-day  of  this 
solid  natural  barrier,  without  other  guarantee  than  insti- 
tutions of  a  moral  character  and  of  distant  and  unknown 
difficulty,  would  mean,  from  the  military  point  of  view, 
the  incurring  of  the  greatest  of  risks. 

The  Armies,  moreover,  know  how  many  lives  it  has  cost 
them. 

[Signed]  F.  Foch. 


Document  26. 

Letter  from  Major  General  Tasker  H.  Bliss, 
March  28,  for  President  Wilson  (autographed 
original),  with  two  memoranda  (typewritten, 
initialed)  on  the  military  intrigues  in  Hungary. 

AMERICAN   COMMISSION   TO    NEGOTIATE   PEACE. 

Hotel  de  Crillon,  Paris, 

March  28,  1919. 
My  dear  Mr.  President: 

The  plan  which  was  presented  yesterday  afternoon  in 
Mr.  Clemenceau's  office  to  you  and  your  colleagues,  was 
unknown  to  me  thirty  minutes  before  that.  I  was  told 
that  it  was  made  "in  execution  of  the  decision  taken 
by  the  Associated  Governments."  I  therefore  could  not 
express  my  real  opinion  about  it  without  instructions  from 
you.  I  think  that  it  brings  you  face  to  face  with  the 
gravest  decision  yet  called  for  at  the  Peace  Conference. 
If  carried  into  execution  it  means  the  resumption  of  gen- 
eral war  and  the  probable  dissolution  of  the  Peace  Con- 
ference. I  believe  that  this  is  the  deliberate  intention  of 
those  who  have  proposed  it.  Various  facts  and,  I  think, 
justifiable  inferences  from  facts,  have  come  to  my  knowl- 
edge which  I  hesitate  to  commit  to  writing.  I  beg  you 
to  take  no  action  either  in  respect  to  the  plan  proposed 
yesterday  or  the  previous  plan  of  providing  supplies  for 
the  Roumanian  Army,  until  you  can  give  me  a  very  short 
time  in  which  to  state  the  case  to  you. 

I  have  this  moment  had  a  conference  with  Mr.  House 
on  the  subject  and  it  is  on  his  recommendation  that  I 
write  this  letter. 

Very  sincerely, 

[Signed]  Tasker  H.  Bliss. 

238 


GENERAL  BLISS  ON  INTRIGUES  IN  HUNGARY  239 

P.  S.  I  invite  attention  to  the  marked  paragraphs  of 
my  attached  memorandum  prepared  last  night.     T.  H.  B. 

[Note:  this  is  in  General  Bliss's  own  handwriting,  and 
refers  to  paragraphs  6,  7,  and  8  of  the  first  memorandum.] 

The  President 

of  the  United  States. 

Hotel  de  Crillon,  Paris, 

March  27,  1919. 

Memorandum. 

1.  The  armistice  with  Hungary,  signed  on  November 
13th  by  Gen.  Franchet  d'Esperey  and  Count  Karolyi, 
fixed  the  line  of  demarcation  between  the  Hungarian 
and  Roumanian  troops  as  the  river  Szamos-Bistritz, 
river  Maros.  General  Charpy,  Chief  of  Staff  of  Gen. 
Franchet  d'Esperey,  reported  on  Feb.  25,  1919,  that  the 
Hungarians  had  carried  out  all  the  conditions  of  the  armis- 
tice but  that  the  Roumanians  had  not,  as,  without  inform- 
ing General  Franchet  d'Esperey,  they  had  crossed  the 
demarcation  line  and  had  commenced  an  advance  which 
on  that  date  had  reached  the  line  Maramaros  Sziget 
CsuRSA.  General  Charpy  expressed  the  opinion  that 
the  Roumanians  should  remain  on  their  present  line. 

2.  On  February  26,  1919,  the  Supreme  Council  ap- 
proved a  recommendation  of  the  Military  Representatives 
for  the  establishment  of  a  neutral  zone  about  50  kilometres 
in  width,  the  Western  or  Hungarian  limit  of  which  is 
the  line  Vasaros  Nameny-Szeged,  that  is  the  treaty 
line  of  1916,  and  the  Eastern  or  Roumanian  limit,  the  line 
Szatmar  Nemeti-Arad.  The  creation  of  this  zone 
permitted  a  further  advance  of  the  Roumanian  forces  of 
about  70  kilometers  and  imposed  a  corresponding  retire- 
ment on  the  Hungarian  forces. 

3.  The  Neutral  Zone  approved  by  the  Supreme  Council 
is  open  to  the  objections: 

(a)  That  the  entire  zone  lies  within  the  limits  of  terri- 
tory that  is  ethnically  Hungarian; 

(b)  That  through  sanctioning  a  further  and  extended 


240         WOODllOW  ^YILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

advance  of  the  Roumanian  beyond  the  demarcation  line 
of  the  armistice,  it  subjects  the  Associated  Powers  to  a 
charge  of  breach  of  faith; 

(c)  That  it  has  been  interpreted  by  the  Hungarians  as 
a  recognition  by  the  Supreme  Council,  of  the  Treaty  of 
1916. 

4.  A  more  equitable  neutral  zone  would  have  been  one 
whose  median  line  corresponded  with  the  line  of  ethnic 
cleavage,  that  is  the  line  Szatmar  Nemeti-x\rad,  or 
the  Eastern  limit  of  the  zone  established  by  the  Supreme 
Council.  Such  a  zone  would  be  made  up  of  about  equal 
parts  of  Hungarian  and  Roumanian  ethnic  territory,  and 
would  not  raise  the  question  of  the  Treaty  of  1916. 

5.  On  March  22,  1919,  General  Franchet  d'Esperey 
telegraphed  that  when  on  March  19th  he  notified  the 
Hungarian  Government  of  the  decision  of  the  Supreme 
Council,  that  Government  resigned,  declaring  itself  unable 
either  to  receive  the  decision  or  to  prescribe  measures  for 
its  execution.  The  Karolyi  Government  has  been  re- 
placed by  a  government  of  Bolshevik  tendencies  which 
is  reported  to  be  seeking  an  alliance  with  the  Bolshevik 
Government  in  Russia. 

6.  The  question  now  confronting  the  United  States  is 
one  of  fundamental  far-reaching  importance.  If  we  join 
the  other  Associated  Powers  in  attempting  the  coercion 
by  armed  force  of  Hungary  aided  by  Russia,  we  shall  be 
committing  ourselves  to  a  war  of  enormous  magnitude, 
and  of  indefinite  duration;  one  which  will  have  to  be 
financed  entirely  by  us;  and  one  in  which,  because  of  the 
war-weariness  of  the  peoples  of  our  allies,  we  may  find 
ourselves  standing  alone. 

7.  The  present  conditions  in  Hungary  are  the  direct 
result  of  the  action  of  the  Supreme  Council  on  February 
26,1919.  That  act,  therefore,  was  poHtically  unwise.  It 
cannot  be  justified  morally  before  the  people  of  the  United 
States. 

8.  It  is  believed  that  the  United  States  should  decline 
categorically  to  participate  in  armed  intervention  in  this 
theatre  through  the  contribution  of  men  or  money  or  sup- 
plies.    It  is  believed  also  that  if  the  United  States  is  to 


GENERAL  BLISS  ON  INTRIGUES  IN  HUNGARY  241 

continue  to  act  with  the  Associated  Powers  in  the  deter- 
mination of  territorial  and  economic  questions  relating  to 
the  former  Austrian-Hungarian  Empire,  it  insist  upon  the 
immediate  reversal  of  the  action  of  the  Supreme  Council 
of  February  26,  1919;  upon  the  issuance  of  orders  to  the 
Commanding  General  of  the  Army  of  the  Orient  and  all 
other  representatives  of  the  Associated  Powers  in  the 
countries  bordering  on  Hungary,  that  no  action  will  be 
taken  by  them  with  respect  to  the  Hungarian  people  or 
territory  that  is  not  clearly  within  the  scope  of  the  terms 
of  the  armistice  concluded  with  Hungary;  and  that  mean- 
while every  effort  be  made  by  the  Supreme  Council  to 
reopen  communication  with  the  Hungarian  people  and  to 
assure  them  that  it  is  the  purpose  of  the  Associated  Powers 
to  conclude  a  peace  with  Hungary  on  a  basis  of  the  declara- 
tions of  President  Wilson  contained  in  his  address  of 
January  8,  1918,  and  subsequent  addresses. 

[Initialed]  T.  H.  B. 


Memorandum. 

showing  the  sequence  of  events  connected  with  the 
establishment  of  the  neutral  zone  in  hungary, 
and  of  events  subsequent  to  the  establishment 

of  that  zone. 

Note:  From  February  13th  until  sometime  after  the 
President's  return  from  Washington,  I  w^as  entirely  oc- 
cupied with  work  on  the  Committee  drafting  the  final 
military,  naval  and  air  peace  terms  with  Germany,  and 
became  acquainted  with  the  following  sequence  of  events 
only  in  connection  with  the  preparation  of  my  memoran- 
dum to  Mr.  Lansing  dated  March  8th,  1919. 

1.  On  the  signature  of  the  Armistice  between  the  Hun- 
garians and  the  French  Army  of  the  East,  General  Fran- 
chet  d'Esperey  fixed  a  fair  armistice  line  beyond  which 
neither  the  Roumanians  nor  the  Hungarians  were  to  ad- 
vance. Continued  violation  of  this  agreement  on  the 
part  of  the  Hungarians  resulted  in  serious  trouble. 

2.  February  19.     On  this  date  the  Committee  on  Rou- 


242         WOODROW  \MLSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

manian  affairs  had  under  consideration  a  proposed  Neutral 
Zone  in  Hungary  to  avoid  further  conflict  between  the 
Hungarians  and  the  Roumanians.  General  Alby,  repre- 
senting the  French  War  Ministry,  read  a  Note  to  the 
Committee  in  which  he  said,  inter-alia,  that  "General 
Berthelot's  Army  must  be  kept  ready  for  disposal  and 
eventual  employment  in  South  Russia."  This  matter 
was  brought  before  the  Committee  on  Roumanian  affairs 
by  the  French  Foreign  OflBce,  as  a  matter  of  urgency. 

I  understand  that  the  French  F.  O.  submitted  the 
boundaries  of  the  proposed  Neutral  Zone. 

Note:  The  underscored  lines  refer  to  some  unknown 
plan  of  operations  against  Russia. 

3.  February  25.  Marshal  Foch  outlined  to  the  Council 
of  Ten  a  plan  which  he  had  prepared  for  forming,  imme- 
diately after  signature  of  peace  with  Germany,  an  army  of 
Greeks,  Serbs,  Roumanians,  Poles,  Czecho-Slovaks,  Es- 
thonians,  etc.,  under  French  direction,  to  fight  Bolshevism. 
Mr.  Balfour's  remarks  on  this  subject,  in  the  minutes  of 
that  session,  are  interesting. 

Note:  The  vaguely  expressed  plan  of  IMarshal  Foch 
indicates  the  motive  for  the  dispatch  of  three  Greek  divi- 
sions to  Odessa. 

4.  The  final  recommendation  of  the  Committee  on  Rou- 
manian affairs  was  submitted  to  the  Council  of  Ten  and 
by  it  referred  to  the  Military  Representatives  on  the 
Supreme  War  Council  at  Versailles. 

5.  February  25.  The  Military  Representatives  con- 
curred in  a  recommendation  as  to  the  Neutral  Zone.  The 
officer  of  the  American  Section  who  was  present  made 
the  reservation  that  this  was  not  in  any  way  to  commit 
the  United  States  to  military  action,  as  we  were  not  rep- 
resented in  Southeast  Europe. 

6.  February  .26.  The  Council  of  Ten  approved  the 
Neutral  Zone. 

7.  March  8."^  Mr.  C.  M.  Storey,  who  had  just  previ- 
ously returned  from  Hungary,  sent  me  a  memorandum, 
through  Mr.  Lansing,  who  asked  for  any  comments  I 
might  desire  to  make,  on  the  subject  of  the  proposed 
Neutral  Zone.     I  returned  it  to  jNIr.  Lansing  on  March  8th 


GENERAL  BLISS  ON  INTRIGUES  IN  HUNGARY  243 

with  my  comments.     It  is  the  study  which  I  then  made 
that  acquainted  me  with  the  facts  set  forth  above. 

8.  In  the  sessions  of  the  Council  of  Ten,  where  was  dis- 
cussed the  transportation  of  the  Pohsh  divisions  to  Dant- 
zig,  Marshal  Foch  brought  up  in  various  ways,  his  inten- 
tion to  unite  these  with  the  Roumanians  in  order  to  fight 
the  Ukrainians  at  Lemberg.  On  March  17th,  he  urged 
that  he  be  authorized  to  study  the  question  of  the  trans- 
portation of  these  divisions  or  a  part  of  them  by  rail  via 
Vienna.  The  council,  as  I  remember  it,  refused  to  give 
him  this  authorization. 

9.  March  19th.  On  this  day,  two  days  after  dis- 
approval of  the  idea  of  transporting  the  Polish  divisions 
by  rail,  the  ofhcial  note  establishing  the  Neutral  Zone 
was  delivered  to  Karolyi's  Government  in  Budapest  and 
that  government  fell  and  was  succeeded  by  a  so-called 
Bolshevik  Government.  What  is  the  connection  between 
these  two  dates  .^^ 

10.  March  25th.  On  this  day  the  Council  of  Four  had 
before  them  the  telegrams  from  General  Berthelot  relating 
to  the  situation  in  Odessa.  Sending  for  Marshal  Foch, 
they  learned  from  him  that  he  did  not  consider  it  worth 
while  to  hold  Odessa,  but  that  the  forces  of  Roumania  and 
Poland  should  be  strengthened.  This  led  to  the  question 
of  participation  by  the  Four  Governments  in  the  equip- 
ment and  maintenance  of  the  Roumanian  Army. 

11.  March  27.  Marshal  Foch  presented  his  plan  to  the 
Council  of  Four  for  the  organization  of  an  army  of  French, 
British,  Americans,  Greeks,  Serbs  and  Roumanians,  to 
extend  from  Odessa  on  the  Black  Sea  around  Hungary, 
and  to  occupy  Vienna.  This  army  is  to  extinguish  Bol- 
shevism in  Hungary  and  unite  to  close  the  "Lemberg 
Gap." 

Thus,  after  many  variations  and  deviations,  we  come 
to  the  original  plan  of  the  great  army  to  be  formed  to  fight 
Bolshevism. 

12.  There  is  reason  to  believe  that  General  Franchet 
d'Esperey  and  his  officers  on  the  spot  do  not  favor  the 


V 


544         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

plan  of  military  intervention.  His  chief -of-staff,  on  Feb- 
ruary 25th,  opposed  the  proposed  Neutral  Zone.  It  is 
said  that  General  Franchet  d'Esperey  made  a  report  op- 
posing intervention. 

On  the  other  hand,  General  Berthelot  has  been  in  Rou- 
mania  as  the  immediate  agent  of  the  French  Ministry  of 
War.  He  has  favored  the  Roumanians,  and  the  French 
Government  appears  to  be  guided  by  his  advice, 

13.  There  appears  to  be  no  doubt  from  what  Mr.  Nor- 
man Davis  has  told  me,  that  some  days  prior  to  March 
25th  (when  the  evacuation  of  Odessa  and  provision  for 
the  maintenance  of  the  Roumanian  Army  were  discussed 
by  the  Council  of  Four),  the  British  and  French  Govern- 
ments agreed  with  the  Roumanian  Government  to  provide 
for  the  entire  maintenance  of  the  latter's  army. 

From  Colonel  Browning's  reports  to  me  of  the  pro- 
ceedings of  Marshal  Foch's  Committee,  there  seems  no 
doubt  that  the  European  Allies  expect  that  the  United 
States  will  not  merely  provide  certain  food,  clothing,  etc. 
for  the  Roumanian  Army,  but  will  also  share  in  all  of  the 
other  expenses  of  its  maintenance.  There  is  no  law  under 
which  this  can  be  done. 

14.  Another  grave  fact  to  notice  is  that  the  negotia- 
tions by  the  French  with  the  Germans  for  authority  to 
move  the  Polish  divisions  through  the  port  of  Dantzig 
will  in  all  probability,  in  view  of  the  manner  in  which 
the  matter  has  been  presented  heretofore  to  the  Ger- 
man Government,  result  in  the  refusal  of  the  Germans 
to  permit  it. 

It  looks  as  though,  either  through  the  action  taken  in 
Hungary  or  the  proposed  action  in  respect  to  the  port  of 
Dantzig,  or  through  both  of  those  means,  it  was  deter- 
mined to  break  off  the  general  armistice,  both  with  Ger- 
many and  with  the  Austro-Hungarian  States.  The 
United  States  is  being  dragged  into  a  resumption  of  the 
war  through  the  fact  that  all  negotiations  or  dealings  with 
the  enemy  are  in  the  hands  of  the  French.  They  can  do 
nothing  except  with  the  hope  that  the  United  States  will 


GENERAL  BLISS  ON  INTRIGUES  IN  HUNGARY  245 

see  them  through.  Nothing  but  the  most  complete  under- 
standing  with  them  as  to  the  general  attitude  of  the  United 
States  will  alter  the  present  tendency  of  events.  I  believe 
that  the  issue  must  be  met  within  a  very  few  days. 

[Initialed]  T.  H.  B. 
Hotel  Crillon, 
March  28,  1919. 


Document  27. 

Letter  of  King  of  Spain  to  President  Wilson, 
March  25  (written  by  hand  in  EngHsh  and 
autographed),  with  copy  of  letter  of  Ex-Emperor 
Karl  of  Austria-Hungary  (typewritten  in  Ger- 
man and  translated  by  Dr.  J.  V.  Fuller). 

25.  III.  1919. 

My  dear  President: 

I  have  just  received  a  letter  of  my  Cousin  Charles,  the 
late  Emperor  of  Austria,  giving  the  uttermost  importance 
to  its  text.  I  enclose  you  a  full  copy,  hoping  that  you 
will  do  all  you  can  to  stop  the  advance  of  Bolshevist  ideas, 
as  it  is  for  the  sake  of  us  all. 

Excuse  the  step  I  am  taking,  &  believe  me 
Your  very  sincere  &  loyal  friend, 

Alphonso  R.  H. 


Ex-Emperor  Karl  to  the  King  of  Spain 

(Transmitted  to  Wilson  by  the  latter  with  covering 
letter  dated  March  25th.) 

Dear  Cousin: 

You  once  urged  me  that  whenever  I  had  anything  on 
my  heart,  I  should  communicate  confidentially  with  you 
through  your  courier. 

I  should  now  like  to  beg  a  great  friendly  favor  of  you. 
I  will  describe  the  situation  here,  in  the  Monarchy,  to  you 
loyally  and  without  reserve.  Would  it  not  be  possible 
for  you  to  instruct  along  these  lines  the  Entente  which 
alone  can  save  us  from  Bolshevism  and  utter  collapse 
through  division  into  a  number  of  dis-united  independent 
States? 

246 


LETTER  OF  KING  OF  SPAIN  TO  WILSON  247 

After  the  armistice,  I  disbanded  my  brave  army.  The 
sohd,  respectable  portions  of  it  returned  to  their  occupa- 
tions. That  portion  which  we  may  properly  term  the 
rabble,  which  had  nothing  to  lose  and  had  mostly  crowded 
to  the  rear,  formed  the  new  armies  of  the  national  states. 

You  cannot  possibly  consider  these  to-day  any  real 
bulwarks  against  Bolshevism.  Every  government  among 
these  national  states  is  busily  engaged  in  throwing  sand 
into  the  eyes  of  the  Entente  to  convince  it  that  complete 
order  reigns  in  their  countries  and  Bolshevism  has  no 
chance  there.  Believe  me,  I  hold  myself  above  the 
nations  and  have,  naturally,  nothing  to  do  with  their 
squabbles;  and  I  can  see  that  all  these  new  states  will 
sooner  or  later  come  to  first-class  Bolshevism,  and  this 
fire  be  spread  into  the  Allied  states,  unless  the  Entente 
intervenes  with  powerful  military  forces.  The  Govern- 
ments are  utterly  powerless  and  allow  themselves  to  be 
swayed  by  the  radicals. 

The  means  of  preventing  Bolshevism  and  long  continu- 
ing wars  are: 

1.  As  I  have  already  remarked,  that  the  Entente  send 
troops ; 

2.  That  food  be  brought  in  the  greatest  possible 
quantities. 

3.  That  the  present  national  states,  with  reservation  of 
their  complete  independence  even  in  regard  to  form  of 
government  (republic  or  monarchy),  be  brought  together 
under  the  dynasty  into  a  confederation  with  only  certain 
common  departments — foreign  affairs,  army,  commerce 
and  customs. 

If  this  is  not  done,  Austria  will  become  a  second 
Balkan  peninsula.  A  president  of  the  confederation 
from  any  one  of  the  nationalities  would  always  be  a  thorn 
in  the  side  of  the  others.  Only  the  Dynasty,  standing 
above  the  nations,  can  assume  this  position. 

Do  not  believe  that  I  have  proposed  the  third  point  for 
selfish  reasons;  but  I  regard  any  other  solution  as  dis- 
astrous for  the  peoples  entrusted  to  me  by  God.  Another 
consideration  is  that  Bolshevism  has  by  this  time  spread 
widely  in  Germany,  where  an  operation  is  already  hardly 


248         >NC)()DROW  WILSON  .\ND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

possihle,  while  in  our  part  of  the  world  it  is  just  raising 
its  head  and  can  be  stifled  by  quick  action. 

I  could  give  you  manj'  examples  showing  that  my  fears 
are  justified,  but  here  are  a  few^  small  ones.  In  Baden, 
which  you  know,  a  Soldiers'  Council  collects  its  own  taxes 
while  the  Government  looks  calmly  on.  In  Hungary, 
many  of  the  great  estates  which  constitute  the  w^ealth  of 
the  country  have  been  socialized,  which  means  confiscated 
by  the  state  and  put  under  the  administration  of  some 
Socialist  or  other.  The  lord  receives  no  income  from  his 
estate,  but  must  bear  all  the  expenses  of  its  operation. 
In  Bohemia  there  is  a  Bolshevik  by  the  name  of  Muna  who 
predicts  a  universal  overturn  on  the  first  of  Ma3\ 

Wages  are  extravagantly  high.  In  Budapest,  one 
must  pay  a  common  private  coachman  300  crowns  a 
week;  the  street-cleaner  receives  150  crow'ns  a  day;  w^hile 
imiversity  professors  are  obliged  to  carry  sacks  in  their 
free  time  in  order  to  make  a  living.  The  Hungarian 
government  has  just  expended,  in  time  of  peace,  3  milliards 
of  crowns  in  a  month  and  a  half;  whereas  a  threefold 
greater  Hungary  spent  only  400  millions  a  month  in  time 
of  w^ar.  The  bank-note  press  is  as  overworked  as  in 
Russia.  What  will  all  this  lead  to.'^  And  it  is  almost  as 
bad  in  all  the  other  states  as  in  Hungary !  W^e  must  have 
financial  help! 

Excuse  this  long  letter,  but  I  could  not  help  unburden- 
ing my  heart  for  once  to  a  loyal  relation. 

Many  sincere  good  wishes  from 

Your  devoted  cousin, 

Karl. 

Eckartsau,  March  17,  1919. 


Document  28. 

Letter  of  M.  Clemenceau  to  President  Wilson, 
March  31  (autographed  original),  together  with 
his  note  of  reply  to  Lloyd  George's  memorandum 
of  March  26  (carbon  copy,  translation). 

REPUBLIQUE    FRANCAISE 

he  President  du  Conseil 
Ministre  de  la  Guerre 

Paris,  le  31  Mars,  1919. 
Monsieur  le  President, 

Vous  trouverez  sous  ce  pli  une  note  en  reponse  a  la  note 
de  M.  Lloyd  George  du  26  Mars  1919. 

Veuillez  agreer,  Monsieur  le  President,  1 'assurance  de 
ma  haute  consideration. 

[Signed]  G.  Clemenceau. 

Monsieur  le  President  Wilson, 
President  des  Etats-Unis  d'Amerique. 

28th  of  March,  1919. 

General  Observations  on  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  Note 
OF  March  26th. 

1.  The  French  Government  is  in  complete  accord  with 
the  general  purpose  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  note:  that  is 
to  say,  to  make  a  durable  and  consequently  a  just  peace. 

It  does  not  believe,  on  the  other  hand,  that  the  principle 
which  it  shares,  really  leads  to  the  conclusions  drawn  by 
the  note  in  question. 

2.  The  note  suggests  that  moderate  territorial  condi- 
tions should  be  imposed  upon  Germany  in  Europe  in  order 
not  to  leave  a  profound  feeling  of  resentment  after  peace. 

This  method  might  have  value,  if  the  late  war  had  been 

249 


250        ^YOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

for  Germany  a  European  war.  This,  however,  was  not 
the  case.  Before  the  w^ar  Germany  was  a  great  naval 
power  whose  future  lay  upon  the  water.  This  world 
power  was  Germany's  pride;  she  will  not  console  herself 
for  having  lost  it. 

But,  without  being  deterred  by  the  fear  of  such  resent- 
ment, all  of  her  colonies,  her  entire  navy,  a  great  part  of 
her  commercial  fleet  (as  a  form  of  reparation),  and  her 
foreign  markets  over  which  she  held  sway,  have  been 
taken  from  her,  or  will  be  taken  from  her.  Thus  the  blow 
which  she  will  feel  the  most  is  dealt  her,  and  people  think 
that  she  can  be  appeased  by  a  certain  amelioration  of  terri- 
torial conditions.  This  is  a  pure  illusion  and  the  remedy 
is  not  proportionate  to  the  evil. 

If  a  means  of  satisfying  Germany  is  sought,  it  should 
not  be  sought  in  Germany.  This  kind  of  conciliation  will 
be  idle,  in  case  Germany  is  severed  from  her  world  policy. 
If  it  is  necessary  to  appease  her  she  should  be  offered 
colonial  satisfaction,  naval  satisfaction  or  satisfaction  with 
regard  to  her  commercial  expansion.  The  note  of  the 
26th  of  March,  however,  only  takes  into  account  European 
territorial  satisfaction. 

3.  The  note  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George  fears  that  too  severe 
territorial  conditions  will  be  playing  the  game  of  Bolshe- 
vism in  Germany.  Is  it  not  to  be  feared  that  the  method 
suggested  will  have  precisely  this  result? 

The  conference  has  decided  to  call  to  life  a  certain  num- 
ber of  new  states.  Can  the  Conference,  without  commit- 
ting an  injustice,  sacrifice  them,  out  of  consideration  for 
Germany,  by  imposing  upon  them  inacceptable  frontiers.'^ 

If  these  peoples,  especially  Poland  and  Bohemia,  have 
been  able  to  resist  Bolshevism  up  to  now,  it  is  because  of 
a  sense  of  nationality.  If  violence  is  done  to  this  senti- 
ment, Bolshevism  will  find  these  two  peoples  an  easy  prey, 
and  the  only  barrier  which  at  the  present  moment  exists 
between  Russian  Bolshevism  and  German  Bolshevism 
will  be  shattered. 

The  result  will  be  either  a  confederation  of  Eastern  and 
Central  Europe  under  the  domination  of  a  Bolshevist 
Germany,  or  the  enslavement  of  the  same  countries  by  a 


LLOYD  GEORGE'S  MEMORANDUM  OF  MARCH  26       251 

reactionary  Germany,  thanks  to  the  general  anarchy.  In 
both  cases,  the  Allies  will  have  lost  the  war.  On  the  con- 
trary, the  policy  of  the  French  Government  is  resolutely 
to  aid  these  young  peoples  with  the  support  of  the  liberal 
elements  in  Europe,  and  not  to  seek  at  their  expense,  in- 
effectual attenuations  of  the  colonial,  naval  and  commer- 
cial disaster  inflicted  upon  Germany  by  the  Peace.  If  one 
is  obliged,  in  giving  to  these  young  peoples  frontiers  with- 
out which  they  cannot  live,  to  transfer  to  their  sovereignty 
the  sons  of  the  very  Germans  who  have  enslaved  them, 
it  is  to  be  regretted  and  it  must  be  done  with  moderation, 
but  it  cannot  be  avoided. 

Moreover,  while  one  deprives  Germany  totally  and 
definitely  of  her  colonies,  because  she  maltreated  the 
indigenous  population,  by  what  right  can  one  refuse  to 
give  Poland  and  Bohemia  normal  frontiers  because  the 
Germans  have  installed  themselves  upon  Polish  and 
Bohemian  soil  as  guarantors  of  oppressive  pan-Ger- 
manism ? 

4.  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  note  insists — ^and  the  French 
Government  is  in  agreement — upon  the  necessity  of 
making  a  peace  which  shall  seem  to  Germany  to  be  a 
just  peace.  But  in  view  of  German  mentality,  it  is  not 
sure  that  justice  is  conceived  by  the  Germans  as  it  is 
conceived  by  the  Allies. 

Furthermore,  it  should  not  be  forgotten  that  this 
impression  of  justice  must  be  obvious  not  only  to  the 
enemy,  but  also  and  principally  to  the  Allies.  The 
Allies  who  have  fought  side  by  side  must  terminate 
the  war  with  an  equitable  peace.  But  what  would  be  the 
results  of  following  the  method  suggested  by  the  note  of 
March  26th  .^  A  certain  number  of  total  and  definitive 
guarantees  will  be  acquired  by  maritime  nations  which 
have  not  known  an  invasion.  The  surrender  of  the 
German  colonies  would  be  total  and  definitive.  The 
surrender  of  the  German  navy  would  be  total  and  de- 
finitive. The  surrender  of  a  large  portion  of  the  German 
merchant  fleet  would  be  total  and  definite.  The  ex- 
clusion of  Germany  from  foreign  markets  would  be  total 
and   would   last   for   some   time.     On   the   other   hand. 


252        WOODROW  ^VILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

partial  and  temporary  solutions  would  be  reserved  for 
the  continental  countries,  that  is  to  say  those  which  have 
suffered  most  from  the  war.  The  reduced  frontiers 
suggested  for  Poland  and  Bohemia  would  be  partial 
solutions.  The  defensive  agreement  offered  to  France 
for  the  protection  of  her  territory  would  be  a  temporary 
solution.  The  proposed  regime  for  the  coal  fields  of  the 
Sarre  would  be  temporary.  Here  we  have  a  condition  of 
inequality  which  might  risk  leaving  a  bad  impression 
upon  the  after-war  relations  between  the  Allies,  more 
important  than  the  after-war  relations  between  Germany 
and  the  Allies. 

In  Paragraph  1  it  has  been  demonstrated  that  it  is 
vain  to  hope  by  territorial  concessions  to  find  sufficient 
compensation  for  Germany  for  the  world  disaster  which 
she  has  undergone.  It  may  be  permitted  to  add  that  it 
would  be  an  injustice  to  impose  the  burden  of  these 
compensations  upon  those  of  the  Allies  who  have  felt 
the  weight  of  the  war  most  heavily. 

These  countries,  after  the  expenses  of  war,  cannot 
incur  the  expenses  of  peace.  It  is  essential  that  they  also 
should  have  the  sensation  of  a  just  and  equitable  peace. 
In  default  of  this,  it  is  not  alone  in  Central  Europe  that 
Bolshevism  is  to  be  feared,  for  no  field  can  be  more 
favourable  to  its  propagation,  it  has  been  well  noted,  than 
the  field  of  national  disappointment. 

5.  For  the  moment,  the  French  Government  desires 
to  limit  itself  to  observations  of  a  general  nature. 

It  renders  full  credit  to  the  intentions  which  have 
inspired  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  memorandum.  But  it  be- 
lieves that  the  deductions  made  in  the  present  note  are  in 
harmony  with  justice  and  with  general  interest  of  all. 

The  French  Government  will  be  inspired  by  these 
considerations  in  the  forthcoming  meetings  when  the 
terms  suggested  by  the  British  Prime  Minister  are 
discussed. 


Document  29. 

Bernard  M.  Baruch's  letter  to  President  Wilson 
of  April  9,  arguing  against  French  ownership  of 
the  coal  mines  of  the  Saar  (typewritten  copy). 

Hotel  de  Crillon,  Paris, 
April  9,  1919. 
My  dear  Mr.  President: — 

The  proposed  arrangement  by  which  the  French  would 
own  the  coal  mines  in  the  Sarre  Valley,  while  the  territory 
itself  would  remain  German,  would,  in  my  opinion,  be  a 
constant  source  of  turmoil  and  unending  friction.  A 
solution  is  possible  through  making  a  distribution  of  the 
product  of  the  Sarre  Valley  as  one  item  in  the  general 
allocation  of  coal  from  Germany  to  France,  as  a  part  of 
the  reparation  adjustment. 

So  long  as  the  Sarre  mines  exist,  the  French  are  en- 
titled to  the  delivery  of  that  quantity  of  coal  from  the 
Sarre  Basin  that  has  been  used  in  Alsace-Lorraine,  and  as 
much  more  as  they  desire  to  use,  which  can  be  produced 
from  the  Sarre  mines  without  interference  with  the  present 
German  industrial  and  civil  life,  which  is  now  dependent 
upon  this.  The  French  are  now  asking  for  twenty-seven 
millions  additional  tons  of  coal  in  substitution  for  that 
which  was  produced  from  the  Lens  and  Pas  de  Calais 
fields,  and  are  quite  willing  to  accept  that  solution. 
There  seems  to  be  no  reason  why  the  same  thing  should 
not  be  done  in  the  case  of  the  Sarre  Valley.  The  following 
is  my  recommendation. 

1.  Germany  should  be  required  to  deliver  to  France 
seven  million  tons  a  year,  the  amount  which  France  im- 
ported annually  before  the  war. 

2.  Germany  should  be  required  to  supply  to  France  an 
amount  of  coal  sufficient  to  make  up  the  deficit  in  the 

253 


254         WOODROW  WILSON  .VXD  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

normal  production  of  the  Lens  and  Pas  de  Calais  fields 
during  the  period  of  their  restoration.  The  complete 
restoration  of  the  mines  should  require  not  to  exceed  five 
years. 

3.  During  the  life  of  the  Sarre  mines  Germany  should 
be  required  to  sell  the  same  amount  of  coal  she  has  here- 
tofore sold  to  territories  that  have  now  become  French, 
France  having  the  option  to  receive  a  percentage  of  the 
increased  production  of  the  Sarre,  which  its  present  de- 
mands bear  to  the  total  production. 

It  is  well  to  note  that  the  German  metallurgical  in- 
dustries in  the  Sarre  Valley,  as  w^ell  as  many  of  the  gas 
worjvs  of  Southern  Germany,  are  dependent  upon  the 
coal  of  the  Valley  of  the  Sarre.  Therefore,  the  ownership 
of  these  mines  by  the  French  could  be  used  to  handicap 
these  industries  and  greatly  disturb  the  economic  life. 
It  should  also  be  noted  that  the  steel  mills  in  the  Sarre 
Valley  and  adjacent  German  territory  are  dependent 
upon  the  iron  ores  from  Lorraine,  which  is  now  French 
territory.  This  furnishes  the  French  with  a  powerful 
weapon  for  trading. 

The  Germans  might,  with  equal  justice,  demand  an 
ownership  in  the  iron  mines  of  Lorraine  for  the  protection 
of  their  industries  which  have  heretofore  been  supplied 
from  this  source  and  from  which  a  large  amount  must 
come  for  reparational  purposes. 

A  solution  of  the  Sarre  Valley -Lorraine  problem  would 
be  a  reciprocal  arrangement,  whereby  Germany  would  be 
required  to  fiiTnish  the  same  percentage  of  the  coal  out- 
put that  has  heretofore  been  used  in  Lorraine,  and  the 
French,  in  turn,  be  required  to  furnish  to  Germany  the 
same  percentage  of  the  iron  ore  output  that  had  previously 
been  distributed  to  the  territory  that  still  remams  in  Ger- 
many. 

Very  sincerely  yours, 

Bernard  M.  Baruch. 

The  President  of  the  United  States, 

1 1  Place  des  Etats-Unis, 

Paris. 


Document  30. 

Letter  of  P.  B.  Noyes,  American  Delegate, 
Inter-Allied  Rhineland  Commission  to  President 
Wilson,  sharply  criticizing  the  proposed  arrange- 
ments for  the  "Left  Bank." 

Appendix  IV  to  C.  F.  Jf,l. 

AMERICAN  COMMISSION  TO  NEGOTIATE  PEACE. 

Paris,  May  27,  1919. 
Honorable  Woodrow  Wilson, 

President  of  the  United  States  of  America, 
11,  Place  des  Etats-Unis,  Paris. 

Dear  Sir: 

After  a  month  spent  in  the  Rhineland  as  American 
Commissioner  I  feel  there  is  a  d^anger  that  a  disastrous 
mistake  will  be  made.  The  "Convention"  for  the  gov- 
ernment of  those  territories,  as  drafted  by  the  military 
representatives  of  the  Supreme  War  Council  on  May 
eleventh,  is  more  brutal,  I  believe,  than  even  its  authors 
desire  upoiL  second  thought.  It  provides  for  unendurable 
oppression  of  six  million  people  during  a  period  of  years. 

This  "Convention"  is  not  likely  to  be  adopted  without 
great  modification.  What  alarms  me,  however,  is  that 
none  of  the  revisions  of  this  document  which  I  have  seen 
recognize  that  its  basic  principle  is  bad — that  the  quarter- 
ing of  an  enemy  army  in  a  country  as  its  master  in  time  of 
peace  and  the  billeting  of  tToops  on  the  civil  population 
will  insure  hatred  and  ultimate  disaster. 

I  have  discussed  this  matter  at  length  with  the  Ameri- 
can Commanders  of  the  Army  of  Occupation;  men  who 
have  seen  "military  occupation"  at  close  range  for  six 
months.  These  Officers  emphatically  indorse  the  above 
statements.     They  say  that  an  occupying  army,  even  one 

255 


2JG         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

with  the  best  of  intentions,  is  guilty  of  outrages  and  that 
mutual  irritation,  in  spite  of  every  effort  to  the  contrary, 
grows  apace.  Force  and  more  force  must  ine^^tably  be 
the  history  of  such  occupation  long  continued. 

Forgetting  the  apparent  ambitions  of  tlie  French  and 
possibly  overlooking  political  limitations,  I  have  sketched 
below  a  plan  which  seems  to  me  the  maximum  for  military 
domination  in  the  Rhineland  after  the  signing  of  peace. 
Our  Army  Commanders  and  others  who  have  studied  the 
subject  on  the  ground  agree  with  this  programme: 

SKELETON    PLAN. 

I.  As  few  troops  as  possible  concentrated  in  barracks 
or   reserve   areas    with   no  "billeting,"  excepting 
possibly  for  officers. 
II,  Complete  self-government  for  the  territory  with  the 
exceptions  below. 
III.  A  Civil  Commission  with  powers: — 

(a)  To  make  regulations  or  change  old  ones  when- 

ever German  law  or  actions — 

(1)  Threaten   the  carrying  out   of  Treaty 

terms,  or — 

(2)  Threaten    the   comfort   or   security   of 

troops. 

(b)  To  authorize  the  army  to  take  control  under 

martial  law,  either  in  danger  spots  or 
throughout  the  territory  whenever  condi- 
tions seem  to  them  to  make  this  neces- 
sary. 

Very  truly  yours, 

[Signed]     P.  B.  No  yes. 

American  Delegate, 

Inter-Allied  Rhineland  Commission. 


PART  VI 
THE  ITALIAN  CRISIS 


Document  31. 

Basic  Recommendation  of  American  Experts, 
January  21,  1919,  regarding  Italian  boundary 
settlements. 

OUTLINE  OF  TENTATIVE  REPORT  AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS. 

Prepared  by  the  Intelligence  Section,  in  accordance  with 
instructions,  for  the  President  and  the  Plenipotentiaries 
January  21,  1919. 

Italy. 

It  is  recommended: 

1.  That  Italy  be  given  a  northern  frontier  midway  be- 
tween the  linguistic  line  and  the  line  of  the  treaty  of 
London,  1915.  The  proposed  line  is  delimited  on  maps 
12  to  15  inclusive. 

2.  That  Italy's  eastern  frontier  be  rectified  as  shown  on 
map  15. 

3.  That  consideration  be  given  the  doubtful  claim  of 
Italy  to  a  sphere  of  influence  at  Avlona. 

Jf.  That  Rhodes  and  the  Dodecanese  be  assigned  to 
Greece. 

5.  That  Libya  be  given  a  hinterland  adequate  for 
access  to  the  Sudan  and  its  trade,  but  so  limited  as  not 
to  hamper  the  French  colonial  domain  or  the  Anglo- 
Egyptian  Sudan. 

DISCUSSION. 

1.  It  is  recommended  that  Italy  be  given  a  northern 
frontier  midway  between  the  linguistic  line  and  the  line 
of  the  treaty  of  London,  1915.  The  proposed  line  is  de- 
limited on  maps  12  to  15  inclusive. 

This  recommendation  would  give  Italy  all  that  part 
of  the  T\^rol  to  which  she  has  any  just  claim  on  linguistic, 
cultural,  or  historical  grounds.     It  would  leave  no  rational 

259 


2G0         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

basis  for  future  irredentist  agitation  in  this  direction.  It 
transfers  to  Italy  over  10,000  square  kilometers  of  terri- 
tory and  a  population  consisting  of  373,000  Italians  and 
Ladins,  161,000  Germans,  and  3,000  others. 

The  recommended  line  does  not  meet  those  claims  of 
Italy  which  are  based  on  strategic  grounds  alone,  for  the 
line  of  1915,  following  as  it  does  the  main  watershed, 
gives  incomparably  the  best  strategic  frontier.  On  the 
other  hand,  the  proposed  line  does  ameliorate  the  in- 
tentionally bad  frontier  imposed  upon  Italy  by  Austria, 
and  some  such  amelioration  seems  essential  if  the  Italians 
are  to  enter  a  League  of  Nations  with  confidence  in  its 
ability  to  render  their  peaceful  existence  reasonably  sure. 
The  weight  of  this  argument  would  be  augmented  if 
Italy  were  confronted  by  a  united  and  potentially  power- 
ful German  state  on  the  north.  The  task  of  the  League 
of  Nations  will  be  rendered  easier  and  its  success  made 
more  certain  by  the  adjustment  of  Italy's  northern 
frontier  at  least  in  part  along  lines  which  would  discourage 
armed  aggression  by  a  powerful  German  state. 

As  laid  down  upon  the  map  the  proposed  boundary  is 
a  good  line  from  the  geographical  standpoint,  since  it 
follows  natural  lines  of  demarcation  and  coincides  with 
the  marked  topographical  barrier  between  regions  cli- 
matically dissimilar.  Its  position  is  easily  recognizable 
on  the  ground,  it  is  capable  of  clear  and  accurate  delimi- 
tation, and  is  not  subject  to  change  from  natural  causes. 
Since  throughout  its  entire  length  it  traverses  regions  of 
little  or  no  population  it  does  not  interfere  with  the 
activities  of  the  local  population,  and  the  small  number  of 
practicable  passes  make  the  administration  of  customs  and 
other  frontier  regulations  simple. 

Finally,  it  is  so  drawn  as  to  throw  into  Austria  about 
71,000  Germans,  with  a  minority  of  10,000  Italians  and 
Ladins,  forming  properly  a  part  of  the  Austrian  realm. 
Were  the  line  of  1915  to  be  followed  (red  line  on  map  13), 
it  would  simply  throw  the  irredentist  problem  into 
Austrian  territory  and  would  not  lead  to  a  lasting  peace. 

2.  It  is  recommended  that  Italy's  eastern  frontier  be 
rectified  as  shown  on  map  15. 


AMERICAN  EXPERTS  ON  ITALIAN  SETTLEMENTS      261 

The  Jugo-Slav  boundary  in  the  Istria-Isonzo  region  is 
the  subject  of  hot  dispute  because  both  the  Jugo-Slavs 
and  the  ItaHans  are  eager  for  the  possession  of  the  eastern 
Adriatic  littoral  and  its  ports.  The  commercial  and 
strategic  advantages  accruing  to  the  possessor  are  ob- 
vious. 

The  proposed  boundary  coincides  in  general  with  the 
main  watershed  of  the  Carnic  and  Julian  Alps,  and 
follows  the  crest  of  the  high  ridge  forming  the  backbone  of 
the  Istrian  peninsula.  It  gives  to  Italy  all  of  that  portion 
of  the  Isonzo  basin  and  of  the  eastern  Adriatic  coast  to 
which  she  has  any  valid  claim,  together  with  as  much  of 
the  hinterland,  peopled  by  Slavs,  as  is  vitally  needed  on 
economic  grounds.  It  gives  to  the  Jugo-Slavs  part  of 
the  Istrian  coast  and  all  of  the  Dalmatian  coast  and  archi- 
pelago claimed  by  Italy,  with  a  fine  series  of  harbors 
from  Fiume  southward. 

The  proposed  division  would  add  6,680  square  kilo- 
meters to  Italy  and  a  population  of  715,000,  consisting 
of  345,000  Italians  and  370,000  Jugo-Slavs.  In  Jugo- 
Slav  territor}^  there  would  be  left  75,000  Italians,  a  very 
small  number  as  compared  with  the  number  of  Jugo- 
Slavs  in  Italy.  The  Jugo-Slavs  would  be  left  in  un- 
disturbed possession  of  a  stretch  of  coast  upon  which 
their  hopes  have  centered  for  years,  and  where  the 
Italian  claim  to  majorities  is  unsubstantiated,  except  in 
the  case  of  several  of  the  coast  towns,  such  as  Fiume  and 
Zara — there  is  a  small  Italian  majority*  in  Fiume  proper, 
but  a  small  Croat  majority  if  the  suburb  of  Susak,  in 
fact  a  part  of  Fiume,  be  added. 

The  retention  of  Fiume  by  Jugo-Slavia  is  vital  to  the 
interests  of  the  latter,  and  likewise  assures  to  the  more 
remote  hinterland,  including  Austria  and  Hungary,  the 
advantages  of  two  competing  ports  under  the  control  of 
different  nations. 

Italy  is  accorded  on  the  east  as  much  natural  protection 
as  can  be  permitted  without  giving  undue  weight  to 
strategic  considerations.  As  defined  the  line  affords 
reasonable   protection   for   Trieste   and   Pola   and   their 

*Relative  majority. 


262         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

connecting  railway,  and  in  fact  would  leave  the  Jugo- 
slavs in  a  position  of  military  inferiority  if  they  did  not 
have  a  protective  mountainous  terrain  and  one  of  the 
best  coasts  in  the  world  for  defensive  naval  operations. 
For  almost  its  entire  length  the  boundary  follows  water- 
sheds on  high  and  sparsely  settled  plateaus.  It  is  not 
without  at  least  remote  historical  basis,  since  it  follows 
the  frontier  between  Italy  and  the  Provinces  as  it  existed 
for  several  centuries  during  the  Roman  period. 

3.  It  is  recommended  that  consideration  be  given  to 
the  doubtful  claim  of  Italy  to  a  sphere  of  influence  at 
Avlona. 

Probably  Italy  must  be  left  in  Avlona  and  its  imme- 
diately adjacent  territory,  not,  however,  as  the  final  pos- 
sessor of  the  region,  but  as  a  mandatory  of  the  League  of 
Nations.  In  this  manner  any  alleged  propagandist  move- 
ments may  be  reviewed  and  restrictions  imposed  in  har- 
mony with  the  spirit  of  the  time  in  which  they  arise. 
Otherwise  there  will  be  left  in  both  the  northern  and 
southern  ends  of  Jugo-Slavia  regions  of  conflict  between 
two  neighbouring  peoples,  the  Jugo-Slavs  and  the  Italians, 
from  which  there  could  result  only  continued  discord  and 
possible  war. 

-4.  It  is  recommended  that  Rhodes  and  the  Dodecanese 
be  assigned  to  Greece. 

Over  80  per  cent,  of  the  population  of  Rhodes  and  the 
Dodecanese  are  Greek  Orthodox.  They  are  bitterly  op- 
posed to  the  present  Italian  occupation,  and  should  be 
assigned  to  the  mother  country. 

5.  It  is  recommended  that  Libya  be  given  a  hinterland 
adequate  for  access  to  the  Sudan  and  its  trade,  but  so 
limited  as  not  to  hamper  the  French  colonial  domain  or 
the  Anglo-Egyptian  Sudan. 

The  need  for  such  a  hinterland  is  evident,  and  with  the 
limitations  mentioned  it  is  fair  to  satisfy  this  need.  The 
proposed  action  would  no  doubt  be  agreeable  to  France 
and  Great  Britain. 


Document  32. 

Memorandum,  March  18,  of  four  American 
experts,  regarding  Italian  claims  to  Dalmatia  and 
Fiume,  reaffirming  their  recommendation  that 
"Fiume  and  all  Dalmatia  shall  go  to  the  Jugo- 
slavs"    (carbon  copy). 

18  March  1919. 
Memorandum. 

From:     Chiefs   of   the   Austro-Hungarian   Division,   the 

Balkan  Division,  the  Italian  Division  and  the 

Division   of   Boundary    Geography,    Section    of 

Territorial,  Political  and  Economic  Intelligence. 

To:         The  Commissioners. 

Re:         Dalmatia  and  Fiume. 

The  Italians,  in  their  memorandum  presented  to  the 
Council  of  Ten  on  11  March  1919,  demand: 

1 — That  part  of  Dalmatia  granted  to  them  by  the 
Treaty  of  London,  and,  in  addition, 

2 — Dalmatia  as  far  south  as  Spalato, 

3 — Fiume  and  the  adjacent  district. 

Every  memorandum  hitherto  submitted  to  the  Com- 
missioners, about  which  any  of  the  heads  of  the  above- 
named  divisions  have  been  consulted,  recommends  that 
Fiume  and  all  of  Dalmatia  should  go  to  the  Jugo-Slavs. 
We  are  still  unanimously  of  that  opinion  for  the  reasons 
here  set  forth. 

I.      DALMATIA. 

1.  The  population  of  that  portion  of  Dalmatia  de- 
manded by  Italy  was  divided  linguistically  in  1910,  as 
follows:  406,100  Jugo-Slavs,  16,280  Italians.  The  town 
of  Zara  had  an  Italian  majority.  Elsewhere  there  was 
no  commune  in  all  Dalmatia  with  an  Italian  minority  as 
large  as  ten  percent  and  only  five  with  minorities  of  more 

2G3 


264         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

than  five  percent.  The  Austrian  statistics  may  do  some 
injustice  to  the  Itahans,  but  there  is  no  doubt  that  the 
Itahans  are  hnguistically  in  a  negligible  minority.  Though 
in  Alsace-Lorraine  language  may  not  be  a  good  index  of 
nationality,  it  is  in  Dalmatia.  There  can  be  little  doubt 
that  the  national  sympathies  of  an  overwhelming  majority 
of  the  population  are  Jugo-Slav.  The  Jugo-Slavs,  more- 
over, have  been  settled  in  Dalmatia  for  over  twelve 
centuries,  and  for  several  centuries  they  have  occupied 
the  largest  part  of  the  province.  They  are  not  a  recent 
importation  of  the  Austrian  government,  as  the  Italian 
memorandum  implies. 

2.  Italy  has  no  "historic  right "  to  Dalmatia.  Trent  and 
Trieste  with  their  adjacent  lands  were  integral  parts  of  Italy 
in  Roman  days,  but  Dalmatia  was  not.  Dalmatia  was 
merely  a  Roman  province,  as  were  also  France  and  England. 
In  the  middle  ages,  Venice  began  to  establish  dominion 
over  the  cities  of  the  coast,  but  her  control  never  extended 
far  inland,  except  during  the  last  century  of  her  rule. 

3.  Dalmatia  is  not  now  important  as  a  commercial 
outlet  for  the  interior  east  of  the  mountainous  coast.  It 
was  the  Austrian  policy  to  prevent  the  construction  of 
railways  across  the  mountains.  But  there  are  routes  by 
which  it  is  practicable  to  build  railroads  connecting  the 
interior  with  excellent  harbors  on  the  coast.  The  Slavs 
of  the  interior  would  have  every  incentive  to  build  rail- 
ways if  they  controlled  the  ports;  the  Italians  whose  in- 
terests in  Dalmatia  are  primarily  strategic  would  be  less 
likely  to  make  the  sacrifices  necessary  for  the  economic 
development  of  the  Slav  hinterland. 

4.  Italy  claims  Dalmatia  in  order  to  avoid  remaining 
in  a  state  of  permanent  strategic  inferiority.  It  should 
be  noted,  however,  that  Italian  naval  experts  (see  special 
memorandum  submitted  to  Colonel  House  by  Major 
Douglas  Johnson)  generally  agree  with  the  opinion  of  the 
U.  S.  Naval  Advisory  Staff  as  expressed  in  its  memoran- 
dum on  "Problems  of  Naval  Strategy,"  that  secure  pos- 
session of  Valona,  Pola  and  a  base  in  an  island  group  near 
the  central  Adriatic,  would  give  to  Italy  effective  control 
of  that  sea. 


MEMORANDUM  OF  FOUR  AMERICAN  EXPERTS         265 
II      FIUME. 

1.  In  Fiume  and  the  adjacent  district  the  majority  is 
also  Jugo-Slav.  The  Itahan  memorandum  does  not  de- 
hmit  the  district  exactly,  but,  assuming  the  smallest 
proportions  admitted  by  the  description,  it  contained  in 
1910  a  population  of  87,248  of  whom  24,870  were  Italians 
and  48,886  Jugo-Slavs.  The  whole  surrounding  hinter- 
land was  solidly  Jugo-Slav. 

2.  For  economic  reasons  it  is  essential,  if  Trieste  goes 
to  Italy,  that  Fiume  should  go  to  Jugo-Slavia. 

(a)  No  other  port  could  be  developed  except  at  great 
cost,  and  no  other  port  could  handle  the  commerce  of  the 
Jugo-Slav  State  as  advantageously  as  Fiume.  Of  the 
Croatian  coast  Cholnoky,  the  Hungarian  geographer 
rightly  says:  "No  baj^s  suitable  for  modern  shipping  are 
open."  Dalmatian  ports  could  not  be  utilized  until  con- 
necting railways  had  been  built,  and  they  could  never 
supply  to  advantage  the  commercial  needs  of  the  northern 
part  of  the  Jugo-Slav  State. 

(b)  Fiume  is  in  no  way  an  economic  necessity  to  Italy. 
The  port's  commercial  hinterland  is  on  the  eastern  side  of 
the  Adriatic.  Fiume  in  Italian  hands  would  probably 
have  its  development  sacrificed  to  that  of  Trieste. 

(c)  The  commercial  interests  of  Central  Europe  should 
be  a  primary  consideration  in  determining  the  disposition 
of  Fiume.  These  interests  would  be  safeguarded  better 
by  the  competition  that  would  result  from  the  assignment 
of  Trieste  to  Italy  and  Fiume  to  the  Jugo-Slavs  than  in 
any  other  way. 

We  are  unanimously  of  the  opinion  that  neither  Fiume  nor 
any  part  of  Dalmatia  (with  the  possible  exception  of  Lissa 
and  its  neighboring  islets)  should  be  assigned  to  Italy. 
Charles  Seymour 

Chief  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Division. 
Clive  Day 

Chief  of  the  Balkan  Division. 
W.   E.   LUNT 

Chief  of  the  Italian  Division. 
Douglas  W.  Johnson 

Chief  of  the  Division  of  Boundary-Geography. 


Document  33. 

Memorandum,  April  4,  of  five  American  ex- 
perts to  President  Wilson,  regarding  disposition 
of  Fiume  ad\'ising  that  "it  is  unwise  to  make 
Fiume  a  free  city,"  with  memorandum  on  the 
legal  aspects  of  the  situation  by  David  Hunter 
Miller  (autographed  originals). 

AMERICAN  COMMISSION  TO  NEGOTIATE  PEACE. 

April  4,  1919. 

From:  Chiefs  of  the  Italian  Division,  the  Balkan  Divi- 
sion, the  Austro-Hungarian  Division,  the  Division 
of  Boundary  Geography,  and  the  Division  of 
Economics. 

To:         President  Wilson. 

Subject:  Disposition  of  Fiume. 

The  following  statement  of  facts  and  opinions  is 
respectfully  submitted  for  the  President's  considera- 
tion: 

1.  The  port  of  Fiume  is  vitally  necessary  to  the  eco- 

nomic life  of  Jugo-Slavia. 

2.  It  has  no  economic  significance  for  Italy,  except  as 

its  development  would  prevent  Italy  from  con- 
trolling trade  which  might  otherwise  be  artifi- 
cially deflected  to  Trieste. 

3.  The  large  business  interests  of  Fiume,  the  banking 

houses,  and  the  shipping  are  mainly  in  Hungarian 
and  Jugo-Slav  hands.  Italian  capital  did  not 
develop  the  port.  The  Italians  constitute  the 
small  traders  and  shop  keepers  and  to  some  ex- 
tent the  professional  classes. 

266 


AMERICAN  EXPERTS  ON  DISPOSITION  OF  FIUME      267 

^.  According  to  the  last  official  census  the  Italians 
constituted  only  a  plurality  of  the  population  of 
Fiume,  even  when  its  artificial  separation  from 
the  Slavic  Susak  is  maintained. 

5.  The  Italian  plurality  in  the  restricted  Fiume: 

(a)  If    of   recent    development    (Since    1880    or 

1890). 

(b)  Includes  an  unknown  but  considerable  num- 

ber who  have  not  given  up  Italian  citizen- 
ship. 

(c)  Has  probably  resulted  from  artificial  encour- 

agement by  the  Hungarian  government, 
which   had   a   comprehensible  interest   in 
^  developing  an   alien   rather  than  a  Slav 

majority  in  the  city. 
Q.  The  Italian  agitation  in  favor  of  annexing  Fiume  is 
only  a  few  months  old.  Last  summer  it  was 
generally  admitted  in  high  Italian  circles  that 
Fiume  would  and  should  go  to  Jugo-Slavia. 
In  view  of  the  foregoing  consideration  the  American 
specialists  are  unanimously  of  the  opinion: 

1.  That  Fiume  should  he  given  to  the  Jugo-Slav  State 
without  restriction. 

This  solution  is  the  only  one  which  in  our  opin- 
ion will  prove  attractive  at  the  same  time  to  Jugo- 
Slav  capital  and  to  outside  capital  (Hungarian, 
Czecho-Slovak,  etc.);  it  will  best  serve  the  vital 
economic  interests  of  both  city  and  state;  and  in 
view  of  the  facts  regarding  the  nature  and  origin  of 
the  Italian  population,  it  seems  to  us  the  most  just 
morally. 

2.  That  the  interests  of  the  Italian  minority  of  greater 
Fiume  should  be  assured  by  the  establishment  of  adequate 
guarantees  for  protection. 

Similar  guarantees  should  be  extended,  in  a  spirit  of 
equality  and  justice,  to  the  other  Italian  minorities 
in  Jugo-Slavia,  and  to  the  much  larger  Slavic  mi- 
norities in  Trieste  and  other  areas  transferred  to 
Italy  by  the  recommended  new  frontier. 

3.  That  it  is  unwise  to  make  of  Flume  a  free  city. 


268         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

Our  unanimity  of  opinion  on  this  point  is  due  to  the 
approximate  equahty  of  the  two   antagonistic  ele- 
ments of  the  population,  the  testimony  of  observers 
as  to  the  inability  of  the  Italians  of  Fiume  properly 
to  administer  the  port,  the  justified  sensitiveness  of 
the  Slavs  toward  any  infringement  of  sovereignty  over 
their  only  good  port  and  chief  commercial  city,  and 
the    serious    economic    and    political    disadvantages 
which    such    infringement   would   entail    under   the 
peculiar  physical  conditions  which  obtain  at  Fiume. 
(See  attached  letter  by  Mr.  Miller.) 
^.   That  if  for  reasons  not  connected  with  the  best  in- 
terests of  the  city  and  its  hinterland  it  is  deemed  necessary 
that  Fiume  be  made  a  free  city,  its  right  of  local  self-govern- 
ment should  be  accompanied  by  the  following  safe-guards 
of  the  interests  of  the  Jugo-Slav  State: 

a.  The  moles,  docks,  basins  and  other  instrumen- 
talities of  the  port  must  be  under  Jugo-Slav  sover- 
eignty as  well  as  Jugo-Slav  ownership,  and  it  must  be 
possible  for  the  Jugo-Slavs  to  acquire  the  land  and 
other  property  needed  for  their  extension. 

b.  The  railways  and  other  means  of  communication 
with  the  interior,  (e.  g.,  telephones,  telegraphs,  and 
postal  service)  must  likewise  be  under  Jugo-Slav 
control. 

c.  There  must  be  no  discrimination  with  respect 
to  political  and  economic  rights  of  any  kind,  nor 
with  respect  to  schools  and  churches. 

d.  The  city  (except  for  a  possible  free  port)  must 
be  included  within  the  Slav  customs  frontier. 

e.  The  organization  of  the  city  must  be  such  as  to 
abolish  the  present  artificial  division  of  the  port  into 
two  parts. 

These  safe-guards  are  necessary  :(1)  To  ensure  conditions 
of  sufficient  stability  to  justify  expenditures  by  the  govern- 
ment and  by  Jugo-Slav  and  foreign  private  capitalists 
for  the  improvement  and  development  of  the  port ;  (2)  To 
prevent  Italian  interference  with  the  development  of  the 
port  and  with  its  full  use;  (3)  To  give  the  Slavs  a  fair 
opportunity  to  achieve  a  position  in  the  industrial  and 


AMERICAN  EXPERTS  ON  DISPOSITION  OF  FIUME      2G9 

political  life  of  the  community  strong  enough  to  safe- 
guard their  vital  interests. 

[Signed]  W.  E.  Lunt 

Chief  of  the  Italian  Division. 
Clive  Day 

Chief  of  the  Balkan  Division, 
Charles  Seymour 

Chief  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Division. 
Douglas  Johnson 

Chief  of  the  Division  of  Boundary  Geography. 
Allyn  a.  Young 

Chief  of  the  Division  of  Economics. 


AMERICAN  COMMISSION  TO  NEGOTIATE  PEACE 
OFFICE  OF  TECHNICAL  ADVISORS. 

6  April,  1919. 
Dear  Major  Johnson: 

In  our  conversation  yesterday  you  asked  my  views  as 
to  the  creation  of  an  independent  territory  comprising, 
with  certain  exceptions,  the  districts  of  Fiume  and  Susak 
under  the  hypothesis  that  the  territory  surrounding  these 
districts  was  entirely  within  the  limits  of  Jugo-Slavia, 
and  under  the  further  hypothesis  that  the  entire  port 
facilities  of  Fiume  as  well  as  any  land  necessary  for  their 
extension  would  likewise  be  under  the  sovereignty  of 
Jugo-Slavia,  and  that  the  railroads  running  into  Fiume 
and  other  means  of  communication  with  the  interior, 
such  as  telephones,  telegraphs,  and  postal  service,  should 
be  under  the  control  of  Jugo-Slavia. 

I  do  not  doubt  that  such  an  arrangement  is  a  legal 
possibility,  but  there  are  certain  legal  questions  to  which 
attention  should  be  directed  as  they  involve  matters  of 
practical  importance. 

Under  the  hypothesis  the  territory  in  question  would  be 
independent  but  the  character  of  the  locus  is  such  as  to 
make  it  doubtful  whether  that  independence  could  be 
more  than  theoretical. 

From  the  maps  which  you  showed  me  it  appears  that 


270         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

what  I  will  call  the  proposed  "free  area"  while  of  very 
irregular  shape,  would  run  along  the  coast  for  ten  or 
twelve  miles,  extending  into  the  interior  for  a  very  short 
distance  except  in  the  center  of  the  strip  where  it  would 
be  perhaps  five  or  six  miles  wide,  and  even  from  this  area 
would  have  to  be  deducted  all  of  the  docks,  etc.,  which 
extend  over  most  although  not  all  of  the  waterfront. 
Furthermore,  the  control  of  the  railroads  by  Jugo-Slavia 
would  result  in  dividing  the  territory  to  be  administered 
in  the  free  area  into  three  parts:  the  first  what  may  be 
called  the  interior  on  the  land  side  of  the  railroad,  and  the 
other  two  small  strips  of  the  coast  between  the  railroad 
and  the  sea,  lying  on  either  side  of  the  docks. 

It  should  be  added  that  under  your  statement  of  the 
hypothesis  the  area  would  for  customs  purposes  be  part 
of  Jugo-Slavia,  and  that  the  population  of  the  area  is 
perhaps  60,000  persons,  of  whom  no  doubt  a  certain 
number  reside  in  the  portion  devoted  to  the  docks. 

Under  any  form  of  agreement  it  seems  to  me  that  the 
difficulties  of  the  administration  of  such  a  very  small 
area  as  an  independent  unit  would  be  enormous,  and  to 
be  successful  would  require  almost  complete  cooperation 
and  harmony  between  the  government  of  the  free  area 
and  the  government  of  Jugo-Slavia.  Take  for  example 
the  question  of  police.  The  jurisdiction  of  police  over 
the  docks,  etc.  would  necessarily  be  Jugo-Slav,  and  also 
similar  jurisdiction  over  the  railroads  and  their  appurte- 
nances, and  even  if  the  latter  were  not  technically  under 
the  sovereignty  but  only  under  the  control  of  Jugo- 
Slavia.  Thus  the  police  of  the  free  area  would  be  over 
three  distinct  pieces  of  territory  with  the  consequent 
necessity  of  free  passage  and  repassage  over  the  railroad. 

It  may  be  assumed,  although  you  did  not  so  state,  that 
there  is  one  water  supply  for  the  territory  which  would 
be  within  the  free  area,  and  for  the  docks,  etc.  Such  a 
water  supply  would  be  under  two  distinct  sovereignties 
and  yet  would  of  necessity  be  under  a  single  management ; 
indeed,  it  would  be  quite  important  to  determine  in 
making  such  an  agreement  where  the  source  of  the  water 
supply  of  Fiume  was  located,  for  if  this  source  is  in  the 


AMERICAN  EXl'ERTS  ON  DISPOSITION  OF  FIUME       271 

interior  outside  of  the  free  area  a  still  very  difficult  com- 
plication would  be  presented. 

Without  attempting  to  go  into  further  detail  I  may 
mention  that  somewhat  similar  questions  of  administra- 
tion would  be  presented  in  regard  to  the  protection  of 
health,  the  sewage  system,  the  prevention  of  fire,  and  the 
means  of  communication  between  the  two  areas. 

These  matters  are  not  mentioned  for  the  purpose  of 
expressing  any  opinion  upon  the  questions  of  policy  in- 
volved, but  chiefly,  as  you  suggest,  in  order,  if  such  an 
arrangement  is  to  be  made,  that  very  detailed  knowledge 
of  the  local  conditions  may  be  obtained  so  that  so  far  as 
possible  future  difficulties  may  be  foreseen  and  perhaps 
avoided. 

Very  sincerely  yours, 
[Signed]  David  Hunter  Miller. 

Major  Douglas  W.  Johnson 
Hotel  Crillon 
Paris. 


Document  34. 

Letter  of  Orlando  to  President  Wilson,  April 
3,  1919,  refusing  to  discuss  boundary  problems 
while  representatives  of  the  Croats  and  Slovenes 
were  present     (autographed  original). 

Il  Presidente 

del 
Consiglio  dei  Ministri. 

Paris,  April  3rd,  1919. 
Mr.  President, 

The  quite  unexpected  way  in  which  the  Italian  ques- 
tions came  up  for  discussion  to-day,  made  it  impossible 
to  examine  more  thoroughly  the  many  difficult  points, 
including  even  questions  of  procedure,  which  present 
themselves. 

I  had  not  been  able  to  come  to  an  understanding  with 
my  colleagues  on  the  Delegation,  nor  had  my  colleague, 
the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  Baron  Sonnino,  come  to 
the  meeting,  as  it  had  been  agreed  that  he  would  do,  and 
as  was  done  in  the  case  of  Mr.  Tardieu  when  the  problem 
of  the  French  frontiers  was  under  consideration. 

As  for  the  very  delicate  matter  of  giving  a  further 
hearing  to  the  representatives  of  the  Slovenes  and  Croats, 
■ — against  whom  Italy  has  been  at  war  for  four  years, — 
I  would  not  insist  against  it,  just  as  I  would  not  exclude 
the  advisability  of  giving  a  hearing  to  the  representatives 
of  any  other  enemy  people  on  whom  it  is  a  question  of 
imposing  conditions.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  as  no  such 
debate  has  yet  been  granted,  I  insist  in  thinking  it  ad- 
visable to  abstain  from  taking  part  in  a  meeting  which, 
as  things  stand,  must  necessarily  give  rise  to  debate. 

I  realize,  with  keen  regret,  that  my  absence  may  give 
rise  to  an  impression,  which  I  should  be  the  first  to  wish 

272 


ORLANDO  TO  PRESIDENT  WILSON,  APRIL  3,  1919       273 

to  avoid,  that  a  misunderstanding  has  arisen  between  the 
Itahan  Government  and  the  Alhed  and  Associated  Gov- 
ernments. I  think  however  that  such  an  impression  will 
not  be  given,  as  the  meeting  this  afternoon  is  not  the 
meeting  of  the  representatives  of  the  four  Powers,  but  a 
conversation  between  the  President  of  the  United  States 
and  the  Prime  Ministers  of  Great  Britain  and  France 
with  those  Gentlemen. 

I  earnestly  hope,  Mr.  President,  that  in  this  way  the 
reason  for  my  absence  will  be  seen  in  its  true  light,  i.  e. 
not  as  an  evidence  of  disagreement,  but  as  an  act  of  con- 
sideration towards  colleagues,  whose  wish  it  is  to  obtain 
all  the  data  available  in  order  to  form  their  own  opinion 
on  the  grave  matters  under  consideration. 
Believe  me, 

Mr.  President, 

Sincerely  yours, 

[Signed]  V.  L.  Orlando. 


Document  35. 

Memorandum  concerning  the  question  of  the 
Itahan  chiims  on  the  Adriatic,  presented  by 
President  Wilson  to  the  Itahan  delegation  on 
April  14,  with  permission  to  make  it  public  in 
Italy.     Rejected  by  Orlando. 

Memorandum  Concerning  the  Question  of  Italian 
Claims  on  the  Adriatic. 

There  is  no  question  to  which  I  have  given  more  carefid 
or  anxious  thought  than  I  have  given  to  this,  because  in 
common  with  all  my  colleagues  it  is  my  earnest  desire 
to  see  the  utmost  justice  done  to  Italy.  Throughout 
my  consideration  of  it,  however,  I  have  felt  that  there 
was  one  matter  in  which  I  had  no  choice  and  could  wish 
to  have  none. 

I  felt  bound  to  square  every  conclusion  that  I  should 
reach  as  accurately  as  possible  with  the  fourteen  principles 
of  peace  which  I  set  forth  in  my  address  to  the  Congress 
of  the  United  States  on  the  eighth  of  January,  1918,  and 
in  subsequent  addresses. 

These  fourteen  points  and  the  principles  laid  down  in 
the  subsequent  addresses  were  formally  adopted,  with 
only  a  single  reservation,  by  the  Powers  associated 
against  Germany,  and  will  constitute  the  basis  of  peace 
with  Germany.  I  do  not  feel  at  liberty  to  suggest  one 
basis  for  peace  with  Germany  and  another  for  peace  with 
Austria. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  in  reply  to  a  communication 
from  the  Austrian  Government  offering  to  enter  into 
negotiations  for  an  armistice  and  peace  on  the  basis  of 
the  fourteen  points  to  which  I  have  alluded,  I  said  that 
there  was  one  matter  to  which  those  points  no  longer 
applied. 

274 


WILSON  TO  THE  ITALIAN  DELEGATION.  APRIL  14      275 
INDEPENDENT    STATES. 

They  had  demanded  autonomy  for  the  several  States 
which  had  constituted  parts  of  the  Austro-Hungarian 
Empire,  and  I  pointed  out  that  it  must  now  be  left  to  the 
choice  of  the  people  of  those  several  countries  what  their 
destiny  and  political  relations  should  be. 

They  have  chosen,  with  the  sympathy  of  the  whole 
world,  to  be  set  up  as  independent  States.  Their  complete 
separation  from  Austria  and  the  consequent  complete 
dissolution  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire  has  given  a 
new  aspect  and  significance  to  the  settlements  which 
must  be  effected  with  regard  at  any  rate  to  the  eastern 
boundaries  of  Italy. 

Personally  I  am  quite  willing  that  Italy  should  be 
accorded  along  the  whole  length  of  her  northern  frontier 
and  wherever  she  comes  into  contact  with  Austrian 
territory  all  that  was  accorded  her  in  the  so-called  Pact  of 
London,  but  I  am  of  the  clear  opinion  that  the  Pact  of 
London  can  no  longer  apply  to  the  settlement  of  her 
eastern  boundaries. 

The  line  drawn  in  the  Pact  of  London  was  conceived  for 
the  purpose  of  establishing  an  absolutely  adequate 
frontier  of  safety  for  Italy  against  any  possible  hostility 
or  aggression  on  the  part  of  Austro-Hungary.  But 
Austro-Hungary  no  longer  exists. 

These  eastern  frontiers  will  touch  countries  stripped 
of  the  military  and  naval  power  of  Austria,  set  up  in 
entire  independence  of  Austria,  and  organized  for  the 
purpose  of  satisfying  legitimate  national  aspirations,  and 
created  States  not  hostile  to  the  new  European  order,  but 
arising  out  of  it,  interested  in  its  maintenance,  dependent 
upon  the  cultivation  of  friendships,  and  bound  to  a 
common  policy  of  peace  and  accommodation  by  the 
covenants  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

ISTRIAN    PENINSULA. 

It  is  with  these  facts  in  mind  that  I  have  approached  the 
Adriatic  question.  It  is  commonly  agreed,  and  I  very 
heartily   adhere   to   the   agreement,    that   the   ports   of 


270         VVOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

Trieste  and  Pola,  and  with  them  the  greater  part  of  the 
Istrian  Peninsula,  should  be  ceded  to  Italy,  her  eastern 
frontier  running  along  the  natural  strategic  line  estab- 
lished by  the  physical  conformation  of  the  coimtry,  a  line 
which  it  has  been  attempted  to  draw  with  some  degree  of 
accurac}''  on  the  attached  map. 

Within  this  line  on  the  Italian  side  will  lie  considerable 
bodies  of  non-Italian  population,  but  their  fortunes  are  so 
naturally  linked  by  the  nature  of  the  country  itself  with 
the  fortunes  of  the  Italian  people  that  I  think  their  in- 
clusion is  fully  justified. 

There  would  be  no  such  justification,  in  my  judgment, 
in  including  Fiume  or  any  part  of  the  coast  lying  to  the 
south  of  Fiume  within  the  boundaries  of  the  Italian 
kingdom. 

PORT   OF   NEW   STATES. 

Fiume  is  by  situation  and  by  all  the  circumstances  of  its 
development  not  an  Italian  but  an  international  port, 
serving  the  countries  to  the  east  and  north  of  the  Gulf  of 
Fiume.  Just  because  it  is  an  international  port  and 
cannot  with  justice  be  subordinated  to  any  one  sover- 
eignty it  is  my  clear  judgment  that  it  should  enjoy  a  very 
considerable  degree  of  genuine  autonomy  and  that,  while 
it  should  be  included  no  doubt  within  the  Customs 
system  of  the  new  Jugo-Slav  State  it  should  nevertheless 
be  left  free  in  its  own  interest  and  in  the  interest  of  the 
States  lying  about  it  to  devote  itself  to  the  service  of  the 
commerce  which  naturally  and  inevitably  seeks  an  out- 
let or  inlet  at  its  port. 

The  States  which  it  serves  will  be  new  States.  They 
will  need  to  have  complete  confidence  in  their  access  to  an 
outlet  on  the  sea.  The  friendships  and  the  connections  of 
the  future  will  largely  depend  upon  such  an  arrangement  as 
I  have  suggested;  and  friendship,  cooperation,  freedom  of 
action  must  underlie  every  arrangement  of  peace,  if 
peace  is  to  be  lasting. 

I  believe  that  there  will  be  common  agreement  that  the 
Island  of  Lissa  should  be  ceded  to  Italy  and  that  she 
should  retain  the  port  of  ^^olna.     I  believe  that  it  will  be 


WILSON  TO  THE  ITALIAN  DELEGATION,  APRIL  14      277 

generally  agreed  that  the  fortifications  which  the  Aus- 
trian Government  established  upon  the  islands  near  the 
eastern  coast  of  the  Adriatic  should  be  permanently  dis- 
mantled under  international  guarantees,  and  that  the 
disarmament  which  is  to  be  arranged  under  the  League  of 
Nations  should  limit  the  States  on  the  eastern  coast  of  the 
Adriatic  to  only  such  minor  naval  forces  as  are  necessary 
for  policing  the  waters  of  the  islands  and  the  coast. 

These  are  the  conclusions  to  which  I  am  forced  by 
the  compulsion  of  the  understandings  which  underlay 
the  whole  initiation  of  the  present  peace.  No  other 
conclusions  seem  to  me  susceptible  of  being  rendered 
consistent  with  these  understandings.  They  were  under- 
standings accepted  by  the  whole  world,  and  bear  with 
peculiar  compulsion  upon  the  United  States  because  the 
privilege  was  accorded  her  of  taking  the  initiative  in 
bringing  about  the  negotiations  for  peace  and  her  pledges 
underlie  the  whole  difficult  business. 

And  certainly  Italy  obtains  under  such  a  settlement  the 
great  historic  objects  which  her  people  have  so  long  had 
in  mind.  The  historical  wrongs  inflicted  upon  her  by 
Austro-Hungary  and  by  a  long  series  of  unjust  transac- 
tions which  I  hope  will  before  long  sink  out  of  the  memory 
of  man  are  completely  redressed.  Nothing  is  denied  her 
which  will  complete  her  national  unity. 

Here  and  there  upon  the  islands  of  the  Adriatic  and  upon 
the  eastern  coast  of  that  sea  there  are  settlements  con- 
taining large  Italian  elements  of  population,  but  the 
pledges  under  which  the  new  States  enter  the  family  of 
nations  will  abundantly  safeguard  the  liberty,  the  develop- 
ment, and  all  the  just  rights  of  national  or  racial  minorities 
and  back  of  these  safeguards  will  always  lie  the  watchful 
and  sufficient  authority  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

And  at  the  very  outset  we  shall  have  avoided  the  fatal 
error  of  making  Italy's  nearest  neighbours  on  the  east  her 
enemies  and  nursing  just  such  a  sense  of  injustice  as  has 
disturbed  the  peace  of  Europe  for  generations  together 
and  played  no  small  part  in  bringing  on  the  terrible 
conflict  through  which  we  have  just  passed. 


Document  36. 

Letter  of  six  American  experts  to  President 
Wilson  urging  him  not  to  yield  on  the  Italian 
claims  (carbon  copy). 

April  17,  1919. 
Dear  Mr.  President: 

En  route  to  France,  on  the  George  Washington  in  De- 
cember, the  President  gave  the  territorial  specialists  an 
inspiriting  moral  direction : 

"Tell  me  what's  right  and  I'll  fight  for  it.  Give  me  a  guaranteed 
position." 

We  regard  this  as  a  noble  charter  for  the  new  international 
order.  We  have  been  proud  to  work  for  that  charter.  At 
this  critical  moment  we  should  like  to  take  advantage  of 
the  gracious  invitation  of  the  President  to  address  him 
directly  on  matters  of  the  gravest  importance,  and  in 
accordance  therewith  beg  to  submit  the  following  observa- 
tions : 

The  Italian  representatives  demand  Fiume  and  part 
of  Dalmatia  in  order  to  emerge  from  the  Conference 
with  loot  for  their  people.  These  districts  belong  to 
Jugo-Slavia,  not  to  Italy.  In  our  opinion  there  is  no 
way — no  political  or  economic  device,  of  a  free  port  or 
otherwise — which  can  repair  to  Jugo-Slavia  the  injury 
done  if  any  outside  Power  prevents  Fiume  from  being 
made  an  integral  part  of  the  Jugo-Slav  organization. 
It  would  be  charged  that  we  had  betrayed  the  rights  of 
small  nations.  It  would  be  charged  that  the  principle, 
"There  shall  be  no  bartering  of  peoples"  had  been 
publicly  and  cynically  thrown  aside. 

Italy  entered  the  war  with  a  demand  for  loot.  France 
and  England  surrendered  to  her  demand.  Of  all  the 
world's  statesmen  the  President  alone  repudiated  a  war 

278 


SIX  AMERICAN  EXPERTS  ON  ITALIAN  CLAIMS         279 

for  spoils  and  proclaimed  the  just  principles  of  an 
enduring  peace.  The  belligerent  nations,  including 
Italy,  agreed  to  make  peace  on  the  President's  prin- 
ciples. Italy  now  insists  that  she  must  carry  home  an 
ample  bag  of  spoils  or  the  government  will  fall. 

If  Italy  gets  even  nominal  sovereignty  over  Fiume  as 
the  price  of  supporting  the  League  of  Nations,  she  has 
brought  the  League  down  to  her  level.  It  becomes 
a  coalition  to  maintain  an  unjust  settlement.  The 
world  will  see  that  a  big  Power  has  profited  by  the  old 
methods:  secret  treaties,  shameless  demands,  selfish 
oppression.  The  League  of  Nations  will  be  charged 
with  the  acceptance  of  the  doctrines  of  Talleyrand  and 
Metternich. 

If  Jugo-Slavia  loses  Fiume,  war  will  follow.  When 
it  comes,  the  League  will  be  fighting  on  the  wrong  side. 
Ought  we  to  hope  that  it  will  be  strong  enough  to  win.f* 
Will  the  people  of  the  world  send  armies  and  navies 
and  expend  billions  of  dollars  to  maintain  a  selfish  and 
aggressive  settlement.'^ 

Better  a  League  of  Nations  based  on  justice  than  a 
League  based  on  Italian  participation  bought  at  a 
price.  The  Italian  government  rnay  fall,  but  the 
Italian  people  cannot  long  withstand  the  opinion  of  the 
world. 

Never  in  his  career  did  the  President  have  presented 
to  him  such  an  opportunity  to  strike  a  death  blow  to  the 
discredited  methods  of  old-world  diplomacy.  Italian 
claims  are  typical  of  the  method  of  making  excessive 
demands  in  the  hope  of  saving  a  portion  of  the  spoils 
in  subsequent  compromises.  To  the  President  is 
given  the  rare  privilege  of  going  down  in  history  as  the 
statesman  who  destroyed,  by  a  clean-cut  decision 
against  an  infamous  arrangement,  the  last  vestige  of 
the  old  order. 

Respectfully  submitted, 
Isaiah  Bowman 

Chief  Territorial  Specialist. 
W.   E.   LUNT 

Chief  of  the  Italian  Division. 


280         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

Clive  Day 

Chief  of  the  Balkan  Division. 
Douglas  W.  Johnson 

Chief  of  the  Division  of  Boundary  Geography. 
Charles  Seymour 

Chief  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Division. 
Allyn  a.  Young 

Chief  of  the  Division  of  Economics  and  Statistics. 


Document  37. 

Memorandum  of  A.  J.  Balfour,  April  24,  ex- 
plaining attitude  of  Great  Britain  and  France 
regarding  the  Italian  settlement.  A  great  con- 
troversy raged  over  making  this  document 
public,  but  it  was  finally  kept  secret  and  has 
never  before  been  published  (typewritten  copy). 

FIUME  AND  THE  PEACE  SETTLEMENT. 

We  learn  with  a  regret  which  it  is  difficult  to  measure 
that,  at  the  very  moment  when  Peace  seems  almost 
attained,  Italy  threatens  to  sever  herself  from  the  company 
of  the  Allied  nations,  through  whose  common  efforts 
victory  has  been  achieved.  We  do  not  presume  to  offer 
any  opinion  as  to  the  effects  which  so  momentous  a  step 
would  have  upon  the  future  of  Italy  herself.  Of  these 
it  is  for  the  Italian  people  and  its  leaders  to  judge,  and 
for  them  alone.  But  we,  w^ho  have  been  Italy's  Allies 
through  four  anxious  years,  and  would  gladly  be  her 
Allies  still,  are  bound  to  express  our  fears  as  to  the  dis- 
astrous effects  it  will  surely  have  upon  us,  and  upon  the 
policy  for  which  we  have  striven. 

WTieii  in  1915  Italy  threw  in  her  lot  with  France, 
Russia  and  the  British  Empire  in  their  struggle  against 
the  Central  Powers,  Turkey  and  Bulgaria,  she  did  so  on 
conditions.  She  required  her  Allies  to  promise  that  in 
case  of  victory  they  would  help  her  to  obtain  in  Europe 
Tthe  frontier  of  the  Alps,  the  great  ports  of  Trieste  and 
I  Pola,  and  a  large  portion  of  the  Dalmatian  coast  with 
many  of  its  adjacent  islands.  '  Such  accessions  of  terri- 
tory would  enormously  strengthen  Italy's  power  of 
defense,  both  on  land  and  sea,  against  her  hereditary 

281 


28^2         WOODJIOW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

enemy,  and  would  incidentally  result  in  the  transfer  of 
over  200,000  German-speaking  Tyrolese  and  over  750,000 
Southern  Slavs  from  Austrian  to  Italian  rule.  Under 
this  arrangement  Fiume  was  retained  by  Croatia. 

Such  was  the  situation  in  April,  191.5.  In  November, 
1918,  it  had  profoundly  changed.  Germany  was  beaten; 
the  Dual  Monarchy  had  ceased  to  exist:  and  side  by  side 
with  this  ^lilitary  revolution,  the  ideals  of  the  Western 
Powers  had  grown  and  strengthened.  In  1915  the  im- 
mediate needs  of  self-defense,  the  task  of  creating  and 
equipping  vast  armies,  the  contrivance  of  new  methods  for 
meeting  new  perils,  strained  to  the  utmost  the  energies 
of  the  Allies.  But  by  1918,  we  had  reached  the  double 
conviction  that  if  the  repetition  of  such  calamities  was  to 
be  avoided,  the  Nations  must  organize  themselves  to 
maintain  Peace,  as  Germany,  Austria,  Bulgaria  and 
Turkey  had  organized  themselves  to  make  War;  and  that 
little  could  be  expected,  even  from  the  best  contrived 
organization,  unless  the  boundaries  of  the  States  to  be 
created  by  the  Conference  were  framed,  on  the  whole,  in 
accordance  with  the  wishes  and  lasting  interests  of  the 
populations  concerned. 

This  task  of  re-drawing  European  frontiers  has  fallen 
upon  the  Great  Powers;  and  admittedly  its  difficulty  is 
immense.  Not  always,  nor  indeed  often,  do  race,  religion, 
language,  history,  economic  interests,  geographical  con- 
tiguity and  convenience,  the  influence  of  national  preju- 
dices and  the  needs  of  national  defense,  conspire  to 
indicate  without  doubt  or  ambiguity  the  best  frontier  for 
any  State: — be  it  new  or  old.  And  unless  they  do,  some 
element  in  a  perfect  settlement  must  be  neglected, 
compromise  becomes  inevitable,  and  there  may  often  be 
honest  doubts  as  to  the  form  the  compromise  should 
take. 

Now  as  regards  most  of  the  new  frontier  between 
Italy  and  what  was  once  the  Austrian  Empire,  we  have 
nothing  to  say.  We  are  bound  by  the  Pact  of  London, 
and  any  demand  for  a  change  in  that  Pact  which  is 
adverse  to  Italy  must  come  from  Italy  herself.  But  this 
same  Pact  gives  Fiume  to  Croatia,  and  we  would  very 


BALFOUR  ON  THE  ITALIAN  SETTLEMENT  283 

earnestly  and  respectfully  ask  whether  any  valid  reason 
exists  for  adding,  in  the  teeth  of  the  Treaty,  this  little  city 
on  the  Croatian  coast  to  the  Kingdom  of  Italy?  It  is  said 
indeed,  and  with  truth,  that  its  Italian  population  desire 
the  change.  But  the  population  which  clusters  around 
the  port  is  not  predominantly  Italian.  It  is  true  that  the 
urban  area  wherein  they  dwell  is  not  called  Fiume;  for 
it  is  divided  by  a  narrow  canal,  as  Paris  is  divided  by  the 
Seine,  or  London  by  the  tidal  estuary  of  the  Thames, 
and  locally  the  name,  Fiume,  is  applied  in  strictness  only 
to  the  streets  on  one  side  of  it.  But  surely  we  are  con- 
cerned with  things,  not  names;  and  however  you  name  it, 
the  town  which  serves  the  port,  and  lives  by  it,  is  physi- 
cally one  town,  not  two :  and  taken  as  a  whole  is  Slav,  not 
Italian. 

But  if  the  argument  drawn  from  the  wishes  of  the 
present  population  does  not  really  point  to  an  Italian 
solution,  what  remains?  Not  the  argument  from  history; 
for  up  to  quite  recent  times  the  inhabitants  of  Fiume,  in 
its  narrowest  meaning,  were  predominantly  Slav.  Not 
the  arguments  from  contiguity;  for  the  country  popula- 
tion, up  to  the  very  gates  of  the  city,  are  not  merely 
predominantly  Slav,  but  Slav  without  perceptible  ad- 
mixture. Not  the  economic  argument;  for  the  territories 
which  obtain  through  Fiume  their  easiest  access  to  the 
sea,  whatever  else  they  be,  at  least  are  not  Italian. 
Most  of  them  are  Slav;  and  if  it  be  said  that  Fiume  is  also 
necessary  to  Hungarian  and  Transylvanian  commerce, 
this  is  a  valid  argument  for  making  it  a  free  port,  but 
surely  not  for  putting  it  under  Italian  sovereignty. 

There  is  one  other  line  of  argument  on  this  subject  about 
which  we  would  ask  leave  to  say  a  word.  It  is  urged  by 
some,  and  thought  by  many  that  the  task  of  the  Great 
Powers  is  not  merely  to  sit  down  and  coldly  rearrange 
the  pieces  on  the  European  board  in  strict,  even  pedantic, 
conformity  with  certain  admirable  but  very  abstract 
principles.  They  must  consider  these  great  matters  in 
more  human  fashion.  After  all  (so  runs  the  argument), 
the  problems  to  be  dealt  with  arise  out  of  a  great  war. 
The  conquerors  in  that  War  were  not  the   aggressors: 


284         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

Their  sacrifices  have  been  enormous;  the  burdens  they 
have  to  bear  seem  well-nigh  intolerable.  Are  they  to  get 
nothing  out  of  victory,  except  the  consciousness  that  State 
frontiers  in  Europe  will  be  arranged  in  a  better  pattern 
after  1918  than  they  were  before;  and  that  nations  who 
fought  on  the  wrong  side,  or  who  did  not  fight  at  all,  will 
have  gained  their  freedom  through  other  peoples'  losses? 
Surely  the  victors,  if  they  want  it,  are  entitled  to  some 
more  solid  reward  than  theoretical  map-makers,  working 
in  the  void,  may  on  abstract  principles  feel  disposed  to 
give  them. 

There  is  something  in  this  w^ay  of  thinking  which  at 
first  sight  appeals  to  us  all;  and  where  no  interests  are 
concerned  but  those  of  the  criminal  aggressors,  it  deserves 
respectful  consideration.  But  in  most  cases  of  territorial 
redistribution  it  is  at  least  as  important  to  enquire  what 
effects  the  transfer  will  have  on  the  nations  to  whom  the 
territory  is  given,  as  upon  those  from  whom  it  is  taken: 
and  when,  as  in  the  case  of  Jugo-Slavia,  the  nation  from- 
whom  it  is  taken  happens  to  be  a  friendly  State,  the 
difficulty  of  the  problem  is  doubled. 

We  do  not  presume  to  speak  with  authority  on  the 
value  of  the  strategical  gains  which  Italy  anticipates 
from  the  acquisition  of  the  islands  and  coastline  of 
Dalmatia.  They  seem  to  us  to  be  small;  though,  small 
as  they  are,  they  must  greatly  exceed  the  economic  ad- 
vantages, which  will  accrue  to  Italian  trade  from  new 
opportunities,  or  to  the  Italian  Treasury  from  new  sources 
of  revenue.  We  cannot  believe  that  the  owners  of 
Trieste  have  anything  to  fear  from  Fiume  as  a  commercial 
rival,  or  the  owners  of  Pola  from  Fiume  as  a  Naval  base. 

But  if  Italy  has  little  to  gain  from  the  proposed  ac- 
quisition, has  she  not  much  to  lose?  The  War  found  her 
protected  from  an  hereditary  enemy  of  nearly  twice  her 
size  by  a  frontier  which  previous  Treaties  had  deliberately 
[rendered]  insecure.  Her  Eastern  seaboard  was  almost 
bare  of  harbours,  while  Austria-Hungary  possessed  on 
the  opposite  side  of  the  Adriatic  some  of  the  finest  harbours 
in  the  world.  This  was  her  condition  in  1914.  In  1919  her 
Northern  and  Eastern  frontiers  are  as  secure  as  mountains 


BALFOUR  ON  THE  ITALIAN  SETTLEMENT  285 

and  rivers  can  make  them.  She  is  adding  two  great  ports 
to  her  Adriatic  possessions;  and  her  hereditary  oppressor 
has  ceased  to  exist.  To  us  it  seems  that,  as  a  State  thus 
situated  has  nothing  to  fear  from  its  neighbours'  enmity, 
so  its  only  interest  must  be  to  gain  their  friendship.  And 
though  memories  belonging  to  an  evil  past  make  friend- 
ship difficult  between  Italians  and  Slavs,  yet  the  bitterest 
memories  soften  with  time,  unless  fresh  irritants  are 
frequently  applied;  and  among  such  irritants  none  are 
more  powerful  than  the  constant  contemplation  of  a 
disputed  and  ill-drawn  frontier. 

It  is  for  Italy,  and  not  for  the  other  signatories  of  the 
Pact  of  London,  to  say  whether  she  will  gain  more  in 
power,  wealth  and  honour  by  strictly  adhering  to  that  part 
of  the  Pact  of  London  which  is  in  her  favour,  than  by 
accepting  modifications  in  it  which  would  bring  it  into 
closer  harmony  wdth  the  principles  which  are  governing 
the  territorial  decisions  of  the  Allies  in  other  parts  of 
Europe.  But  so  far  as  Fiume  is  concerned,  the  position 
is  different.  Here,  as  we  have  already  pointed  out,  the 
Pact  of  1915  is  against  the  Italian  contention;  and  so 
also,  it  seems  to  us,  are  justice  and  policy.  After  the 
most  prolonged  and  anxious  reflection,  we  cannot  bring 
ourselves  to  believe  that  it  is  either  in  the  interests  of 
Jugo-Slavia,  in  the  interests  of  Italy  herself,  or  in  the 
interests  of  future  peace — which  is  the  concern  of  all  the 
world, — that  this  port  should  be  severed  from  the  terri- 
tories to  which,  economically,  geographically  and  eth- 
nologically  it  naturally  belongs. 

Can  it  be  that  Italy  on  this  account  is  prepared  to 
separate  herself  from  her  Allies  .^^  The  hope  that  sustained 
us  through  the  perilous  years  of  War  was  that  victory, 
when  it  came,  would  bring  with  it,  not  merely  the  defeat 
of  Germany,  but  the  final  discredit  of  the  ideals  in  which 
Germany  had  placed  her  trust.  On  the  other  hand, 
Germany,  even  when  she  began  to  entertain  misgivings 
about  the  issues  of  the  campaign,  felt  sure  that  the  union 
of  her  enemies  would  never  survive  their  triumphs.  She 
based  her  schemes  no  longer  on  the  conquest  of  Europe, 
but  on  its  political,  and  perhaps  also  on  its  social,  dis- 


280         WOODROW  WILSOiX  .VND  WOULD  SETTLEMENT 

integration.  The  Armistice  might  doubtless  produce  a 
brief  cessation  of  hostihties;  but  it  would  bring  no  repose 
to  a  perturbed  and  overwrought  world.  Militant  na- 
tionalism would  lead  to  a  struggle  between  peoples; 
militant  internationalism  to  a  struggle  between  classes. 
In  either  event,  or  in  both,  the  Conference  summoned  to 
give  us  peace  would  leave  us  at  war,  and  Germany  alone 
would  be  the  gainer. 

This  or  something  like  this  is  the  present  calculation 
of  a  certain  section  of  German  politicians.  Could  any- 
thing more  effectually  contribute  to  its  success  than 
that  Italy  should  quarrel  with  her  Allies,  and  that  the 
cause  of  quarrel  should  be  the  manner  in  which  our 
common  victory  may  best  be  used.'^  We  are  calling  into 
being  a  League  of  Nations;  we  are  daily  adding  to  the 
responsibilities  which,  under  the  approaching  Treaty,  it 
will  be  called  upon  to  assume;  yet  before  the  scheme  has 
had  time  to  clothe  itself  in  practical  form,  we  hasten  to 
destroy  its  credit.  To  the  world  we  supply  dramatic 
proof  that  the  Association  of  the  Great  Powers,  which 
won  the  War,  cannot  survive  peace;  and  all  the  world 
will  ask  how,  if  this  be  so,  the  maintenance  of  Peace  can 
safely  be  left  in  their  hands. 

For  these  reasons,  if  for  no  other,  we  beg  our  Italian 
colleagues  to  re-consider  their  policy.  That  it  has  been 
inspired  by  a  high  sense  of  patriotism  we  do  not  doubt. 
But  we  cannot  believe  either  that  it  is  in  Italy's  true 
interests,  or  that  it  is  worthy  of  the  great  part  which 
Italy  is  called  upon  to  play  in  the  Coimcils  of  the  Nations. 

[Initialed]  A.  J.  B. 
Paris 

24.  4.   19 


r 


Document  38. 

Famous  public  statement  of  President  Wilson 
April  23,  on  the  Italian  settlement,  whicli  nearly 
disrupted  the  Peace  Conference. 


STATEMENT  IN  RE  ADRIATIC. 


April  23. 

In  view  of  the  capital  importance  of  the  questions 
affected,  and  in  order  to  throw  all  possible  light  upon 
what  is  involved  in  their  settlement,  I  hope  that  the 
following  statement  will  contribute  to  the  final  formation 
of  opinion  and  to  a  satisfactory  solution. 

WTien  Italy  entered  the  war  she  entered  upon  the  basis 
of  a  definite,  but  private,  understanding  with  Great 
Britain  and  France,  now  known  as  the  Pact  of  London. 
Since  that  time  the  whole  face  of  circumstance  has  been 
altered.  Many  other  powers,  great  and  small,  have 
entered  the  struggle,  with  no  knowledge  of  that  private 
understanding.  The  Austro-Hungarian  Empire,  then 
the  enemy  of  Europe,  and  at  whose  expense  the  Pact  of 
London  was  to  be  kept  in  the  event  of  victory,  has  gone 
to  pieces  and  no  longer  exists.  Not  only  that.  The 
several  parts  of  that  Empire,  it  is  now  agreed  by  Italy  and 
all  her  associates,  are  to  be  erected  into  independent  states 
and  associated  in  a  League  of  Nations,  not  with  those  who 
were  recently  our  enemies,  but  with  Italy  herself  and  the 
powers  that  stood  with  Italy  in  the  great  war  for  liberty. 
We  are  to  establish  their  liberty  as  well  as  our  own.  They 
are  to  be  among  the  smaller  states  whose  interests  are 
henceforth  to  be  as  scrupulously  safeguarded  as  the 
interests  of  the  most  powerful  states. 

The  war  was  ended,  moreover,  by  proposing  to  Germany 
an   armistice   and  peace   which   should   be   founded   on 

287 


288         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

certain  clearly  defined  principles  which  should  set  up  a 
new  order  of  right  and  justice.  Upon  those  principles  the 
peace  with  Germany  has  been  conceived,  not  only,  but 
formulated.  Upon  those  principles  it  will  be  executed. 
We  cannot  ask  the  great  body  of  powers  to  propose  and 
effect  peace  with  Austria  and  establish  a  new  basis  of 
independence  and  right  in  the  states  which  originally 
constituted  the  Austro-Hungarian  Empire  and  in  the 
states  of  the  Balkan  group  on  principles  of  another  kind. 
We  must  apply  the  same  principles  to  the  settlement  of 
Europe  in  those  quarters  that  we  have  applied  in  the 
peace  with  Germany.  It  was  upon  the  explicit  avowal  of 
those  principles  that  the  initiative  for  peace  was  taken. 
It  is  upon  them  that  the  whole  structure  of  peace  must 
rest. 

If  those  principles  are  to  be  adhered  to,  Fiume  must 
serve  as  the  outlet  and  inlet  of  the  commerce,  not  of 
Italy,  but  of  the  lands  to  the  north  and  northeast  of  that 
port:  Hungary,  Bohemia,  Roumania,  and  the  states  of  the 
new  Jugo-Slavic  group.  To  assign  Fiume  to  Italy  would 
be  to  create  the  feeling  that  we  had  deliberately  put  the 
port  upon  which  all  these  countries  chiefly  depend  for 
their  access  to  the  Mediterranean  in  the  hands  of  a  power 
of  which  it  did  not  form  an  integral  part  and  whose 
sovereignty,  if  set  up  there,  must  inevitably  seem  foreign, 
not  domestic  or  identified  with  the  commercial  and  in- 
dustrial life  of  the  regions  which  the  port  must  serve.  It 
is  for  that  reason,  no  doubt,  that  Fiume  was  not  included 
in  the  Pact  of  London  but  there  definitively  assigned  to 
the  Croatians. 

And  the  reason  why  the  line  of  the  Pact  of  London 
swept  about  many  of  the  islands  of  the  eastern  coast  of 
the  Adriatic  and  around  the  portion  of  the  Dalmatian 
coast  which  lies  most  open  to  that  sea  was  not  only  that 
here  and  there  on  those  islands  and  here  and  there  on  that 
coast  there  are  bodies  of  people  of  Italian  blood  and  con- 
nection but  also,  and  no  doubt  chiefly,  because  it  was 
felt  that  it  was  necessary  for  Italy  to  have  a  foothold 
amidst  the  channels  of  the  eastern  Adriatic  in  order  that 
she  might  make  her  own  coasts  safe  against  the  naval 


WILSON'S  PUBLIC  STATEMENT  OF  APRIL  23  289 

aggression  of  Austria-Hungary.  But  Austria-Hungary 
no  longer  exists.  It  is  proposed  that  the  fortifications 
which  the  Austrian  government  constructed  there  shall 
be  razed  and  permanently  destroyed.  It  is  part,  also, 
of  the  new  plan  of  European  order  which  centres  in  the 
League  of  Nations  that  the  new  states  erected  there  shall 
accept  a  limitation  of  armaments  which  puts  aggression 
out  of  the  question.  There  can  be  no  fear  of  the  unfair 
treatment  of  groups  of  Italian  people  there  because 
adequate  guarantees  will  be  given,  under  international 
sanction,  of  equal  and  equitable  treatment  of  all  racial  or 
national  minorities. 

In  brief,  every  question  associated  with  this  settlement 
wears  a  new  aspect, — a  new  aspect  given  it  by  the  very 
victory  for  right  for  which  Italy  has  made  the  supreme 
sacrifice  of  blood  and  treasure.  Italy,  along  with  the 
four  other  great  powers,  has  become  one  of  the  chief 
trustees  of  the  new  order  which  she  has  played  so  honour- 
able a  part  in  establishing. 

And  on  the  north  and  northeast  her  natural  frontiers 
are  completely  restored,  along  the  whole  sweep  of  the 
Alps  from  northwest  to  southeast  to  the  very  end  of  the 
Istrian  peninsula,  including  all  the  great  watershed 
within  which  Trieste  and  Pola  lie  and  all  the  fair  regions 
whose  face  nature  has  turned  towards  the  great  peninsula 
upon  which  the  historic  life  of  the  Latin  people  has  been 
worked  out  through  centuries  of  famous  story  ever  since 
Rome  was  first  set  upon  her  seven  hills.  Her  ancient 
unity  is  restored.  Her  lines  are  extended  to  the  great 
walls  which  are  her  natural  defence.  It  is  within  her 
choice  to  be  surrounded  by  friends;  to  exhibit  to  the 
newly  liberated  peoples  across  the  Adriatic  that  noblest 
quality  of  greatness,  magnanimity,  friendly  generosity, 
the  preference  of  justice  over  interest. 

The  nations  associated  with  her,  the  nations  that 
know  nothing  of  the  Pact  of  London  or  of  any  other  special 
understanding  that  lies  at  the  beginning  of  this  great 
struggle,  and  who  have  made  their  supreme  sacrifice 
also  in  the  interest,  not  of  national  advantage  or  defence, 
but  of  the  settled  peace  of  the  world,  now  unite  with  her 


290         VVOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

older  associates  in  urging  her  to  assume  a  leadership  which 
cannot  be  mistaken  in  the  new  order  of  Europe.  America 
is  Italy's  friend.  Her  people  are  drawn,  millions  strong, 
from  Italy's  own  fair  countrysides.  She  is  linked  in 
blood  as  well  as  in  affection  with  the  Italian  people. 
Such  ties  can  never  be  broken.  And  America  was 
privileged,  by  the  generous  commission  of  her  associates 
in  the  war,  to  initiate  the  peace  we  are  about  to  con- 
summate,— to  initiate  it  upon  terms  she  had  herself 
formulated,  and  in  which  I  was  her  spokesman.  The 
compulsion  is  upon  her  to  square  every  decision  she  takes 
a  part  in  with  those  principles.  She  can  do  nothing  else. 
She  trusts  Italy,  and  in  her  trust  believes  that  Italy  will 
ask  nothing  of  her  that  cannot  be  made  unmistakably 
consistent  with  these  sacred  obligations.  Interest  is  not 
now  in  question,  but  the  rights  of  peoples,  of  states  new 
and  old,  of  liberated  peoples  and  peoples  whose  rulers  have 
never  accounted  them  worthy  of  right;  above  all,  the 
right  of  the  world  to  peace  and  to  such  settlements  of 
interest  as  shall  make  peace  secure. 

These,  and  these  only,  are  the  principles  for  which 
America  has  fought.  These,  and  these  only,  are  the 
principles  upon  which  she  can  consent  to  make  peace. 

i  Only  upon  these  principles,  she  hopes  and  believes,  w411 

I  the  people  of  Italy  ask  her  to  make  peace. 

L—  [Signed]  Woodrow  Wilson. 


Document  39. 
Orlando's  reply  to  President  Wilson,  April  24. 

ORLANDO'S  STATEMENT. 

April  24,  1919. 

Yesterday,  while  the  Italian  Delegation  was  assembled 
discussing  an  alternative  proposal  sent  them  from  the 
British  Prime  Minister  for  the  purpose  of  conciliating  the 
opposing  tendencies  that  had  shown  themselves  in  regard 
to  Italian  territorial  aspirations,  the  newspapers  of  Paris 
published  a  message  from  the  President  of  the  United 
States,  Mr.  Wilson,  in  which  he  expressed  his  own  opin- 
ion in  reference  to  some  of  the  most  serious  problems 
that  have  been  submitted  to  the  judgment  of  the  Con- 
ference. 

The  step  of  making  a  direct  appeal  to  the  different 
peoples  certainly  is  an  innovation  in  international  inter- 
course. It  is  not  my  intention  to  complain  about  it,  but 
I  do  take  official  notice  of  it  so  as  to  follow  this  precedent ; 
inasmuch  as  this  new  system  without  doubt  will  aid  in 
granting  the  different  peoples  a  broader  participation  in 
international  questions,  and  inasmuch  as  I  have  always 
personally  been  of  the  opinion  that  such  participation  was 
a  sign  of  a  newer  era.  However,  if  such  appeals  are  to  be 
considered  as  being  addressed  to  peoples  outside  of  the 
Governments  that  represent  them,  I  should  say  almost  in 
opposition  to  their  Governments,  it  is  a  great  source  of 
regret  for  me  to  remember  that  this  procedure,  which, 
up  to  now,  has  been  used  only  against  enemy  Govern- 
ments, is  to-day  for  the  first  time  being  used  against  a 
Government  which  has  been,  and  has  tried  to  be  always  a 
loyal  friend  of  the  Great  American  Republic: — against 
the  Italian   Government.     I  could  also  complain   that 

291 


292         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEIMENT 

such  a  message,  addressed  to  the  people,  has  been  pub- 
hshed  at  the  very  moment  when  the  AlKed  and  Associated 
Powers  were  in  the  middle  of  negotiations  with  the 
Itahan  Government,  that  is  to  say,  w^ith  the  very  Govern- 
ment whose  participation  had  been  sohcited  and  highly 
valued  in  numerous  and  serious  questions  which,  up  to 
now,  had  been  dealt  with  in  full  and  intimate  faith. 

But  above  all  I  shall  have  the  right  to  complain,  if  the 
declarations  of  the  presidential  message  signified  opposi- 
tion to  the  Italian  Government  and  people,  since  in  that 
case  it  would  amount  to  ignoring  and  denying  the  high 
degree  of  civilization  which  the  Italian  nation  has  at- 
tained in  these  forms  of  democratic  and  Liberal  rule,  in 
which  it  is  second  to  no  nation  on  earth. 

To  oppose,  so  to  speak,  the  Italian  Government  and 
people,  would  be  to  admit  that  this  great  free  nation  could 
submit  to  the  yoke  of  a  will  other  than  its  own,  and  I  shall 
be  forced  to  protest  vigorously  against  such  suppositions, 
unjustly  offensive  to  my  country. 

I  now  come  to  the  contents  of  the  presidential  message : 
it  is  devoted  entirely  to  showing  that  the  Italian  claims, 
beyond  certain  limits  defined  in  the  message,  violate  the 
principles  upon  which  the  new  regime  of  liberty  and 
justice  among  nations  must  be  founded.  I  have  never 
tdenied  these  principles,  and  President  Wilson  will  do  me 
the  justice  to  acknowledge  that  in  the  long  conversations 
that  we  have  had  together  I  have  never  relied  on  the 
formal  authority  of  a  treaty  by  which  I  knew  very  well 
that  he  was  not  bound.  In  these  conversations  I  have 
.relied  solely  on  the  force  of  the  reason  and  the  justice  upon 
which  I  have  always  believed,  and  upon  which  I  still 
believe,  the  aspirations  of  Italy  are  solidly  based.  I  did 
not  have  the  honor  of  convincing  him :  I  regret  it  sincerely, 
but  President  Wilson  himself  has  had  the  kindness  to 
recognize,  in  the  course  of  our  conversations,  that  truth 
and  justice  are  the  monopoly  of  no  one  person,  and  that 
all  men  are  subject  to  error,  and  I  add  that  the  error  is  all 
the  easier  as  the  problems  to  which  the  principles  apply 
are  more  complex.  Humanity  is  such  an  immense  thing, 
the  problems  raised  by  the  life  of  the  people  are  so  in- 


ORLANDO'S  REPLY  TO  WILSON,  APRIL  24  293 

finitely  complex,  that  nobody  can  believe  that  he  has 
found  in  a  determined  number  of  proposals  as  simple  and 
sure  a  way  to  solve  them  as  if  it  were  a  question  of  deter- 
mining the  dimensions,  the  volume  and  the  weight  of 
bodies  with  various  units  of  measure.  While  remarking 
that  more  than  once  the  Conference  nearly  failed  com- 
pletely when  it  was  a  question  of  applying  these  principles 
I  do  not  believe  that  I  am  showing  disrespect  toward  this 
high  assembly.  On  the  contrary,  these  changes  have 
been  and  still  are,  the  consequence  of  all  human  judgment. 
I  mean  to  say  only,  that  experience  has  proved  the 
difficulties  in  the  application  of  these  principles  of  an 
abstract  nature  to  concrete  cases,  thus  with  all  deference 
but  firmly,  I  consider  as  justified,  the  application  made  by 
President  Wilson  in  his  message  of  his  principles  to 
Italian  claims.  It  is  impossible  for  me,  in  a  document  of 
this  sort,  to  repeat  the  detailed  proofs  which  were  pro- 
duced in  great  number.  I  shall  only  say,  one  cannot 
accept  without  reservation  the  statement  that  the  down- 
fall of  the  Austria-Hungarian  Empire  implies  a  reduction 
of  the  Italian  aspirations.  It  is  even  permissible  to 
believe  the  contrary,  that  is,  that  at  the  very  moment 
when  all  the  varied  peoples  who  constituted  that  empire 
sought  to  organize  according  to  their  ethnic  and  national 
affinities,  the  essential  problem  caused  by  the  Italian  claims 
can  and  must  be  completely  solved.  Now  this  problem  is 
that  of  the  Adriatic  in  which  is  summed  up  all  the  rights 
of  both  the  ancient  and  the  new  Italy,  all  her  sufferings 
throughout  the  centuries  and  all  the  benefits  she  is 
destined  to  bring  to  the  great  international  community. 

The  Presidential  message  affirms  that  with  the  con- 
cessions which  she  has  received,  Italy  would  attain  the 
walls  of  the  Alps,  which  are  her  natural  defences.  This  is 
a  grant  of  vast  importance  upon  condition  that  the 
eastern  flank  of  that  wall  does  not  remain  uncovered  and 
that  there  be  included  among  the  rights  of  Italy  that 
line  from  Mount  Neveso  separating  the  waters  which 
flow  toward  the  Black  Sea  from  those  which  empty  into 
the  Mediterranean.  It  is  this  mountain  which  the  Romans 
themselves  have  called  the  "Limes  Italianus"  since  the 


294        WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

very  hour  when  the  real  figure  of  Italy  appeared  to  the 
sentiment  and  the  conscience  of  the  people. 

Without  that  protection  a  dangerous  breach  would 
remain  open  in  that  admirable  natural  barrier  of  the 
Alps;  and  it  would  mean  the  rupture  of  that  unques- 
tionable political,  historical  and  economic  unity  consti- 
tuted by  the  peninsula  of  Istria. 

I  believe,  moreover,  that  he  who  can  proudly  claim 
that  it  was  he  who  stated  to  the  world  the  free  right  of 
self-determination  of  nations,  is  the  very  person  who 
must  recognize  this  right  for  Fiume,  ancient  Italian  city, 
which  proclaimed  its  Italianness  even  before  the  Italian 
ships  were  near;  to  Fiume,  admirable  example  of  a 
national  consciousness  perpetuated  throughout  the  cen- 
turies. To  deny  it  this  right  for  the  sole  reason  that  it 
has  to  do  only  with  a  small  community,  would  be  to 
admit  that  the  criterium  of  justice  toward  nations  varies 
according  to  their  territorial  expansion.  And  if,  to  deny 
this  right,  we  fall  back  on  the  international  character 
of  this  port,  must  we  not  take  into  account  Antwerp, 
Genoa,  Rotterdam, — all  of  them  international  ports  which 
serve  as  outlet  for  a  variety  of  nations  and  regions  without 
their  being  obliged  to  pay  dearly  for  this  privilege  by  the 
suppression  of  their  national  consciousness? 

And  can  one  describe  as  excessive  the  Italian  aspiration 
for  the  Dalmatian  Coast,  this  boulevard  of  Italy  through- 
out the  centuries,  which  Roman  genius  and  Venetian 
activity  have  made  noble  and  great,  and  whose  Italian- 
ness, defying  all  manner  of  implacable  persecution  through- 
out an  entire  century,  to-day  shares  with  the  Italian 
nation  the  same  emotions  of  patriotism.^ — The  principle 
is  being  adduced  with  regard  to  Poland  that  denationaliza- 
tion obtained  by  violent  and  arbitrary  methods  should 
not  constitute  grounds  for  de  jure  claims;  why  not  apply 
the  same  principle  to  Dalmatia? 

And  if  we  wish  to  support  this  rapid  synthesis  of  our 
good  international  rights  by  cold  statistical  facts,  I 
believe  I  am  able  to  state  that  among  the  various  na- 
tional reorganizations  which  the  Peace  Conference  has 
already  brought  about  or  may  bring  about  in  the  future, 


ORLANDO'S  REPLY  TO  WILSON.  APRIL  24  295 

none  of  these  reorganized  peoples  will  count  within  its  new 
frontiers  a  number  of  people  of  a  foreign  race  propor- 
tionately less  than  that  which  would  be  assigned  to  Italy. 
Why,  therefore,  is  it  especially  the  Italian  aspirations 
that  are  to  be  suspected  of  Imperialistic  cupidity? 

In  spite  of  all  these  reasons,  the  history  of  these  nego- 
tiations shall  demonstrate  that  the  firmness  which  was 
necessary  to  the  Italian  Delegation  was  always  associated 
to  a  great  spirit  of  conciliation  in  the  research  for  a  general 
agreement  that  we  all  wished  for  fervently. 

The  Presidential  message  ends  by  a  warm  declaration  of 
friendship  of  America  towards  Italy.  I  answer  in  the 
name  of  Italian  people  and  I  acclaim  with  pride  this 
right  and  this  honor  which  is  due  me  as  the  man  who  in 
the  most  tragic  hour  of  this  war  has  uttered  to  the  Italian 
people  the  cry  of  resistance  at  all  costs;  this  cry  was 
listened  to  and  answered  with  a  courage  and  abnegation  of 
which  few  examples  can  be  found  in  the  history  of  the 
world.  And  Italy,  thanks  to  the  most  heroic  sacrifices 
and  the  purest  blood  of  her  children,  has  been  able  to 
climb  from  an  abyss  of  misfortune  to  the  radiant  summit 
of  the  most  resounding  victory.  It  is  therefore,  in  the 
name  of  Italy,  that  in  my  turn  I  express  the  sentiment  of 
admiration  and  deep  sympathy  that  the  Italian  people 
has  for  the  American  people. 

[Signed]  V.  E.  Orlando. 
Paris,  April  24,  1919. 


Document  40. 

Memorandum  of  May  8  for  Adriatic  settle- 
ment through  plebiscites  and  the  development  of 
a  new  port  for  the  Jugo-Slavs  (Buccari)  to  take 
the  place  of  Fiume.  Presented  by  the  Chief  of 
Boundary  Geography,  Douglas  W.  Johnson,  to 
President  Wilson  and  by  him  laid  before  the 
Council  of  Four  (carbon  copy). 

AMERICAN  COMMISSION  TO  NEGOTIATE  PEACE. 

Paris,  May  8,  1919. 
From:     Chief  of  Division  of  Boundary  Geography. 
To:         The  Commissioners. 
Subject:     Formula  for  Adriatic  Settlement. 
Referring  to  Ambassador  Page's  telegram  of  May  5 
suggesting  construction  of  a  Jugoslav  port  at  Buccari 
in  order  that  Fiume  might  eventually  be  ceded  to  Italy 
without  injury  to  the  economic  life  of  Jugoslavia,  atten- 
tion  is   directed   to   the   accompanying   formula   which 
might  offer  to  the  Italian  plenipotentiaries  a  means  of 
emerging  from  a  difficult  situation   without  humiliating 
the  Italian  people.     Adoption  of  the  formula  would  result 
in  the  solution  supported  by  the  American  territorial 
specialists  and  proposed  by  the  President  in  his  public 
memorandum  of  April  22nd,  and  hence  is  not  a  com- 
promise solution;  but  the  ends  sought  would  be  attained 
without  needlessly  wounding  Italian  sensibilities. 

The  following  comments  will  make  clear  the  intent  of 
the  formula: 

Paragraph  1.  If  Italy  is  to  receive  all  of  German 
Tyrol  south  of  the  Brenner  watershed,  as  seems  to  be 
implied  in  the  President's  published  memorandum,  the 
addition  of  this  small  but  strategically  important 
gateway  into  Italy  would  not  appreciably  increase  the 

296 


MEMORANDUM  OF  MAY  8  FOR  ADRIATIC  SETTLEMENT     297 

injury  done  to  German  sentiment  in  the  Tyrol,  and 
would  materially  strengthen  Italy's  northern  frontier. 

Paragraph  2.  In  an  earlier  memorandum  the  Amer- 
ican specialists  have  already  recommended  assigning 
the  Tarvis  district  to  Italy  on  condition  that  Fiume 
goes  to  Jugoslavia,  and  have  set  forth  the  considerations 
which  make  this  desirable  from  the  point  of  view  of 
the  central  European  countries.  Possession  of  Tarvis 
would  favor  Italy's  scheme  for  a  Predil  Pass  railway 
and  give  her  a  better  natural  frontier  on  the  Carnic 
Alps-Karawanken  Mountains  crest. 

Paragraphs  3  and  4.  The  area  shaded  blue,  between 
the  line  recommended  by  the  American  specialists 
and  the  extreme  Italian  claims'  line,  is  solidly  Jugoslav, 
is  attached  economically  to  Jugoslavia,  and  would  un- 
doubtedly vote  for  union  with  the  Jugoslav  State.  The 
Jugoslavs  accept  in  principle  decision  by  plebiscite,  and 
while  the  Slavs  w^est  of  the  recommended  frontier,  who 
for  economic  and  geographic  reasons  are  not  permitted 
a  vote,  may  object  to  this  discrimination,  the  Jugoslavs 
in  genera]  would  not  strongly  contest  a  solution  which 
would  give  them  the  area  in  question.  The  Italian 
Government  should  find  satisfaction  in  a  solution  which 
granted  part  of  their  claim  immediately  and  which 
merely  postponed  final  decision  for  a  few  months  as 
regards  the  remainder;  and  the  Italian  people,  their/ 
passions  cooled,  would  find  it  difficult  to  press  their 
case  in  face  of  a  decision  of  the  population  in  question 
to  become  Jugoslav. 

Paragraph  5.  A  plebiscite  in  Fiume  would,  in  the 
opinion  of  competent  observers,  show  a  majority  in 
favor  of  Jugoslav  sovereignty  for  economic  reasons 
under  present  economic  conditions.  It  may  be  re- 
garded as  certain  that  w^hen  asked  to  choose  between 
Jugoslav  sovereignty  on  the  one  hand,  and  on  the 
other  Italian  sovereignty  after  a  rival  port  has  been 
built  at  Buccari,  even  the  Italians  of  Fiume  (about 
50  per  cent,  of  the  population)  must  in  their  own  in- 
terest vote  in  large  numbers  for  Jugoslav  sovereignty; 
the  total  vote  in  this  sense  would  presumably  be  an 


208         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

overwhelming  majority.  Thus  the  provisions  of  para- 
graph (b)  would  never  be  called  into  operation.  Even 
if  they  were,  the  practical  impossibility  of  constructing 
an  adequate  port  at  Buccari  would  be  forced  upon  the 
Italian  Government  as  soon  as  it  began  to  study  the 
problem  and  to  count  the  cost.  The  government's 
decision  to  abandon  the  project  would  come  when 
passions  were  less  aroused,  and  the  artificially  stimu- 
lated campaign  for  Fiume  had  subsided.  Since  Italy 
claims  that  Fiume  has  already  manifested  its  unanimous 
desire  to  be  Italian,  and  also  claims  that  Buccari  can 
serve  Jugoslavia  as  well  as  Fiume,  the  formula  is  fair 
to  the  Italian  claims. 

Paragraph  6.  Lussin  and  adjacent  islands  are 
Italian  in  population,  and  while  they  dominate  the 
entrances  to  the  Gulf  of  Fiume,  under  the  League  of 
Nations  such  a  condition  may  not  be  so  serious  as  to 
prevent  giving  the  islands  to  Italy  if  such  concession  is 
deemed  necessary  in  order  to  secure  a  proper  solution 
of  the  much  more  important  Fiume  and  Dalmatian 
questions.  Lissa  has  already  been  tentatively  offered 
to  Italy.  The  Pelagosa  group  could  be  given  to  Italy 
without  appreciable  injury  to  Jugoslavia. 

Paragraph  7.  There  are  objections  to  making  Zara 
a  free  city,  but  these  may  be  overbalanced  by  the  ad- 
vantages of  making  a  concession  to  Italian  sentiment  at 
this  point,  provided  the  town  alone  is  involved.  If  the 
area  were  enlarged  to  include  the  commune  of  Zara,  a 
Jugoslav  majority  w^ould  be  included. 

Paragraph  8.  A  plebiscite  in  the  Dalmatian  coast 
and  islands  will  give  that  area  to  Jugoslavia  by  an  over- 
whelming majority.  The  area  should  vote  as  a  whole, 
to  avoid  difficulties  due  to  possible  small  Italian  en- 
claves. The  islands  of  Pago  and  Cherso,  included  in 
the  Treaty  of  London  line,  are  omitted  from  the  pro- 
posed plebiscite  area.  The  Italians  have  themselves 
suggested  relinquishing  their  claim  to  Pago.  Cherso, 
partly  Italian  in  population,  would  together  with  its 
territorial  waters  practically  close  Flume's  two  best 
outlets  to  the  Adriatic;  it  may  therefore  be  wise  to 


MEMORANDUM  OF  MAY  8  FOR  ADRIATIC  SETTLEMENT     299 

avoid  complications  which  might  result  in  the  improb- 
able event  that  a  majority  on  this  island  should  vote 
for  Italian  sovereignty.  The  chief  value  of  the  pleb- 
iscite would  lie  in  the  fact  that  it  is  a  popular  decision 
which  the  Italian  people  might  be  induced  to  accept 
in  view  of  their  claim  that  the  majority  of  the  popula- 
tion not  only  speaks  Italian  but  is  attached  to  Italy  by 
cultural  and  economic  bonds;  and  that  it  is  a  postponed 
decision  which  would  materialize  only  after  the  present 
excitement  in  Italy  had  abated. 

Paragraphs  9  and  10.  Here  may  be  inserted  such 
provisions  for  an  Italian  mandate  in  Albania,  Abyssinia 
or  elsewhere  as  may  be  deemed  wise. 

NOTE. 

The  attached  formula  has  been  examined  by  the  terri- 
torial specialists  concerned  with  the  Fiume  and  Dalmatian 
problems  (the  Chiefs  of  the  Italian  Division,  Balkan 
Division,  Division  of  Economics,  Division  of  Boundary 
Geography,  and  Chief  Territorial  Specialist, — the  Chief 
of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Division,  being  absent)  and 
has  their  unanimous  approval. 

Suggested  Formula 
FOR  Adriatic  Settlement. 

WITH    president's   RECOMMENDATION. 

1.  Italy  to  receive  the  Sexten  Valley  (shaded  green 
on  accompanying  map),  a  strategic  gatew^ay  into  north- 
ern Italy  (not  included  in  Treaty  of  London). 

2.  Italy  to  receive  the  Tarvis  district  (shaded  green 
on  map),  a  railway  junction  of  much  strategic  and 
commercial  importance  (not  included  in  Treaty  of 
London). 

3.  Italy  to  receive  the  natural  geographic  frontier 
in  Julian  Venetia  shown  by  heavy  black  line  on  the 
accompanying  map. 

4.  Italian  troops  to  be  immediately  withdrawn  from 
areas  east  of  this  line.  A  plebiscite  to  be  held  within 
a  period  to  be  fixed  by  the  League  of  Nations,  and  under 
appropriate  safeguards,  to  determine  whether  the  area 


800        WOODROW  \MLSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

shaded  blue  on  the  accompanying  map  shall  belong  to 
Italy  or  to  Jugo-Slavia. 

5.  Italian  troops  to  be  immediately  withdrawn  from 
the  vicinity  and  city  of  Fiume,  which  shall  be  ad- 
ministered, within  the  Jugo-Slav  customs  regime,  by 
the  League  of  Nations  until  its  future  status  is  de- 
termined. The  city  and  district  of  Fiume,  together  with 
its  moles,  docks,  basins  and  other  port  instrumentalities, 
to  be  ceded  to  Italy  when  and  if  the  following  conditions 
are  fulfilled: 

(a)  By  a  plebiscite  held  within  a  period  to  be 
fixed  by  the  League  of  Nations,  and  under  appropriate 
safeguards,  the  city  and  district  of  Fiume  by  a 
majority  of  all  votes  cast  manifests  its  desire  to  be 
annexed  to  Italy  under  condition  that  and  as  soon  as 
the  provisions  in  (b)  have  been  satisfied. 

(b)  Within  six  months  after  the  plebiscite  pro- 
vided in  (a)  has  been  held,  and  in  case  this  plebiscite 
results  favorably  to  the  annexation  of  Fiume  to 
Italy  under  the  conditions  specified,  Italy  shall 
proceed  to  the  construction  in  and  about  the  bay  of 
Buccari  of  all  the  port  works,  including  moles,  docks, 
basins,  warehouses,  office-buildings,  railway  tracks 
and  all  other  port  instrumentalities,  necessary  to 
provide  for  Jugo-Slavia  and  neighboring  states  a 
port  whose  facilities  and  possibilities  of  future 
development  shall  not  be  inferior  to  those  of  the  pres- 
ent port  of  Fiume;  and  shall  construct  rail  connections 
between  the  new  port  and  the  Fiume-Agram  and 
Fiume-Laibach  railways  not  inferior  to  the  existing 
rail  connections  between  Fiume  and  the  interior. 
Construction  shall  proceed  under  the  supervision  of 
an  international  commission  of  experts  appointed 
by  majority  vote  of  the  Council  of  the  League  of 
Nations,  which  shall  certify  that  the  port  works, 
when  completed,  are  not  inferior  to  the  present  port 
of  Fiume  in  facilities,  possibilities  of  future  develop- 
ment, and  rail  connections  with  the  interior.  The 
works  to  be  completed  within  a  period  to  be  deter- 
mined by  majority  vote  of  the  Council  of  the  League 


MEMOR.\NDUM  OF  MAY  8  FOR  ADRIATIC  SETTLEMENT     301 

of  Nations,  and  to  be  transferred  without  encum- 
brance to  Jugo-Slavia  under  such  conditions  as  to 
free  port  provisions  as  the  Council  of  the  League  of 
Nations  may  by  majority  vote  determine. 

(c)  Italy  shall  assure  in  perpetuity,  to  all  nations 
concerned,  the  free  and  unhampered  transit  across 
the  city  and  district  of  Fiume  of  persons  and  goods  en 
route  between  points  outside  the  territory  of  s^id 
city  and  district.  (None  of  the  territory  to  be 
ceded  to  Italy  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of 
Section  5  was  promised  to  Italy  by  the  Treaty  of 
London.) 

In  case  any  of  the  above  conditions  remain  un- 
fulfilled at  the  end  of  a  period  to  be  fixed  by  majority 
vote  of  the  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations,  Fiume 
shall  be  transferred  to  Jugo-Slav  sovereignty  with 
such  restrictions  as  to  free  port  provisions  as  the 
Council  of  the  League  of  Nations  may  by  majority 
vote  determine. 

6.  Italy  to  receive  the  islands  of  Lussin,  LTnie, 
Sansego,  Asinella,  Lissa  and  its  adjacent  islets  including 
Busi  and  San  Andrea,  and  the  Pelagosa  group  (Pelagosa 
Grande,  Pelagosa  Piccola,  Cajola,  and  immediately 
adjacent  islets),  (enclosed  in  green  circles  on  ac- 
companying map). 

7.  The  town  of  Zara  to  be  made  a  free  city. 

8.  Italy  to  relinquish  claim  to,  and  immediately 
withdraw  all  troops  from,  those  parts  of  the  Istrian 
and  Dalmatian  islands  and  the  Dalmatian  mainland 
not  mentioned  in  paragraphs  6  and  7.^ 

(//  fwiher    concessions    to    Italian    sentiment    are 

considered  essential: 

Change  'paragraph  8  to  read: 

8.  Italian  troops  to  be  immediately  withdrawn  from 
all  parts  of  the  Istrian  and  Dalmatian  islands  and 
Dalmatian  mainland  not  mentioned  in  paragraphs  6 
and  7.  A  plebiscite  to  be  held  within  a  period  of  one 
year  from  date  of  this  Treaty,  under  appropriate  safe- 


'Paragraphs  indicated  by  rule  in  margin  were  ringed  in  the  original  document  by 
President  Wilson. 


302         WOODROW  WILSON  .\ND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

guards,  [prescribed  by  a  majority  of  the  Council  of  the 
League  of  Nations^  to  determine  whether  the  area 
shaded  red  on  the  accompanying  map  shall,  as  a  whole, 
belong  to  Italy  or  to  Jugo-Slavia). 

9.  Italy  to  receive  Valona  and  a  sufficient  hinterland 
for  its  defense. 

10.  Italy  to  receive  mandatories  in  such  regions  as 
may  be  agreed  upon,  and  to  be  assured  such  equitable 
economic  safeguards  as  are  justifiable  in  view  of  her 
special  situation.^ 

(See  next  page  for  11,  added  after  conference  with 
Trumbitch,  and  12,  added  tentatively  by  me  (Professor 
Johnson)  to  sound  the  President  on  this  point). 

11.  The  entire  east  Adriatic  coast,  from  the  former 
Austro-Italian  frontier  to  the  northern  frontier  of 
Albania,  to  be  neutralized  under  the  League  of  Nations. 
No  fortresses  to  be  allowed  on  any  part  of  the  coast, 
and  no  war  vessels  of  any  kind  to  be  permitted  in  the 
waters  bordering  this  coast.  This  provision  to  be 
accompanied  by  guarantees  for  the  free  passage  of 
Jugo-Slav  merchant  vessels  through  the  southern 
Adriatic  and  Straits  of  Otranto,  even  in  time  of  war. 

(If  further  concessions  to  Italian  sentiment  are 
necessary,  change  first  sentence  to  read:  "The 
entire  Jugo-Slav  coast  to  be  neutralized"). 

The  effect  of  this  provision  would  be  to  render  a 
Jugo-Slav  navy  impossible,  and  to  give  to  Italy 
absolute  control  of  the  Adriatic  Sea.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  Jugo-Slavs  would  have  the  protection  of 
the  League  of  Nations  against  any  attack  by  sea. 

12.  The  American  government,  as  an  evidence  of  its 
friendship  for  Italy,  engages  to  loan  to  Italy,  on  favor- 
able terms,  all  funds  received  by  the  American  govern- 
ment by  virtue  of  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace  with 
Germany. 


^Handwritten  notation  by  President  Wilson. 

-Paragraphs  indicated  by  rule  in  margin  were  ringed  in  the  original  document  by 
President  Wilson. 


Document  41. 

Balfour's  memorandum  of  May  17,  on  the  "Prob- 
lem of  Italy  and  Turkey  in  Anatolia"  (mimeo- 
graph). 

Mr.  Balfour's  Statement  Regarding  the  Problem  of  Italy 
and  Turkey  in  Anatolia,  Dated  May  16,  1919,  and  At- 
tached as  an  Appendix  to  the  Minides  of  the  Council  of 
Four,  May  17,  1919. 

The  scheme  provisionally  accepted  on  Wednesday  last 
at  a  meeting  of  the  "Three",  contemplates  the  final 
destruction  of  the  Turkish  State.  This  is  already  con- 
demned, and  I  think  rightly,  to  the  loss  of  its  European 
possessions,  its  Arab-speaking  population,  and  Armenia. 
It  is  therefore  in  any  case  reduced,  as  far  as  the  area  of  its 
Empire  is  concerned,  to  a  mere  fraction  of  its  former  self; 
this  fraction,  however,  we  originally  proposed  to  preserve, 
thus  leaving  to  the  Sultan  that  great  block  of  Anatolia 
lying  west  of  the  meridian  of  Constantinople,  which  is  not 
merely  inhabited  by  a  population  the  vast  majority  of 
whom  are  Turks,  but  which  contains  within  its  boundaries 
most  of  the  Turkish  race.  For  this  scheme  has  now  been 
substituted  one  which  cuts  this  region  into  two  separate 
states,  with  different  capitals,  different  sovereigns  and 
different  mandatories. 

I  look  with  much  misgiving  at  this  proposal.  It  will 
not  only  deeply  shock  large  sections  of  Mohammedan 
opinion,  but  I  think  it  will  also  be  made  the  subject  of  a 
great  deal  of  very  unfavourable  Christian  commentary. 
We  are  all  most  anxious  to  avoid  as  far  as  possible  placing 
reluctant  populations  under  alien  rule;  but  ought  we  not 
to  be  quite  as  careful  to  avoid  the  opposite  fault?  Is  it 
a  greater  crime  to  join  together  those  who  wish  to  be 
separated  than  to  divide  those  who  wish  to  be  united.'^ 

303 


304         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

And  if  the  Anatolian  Turks  say  they  desire  to  remain  a 
single  people  under  a  single  sovereign,  to  what  principle 
are  we  going  to  make  appeal  when  we  refuse  to  grant  their 
request? 

I  think  we  must  admit  that  no  such  scheme  would  ever 
have  been  thought  of,  if  it  had  not  been  necessary  to  find 
some  method  of  satisfying  Italian  ambitions.  Unfor- 
tunately, this  necessity  haunts  and  hampers  every  step  in 
our  diplomacy.  The  Italians,  armed  with  the  Treaty  of 
London,  and  supported  by  a  passionate  public  opinion, 
will  never  be  content  with  fragments  of  Tyrolese  and 
Jugo-Slav  territory  in  Europe;  with  French  and  British 
Colonial  concessions  in  Africa,  and  with  the  Caucasus  in 
the  Middle  East.  We  have  also  to  find  something  for 
them  out  of  the  Turkish  Empire  in  Asia  Minor.  Now  I 
believe  there  are  only  two  kinds  of  scheme  possible  by 
which  the  latter  operation  can  be  accomplished; — the 
scheme  of  partition  advocated  by  the  "Three",  and  the 
scheme  which  I  ventured  to  lay  before  them.  This  last 
has  not,  perhaps,  in  all  respects,  been  very  clearly  under- 
stood; which  is  not  surprising,  for  it  was  very  hastily 
written,  and  not  very  fully  explained.  But  the  matter  is 
so  important  that  I  may  be  permitted  to  return  to  it. 

Under  my  scheme  Turkey  remained  an  undivided 
State  without  a  Mandatory.  Its  status  was  substantially 
that  of  the  historic  Turkish  Empire.  Its  territories  were, 
indeed,  much  diminished;  it  could  no  longer  count  as  a 
Great  Power;  but  in  other  respects  the  Sultan  would 
reign  at  Brussa  or  Konia  as  his  predecessors  had  formerly 
reigned  at  Constantinople. 

Now  it  must  be  remembered  that  even  at  Constantinople 
representatives  of  the  Western  Powers  had  special 
positions  in  his  administration,  justified,  and,  indeed, 
rendered  necessary  for  various  well-known  reasons.  The 
public  debt,  the  customs,  and  in  some  cases  the  police, 
were  under  the  control  or  supervision  of  foreign  advisers. 
This  system  I  do  not  propose  to  alter,  but  rather  to  per- 
fect. The  Turks  are  familiar  with  it,  up  to  a  certain 
point  they  welcome  it,  and  they  do  not  deem  it  incon- 
sistent with  their  unity  or  their  independence. 


BALFOUR  ON  ITALY  AND  TURKEY  IN  ANATOLIA      305 

The  alternative  scheme,  which  found  favour  on  Wednes- 
day, destroys  both;  for  it  cuts  Turkey  into  two  halves; 
and  puts  each  half  under  a  separate  Mandatory.  What 
are  its  compensating  advantages?  It  is  said,  in  the  first 
place,  that  it  avoids  the  evils  of  a  Condominium.  A 
Condominium,  we  are  told,  is  never  a  success;  it  is  slow 
moving,  ineffectual  and  the  occasion  of  endless  friction 
between  the  controlling  Powers; — a  friction  so  acute  as 
even  to  endanger  the  peace  of  the  world. 

But  the  plan  I  propose  is  not  a  Condominium.  A 
Condominium,  as  I  understand  it,  is  the  joint  Government 
of  a  single  State  by  many  Powers  acting  collectively. 
Under  such  a  system,  the  Powers  first  agree  upon  a 
policy,  and  then  impose  it  upon  the  subordinate  State. 
They  control,  actually  or  potentially,  the  whole  ad- 
ministration. If  they  differ,  the  administrative  machin- 
ery stands  still.  If  their  differences  are  due  to  their 
being  moved  by  inconsistent  interests,  they  may  be- 
come acute  and  even  dangerous.  The  subordinate  Gov- 
ernment is  perpetually  tempted  to  play  one  off  against 
the  other,  and  the  whole  country  becomes  the  theatre 
of  rival  intrigues.  Everybody  quarrels,  and  nothing  is 
done. 

Now  nobody  will  pretend  that  the  Constantinople 
Government  was  a  good  one,  but  it  was  not  as  bad  as  all 
this.  There  were,  of  course,  endless  intrigues,  political 
and  financial.  There  was  a  perpetual  struggle  to  obtain 
influence  with  the  Sultan  and  his  Ministers.  There  was 
much  corruption;  there  was  much  mal-administration. 
But  it  was  never  a  Condominium.  The  Sultan  appointed 
his  ministers;  he  appointed  the  Governors  of  his  Prov- 
inces; he  raised  and  commanded  the  Army;  he  directed 
the  foreign  policy  of  his  country,  and  was  in  these  and 
all  other  important  respects,  an  independent  sovereign. 
Certain  branches  of  his  administration  were  no  doubt 
controlled,  not  by  a  foreign  Condominium,  but  by  foreign- 
ers. He  remained,  nevertheless,  in  quite  a  different  po- 
sition from  that  which  he  would  have  held  either  under 
a  Condominium  or  under  a  Mandatory. 

Another  objection  raised  against  my  scheme  is  that  it 


30G         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEIMENT 

gives  special  privileges  to  Italy  in  the  southern  part  of  the 
Turkish  state.  This  is  quite  true,  and  of  course  I  should 
greatly  prefer  that  it  were  otherwise.  But  inasmuch  as 
the  whole  plan  is  primarily  devised  in  order  to  do  some- 
thing to  satisfy  Italian  appetites,  that  is,  I  am  afraid, 
inevitable.  From  an  administrative  point  of  view,  the 
scheme  would  no  doubt  be  much  better  if  the  Italians 
played  no  part  in  it.  I  freely  admit  it — but  I  submit 
that  the  argument  is  irrelevant.  The  Italians  must 
somehow  be  mollified,  and  the  only  question  is  how  to 
mollify  them  at  the  smallest  cost  to  mankind. 

Then  it  is  said  that  to  give  the  Italians  a  first  claim  to 
concessions  in  any  district  is  to  violate  the  principle  of 
equal  opportunities  for  all  nations.  Again,  I  am  not 
prepared  to  deny  the  charge.  INIy  whole  object  is  to 
give  the  Italians  something  which  they  will  really  like, 
and  it  seems  that  they  have  a  great  liking  for  concessions. 
I  remember,  when  the  Marquis  Imperiali  was  comparing 
the  advantages  which  the  French  would  get  out  of 
Cilicia  with  the  advantages  which  Italy  was  likely  to  get 
out  of  her  share  of  Asia  Minor,  he  was  wont  to  dwell 
upon  the  wonders  of  a  certain  copper  mine,  which  he 
said,  I  am  sure  quite  truly,  was  to  be  found  somewhere 
in  the  French  zone.  In  the  same  way,  I  observe  that 
Baron  Sonnino's  eyes  are  lovinglj^  fixed  upon  a  very 
indifferent  coal  mine  on  the  Southern  shores  of  the  Black 
Sea.  Pei-sonally,  I  regard  these  hopes  and  expectations 
with  considerable  scepticism.  I  doubt  the  existence  of 
these  hidden  riches  in  Southern  Anatolia.  Even  if  they 
exist,  I  doubt  whether  their  exploitation  is  going  to  make 
Italy  rich;  and  I  have  a  strong  suspicion  that  even  if 
these  industrial  enterprises  are  started  under  Italian 
patronage,  they  will  be  found  after  no  great  lapse  of  time 
to  be  under  German  management.  But  all  this  does  not 
seem  to  me  to  be  to  the  point.  The  object  is  to  find  some 
privileged  position  for  the  Italians  in  Southern  Anatolia; 
and  I  particularly  beg  the  "Three"  to  remember  that  she 
has  already  got  the  germs  of  such  a  position  by  a  pre-war 
arrangement  which  she  made  with  the  Turks,  in  respect 
of  the  region  neighbouring  on  Adalia.     ]My  suggestion 


BALFOUR  ON  ITALY  iVND  TURKEY  IN  ANATGUA       307 

only  extends  and  emphasises  her  privileges.     It  does  not 
create  them. 

In  any  case,  as  Italy  is  not,  under  my  plan,  intended 
to  occupy  the  position  of  a  Mandatory  in  these  regions, 
the  general  principle^ — that  no  Mandatory  has  a  right  to 
exceptional  trade  advantages  in  the  country  which  it 
controls — is  not  violated.  The  only  difference  that  I  can 
see  between  what  would  happen  under  my  plan,  and  what 
would  happen  if  nothing  were  done  for  the  Italians  in 
Asia  Minor,  is  that  in  the  first  case  Italy  would  without 
question  or  controversy  have  the  refusal  of  all  concessions 
within  a  certain  area:iri  t^>e  second  case  these  concessions 
will  be  scrambled  for  at  Brussa  by  the  rival  company- 
mongers  of  every  country  under  Heaven,  supported,  no 
doubt,  by  their  respective  Ministers.  The  first  plan  may 
be  an  infringement  upon  the  liberty  and  equality,  nomi- 
nally at  least,  secured  by  the  second;  but  I  do  not  know 
that  these  most  excellent  things  are  seen  to  the  best  ad- 
vantage when  they  are  enjoyed  by  corrupt  administrators 
and  greedy  speculators. 

But  once  again,  this  is  relatively  unimportant  compared 
with  the  main  objects  of  the  scheme  I  am  endeavouring 
to  support.  This  is  designed  to  do  two  things :  to  maintain 
something  resembling  an  independent  Turkish  Govern- 
ment, ruling  over  a  homogeneous  Turkish  population;  the 
other  is  to  find  a  position  for  the  Italians  within  this 
Turkish  state  which  will  make  a  sufficient  appeal  to  the 
ambitions  of  the  Italian  Government.  From  every  other 
point  of  view  the  plan  is,  I  admit,  a  bad  one;  but  from  this 
point  of  view — which  is  the  one  at  the  moment  chiefly 
occupying  our  thoughts — I  still  think  it  worthy  of  serious 
consideration. 

[hiitialed]     A.  J.  B. 


PART  VII 
THE  JAPANESE  CRISIS 


Document  42. 

Memorandum  by  Mr.  Balfour  of  his  conversa- 
tion with  the  Japanese  Delegates  presented  to 
the  Council  of  Four,  April  28,  with  important 
letter  of  Mr.  Balfour  to  Baron  Makino  of  the 
same  date  in  which  the  relationship  of  the  Shan- 
tung settlement  to  Japanese  acceptance  of  the 
League  of  Nations  is  set  forth    (mimeograph). 

APPENDIX  VI. 

The  result  of  my  conversations  with  the  Japanese  may, 
I  think,  be  summarized  somewhat  as  follows: — 

In  the  first  place,  the  Japanese  strenuously  deny 
either  that  they  intended  to  modify  in  their  own  favour 
the  conditions  which  the  Germans  had  imposed  upon  the 
Chinese  in  connection  with  the  Shantung  Peninsula,  or 
that,  in  fact,  their  treaties  with  China  would  have  had 
that  effect. 

They  say,  on  the  contrary,  that  they  propose  sur- 
rendering all  military  control  over  the  Peninsula,  in- 
cluding the  50-kilometre  zone  around  Kiaochow  within 
w^hich  German  troops  were  allowed  but  not  Chinese,  and 
all  interference  with  the  civil  administration  of  the  terri- 
tory. Their  intention  is  fully  to  restore  Chinese  sover- 
eignty within  the  leased  territory. 

The  provisions  that  appear  in  the  Treaty  of  1918,  with 
regard  to  maintaining  a  garrison  at  Tsinan  and  guarding 
the  railway  with  Japanese  troops,  are  purely  provisional, 
and  refer  only  to  the  period  of  transition  immediately 
following  peace,  and  this  period  it  is  their  intention  to 
make  as  short  as  possible.  No  date  was  named,  how- 
ever, for  the  determination  of  this  transitory  arrangement. 

In  these  circumstances,  the  German  rights  which  the 

311 


312         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

Japanese  propose  still   to  retain  are  economic  in  their 
character.     They  consist  in: — 

1.  A  right  to  claim  a  concession  at  Tsingtau,  which, 
however,  does  not  exclude,  and  was  not  intended  to  ex- 
clude, the  right  also  for  other  countries  to  organize  an 
international  concession,  if  that  is  desired; 

2.  The  German  rights  in  the  railways  already  built, 
and  the  mines  associated  with  them.  The  railways  are 
built  on  land  which  is  in  full  Chinese  sovereignty,  and 
subject  to  Chinese  law. 

3.  Concessions  granted  to  the  Germans  for  building 
two  other  railways.  These  railways  are  to  be  built  with 
Japanese  capital,  and  the  Japanese  capitalists  are  at  this 
moment  negotiating  with  the  Chinese  Government  as  to 
the  terms  on  which  the  necessary  money  will  be  provided. 
The  Chinese  Government  will  be  able  to  secure  the  same 
position  in  regard  to  these  railways  as  it  has  over  other 
railways  constructed  by  foreign  capital. 

The  Japanese  Plenipotentiaries,  for  reasons  of  na- 
tional dignity  which  are  easy  to  understand,  are  unwilling 
to  modify  the  letter  of  the  treaties  which  they  have  made 
with  China,  but  they  are  ready  (if  I  understand  them 
rightly)  to  give  explicit  and  binding  assurances — 

(a)  That  any  concession  which  China  gives  them  at 
Tsingtau  will  not  exclude  other  foreign  enterprise  from 
the  Port. 

(b)  That  the  economic  control  of  the  railway,  which 
the  possession  of  the  majority  of  the  shares  gives  them 
will  not  be  used  in  any  way  to  discriminate  between  the 
trade  facilities  of  different  nations. 

April  27th,  1919. 

APPENDIX  VII. 

April  28th,  1919. 
Dear  Baron  Making, 

Through  no  fault  of  mine,  there  has,  I  fear,  been  some 
misunderstanding  with  regard  to  to-day's  Meeting,  and 
the  business  of  Shantung  in  which  you  are  particularly 
interested. 


BALFOUR  ON  JAPANESE  SETTLEMENTS  31S 

I  was  not  myself  present  at  the  Meeting  until  I  ac- 
cidentally heard  that  the  question  of  Shantung  was  de- 
ferred until  to-morrow,  when  they  propose  asking  you 
to  give  them  the  honor  of  your  presence.  As  soon  as  I 
heard  of  this  decision  I  went  over  to  President  Wilson's 
house,  and  again  explained  that  you  thought  it  due  to 
you  to  have  the  Shantung  question  settled  one  way  or  the 
other  before  the  discussion  on  the  League  of  Nations  came 
on  this  afternoon  at  the  Plenary  Conference.  It  was 
unfortunately  then  much  too  late  to  ask  you  to  discuss 
the  matter  with  your  colleagues  from  America,  France, 
and  England.  But  after  hearing  what  I  had  to  say  in 
supplement  of  the  paper  which  I  read  to  you  yesterday, 
I  was  authorized  to  tell  you  that  if — which  they  did  not 
doubt — the  view  which  I  represented  to  them  as  being 
yours  was  held  by  you,  they  were  quite  satisfied  as  regards 
the  permanent  arrangements  come  to  between  Japan  and 
China  on  the  question  of  Shantung.  The  essence  of  these 
arrangements,  as  I  repeated  to  them,  is  that  after  German 
rights  have  been  ceded  to  Japan,  Japan  will  hand  back  to 
China  the  whole  of  the  leased  territory  in  complete  sover- 
eignty; that  the  only  rights  which  Japan  will  retain  are  the 
economic  rights  enumerated  in  my  memorandum;  and 
that  Japan  proposes  to  take  every  precaution  to  prevent 
undue  discrimination  in  matters  of  railway  rates,  or 
port  and  harbour  dues,  or  other  cognate  matters  between 
nation  and  nation;  in  fact,  that  the  policy  of  the  open  door 
should  be  fully  carried  out  in  the  spirit  as  in  the  letter. 

The  only  points  on  which  your  colleagues  expressed 
anxiety  were  the  temporary  arrangements  with  regard  to 
guarding  the  line  and  garrisoning  Tsinan.  These,  as  they 
pointed  out,  were  not  merely  interferences  with  Chinese 
sovereignty,  but  interferences  in  excess  of  anything  which 
the  Germans  could  claim  under  their  Shantung  arrange- 
ments. They  hoped  you  would  consent  to  discuss  this 
relatively  unimportant  aspect  of  the  Shantung  problem 
to-morrow  at  11  o'clock.  They  quite  recognize,  and 
greatly  regret,  the  inconvenience  to  which  you  may  have 
been  put  owing  to  the  fact  that  the  Plenary  Conference 
will,  under  this  arrangement,  precede  the  Shantung  dis- 


314         WOODROW  WILSON  .VND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

cussion;  but  they  hoped  that,  inasmuch  as  the  main  doubts 
and  difficulties  connected  with  the  surrender  of  the 
German  lease  appear  to  be  already  satisfactorily  disposed 
of,  you  will  forgive  the  ine\atable  postponement  of  con- 
versations upon  the  purely  temporary  arrangement  which 
still  in  their  view  seem  to  raise  questions  of  difficulty. 

Yours,  &c. 
(Initialed)  A.  J.  B. 


Document  43. 

Statement,  April  30,  of  President  Wilson  re- 
garding the  Shantung  settlement,  the  substance 
of  which,  but  not  the  text,  was  given  to  the  press 
on  the  same  day:  also  cabled  to  Mr.  Tumulty 
(typewritten  original.) 

Paris,  30  April,  1919. 
The  Japanese-Chinese  matter  has  been  settled  in  a  way 
which  seems  to  me  as  satisfactory  as  could  be  got  out  of  the 
tangle  of  treaties  in  which  China  herself  was  involved,  and 
it  is  important  that  the  exact  facts  should  be  known.  I 
therefore  send  you  the  following  for  public  use  at  such  time 
as  the  matter  may  come  under  public  discussion.  In  the 
treaty  all  the  rights  at  Kiao-Chau  and  in  Shantung  Prov- 
ince belonging  to  Germany  are  to  be  transferred  without 
reservation  to  Japan,  but  Japan  voluntarily  engages,  in 
answer  to  questions  put  in  conference,  that  it  will  be  her 
immediate  policy  "to  hand  back  the  Shantung  Peninsula 
in  full  sovereignty  to  China,  retaining  only  the  economic 
privileges  granted  to  Germany  and  the  right  to  establish 
a  settlement  under  the  usual  conditions  at  Tsingtao. 
Owners  of  the  railway  will  use  special  police  only  to  insure 
security  for  traffic.  They  will  be  used  for  no  other  pur- 
pose. The  police  force  will  be  composed  of  Chinese,  and 
such  Japanese  instructors  as  the  directors  of  the  railway 
may  select  will  be  appointed  by  the  Chinese  Government. " 
It  was  understood  in  addition  that  inasmuch  as  the  sov- 
ereign rights  receded  to  China  were  to  be  unqualified,  all 
Japanese  troops  remaining  on  the  peninsula  should  be 
withdrawn  at  the  earliest  possible  time.  Japan  thus  gets 
only  such  rights  as  an  economic  concessionaire  as  are 
possessed  by  one  or  two  other  great  powers  and  are  only 
too  common  in  China,  and  the  whole  future  relationship 
between  the  two  countries  falls  at  once  under  the  guar- 

315 


316         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

antee  of  the  League  of  Nations  of  territorial  integrity  and 
political  independence.  I  find  a  general  disposition  to 
look  with  favor  upon  the  proposal  that  at  an  early  date 
through  the  mediation  of  the  League  of  Nations  all 
extraordinary  foreign  rights  in  China  and  all  spheres  of 
influence  should  be  abrogated  by  the  common  consent  of 
all  the  nations  concerned.  I  regard  the  assurances  given 
by  Japan  as  very  satisfactory  in  view  of  the  complicated 
circumstances.  Please  do  not  give  out  any  of  the  above  as 
a  quotation  from  me,  but  use  it  in  some  other  form  for 
public  information  at  the  right  time. 

WooDROw  Wilson. 


PART  VIII 
THE  ECONOMIC  SETTLEMENTS 


Document  44. 

Cablegram,  November  21,  1918,  William  G. 
McAdoo,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  to  Oscar  T. 
Crosby,  United  States  financial  representative 
in  London  (typewritten  copy)  regarding  policies 
of  continued  financial  and  economic  cooperation: 
with  letter  of  transmittal  to  President  Wilson 
from  Secretary  McAdoo,  November  22,  1918. 
(autographed  original). 

TREASURY  DEPARTMENT 

OFFICE    OF    THE    SECRETARY 

WASHINGTON 

November  22,  1918. 
Dear  Mr.  President: 

I  enclose  a  copy  of  a  cable  which  I  have  sent  Mr. 
Crosby  to  guide  him  in  his  discussions  with  the  Treasuries 
of  the  Allied  Governments.  I  shall  be  glad  if  you  will  look 
over  this  cable  and  let  me  know  if  you  wish  further  instruc- 
tions sent  to  Mr.  Crosby  in  regard  to  these  questions. 

Cordially   yours. 

The  President.  t'^^^^^^J  ^^-  ^-  McAdoo. 

The  White  House. 
Enclosure   1. 

COPY 
By  F.  J. 

ompaie  Special  Green 

Charge  to  Treasury  Department       November  21,  1918. 
Amembassy, 

London. 

For  Crosby  from  McAdoo.     Treasury  576. 
Embassy's  5620  from  Paris  October  29  midnight.     Your 

319 


3-20         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

634.  Embassy's  5662  from  Paris  November  1,  12  p.m. 
Your  644.  Embassy's  5830  from  Paris  November  13, 
1  p.m.  Your  666. 

First.  The  outstanding  contracts  in  United  States  of 
Allied  Governments  are  being  compiled.  Indications  are 
they  will  not  reach  very  heavy  total  and  that  they  will  be 
substantially  reduced  by  cancellations. 

Second.  Regard  it  as  unlikely  that  Allied  Govern- 
ments will  desire  to  make  further  additional  purchases 
here  for  strictly  military  purposes  to  any  important 
amount  but  their  applications  for  new  purchases  will  be 
strictly  scrutinized.  Our  loans  for  war  purposes  should 
rapidly  diminish  and  soon  cease.  Loans  to  some  countries 
for  food  may  have  to  continue  as  a  war  measure  until 
declaration  of  peace. 

Third.  Have  no  authority  to  make  advances  for  re- 
construction or  other  after-the-war  purposes  but  expect 
to  ask  authority  to  establish  credits  after  peace  for  limited 
period  and  to  limited  amounts  so  as  to  be  able  to  furnish 
credits  for  some  of  Allied  Governments  who  for  a  time 
after  peace  is  declared  would  not  be  in  a  position  to  pur- 
chase except  on  credit  certain  of  our  commodities  of 
which  they  are  in  need.  Such  sales  may  aid  us  in 
finding  markets  for  our  commodities  and  there  may 
be  considerable  pressure  here  to  induce  Government 
to  extend  such  aid.  I  feel  we  must  be  careful  not  to 
involve  our  Government  too  deeply  and  must  encour- 
age private  financing  of  foreign  business  as  much  as  pos- 
sible. 

Fourth.  Under  existing  legislation  we  have  authority 
before  peace  within  limits  of  existing  appropriations  to 
establish  credits  from  which  advances  may  be  made  to 
take  care  of  commitments  made  in  the  United  States  by 
Allied  Governments  in  order  that  supplies  they  require  for 
prosecution  of  the  war  should  go  forward  in  an  orderly 
manner.  I  propose  to  establish  such  credits  to  the  ex- 
tent necessary  to  care  for  such  commitments  but  have 
given  no  assurances  in  this  respect  to  Allied  Governments 
nor  do  I  consider  myself  bound  to  make  advances  for 
this  purpose  as  some  of  Allied  Governments  may  be  in  a 


McADOO  ON  AMERICAN  FINANCIAL  POLICY  321 

position  to  meet  their  commitments  otherwise  than 
through  borrowings  from  the  United  States. 

Fifth.  Our  advances  for  purchases  other  than  those 
named  in  the  United  States  should  cease  as  soon  as 
possible  and  new  commitments  for  neutral  purchases 
should  not  be  made  by  any  of  Allied  Governments  in 
expectation  that  our  advances  may  be  used  to  meet  same. 
See  our  560.  Assuming  additional  authority  for  credits 
given  by  Congress  then  as  soon  after  declaration  of  peace 
as  practicable,  and  before  if  possible,  our  loans  to  Allied 
Governments  should  in  general  be  limited  to  expenditures 
for  extraordinary  replacements  and  not  cover  commodities 
for  general  consumption. 

Sixth.  Approve  of  your  indicating  informally  to 
Allied  Governments  that  they  should  notify  their  na- 
tionals who  are  interested  in  the  import  of  articles  of 
general  consumption  to  undertake  at  once  to  make 
private  arrangements  for  their  purchases  and  to  state 
that  a  policy  of  retrenchment  in  the  Government's  loans 
from  the  United  States  must  be  contemplated  as  a  con- 
sequence of  the  armistice.  The  views  above  expressed 
coincide  with  the  conclusions  which  you  indicate  you  have 
reached  as  set  forth  in  your  666.  This  is  fortified  by  the 
important  considerations  set  forth  in  paragraph  5  of  your 
cable  of  that  number. 

Seventh.  I  would  like  to  see  all  restrictions  on  ar- 
bitrage exchange  transactions  removed  and  our  ad- 
vances to  support  exchanges  discontinued.  We  must 
however  recognize  that  the  ability  of  a  foreign  govern- 
ment and  its  nationals  to  obtain  commodities  from  us 
depends  on  their  ability  to  prevent  their  exchange  go- 
ing to  prohibitory  figures  which  in  turn  would  prevent 
them  from  utilizing  our  markets  through  private  trans- 
actions. 

Eighth.  Am  interested  to  know  that  in  your  opinion 
private  assets  available  in  allied  countries  if  used  to 
maximum  will  suffice  as  basis  of  credit  for  transactions 
involving  private  needs.  While  I  approve  of  discussions 
with  Allied  Governments  on  the  lines  that  the  Treasury 
may  not  make  advances  to  foreign  governments  for  these 


322        WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

purposes,  the  time  has  not  come  to  take  final  and  positive 
stand  on  the  subject. 

Ninth.  It  is  obviously  important  that  United  States 
should  retain  the  utmost  freedom  of  action  in  the  disposal 
of  its  resources.  Am  disposed  to  agree  with  your  con- 
clusion as  to  restricting  the  functions  of  inter-allied  bodies 
and  gradually  decreasing  their  activities  and  importance, 
thus  concentrating  all  important  negotiations  and  de- 
cisions in  Washington.  I  do  not  think  however  these 
considerations  should  cause  us  to  ignore  the  advantages  of 
cooperation  in  certain  situations,  and  I  am  quite  willing 
to  consider  cooperation  wherever  the  advantages  to  be 
derived  therefrom  are  demonstrated. 

Tenth.  Determination  of  other  branches  of  govern- 
ment and  decisions  at  peace  conference  must  have  im- 
portant effect  in  determining  the  Treasury  policies.  Am 
therefore  unable  at  present  to  prescribe  any  hard-and-fast 
rules,  but  for  your  guidance  give  you  my  present  views  in 
the  light  of  such  information  as  I  have  at  hand. 

[Sigtied]  W.  G.  McAdoo. 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury. 


Document  45. 

The  Pork  Crisis.  Letter  of  Herbert  Hoover 
to  President  Wilson,  January  8,  1919  (auto- 
graphed original),  regarding  the  refusal  of  Great 
Britain  to  continue  buying  American  food,  es- 
pecially pork,  at  war  prices:  with  his  memoran- 
dum regarding  plans  for  meeting  the  situation, 
(typewritten  original). 

AMERICAN   COMMISSION 
TO   NEGOTIATE   PEACE 

Paris,  8th  January,  1919. 
My  DEAR  Mr.  President: 

I  have  cablegrams  this  morning,  copies  of  which  are 
enclosed,  stating  that  the  whole  of  the  customary  monthly 
orders  from  the  British  buying  organizations  on  behalf  of 
the  Allied  Governments  have  been  withdrawn.  I  am 
informed  by  the  PVench  and  Italian  officials  that  it  is 
untrue,  that  they  have  not  withdrawn  their  share  of  the 
orders,  and  I  am  endeavoring  to  restore  them. 

The  Allied  food  necessities  have  been  outlined  from 
time  to  time  by  a  series  of  programmes  made  up  by  the 
Inter-iVllied  Food  Council;  the  latest  of  these  programmes 
is  as  recent  as  the  15th  of  December  and  calls  for  our 
entire  January  surplus.  Our  manufacturers  have  pro- 
vided the  particular  types  of  manufacture  required  by 
each  of  these  Governments  and  have  enormous  stocks 
of  these  materials  in  hand  ready  for  delivery  in  accordance 
with  the  indicated  programmes  above  mentioned. 

While  we  can  protect  our  assurances  given  producers 
in  many  commodities,  the  most  acute  situation  is  in  pork 
products  which  are  perishable  and  must  be  exported. 
We  have  in  January  a  surplus  of  about  400,000,000 
pounds,  and  the  French,  Italian  and  Belgian  Relief  and 

323 


321         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

other  customary  orders  when  restored  will  cover  60 
percent  of  such.  The  British  orders,  at  the  rate  in- 
dicated in  their  official  programmes,  would  have  been 
140,000,000  pounds  and  covered  our  deficiency  plus  some 
help  I  am  giving  from  the  Relief.  The  British  position 
is  that  they  have  sufficient  supplies  to  last  them  for  some 
weeks  and  that  they  wish  to  reduce  their  stocks. 

If  there  should  be  no  remedy  to  this  situation  we  shall 
have  a  debacle  in  the  American  markets,  and  with  the 
advances  of  several  hundred  million  dollars  now  out- 
standing from  the  Banks  to  the  pork  products  industry 
we  shall  not  only  be  precipitated  into  a  financial  crisis 
but  shall  betray  the  American  farmer  who  has  engaged 
himself  to  these  ends.  The  surplus  is  so  large  that  there 
can  be  no  absorption  of  it  in  the  United  States  and  it, 
being  a  perishable,  will  go  to  waste. 

You  will  recollect  that  measures  are  before  the  Con- 
gress providing  for  appropriations  for  further  economic 
assistance  to  the  Allied  Governments  and  I  am  confident 
that  with  the  disclosure  of  this  situation  and  the  apparent 
desire  of  certain  parties  in  England  to  break  the  Ameri- 
can market  will  cause  a  reaction  in  the  United  States 
that  will  destroy  the  possibility  of  this  economic  support. 
In  the  face  of  this,  the  demand  of  liberated,  neutral  and 
enemy  populations  in  Europe  as  to  fats  is  beyond  the 
ability  of  the  United  States  to  supply,  and  the  need  from 
the  point  of  view  of  preserving  order  and  laying  the 
foundation  of  peace  is  absolutely  instant  in  its  insistence. 

Mr.  Davis  and  I  have  endeavored  for  the  last  six  weeks 
to  arrange  some  cooperative  action  with  the  British 
agencies  to  forefend  this  situation  and,  as  indicated  above, 
the  final  result  has  been  the  refusal  on  their  part  to  co- 
operate. We  have  suggested  that  the  British  Govern- 
ment should  join  with  ourselves  in  the  purchase  of  the 
necessary  amounts  of  fats  at  our  assured  price  to  be  resold 
to  the  liberated  and  enemy  territories  in  order  to  prevent 
the  above  debacle,  and  in  this  they  have  finally  refused. 
I  wish  to  assure  you  again  that  the  prices  which  we  are 
maintaining  are  the  very  minimum  on  which  our  Ameri- 
can producers  can  come  out  whole  on   the  effort  they 


THE  PORK  CRISIS  325 

have  made  in  the  AlHed  cause,  and  I  cannot  impress  upon 
you  too  strongly  the  reaction  that  will  arise  in  the  United 
States  if  this  situation  falls  to  the  ground. 

With  Mr.  Davis  I  have  prepared  the  attached  memo- 
randum which  I  would  like  to  suggest  should  be  presented 
by  you  to  the  Allied  Premiers  at  the  earliest  possible 
moment,  as  I  cannot  conceive  that  men  with  their  vision 
as  to  the  present  situation  will  tolerate  for  one  moment 
the  attitude  taken. 

Faithfully  yours, 

[Signed]    Herbert  Hoover. 
His  Excellency, 

The  President  of  the  United  States, 
Paris. 

Memorandum  for  Agreement  with  Allied  Premiers, 
TO  Comprise  a  Direction  to  Their  Various 
Government  Departments. 

It  is  impossible  to  discuss  the  peace  of  the  world  until 
adequate  measures  have  been  taken  to  alleviate  the  fear 
of  hunger,  its  attendant  anarchy  and  its  danger  of  possible 
further  military  operations.  Therefore,  before  these 
peace  negotiations  can  be  opened  auspiciously,  it  is  es- 
sential to  have  the  better  feeding  of  the  liberated,  neutral 
and  enemy  territories  of  Europe  in  actual  progress  as 
the  foundation  of  stability  in  government  antecedent  to 
the  settlement  of  the  great  problems  that  will  come  be- 
fore the  Conference.  It  is  therefore  agreed  by  the  Allied 
and  the  United  States  Governments  that  each  shall,  with- 
out further  delay,  furnish  every  possible  assistance  and 
facility  required  for  carrying  out  the  undertakings  as  to 
European  Relief,  which  shall  be  carried  out  in  the  name  of 
the  Associated  Governments. 

The  United  States  has,  in  order  to  support  the  Allied 
Governments  in  war,  provided  large  supplies  of  food- 
stuffs, many  of  them  perishable,  which  would  have  been 
required  by  the  Allies  had  hostilities  continued.  In 
order  to  accumulate  these  supplies,  the  American  Govern- 
ment has  given  assurances  and  guarantees  to  their  pro- 


326         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

ducers.  The  Allied  Governments,  as  the  result  of  the 
cessation  of  hostilities  and  the  opening  of  other  markets, 
no  longer  require  the  same  amount  of  supplies  from  the 
United  States  as  they  have  from  time  to  time  indicated 
by  their  programmes. 

This  surplus  is  now  required  to  meet  the  necessities  of 
Europe,  and  it  is  most  fortunate  that  the  surplus  is  avail- 
able for  these  purposes.  It  would  be  a  disaster  to  the 
objects  of  the  Associated  Governments  if  the  congestion 
in  the  United  States  should  not  be  relieved  so  as  to  save 
waste  and  to  meet  the  assurances  given  by  the  United 
States  Government,  and  the  Allied  Governments  agree 
to  at  once  direct  their  departments  to  cooperate  with  the 
United  States  Food  Administration  to  support  these 
assurances,  and  the  application  of  these  foodstuffs  to  the 
needs  of  liberated,  neutral  and  enemy  peoples. 

Pending  the  more  mature  plans  and  settlements  of  the 
Relief  Administration  as  to  food,  shipping  and  finance, 
it  is  directed  that  immediate  provision  should  be  made 
from  any  available  source  of  food  supplies  for  provisions 
to  points  of  acute  need  in  the  Balkan  States,  the  liberated 
peoples  of  Turkey,  Austria,  to  Belgium  and  Poland,  that 
such  provision  shall  be  retroactively  the  obligation  of  the 
four  governments  pending  more  definite  arrangements. 

It  is  desirable  that  the  Associated  Governments  should 
show  their  good  will  towards  the  neutral  countries  of 
Europe  by  the  immediate  increase  in  the  permitted  im- 
portation of  the  surplus  food  commodities  to  these 
neutrals  at  once,  being  such  amounts  as  the  United 
States  shall  declare  to  be  in  surplus. 

That  it  is  necessary  to  at  once  give  evidence  of  progress 
in  the  matter  of  food  supplies  to  Germany  and  South 
Europe,  and  to  this  end  the  British,  French  and  United 
States  Governments  will  each  at  once  give  cabled  orders 
for  the  shipment  during  the  month  of  January  of  30,000 
tons  of  such  fats  (in  addition  to  their  orders  for  home 
consumption)  as  the  United  States  shall  declare  available 
for  these  relief  purposes.  These  foodstuffs  shall  be  sub- 
sequently offered  to  Germany,  subject  to  payment  there- 
for and  other  conditions  that  the  Associated  Governments 


THE  PORK  CRISIS  327 

may  impose.  That  the  Allied  Governments  and  the 
United  States  will  cooperate  in  the  securing  of  such  pay- 
ment in  a  manner  acceptable  to  each  of  the  Associated 
Governments,  and  for  providing  the  transportation  of 
such  foodstuffs.  Before  these  supplies  can  arrive,  the 
Relief  Administration  is  expected  to  be  working  and  to 
decide  the  conditions  of  distribution  of  payment  and  of 
further  supplies  and  shipping. 

These  arrangements  are  declared  binding  upon  all  de- 
partments of  the  Allied  and  the  United  States  Govern- 
ments and  shall  be  given  immediate  execution. 


Document  46. 

Letter  of  Herbert  Hoover  to  President  Wilson 
February  4,  1919,  regarding  French  obstruction 
to  plans  for  feeding  Germany,  with  copy  of  pro- 
posed resolutions,  to  be  presented  to  the  Council 
of  Ten,  providing  for  extending  food  supply  both 
to  Germany  and  to  neutral  nations  (auto- 
graphed original). 

UNITED   STATES  FOOD  ADMINISTRATION. 

Paris,  4  February,  1919. 
Dear  Mr.  President: 

An  error  in  the  enclosure  sent  to  you  in  my  letter  of 
yesterday  with  respect  to  the  relaxation  of  blockade  has, 
I  am  sorry  to  say,  confused  your  mind  on  the  matter.  I 
enclose  herewith  the  resolution  drafted  by  Mr.  McCor- 
mick  and  myself,  which  we  are  anxious  to  get  through 
the  Supreme  War  Council.     It  has  three  main  purposes: 

First.  There  is  no  right  in  the  law  of  God  or  man  that 
we  should  longer  continue  to  starve  neutrals  now  that 
we  have  a  surplus  of  food.  That  is  the  object  of  the 
first  part  of  the  first  resolution. 

Second.  The  French,  by  obstruction  of  every  financial 
measure  that  we  can  propose  to  the  feeding  of  Germany 
in  the  attempt  to  compel  us  to  loan  money  to  Germany 
for  this  purpose,  have  defeated  every  step  so  far  for  getting 
them  the  food  which  we  have  been  promising  for  three 
months.  The  object  of  the  second  part  of  the  first  reso- 
lution and  of  the  second  resolution  is  to  at  least  find 
some  channel  by  which  the  Germans  can  help  themselves 
by  trade  with  neutrals  and  South  America. 

Third.  The  object  of  the  third  resolution  is  to  allow 
the  people  bordering  on  the  Mediterranean  to  get  into 
production  and  trade  with  all  their  might  and  by  so  doing 

328 


HOOVER  ON  PLANS  FOR  FEEDING  GERMANY  329 

not  only  revive  their  commercial  life  but  also  to  a  large 
degree  supply  themselves  with  food  and  other  com- 
modities and  thus  take  a  large  part  of  the  burden  of  relief 
from  the  back  of  our  government. 

There  is  no  possibility  that  with  all  the  restrictions 
on  trade  taken  off  that  the  old  Empire  of  Austria  could 
ever  resurrect  any  military  importance.  At  the  present 
time,  we  are  actually  furnishing  food  to  points  in  Austria 
at  the  expense  of  governments  that  could  be  taken  care 
of  by  private  individuals  if  they  could  revive  their  foreign 
credits  without  enemy  trade  restrictions,  blockade  and 
censorship,  etc.,  on  commercial  transactions.  Of  impor- 
tance also  in  the  longer  view  is  that  the  Southwestern  area 
of  Europe  simply  cannot  be  fed  with  any  governmental 
resources  that  either  the  allies  or  ourselves  can  produce 
over  the  next  six  months,  unless  they  be  allowed  to  get 
into  the  production  of  exportable  commodities  at  the 
earliest  possible  moment. 

I  have  worked  consistently  since  arriving  in  Europe 
on  the  25th  day  of  November  to  secure  these  objects  and 
I  have  to  confess  that  although  they  have  been  accepted 
in  principle  in  first  one  department  and  one  government 
after  another,  they  are  constantly  defeated  by  one 
bureaucratic  and  special  self-interest  after  another  of 
various  governments,  and  I  can  assure  you  that  the 
blockade  against  neutrals  and  the  Southwest  is  being  used 
today  for  purely  economic  ends,  when  its  sole  justifi- 
cation was  for  the  protection  and  furtherance  of  military 
operations,  which  justification  is  now  gone. 

I  realize  that  there  is  still  some  political  importance 
in  maintaining  the  blockade  against  Germany  within 
certain  limits,  but  it  does  not  apply  to  the  rest  of  Europe. 
I  can  see  no  hope  of  securing  the  removal  of  these  restric- 
tions except  by  a  direct  and  strong  intervention  through 
yourself  and  mandatory  orders  given  by  the  Supreme 
War  Council. 

Any  reference  to  a  given  department  in  any  govern- 
ment will  in  many  cases  receive  a  negative  opinion  from 
individuals,  simply  because  of  interest  in  the  self-per- 
petuation of  bureaucracy  or  special  interests  of  govern- 


330         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

merit  or  trade  in  a  desire  to  continue  the  use  of  this 
weapon  for  aims  entirelj^  apart  from  the  war.  I  am 
confident  that  no  action  is  possible  except  of  a  mandatory 
character  from  the  top. 

Faithfully  yours, 
[Signed]  Herbert  Hoover. 
His  Excellency, 
The  President, 
Hotel  Murat. 
Paris. 

Proposed  Resolution  to  Be  Presented  by  the  Presi- 
dent TO  Supreme  War  Council. 

The  Supreme  War  Council  at  the  present  time  sees  no 
military  objection  to  certain  relaxations  of  economic 
control  of  the  enemy  and  approves  and  recommends  the 
following  relaxations  in  existing  export  and  import 
control: 

1.  Norway,  Sweden,  Denmark,  Holland  and  Switzer- 
land to  be  allowed  to  import  unlimited  amounts  of 
foodstuffs  and  to  be  permitted  to  re-export  foodstuffs  to 
Germany  subject  to  the  control  of  the  Associated  Govern- 
ments, the  aggregate  amount  of  such  re-exports  with 
other  imports  of  foodstuffs  by  Germanj^  not  to  exceed 
the  amount  of  foodstuffs  which  the  Supreme  War  Council 
may,  from  time  to  time,  have  agreed  to  permit  to  be 
imported  into  Germany. 

2.  Residents  of  Germany  may  be  permitted,  in  such 
manner  and  through  such  agency  as  may  be  approved  by 
the  Supreme  Council  of  Food  and  Supply  to  communicate 
with  persons  in  foreign  countries  relative  to  the  purchase 
of  such  amounts  of  foodstuffs  as  the  Supreme  War 
Council  may  have  agreed  shall  be  imported  into  Germany. 

3.  All  commodities  to  be  allowed  to  be  imported  into 
or  exported  from  South  Europe  and  countries  bordering 
on  the  Mediterranean  without  limit  as  to  amount  and 
without  guarantee  against  re-export  of  imports. 


Document  47. 

Series  of  letters  regarding  economic  situation 
and  plan  of  financial  reconstruction  of  Europe 
exchanged  between  Lord  Robert  Cecil  for  Great 
Britain,  and  Edward  M.  House  and  Bernard  M. 
Baruch  for  America.     These  are: 

1.  Colonel  House  to  Lord  Robert  Cecil  (carbon 
copy)  April  10,  1919. 

2.  Response  (autographed  original)  Lord  Rob- 
ert Cecil  to  Colonel  House,  April  11,  1919. 

3.  Letter  of  Bernard  M.  Baruch  (carbon  copy) 
to  Lord  Robert  Cecil,  April  12,  1919. 

4.  Response  (autographed  original)  of  Lord 
Robert  Cecil  to  Edward  M.  House,  April  14, 
1919. 

COLONEL  HOUSE  TO  LORD  ROBERT  CECIL. 

(Carbon  copy) 

April  10,  1919. 
Dear  Lord  Robert, 

I  have  received  this  memorandum  you  sent  me  with 
regard  to  the  Economic  Position  of  Europe.  I  agree 
with  you  as  to  the  vital  importance  of  this  matter  dis- 
cussed therein,  and  am  quite  in  accord  with  your  sug- 
gestion that  further  investigation  should  be  made  of  them. 

I  think  the  best  way  would  be  for  France,  England 
and  the  United  States  each  to  appoint  two  representatives 
of  an  expert  character  to  an  unofficial  and  informal 
Committee  which  should  report  to  us  as  soon  as  possible. 
I  will  let  you  know  our  representatives.  Will  you  let 
me  know  the  names  of  yours  and  also  arrange  matters 
with  the  French  Government.f^ 

[Edward  M.  House] 

331 


332         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 
(Autographed  original) 

BRITISH    DELEGATION 
PARIS 

April  11,  1919. 
Dear  Colonel  House, 

With  reference  to  your  letter  of  April  10,  the  names 
of  our  representatives  on  the  Committee  we  discussed 
will  be  Mr.  J.  M.  Keynes  and  the  Hon.  R.  H.  Brand. 
Mr.  Keynes  is  at  present  in  England  for  a  few  days,  but 
I  have  written  to  him  asking  him  to  serve. 

M.  Clementel  has  told  me  that  he  concurs  warmly  in 
the  idea  of  this  Committee,  and  proposes  to  appoint 
^I.  Monnet  and  M.  Cellier,  who  is,  I  understand,  one  of 
the  chief  men  in  the  Ministry  of  Finance.  I  have  told 
M.  Clementel  that  the  Committee  is  quite  informal  and 
private. 

As  soon  as  I  hear  the  names  of  your  representatives 
I  will  ask  Mr.  Brand  to  get  into  touch  with  them,  so  as 
to  make  further  arrangements. 

Yours  sincerely, 

[Signed]  Robert  Cecil. 


(Carbon  copy) 

Hotel  de  Crillon,  Paris 

April  12,  1919. 
My  dear  Lord  Robert  : 

Colonel  House  has  turned  over  to  me  the  communica- 
tions which  have  passed  between  you  and  him.  As  you 
will  recall,  you  and  I  have  discussed  this  matter,  and  I 
endeavored  to  make  it  quite  clear  that  I  thought  it  would 
be  inadvisable,  for  reasons  explained  to  you,  to  undertake 
this  now;  and  I  was  under  the  impression  that  you  con- 
curred in  this  opinion. 

In  the  Supreme  Economic  Council  we  have  discussed 
the  economic  conditions  of  the  world,  and  you  and  I  have 
talked  it  over  at  length.  Furthermore,  you  have  stated 
in  clear  and  unmistakable  terms  to  the  Council  your 
views  upon  this  subject,  in  which  we  all  concur. 


LETTERS  OF  CECIL,  HOUSE,  AND  BARUCH  333 

Moreover,  not  alone  all  the  governments  suggested 
in  the  memorandum,  but  likewise  all  other  governments, 
have  been  aware,  since  the  signing  of  the  Armistice,  of 
the  increasingly  difficult  economic  situation  in  Europe. 
The  Allied  governments  have  it  in  their  power  to  correct 
this  situation  by  removing  restrictions  that  are  hampering 
trade;  but  all  have  refused  to  do  it. 

The  raising  of  these  restrictions  includes  the  removal 
of  the  black  list  and  the  censorship,  and  the  freedom  of 
the  use  of  the  mails  and  the  cables.  This  is  something 
that  could  have  been  done  during  the  last  five  months, 
can  be  done  now,  and  would  go  far  towards  solving  the 
problem.  Until  this  is  done,  the  economic  situation  will 
continually  grow  worse,  and  may  reach  a  position  where 
financial  assistance  may  be  of  no  avail.  Unless  the 
governments  do  this  at  once,  it  is  useless  to  discuss  any 
other  phase  of  the  problem.  What  is  the  value  of 
setting  up  a  commission  to  discuss  this  question,  when 
a  solution  has  already  been  recommended  to  the  various 
governments,  yet  nothing  has  been  done,  while  all  Europe 
suffers.'^ 

The  salvation  of  the  world  must  rest  upon  the  initiative 
of  individuals.  Individual  credit  can  be  established 
where  governmental  credit  is  gone.  It  is  of  a  volume 
far  beyond  the  capacity  of  governmental  credit,  where  it 
does  exist.  It  is  smothered  in  the  Allied  countries,  and 
in  all  other  countries,  by  the  restrictions. 

You  yourself  have  observed  that,  with  Europe  burning 
up,  certain  governments  have  refused  to  give  locomotives, 
now  lying  idle,  to  countries  whose  structures  are  fast 
disintegrating.  You  know  of  the  difficulties  of  trade 
in  Roumania,  and  in  other  parts  of  Europe,  which  are 
causing  the  very  conditions  which  it  would  be  your  en- 
deavor to  remedy. 

I  suggest  that  we  do  not  create  another  commission 
to  advise  the  governments  to  do  the  things  they  have 
already  been  advised  to  do,  which  can  be  done  now, 
and  which  we  all  know  will  help  the  situation,  but  which 
are  not  done.  Let  us  rather  bend  our  energies  to  con- 
vincing our  governments  to  do  these  things  now.     You 


334         WOODROW  WILSON  .\ND  \YORLD  SETTLEMENT 

know   what   the  position  of   the  American  government 
has  been. 

Very  sincerely  yom-s, 

[Bernard    M.    Baruch.] 
The  Rt.  Hon.  Lord  Robert  Cecil, 
Villa  Majestic,  Paris. 


(Autographed  original) 

w. 

April  14th,  1919. 


OFFICES  OF  THE   WAR   CABINET 
WHITEHALL  GARDENS,  S.  W.  1. 


My  dear  Mr.  Baruch, 

I  received  your  letter  of  the  12th  this  morning. 

As  you  know,  I  am  entirely  in  sympathy  with  your 
view  that  all  restrictions  not  proved  to  be  necessary 
should  be  removed,  and  I  have  very  little  doubt  that 
black  lists  will  be  suspended  and  that  the  modifications 
which  you  suggested  in  the  Censorship  will  be  made.  I 
do  not  quite  know  what  you  mean  by  freedom  of  the  use 
of  mails  and  cables,  but  I  shall  be  very  glad  to  take 
that  up  when  I  see  you.  But  with  the  rest  of  your  letter 
I  do  not  feel  myself  in  agreement. 

In  the  first  place,  I  am  sorry  you  should  have  ever 
misunderstood  me  to  the  extent  of  thinking  that  I  thought 
there  was  any  advantage  in  shirking  the  large  economic 
issues  which  lie  before  us.  I  thought  I  had  made  it  quite 
clear  that  in  my  judgment  they  must  be  faced  and  dealt 
with  if  possible  before  the  President  leaves  Europe.  You 
think  that  without  question  the  economic  situation  can 
be  solved  by  individual  initiative.  It  may  be  so,  though 
my  own  opinion  is  to  the  contrary,  and  it  is  for  that 
reason  that  I  pressed  for  the  summoning  of  a  small  expert 
Committee  to  which  Colonel  House  agreed.  It  may  be 
that  the  result  of  the  enquiry  will  show  that  without 
American  assistance  on  a  large  scale,  nothing  can  be  done, 
and  it  may  also  be  that  America  will  decline  to  give  that 
assistance.  If  she  intends  to  take  that  attitude,  forgive 
me  for  saying  that  she  ought  to  take  it  quite  openly  and 


LETTERS  OF  CECIL,  HOUSE,  AXD  BARUCH  335 

before  the  face  of  the  world.     Then  we  in  Europe  shall 
know  the  extent  of  the  problem  that  faces  us. 

I  am  afraid  if  I  write  more  plainly,  I  shall  offend  even 
your  partiality. 

Yours  very  sincerely, 
[Signed]  Robert  Cecil. 
B.  Baruch,    Esq. 


Document  48. 

The  Keynes  Financial  Scheme,  (printed)  to- 
gether with  letter  of  explanation,  date  April  23, 
1919,  from  Mr.  Lloyd  George  to  President  Wilson 
(autographed  original). 

BRITISH  DELEGATION 
PARIS 

23rd  April,  1919. 
Dear  Mr.  President, 

The  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  and  Lord  Robert 
Cecil,  on  behalf  of  the  British  representatives  on  the 
Supreme  Economic  Council,  have  forcibly  urged  on  the 
notice  of  His  Majesty's  Government  the  necessity  of  some 
bolder  solution  for  the  rehabilitation  of  the  credit  and 
economic  life  of  Europe  than  is  now  available.  For  the 
time  being  the  United  States  is  providing  on  a  generous 
scale  for  the  urgent  food  requirements  of  the  non-enemy 
countries  of  Europe.  We,  on  our  part,  are  furnishing 
assistance  on  a  more  modest  scale.  But  these  measures 
which  are  primarily  directed  to  the  relief  of  immediate 
distress,  are  inadequate,  as  Mr.  Hoover  himself  is  the 
first  to  recognise,  to  the  solution  of  the  whole  economic 
problem.  On  the  one  hand,  the  United  States  may  not 
be  able  to  continue  indefinitely  her  present  assistance; 
on  the  other  hand,  this  assistance  does  not  touch  the  prob- 
lem of  supplying  raw  materials  to  any  of  the  countries 
concerned  and  does  not  apply  to  the  enemy  countries  at  all. 

The  position  as  it  is  reported  by  the  British  represen- 
tatives on  the  Supreme  Economic  Council  is  as  follows: 
In  the  case  of  Germany  the  existing  financial  provision 
is  not  expected  to  look  after  food  supplies  alone  much 
beyond  June,  and  for  raw  materials  there  is  no  provision 
at  all,  which,  in  view  of  existing  unemployment,  are  not 

386 


THE  KEYNES  FINANCIAL  SCHEME  337 

less  necessary  if  order  is  to  be  preserved  in  that  country, 
peace  to  be  signed  and  the  obHgations  of  the  peace  to  be 
fulfilled.     The  other  enemy  countries  are  at  a  complete 
economic  standstill  and  there  is  at  present  no  plan  what- 
ever for  dealing  with  them  or  for  preserving  their  social 
and  economic  organisation  from  disruption  and  decay. 
The  condition  of  the  new  States,  of  Serbia  and  of  Rumania 
is  hardly  better.     Mr.  Hoover  is  meeting  their  immediate 
food  requirements,  but  their  economic  and  commercial 
fabric  cannot  be  created  or  re-created  unless  they  can  be 
put  in  the  possession  of  purchasing  power  with  which 
to  enter  the  markets  of  the  world.     France,  Italy  and 
Belgium    present    a    different   problem.     But    here   also 
the  external  financial  position  has  been  represented  to  the 
Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer  by  the  Finance  Ministers 
of  these  countries  to  be  little  short  of  desperate,  and  the 
need  of  outside  assistance  to  be  essential  if  they  are  to 
restore  their  countries  and  recommence  the  normal  ac- 
tivities of  peace.     The  United  Kingdom  enters  upon  the 
peace  in  a  somewhat  less  unfavourable  condition,  with 
the  question  as  to  how  we  are  to  pay  what  we  owe  to  the 
United  States  Treasury  as  the  chief  problem  of  our  ex- 
ternal finance;  but  we  are  in  no  position  to  give  assistance 
to  others  on  anything  approaching  the  scale  which  they 
require.     I  may  add  this,  however,  that  the  difference 
between  the  position  in  England  and  the  complete  eco- 
nomic prostration  of  some  of  the  other  countries  named 
above  is  so  enormous,  that  our  own  serious  difficulties 
in  getting  the  wheels  of  industry  going  may  be  some  index 
to  the  appalling  magnitude  of  the  problem  in  these  other 
countries.     In  short,  the  economic  mechanism  of  Europe 
is  jammed.     Before  the  war,  as  Mr.  Hoover  has  said, 
400,000,000  Europeans  by  working  their  hardest  just  man- 
aged to  feed,  clothe  and  house  themselves,  and  perhaps  six 
months'  capital  on  which  to  live.     That  capital  has  van- 
ished; the  complicated  machinery  of  internal  and  external 
production  is  more  or  less  smashed;  production  has  to 
a  great  extent  ceased.     The  largely  increasing  popula- 
tion of  Europe  has  only  been  maintained  by  the  increasing 
development  and  inter-connection  of  world  industry  and 


X3S         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

finance.  If  this  is  not  only  checked,  but  for  the  time 
being  destroyed,  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  the  population 
can  be  maintained,  at  any  rate  during  the  very  painful 
period  of  drastic  re-adjustment.  If  free  movement  were 
possible  and  other  countries  could  absorb  it,  there  would 
inevitably  be  a  vast  emigration  from  Europe,  until  an 
equilibrium  were  established  between  the  numbers  of 
the  population  and  the  means  of  livelihood.  As  that 
is  not  possible  this  equilibrium  must  be  reached  in  some 
other  way.  In  Russia  it  is  being  reached,  it  appears, 
by  reduction  of  population  by  starvation,  and  by  drastic 
changes  of  occupation,  e.  g.,  by  a  town  population  being 
forced  out  on  the  land  as  labourers. 

To  what  extent  the  same  conditions  spread  over  the 
rest  of  Europe  must  depend  largely  on  whether  or  not 
the  obstacles  to  the  resumption  of  production  can  be 
rapidly  overcome. 

What,  in  such  circumstances,  are  the  alternatives  be- 
fore us.'^  In  some  quarters  the  hope  is  entertained  that 
with  the  early  removal  of  obstacles  in  the  form  of  the 
Blockade  and  similar  measures  to  free  international 
intercourse,  private  enterprise  may  be  safely  entrusted 
with  the  task  of  finding  the  solution.  I  am  in  accord 
with  the  view  that  an  early  removal  of  such  obstacles 
is  an  essential  measure,  and  that  in  the  long  run  we  must 
mainly  look  for  our  salvation  to  the  renewed  life  of  private 
enterprise  and  of  private  initiative.  Indeed,  so  far  as 
trading  and  manufacture  is  concerned,  as  distinct  from 
finance,  no  other  measures  should  be  necessary  from  the 
outset.  Nevertheless,  in  the  financial  sphere,  the  problem 
of  restoring  Europe  is  almost  certainly  too  great  for  private 
enterprise  alone  and  every  delay  puts  this  solution  further 
out  of  court.  There  are  two  main  obstacles:  (a)  the 
risks  are  too  great;  (b)  the  amounts  are  too  big  and  the 
credit  required  too  long.  The  more  prostrate  a  country 
is  and  the  nearer  to  Bolshevism  the  more  presumably  it 
requires  assistance.  But  the  less  likely  is  private  enter- 
prise to  do  it.  To  a  small  extent  and  with  a  great  margin 
some  trade  will  be  done  and  some  barter.  But  not  enough 
to  meet  the  situation. 


THE  KEYNES  FINANCIAL  SCHEME  330 

Apart  from  private  enterprise  His  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment see  onl}^  two  possible  courses — direct  assistance  and 
various  forms  of  guaranteed  finance,  on  a  very  much 
larger  scale  than  is  at  present  contemplated,  by  the 
more  prosperous  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  countries, 
which  probably  means  to  an  extent  of  not  less  than  90%, 
the  United  States,  or  an  attempt  to  re-create  the  credit 
system  of  Europe  and  by  some  form  of  world  wide  co- 
operation to  enable  the  countries  whose  individual  credit 
is  temporarily  destroyed  to  trade  on  their  prospects  of 
Reparation  from  the  Enemy  States  or  to  capitalise  their 
future  prospects  of  production.  Every  consideration  of 
policy  and  interest  indicates  the  superiority  of  the  second. 
The  people  of  Europe  will  have  to  live  on  the  fruits  of 
their  own  daily  labour  and  not  on  the  bounty  of  another 
country. 

His  Majesty's  Government,  therefore,  desire  to  lay 
before  the  Governments  of  the  United  States,  of  France 
and  of  Italy  the  concrete  proposal  contained  in  the 
paper  annexed  to  this  letter  as  their  constructive  con- 
tribution to  the  solution  of  the  greatest  financial  problem 
ever  set  to  the  modern  world.  They  are  prepared  to 
commit  themselves  immediately  to  participation  in  such 
a  scheme,  subject  to  the  legislative  sanction  which  it  will 
presumably  require  in  all  countries;  and  they  invite  your 
observations  and  your  criticisms. 

I  do  not  propose  to  enter  upon  any  detailed  explana- 
tion or  justification  of  this  proposal  until  it  has  been 
examined  in  outline  by  yourself  and  your  advisers.  There 
are  many  points  in  it  which  will  require  very  careful  dis- 
cussions between  our  experts,  and  it  is  doubtless  capable 
of  much  modification  and  improvement  without  detri- 
ment to  the  main  ideas  which  underlie  it.  But  these 
ideas  I  recommend  to  your  judgment. 

I  may,  however,  at  the  present  stage  say  this  much. 
The  scheme  is  an  attempt  to  deal  simultaneously  in  as 
simple  a  way  as  possible  with  several  distinct  problems. 
The  countries  which  have  been  the  victims  of  devasta- 
tion are  enabled  to  convert  the  bonds  of  the  enemy  into 
immediate   purchasing  power  for  the  purpose  of  early 


340        WOODROW  WILSON  .\ND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

restoration.  France  is  probably  the  greatest  gainer  from 
this  scheme  and  is  offered  a  way  out  from  her  almost 
overwhelming  financial  difficulties.  The  acute  problem 
of  the  liquidation  of  inter-ally  indebtedness,  while  not 
disposed  of,  is  sensibly  ameliorated.  The  Governments 
of  the  new  States  are  enabled  to  prepare  definite  economic 
programmes  which  will  consolidate  their  at  present  pre- 
carious positions  and  inspire  confidence  in  their  peoples. 
The  Neutrals  are  shown  that  their  claims  against  the 
estate  of  the  enemy  will  not  be  overlooked,  in  spite  of 
the  circumstances  of  these  claims'  origin,  provided  they 
are  prepared  to  play  their  part  in  the  world  wide  scheme 
for  the  preservation  of  the  credit  of  Europe.  The  enemy 
peoples  are  shown  a  w^ay  of  discharging  a  part  of  their 
obligations  and  are  given  a  reasonable  measure  of  security 
for  their  economic  existence  in  the  immediate  future. 
The  good  faith  of  the  world  as  a  whole  is  pledged  for  the 
carrying  out  of  a  scheme,  the  sole  object  of  which  is  to  set 
on  its  feet  the  new  Europe.  On  the  other  hand  it  opens 
prospects  of  a  renewal  of  trade  to  those  countries  primar- 
ily the  United  States  and  secondarily  the  British  Em- 
pire, who  have  surplus  goods  to  export  or  a  favourable 
balance  of  trade  to  liquidate.  It  cannot  be  supposed 
that  the  two  great  continents,  America  and  Europe,  the 
one  destitute  and  on  the  point  of  collapse  and  the  other 
overflowing  with  goods  which  it  wishes  to  dispose  of, 
can  continue  to  face  one  another  for  long  without  attempt- 
ing to  frame  some  plan  of  mutual  advantage.  And  if  it  be 
admitted,  as  it  must  be,  that  trade  can  only  recommence 
on  the  basis  of  credit  of  some  kind,  what  better  security 
can  the  lenders  hope  to  secure  than  is  herein  proposed  .^^ 
But  chief  of  all,  perhaps,  only  a  scheme  of  large  and  broad 
dimensions,  which  can  be  announced  to  and  understood 
by  the  whole  world,  can  inspire  that  sentiment  of  hope 
which  is  the  greatest  need  of  Europe  at  this  moment. 
A  proposal  which  unfolds  future  prospects  and  shows 
the  peoples  of  Europe  a  road  by  which  food  and  em- 
ployment and  orderly  existence  can  once  again  come 
their  way,  will  be  a  more  powerful  weapon  than  any 
other  for  the  preservation  from  the  danger  of  Bolshevism 


THE  KEYNES  FINANCIAL  SCHEME  341 

of  that  order  of  human  society  which  we  believe  to  be  the 
best  starting  point  for  future  improvement  and  greater 
well  being. 

I  suggest  that  the  relation  of  this  scheme  to  the  Rep- 
aration Terms,  which  we  are  about  to  place  before  the 
German  Government  might  be  as  follows.  In  these 
terms  as  at  present  drafted  we  demand  an  immediate 
payment  of  £1,000,000,000  from  which  sum  is  first  to  be 
deducted  the  cost  of  the  Armies  of  Occupation  and  of 
approved  supplies  of  food  and  raw  material  to  the  enemy. 
I  suggest  that  if  the  present  proposal  is  adopted  the  initial 
payment  might  be  £1,000,000,000  exclusive  of  the  cost  of 
the  Armies  of  Occupation  and  of  approved  supplies,  and 
that  the  enemy  might  be  permitted  to  pay  £724,000,000 
out  of  this  sum  in  special  Bonds  thus  to  be  created, 
providing  the  balance  and  also  the  cost  of  the  Armies  by 
the  transfer  of  ships,  gold,  securities  and  so  forth. 

Ever  sincerely, 
[Signed]  D.  Lloyd  George. 


{Secret.) 

Scheme  for  the  Rehabilitation  of  European  Credit 
AND  FOR  Financing  Relief  and  Reconstruction. 

April,  1919. 

1. — (i)  German  Bonds  to  be  issued  to  a  present  value 
of  £1,000,000,000  and  to  a /ace  value  of  £1,200,000,000, 
carrying  interest  at  the  rate  of  4  per  cent,  per  annum  and 
sinking  fund  at  the  rate  of  1  per  cent,  per  annum  as  from 
January  1st,  1925,  these  payments  to  have  priority  over 
all  other  German  obligations  whatever,  including  addi- 
tional claims  for  reparation  not  covered  out  of  the  above, 
the  difference  between  the  face  value  and  the  present 
value  representing  the  funding  of  interest  from  January 
1st,  1920,  up  to  January  1st,  1925. 

(ii)  Austrian,  Hungarian  and  Bulgarian  Bonds  to  be 

issued  to  the  present  value  of  £125,000,000,  £170,000,000 

and   £50,000,000   respectively   on    similar    conditions. 

(N.B. — Turkey  to  be  dealt  with  separately.) 


342        WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

(iii)  Roumanian*  Polish,  Czecho-Slovakian,  Jugo- 
slav* and  Baltic  States  Bonds  to  be  issued  to  the  pres- 
ent value  of  £15,000,000,  £40,000,000,  £20,000,000, 
£15,000,000  and  £10,000,000  respectively  on  similar 
conditions. 

2.  Interest  on  each  of  the  issues  of  Enemy  Bonds  under 
1  (i)  and  (ii)  above  to  be  guaranteed  jointly  and  sever- 
ally by  the  other  Enemy  States,  in  the  event  of  any  one 
of  them  failing  to  provide  the  payments  due. 

3.  In  the  event  of  the  failure  of  the  above  guarantees, 
interest  at  4  per  cent,  on  all  the  above  Bonds  to  the  ag- 
gregate present  value  of  £1,500,000,000  (or  £1,800,000,000 
as  from  January  1st,  1925),  to  be  guaranteed  by  the  prin- 
cipal Allied  and  Associated  Governments,  by  the  three 
Scandinavian  Governments  and  by  the  Governments  of 
Holland  and  Switzerland. 

4.  In  the  event  of  the  guarantee  under  (3)  becoming 
operative,  the  guaranteeing  Governments  to  be  respon- 
sible in  proportions  determined  in  advance,  as  set  forth 
in  the  accompanying  Schedule  A. 

5.  In  the  event  of  any  of  the  guaranteeing  Govern- 
ments failing  to  meet  their  guarantee,  the  remaining 
guaranteeing  Governments  to  make  good  this  failure 
in  the  same  proportions  amongst  themselves  as  under  (4). 

6.  A  failure  of  any  Government  to  meet  its  guarantee 
under  the  above  clauses  to  be  considered  by  the  Financial 
Section  of  the  League  of  Nations,  and  if  judged  by  them 
to  have  been  avoidable  shall  be  punished  by  such  penalty 
or  forfeiture  of  a  financial,  economic  or  commercial 
character  as  the  League  of  Nations  may  determine. 

7.  The  Bonds  to  be  free  of  all  taxation  in  all  the  issuing 
or  guaranteeing  States. 

8.  Of  the  £1,000,000,000  Bonds  to  be  issued  by  the 
German  Government  £724,000,000  shall  be  paid  over 
to  the  Allied  and  Associated  Governments  on  account  of 
sums  due  for  Reparation,  £76,000,000  shall  be  utilized  for 
the  discharge  of  existing  debts  to  the  three  Scandi- 
navian countries,  Holland  and  Switzerland;  and  the 
remaining  one-fifth   of  the  total,  namely,  £200,000,000 

*Roumania  and  Serbia  also  to  receive  a  share  of  Reparation. 


THE  KEYNES  FINANCIAL  SCHEME  343 

shall  be  left  in  the  hands  of  the  German  Government  to 
be  made  available  for  the  purchase  of  food  and  raw 
materials. 

9.  Of  the  bonds  amounting  to  £345,000,000  in  all  to  be 
issued  by  the  Austrian,  Hungarian  and  Bulgarian  Gov- 
ernments, four-fifths  in  each  case  shall  be  paid  over  to 
the  Allied  and  Associated  Governments  on  account  of 
sums  due  for  Reparation,  the  remaining  one-fifth  being 
left  in  the  hands  of  these  Governments  for  the  purchase 
of  food  and  raw  materials. 

10.  The  Bonds  amounting  in  all  to  the  present  value 
of  £1,000,000,000  to  be  received  by  the  Allied  and  Asso- 
ciated Governments  on  account  of  Reparation  to  be  di- 
vided between  them  in  the  proportions  determined  upon 
by  them  for  the  division  of  Reparation  receipts  generally. 

11.  The  Bonds  to  be  accepted  at  their  par  value  plus 
accrued  interest  in  payment  of  all  indebtedness  between 
any  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Governments. 

12.  The  Bonds  to  be  acceptable  as  first-class  collateral 
for  loans  at  the  Central  Banks  of  all  the  issuing  or  guar- 
anteeing States,  subject  to  such  terms  and  limitations  as 
may  be  in  force  with  these  institutions  from  time  to  time. 

SCHEDULE    A. 

PER  CENT 

United  Kingdom 20 

United  States 20 

France  20 

Italy 10 

Japan 10 

Belgium 5 

Norway 
Sweden 

Denmark     \ 15 

Holland 
Switzerland] 


r 


Document  49. 

Letter  of  President  Wilson  to  Mr.  Lloyd 
George,  May  5,  1919,  criticizing  and  oppos- 
ing the  Keynes  financial  scheme  (typewritten 
copy). 

5  May,  1919. 
My  dear  Mr.  Pri:\ie  Minister  : 

I  have  carefully  considered  your  recent  communication 
enclosing  a  scheme  suggested  for  the  re-establishment  of 
more  normal  economic  and  financial  conditions  in  Europe. 
I  am  fully  alive  to  the  confused  conditions  that  now  exist 
and  to  the  very  great  importance  of  trying  to  clear  and 
improve  them,  especially  in  respect  to  the  situation  of 
the  new  and  weaker  nations  that  are  to  be  set  up  under 
the  Treaty  of  Peace. 

I  am  sorry  to  say,  however,  that  Mr.  Keynes'  plan 
does  not  seem  feasible  from  the  American  point  of  view. 
Our  Treasury  and  our  financial  delegates  here  in  Paris 
are  convinced  that  the  plan  as  presented  lacks  many 
elements  of  economic  and  financial  soundness.  I  have 
asked  our  Treasury  representatives  here,  Mr.  Davis  and 
Mr.  Lamont,  to  explain  in  detail  to  your  financial  advisors 
the  serious  objections  to  the  plan  which  present  them- 
selves to  us.  Personally,  I  am  convinced  of  the  soundness 
of  these  objections.  I  am  convinced,  moreover,  that  it 
would  not  be  possible  for  me  to  secure  from  the  Congress 
of  the  United  States  authority  to  place  a  Federal  guar- 
antee upon  Bonds  of  European  origin.  Whatever  aid 
the  Congress  may  see  fit  to  authorize  should,  in  my 
judgment,  be  rendered  along  independent  lines.  By 
that  I  do  not  mean  in  ways  that  would  not  involve  close 
and  cordial  cooperation  with  European  governments, 
for  such  harmony  and  cooperation  I  consider  indispen- 

344 


WILSON  ON  THE  KEYNES  FINANCIAL  SCHEME         345 

sable.  I  mean  merely  that  such  cooperation  should  not, 
so  far  as  America  is  concerned,  take  the  form  of  a  guar- 
antee upon  bonds.  Our  Treasury  also  holds  the  view 
(and  in  this  again  I  concur)  that  to  the  very  limit  of  what 
is  practicable  such  credits  as  it  may  be  wise  to  grant 
should  be  extended  through  the  medium  of  the  usual 
private  channels  rather  than  through  the  several  Gov- 
ernments. Your  Treasury,  I  understand,  and  certainly 
ours,  believes  it  wise  to  retire  at  the  earliest  possible 
moment  from  "the  banking  business." 

In  order,  however,  that  practical  progress  may  be  made, 
I  have  asked  our  local  advisors  here  to  present  to  me  their 
views  as  soon  as  possible.  Meantime,  may  I  not  call 
to  your  attention  the  following  facts  and  considerations 
with  regard  to  Germany's  present  and  prospective  finan- 
cial situation? 

(a)  Germany  requires  working  capital.  Without  that, 
she  will  be  unable  to  start  her  industrial  life  again,  and 
therefore  unable  to  make  any  substantial  progress  in  the 
way  of  reparation,  but 

(b)  The  provision  of  the  reparation  clauses  of  the  pro- 
posed treaty  demand  that  Germany  shall  deliver  over 
at  once  all  her  working  capital,  that  is,  practically  the 
whole  of  her  liquid  assets. 

(c)  Simultaneously  the  suggestion  is  in  effect  made 
that  America  should  in  a  large  measure  make  good  this 
deficiency,  providing  in  one  form  or  another  credit,  and 
thus  working  capital,  to  Germany. 

Throughout  the  reparation  discussions  the  American 
delegation  has  steadily  pointed  out  to  the  other  delega- 
tions that  the  plans  proposed  would  surely  deprive  Ger- 
many of  the  means  of  making  any  appreciable  reparation 
payments.  I  myself,  as  you  know,  have  frequently  made 
the  same  observation.  But  whenever  any  of  us  was 
urgent  on  this  point,  he  was  accused  of  being  Pro-German. 
Our  delegation  finally  gave  assent  to  the  reparation 
clauses  as  drawn,  only  because  the  reparation  problem 
was  one  that  chiefly  concerned  France,  Great  Britain, 
Belgium,  and  the  other  European  countries,  and  not 
America. 


an 
L   wi' 


34G         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

I  venture  to  point  this  situation  out  to  you  in  order 
that  I  may  make  the  following  point  clear.  America  has, 
in  my  judgment,  always  been  ready  and  will  alwaj^s  stand 
ready  to  do  her  full  share  financially  to  assist  the  general 
situation.  But  America  has  grave  difficulties  of  her 
own.  She  has  been  obliged  within  two  years  to  raise  by 
means  of  war  loans  and  taxes  the  sum  of  forty  billion 
dollars.  This  has  been  a  very  heavy  burden,  even  for 
our  well-to-do  commonwealth,  especially  in  view  of  the 
fact  of  the  short  period  during  which  such  sums  of  money 
had  to  be  raised:  and  our  Treasury  informs  me  that  our 
investing  public  have  reached,  and  perhaps  passed,  the 
point  of  complete  saturation  in  respect  of  investments. 
Such  is  our  situation. 

You  have  suggested  that  we  all  address  ourselves  to 
the  problem  of  helping  to  put  Germany  on  her  feet,  but 
how  can  your  experts  or  ours  be  expected  to  work  out  a 
7ieiv  plan  to  furnish  working  capital  to  Germany  when  we 
deliberately  start  out  by  taking  away  all  Germany's 
present  capital. ^^  How  can  anyone  expect  America  to 
turn  over  to  Germany  in  any  considerable  measure  new 
working  capital  to  take  the  place  of  that  which  the 
European  nations  have  determined  to  take  from  her? 
Such  questions  would  appear  to  answer  themselves,  but 
I  cannot  refrain  from  stating  them,  because  they  so 
essentially  belong  to  a  candid  consideration  of  the  whole 
difficult  problem  to  which  we  are  addressing  ourselves, 
with  as  sincere  a  desire  as  that  of  their  colleagues  to 
reach  a  serviceable  conclusion. 

Cordially  and  sincerely  yours, 
[Signed]  Woodrow  Wilson. 

The  Right  Honorable  David  Lloyd  George, 
Prime  Minister  of  Great  Britain,    f 
Paris,  France. 


Document  50. 

Letter  of  Bernard  M.  Baruch  to  President 
Wilson,  May  7,  suggesting  American  ideas  for 
the  reconstruction  of  Europe  (autographed 
original) . 

AMERICAN  COMMISSION 
TO    NEGOTIATE    PEACE 

Hotel  de  Crillon,  Paris, 
May  7,  1919. 
My  dear  Mr.  President: 

German  militarism  has  been  destroyed  and  the  peoples 
of  the  world  set  free  from  political  domination  not  of 
their  own  choosing.  The  rights  of  self-determination 
and  political  freedom  are  coming  to  the  whole  world 
which  finds  itself  exhausted  from  the  struggle  to  attain 
these  ends — exhausted  mentally,  physically  and  finan- 
cially. It  is  staggering  under  huge  debts.  The  conse- 
quent grave  industrial  problems  will  require  the  strongest 
and  most  sympathetic  treatment.  But  unless  great  care  is 
taken,  military  domination  will  be  succeeded  by  financial 
domination. 

All  of  the  countries  owe  large  debts,  for  the  most  part  to 
the  United  States,  England  and  France.  Exchange  has 
depreciated  and  commercial  and  economic  life  is  prostrate. 

In  order  that  a  government  like  Italy  and  new  govern- 
ments such  as  the  Baltic  Provinces,  Poland,  Czecho- 
slovakia and  Jugo-Slavia,  and  the  Balkan  States  such 
as  Roumania  and  Bulgaria  may  establish  themselves 
financial  assistance  must  be  given.  Otherwise  these 
people  will  find  themselves  financially  shackled  for  years 
to  come  by  a  domination  more  severe  and  more  difficult 
to  throw  off  than  was  the  military  domination. 

Permit  me  to  say  that  I  think  it  is  the  duty  of  the 

347 


348        WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

United  States,  which  has  done  so  much  to  free  these 
people  and  to  estabHsh  high  purposes  and  ideals  in  the 
world,  to  complete  its  work  of  freeing  these  people  by 
giving  them  an  equal  opportunity  in  the  world. 

I  recommend  that  aid  be  given  to  stricken  Europe  by 
the  United  States,  in  cooperation  with  England,  France 
and  any  other  country  that  desires  to  join;  that  the  aid 
be  not  given  jointly  but  independently;  that  the  United 
States,  England  and  France  should  each,  by  consulta- 
tion, know  what  the  others  are  doing  in  order  that  there 
may  be  no  duplication  of  effort. 

A  prime  condition  of  our  granting  aid  should  be  the 
establishment  of  equality  of  trade  conditions  and  removal 
of  economic  barriers.  Any  credits  we  give  should  be 
contingent  upon  the  cancellation  of  preferential  treaties 
and  trade  agreements  now  existing,  and  upon  an  under- 
standing that  the  monies  advanced  by  any  of  the  govern- 
ments should  not  be  held  as  a  special  charge  against  the 
customs  or  duties  or  public  utilities  of  any  country.  All 
advances  should  be  made  with  the  understanding  that 
the  nationals  of  all  countries  should  receive  equal  oppor- 
tunity^ to  do  business  in  the  country  to  which  the  money 
has  been  advanced,  and  that  no  preference  or  special 
concession  should  be  given  to  the  country  making  the 
advance,  except  that  where  commercial  credits  are 
granted  the  material  should  be  bought  in  the  country 
making  the  advance. 

The  restoration  of  economic  life  in  Europe,  particu- 
larly in  the  new  states  which  are  being  constituted  by 
the  terms  of  the  Peace  Treaty,  require  the  following: 

One:  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  should  be  em- 
powered, with  the  approval  of  the  President,  where 
necessary,  to  adjust  and  change  the  terms  of  payment  of 
principal  and  interest  of  the  loans  made  to  other  govern- 
ments. Exchange  in  all  countries  has  depreciated  and  it 
will  be  difficult,  until  economic  conditions  improve,  to  pay 
in  dollars  in  some  cases  even  the  interest  on  these  loans. 
If  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  funded  the  loans  over 
long  periods  and  deferred  the  interest  payments  (taking 
notes  for  the  interest  for  periods  of  from  three  to  five 


BARUCH  ON  THE  RECONSTRUCTION  OF  EUROPE       S49 

years)  these  countries  would  be  freed  from  the  immediate 
necessity  of  finding  money  for  this  purpose.  This  would 
relieve  the  exchange  situation  tremendously,  have  a 
tonic  effect  upon  financial  conditions  in  Europe,  and  give 
these  countries  an  opportunity  to  rehabilitate  and  read- 
just their  systems  of  taxation  and  finance. 

Two:  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  should  be  em- 
powered, with  the  approval  of  the  President,  to  establish 
special  commercial  credit  advances  to  the  various  nations 
which  it  may  be  desirable  to  assist,  such  credits  or  ad- 
vances to  be  used  in  payment  for  raw  materials,  railroad 
supplies,  machinery,  etc.,  required  from  America.  Modi- 
fication of  War  Finance  Corporation  provisions  may 
accomplish  this.  The  necessity  of  all  such  purchases, 
and  the  method  of  purchase,  should  be  supervised. 
Such  loans  should  not  be  available  for  military  purposes 
or  for  any  form  of  public  improvement  or  investment 
in  fixed  property,  but  should  be  used  solely  to  assist  the 
commerce  of  the  country. 

These  loans  should  be  made  through  the  interested 
governments  with  the  guaranty  of  the  borrowing  govern- 
ment, the  guaranty  of  its  banks,  and  on  the  individual 
note  or  credit  of  the  borrowing  merchant  or  grouped 
industry.  This  method  is  recommended  not  alone 
that  we  may  have  a  combined  credit,  but  that  we 
may  have  the  combined  judgment  and  responsibility 
of  the  government,  the  banker  and  the  merchant  in 
passing  upon  the  necessity  for  the  loan.  This  will  pre- 
vent wild  and  unnecessary  expenditures.  An  agent  or 
agency  acting  in  cooperation  (not  joint  agency) 
should  be  established  in  each  country  to  pass  upon  the 
necessity  of  the  commercial  loans  requested.  It,  in 
conjunction  with  the  government  and  the  banks  of  the 
borrowing  country,  should  investigate  the  needs  and  see 
that  the  money  is  expended  for  the  purpose  for  which 
it  is  advanced. 

Each  Allied,  Associated  or  neutral  government  would 
have  an  opportunity  to  take  its  share  in  any  or  all  ad- 
vances; but  a  country  would  make  a  loan  only  for  pur- 
chases from  its  nationals.     There  are  already  banks  in 


350      ^vooDRC)^^'  wilson  and  world  settlement 

most  of  these  countries,  and  others  could  be  readily  es- 
tablished by  the  peoples  of  the  countries  in  question. 
The  banks  in  the  borrowing  countries  should  not  be  per- 
mitted to  charge  more  than  one  per  cent,  in  addition 
to  what  the  lending  government  would  receive.  It 
would  not  be  necessary  to  extend  these  credits  for  more 
than  three  years.  In  most  instances  the  money  would 
be  paid  back  before  this  time. 

It  might  appear  on  the  surface  that  this  is  a  compli- 
cated and  difficult  plan,  but  it  is  not.  The  expenses 
could  be  paid  by  a  charge  of  something  less  than  one- 
quarter  of  one  per  cent.  The  organization  could  be  quickly 
formed,  made  to  function  and  bring  to  the  peoples  whom 
we  desire  to  help  the  freedom  and  liberty  of  action  that 
would  go  further  to  bring  about  normal  and  peaceful 
conditions  than  many  times  the  money  spent  to  restore 
order  by  force  of  arms. 

There  will  be  great  competition  among  the  financial 
and  commercial  interests  of  the  various  countries  to  make 
these  loans.  In  many  cases  the  exporting  or  selling 
house  would  assume  part  of  the  advance.  Before  long 
the  government's  place  would  be  taken  by  private  concerns. 
Once  the  plan  is  started, the  final  result  will  be  that  the 
treasuries  of  the  various  countries  will  be  obliged  to  ad- 
vance less  money  than  is  now^  thought  necessary. 

Three:  To  the  newer  countries  some  advances  will 
have  to  be  made  in  order  to  carry  on  their  governments 
until  the  revenues  come  in  from  their  restored  industrial 
and  economic  life.  But  none  of  these  monies  should  be 
used  for  military  works  or  public  improvements,  except 
for  such  things  as  railroad  facilities.  The  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury  should  be,  with  the  approval  of  the  Presi- 
dent, empowered  to  do  this. 

Whatever  the  amount  may  be,  it  is  an  obligation  that 
we  cannot  escape.  It  is  a  part  of  the  obligation  that  the 
rich  nations  of  the  world,  and  America  in  particular, 
must  carry  out.  America  entered  the  war  with  a  high 
purpose.  It  has  written  that  purpose  into  the  terms 
of  the  peace.  It  must  now  carry  through  that  purpose, 
in  order  that  peace  may  be  maintained  by  the  restoration 


BARUCH  ON  THE  RECONSTRUCTION  OF  EUROPE       351 

of  normal  conditions  and  by  the  granting  of  an  equal  op- 
portunity to  all. 

Economic  inequality  and  barriers  were  among  the 
causes  of  the  war.  They  have  not  been  removed;  in 
many  cases  they  have  been  increased.  No  greater  use 
can  be  made  of  our  resources  and  I  know  of  no  more 
fitting  climax  to  the  part  that  America  has  played  in  the 
war,  and  to  your  own  great  work,  than  the  accomplish- 
ment of  this  project. 

Very  sincerely  yours, 

[Signed]    Bernard  M.  Baruch. 

The  President  of  the  United  States, 
11,  Place  des  Etats-Unis, 
Paris. 


Document  51. 

Printed  memorandum  of  Norman  H.  Davis, 
and  Thomas  W.  Lamont,  May  15,  "Observations 
upon  the  European  [Economic]  Situation:  Pos- 
sible Measures  to  Be  Taken,"  with  letter  of 
transmittal  from  Lamont  (autographed  original). 
The  idea  of  the  American  economic  advisors  as 
to  America's  relation  to  the  European  situation. 

AMERICAN  COMMISSION 
TO    NEGOTIATE    PEACE 

May  15,  1919. 

Financial  Conditions  in  Europe. 

Dear  Mr.  President: 

Attached  to  this  note  is  the  brief  report  which,  some 
little  time  ago,  you  suggested  that  we  make  to  you.  Mr. 
McCormick,  Mr.  Baruch  and  Mr.  Hoover  have  gone  over 
this  and  I  believe  them  to  be  in  substantial  accord  with 
Mr.  Davis  and  myself  in  this  presentation. 

We  have  not  attempted  to  lay  out  a  complete  financial 
plan;  but  rather  to  analyze  the  situation  with  sufficient 
clearness  to  make  certain  solutions  fairly  manifest.  If, 
for  instance,  our  British  and  French  friends  w^ere  to  agree 
with  this  analysis  of  ours,  we  are  inclined  to  believe  that 
they  might  think  it  wise  to  make  certain  fresh  proposals 
far  more  reasonable  than  the  original  Keynes'  suggestion. 
We  should  prefer  to  have  the  British  and  French  make 
these  new  suggestions,  as  the  matter  is  of  even  greater 
concern  to  them  than  to  America. 

You  may  not  deem  it  wise  to  hand  a  copy  of  this  report 
to  Mr.  Lloyd  George  or  Mr.  Clemen ceau,  for  the  reason 
that  it  is  drawn  up  for  your  own  private  consideration  and 
embodies  certain  suggestions  with  reference  to  possible 

S52 


THE  EUROPEAN  ECONOMIC  SITUATION  353 

Congressional  action.     We  can,  however,  readily  revise 
the  text  on  these  points. 

If  you  were  to  find  time  before  tomorrow  to  glance 
through  this  draft  report,  we  should  then  be  in  a  position, 
if  you  can  see  us  tomorrow,  to  go  over  a  few  principal 
points  in  it  upon  which  we  desire  to  secure  your  personal 
views. 

With  great  respect,  I  am,  dear  Mr.  President, 
Sincerely  yours, 
[Signed]  Thomas  W.  Lamont. 

The  Honorable  Woodrow  Wilson, 
President  of  the  United  States, 
Paris. 

For  the  President 
(Secret) 

Observations  upon  the  European  Situation 
Possible  Measures  to  Be  Taken. 

economic  situation. 

The  European  states,  with  the  exception  of  the  neutrals 
and  Great  Britain,  are,  speaking  generally,  in  a  most 
difficult  position.  These  states  have  been  over-run  by 
war,  raw  materials  are  exhausted,  the  ordinary  processes 
of  production  and  distribution  are  in  chaos.  The  ques- 
tion of  feeding  has,  of  course,  been  pressing;  but  the 
Hoover  organization,  supplemented  somewhat  by  Eng- 
land's and  France's  efforts,  has  kept  actual  starvation 
at  bay.  There  will  be  great  suffering  before  the  next 
crop  is  gathered,  but  if  the  industrial  and  trade  situation 
can  be  improved,  food  conditions  will  automatically 
become  better.  Unless  there  is  such  economic  improve- 
ment, it  is  not  too  much  to  expect  that  industrial  and 
political  revolutions  will  continue,  with  disastrous  con- 
sequences for  Europe  and  for  the  world. 

America's  relation  to  Europe's  situation. 

America  has  a  direct  relation  to  the  situation  in  Europe. 
Not  only  is  it  true  that  no  one  great  region  of  the  globe 


354         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

can  remain  in  chaos,  without  such  chaos  vitally  affecting 
the  other  regions;  but  America's  trade  relations  with 
P^urope  are  so  extensive  that  many  of  its  industries  are 
dependent  for  their  success  on  stable  conditions  in  Europe. 
America's  prosperity  in  the  last  decade  has  been  largely 
coincident  with  the  growth  of  its  export  trade  to  the 
Continent  of  Europe.  Continuance  of  unstable  con- 
ditions in  Europe,  unrelieved  by  strong  cooperation  from 
America,  is  bound  to  be  reflected  in  serious  business  and 
industrial  depression  in  America  itself.  For  the  moment 
Europe,  with  great  inherent  wealth,  is  almost  destitute 
of  goods.  America  has,  or  can  produce,  an  exportable 
surplus  of  such  goods.  It  is  almost  inconceivable  that 
America  should  fail  to  make  every  effort  to  meet  such 
a  situation.  Every  consideration  of  humanity,  justice 
and  self-interest  demands  it. 

PRINCIPLES    UPON    WHICH    AMERICAN    COOPERATION    MUST 

BE  BASED. 

If  America  is  to  assist  in  solving  the  European  problem, 
we  must  work  along  certain  sound  principles,  definitely 
stated : 

Generous  Credits 

(a)  Europe  cannot  pay  cash  for  all  raw  materials  she 
vitally  requires;  she  must,  therefore,  receive  credit  on  a 
liberal  scale  for  her  purchases. 

Not  too  Restricted 

(b)  America's  advances  must  not  be  strictly  confined 
to  covering  purchases  made  in  America.  ]\Iore  freedom 
of  action  than  this  must  be  granted  to  Europe,  if  we  are 
to  enable  her  to  restart  her  economic  life. 

Normal  Channels  Preferable 

(c)  Credits  to  Europe  should,  so  far  as  possible,  be 
extended  through  the  normal  channels  of  private  enter- 
prise, commercial  and  banking  credits,  etc.  For  the 
moment,  however,  while  the  situation  here  is  still  so 
unsettled  and  while,  therefore,  private  credit  will  not  be 


THE  EUROPEAN  ECONOMIC  SITUATION  355 

available  in  sufficient  amount,  some  United  States  govern- 
ment aid,  on  a  limited  scale,  either  direct  or  through  the 
medium  of  an  existing  agency  like  the  War  Finance  Cor- 
poration, must  still  be  contemplated. 

Governmental  Guaranty  Required 

(d)  The  extension  of  private  as  well  as  public  credits 
should  for  the  present  be  conditioned  upon  the  guaranty 
of  the  several  governments  in  each  instance  where  credit 
is  granted. 

European  Cooperation  Necessary 

(e)  The  situation  in  Europe  financially  is  closely  inter- 
woven, and  should  be  considered  as  a  whole.  Therefore 
both  governmental  and  private,  commercial  and  banking 
interests  in  Europe  should  understand  the  necessity  for 
co-operation  among  themselves,  so  as  to  be  able  to  present 
at  all  times  an  intelligent  and  comprehensive  view  of 
the  situation.     There  should  be  no  duplication  of  effort. 

In  Extension  of  Credits 

(f)  To  this  end  the  leading  European  nations  and  the 
Neutrals  as  well  (which  in  general  are  enjoying  unusual 
prosperity)  should  co-operate  in  the  extension  of  credits 
for  raw  materials,  etc. ;  and  in  the  case  of  the  small  nations 
in  the  effort  to  establish  their  currencies  upon  a  stable 
basis. 

Mobilization  of  America's  Resources 

(g)  If  America  is  to  be  able,  in  the  long  run,  to  extend 
through  private  channels  the  credits  necessary,  then  it 
is  absolutely  essential  that  America's  investment  re- 
sources should  in  turn  be  mobilized  on  a  large  scale,  so  as 
to  ensure,  in  America,  the  unity  of  action  which  is  essential 
to  meet  the  situation. 

Handling  of  Internal  Conditions 

(h)  If  the  European  countries  as  a  whole  are  to  be 
justified  in  looking  to  America  for  credit,  they  must  at 
once  address  themselves  so  as  to  handle  their  internal 


356         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

situations  of  currency,  taxation,  etc.,  in  a  way  to  com- 
mand the  confidence  of  American  investors. 

Loans  to  Be  Used  Exclusively  for  Upbuilding 

(i)  None  of  the  proceeds  of  loans  made  to,  or  credits 
established  for,  the  European  countries,  shall  be  devoted 
to  military  purpose  or  to  public  improvements,  other  than 
the  necessary  reconstruction  of  transport  facilities.  The 
rebuilding  of  industrial  and  commercial  life  shall  be  the 
sole  end  in  view. 

No  Discriminatory  Tariffs 

(j)  Further,  a  condition  precedent  to  America's  active 
cooperation,  is  that  there  shall  exist  no  tariffs  or  secret 
trade  understandings  between,  or  among,  the  European 
nations,  the  effect  of  which  will  be  discriminatory  against 
America  and  the  lesser  nations. 

The  Matter  of  Concessions 

(k)  In  the  same  way,  the  question  of  private  concessions 
must  be  safeguarded.  America  does  not  purpose,  in  the 
event  she  extends  credit  on  a  considerable  scale,  for  in- 
stance to  the  lesser  nations,  to  make  such  advances  condi- 
tional upon  obtaining  any  industrial  or  banking  concessions. 
But  America  would  seriously  object  to  the  granting  of 
such  concessions  in  a  way  that  might  prejudice  the  interest 
of  her  own  and  other  friendly  nationals.    Finally : 

Situation  Requires  Immediate  Action 

(1)  The  situation  is  so  critical  that  immediate  measures 
are  necessary.  Even  though  the  granting  of  actual 
credits  may,  in  certain  instances,  have  to  await  fresh 
legislation,  yet  steps  should  be  taken  promptly,  and  knowl- 
edge of  such  steps  given  immediate  publicity:  otherwise 
it  may  prove  quite  impossible  to  prevent  the  present 
situation  from  growing  rapidly  worse. 

FIVE  PROBLEMS  TO  CONSIDER. 

There  are  five  concrete  situations  to  be  handled, 
to  wit: 


THE  EUROPEAN  ECONOMIC  SITUATION  357 

(1)  Credits  for  the  newly  constituted,  or  lesser  nations, 

such  as  Poland,  Czecho-Slovakia,  Greater  Serbia, 
Roumania  and  the  Baltic  States. 

(2)  Immediate  credits  for  raw  materials  for  France, 

Belgium  and  Italy. 

(3)  Later  credits  to  France  and  possibly  Belgium  for 

reconstruction. 

(4)  Working  capital  for  Germany  and  the  other  Enemy 

States. 

(5)  Refunding  by  the  United  States  Treasury  of  the 

interest,  for  the  next  three  to  five  years,  on  loans 
to  the  Allied  Governments  up  to  November  11, 
1918.  Also,  the  funding  of  the  principal  of  such 
loans. 

As  to: 

1.  Credits  for  the  Newly  Constituted,  or  Lesser 
Nations,  Such  as  Poland,  Czecho-Slovakia, 
Greater    Serbia,    Roumania    and    the    Baltic 

States. 

(1)  The  United  States  has  been  instrumental  in  con- 
stituting these  new  nationalities.  There  is,  therefore, 
a  certain  moral  obligation  to  help  them  to  a  fair  start  upon 
their  new  national  life.  Credits  for  Poland,  Czecho- 
slovakia, Greater  Serbia,  Roumania  and  the  Baltic 
States  are  essential  for: 

Pressing  Needs 

(a)  The   purchase   of   raw   materials,   railway    stocks 

and  agricultural  implements,  required  for  the 
resumption  of  industrial  and  agricultural  pro- 
ductivity; 

Currency  Reserve  Necessary 

(b)  The  establishment  of  a  reserve  sufficient  to  enable 

these  countries  to  establish  a  stable,  circulating 
medium.  At  present  they  have  no  gold  reserve. 
It  will  be  necessary  for  them  either  to  obtain 


358         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

gold  or  to  make  such  special  credit  arrangements 
as  can  take  the  place  of  gold,  as  a  reserve  against 
notes  to  be  issued. 

Amounts  Required  for  Newer  Nations 

(c)  The  credits  required  for  these  countries,  to  cover 

the  next  six  months,  should  not  exceed,  and 
may  prove  materially  less  than,  the  following 
amounts: 

Poland $250,000,000 

Roumania 50,000,000 

Czecho-Slovakia 50,000,000 

Greater  Serbia 100,000,000 

Baltic  States 50,000,000 

Total $500,000,000 

(d)  Any  plan  looking  to  the  extension  of  credits,  as 

above,  should  (though  forming  part  of  the 
whole  plan)  be  through  natural,  commercial 
and  banking  channels,  so  as  surely  to  enlist  the 
combined  judgment  and  responsibility  of  the 
business  man  and  banker.  But  every  trans- 
action should  also  carry  the  guaranty  of  the 
government  in  question.  Such  a  plan  can  be 
carried  through  without  the  necessity  of  actual 
endorsement  by  the  government  upon  each  credit 
instrument;  but  by  means  of  blanket  legislation, 
along  the  lines  of  a  recent  Belgian  enactment, 
guaranteeing  commercial  and  banking  credits 
extended  by  America. 

As  to 

2.  Immediate  Raw  Materials  for  France,  Belgium 

AND  Italy. 

Estimates  as  to  the  total  requirements  for  these 
three  countries  vary  considerably,  but  it  is  thought  that 
credits  for  $500,000,000  will  be  sufficient  to  cover  their 
requirements  for  this  year.     If  the  French  estimates  are 


THE  EUROPEAN  ECONOMIC  SITUATION  359 

to  be  accepted,  it  may  be  necessary  for  the  United  States 
government  to  continue  certain  temporary  advances. 
Detailed  estimates  should  be  furnished  by  the  three 
Governments. 

As  to: 

3.  Credits    to    France    and    Belgium    for    Recon- 

struction. 

The  amount  of  credits  necessary  in  the  next  six  months 
to  enable  France  and  Belgium  to  make  outside  pur- 
chases for  these  purposes  will  not  be  heavy;  yet  ample 
provision  for  these  requirements  should  be  contemplated 
and  arranged  in  the  general  plan. 

As  to: 

4.  Working  Capital  for  Germany  and  Other  Enemy 

States. 

Germany  requires  working  capital:  without  it  she  will 
be  unable  to  restart  her  industrial  life,  and  thus  to  make 
any  substantial  progress  in  the  way  of  reparation.  But 
the  provisions  of  the  reparation  clauses  of  the  proposed 
Treaty  demand  that  Germany  shall  deliver  over  at  once 
all  her  working  capital,  being  practically  the  total  of 
her  liquid  assets.  The  only  logical  manner  of  meeting 
Germany's  requirements  for  working  capital  is  obviously 
to  leave  Germany  with  sufficient  of  her  present  working 
capital  to  enable  her  to  restore  her  industries.  It  is  for 
the  Governments  which  expect  to  receive  reparation  to 
consider  this  situation  with  respect  to  the  enemy's  working 
capital.  America  has  no  further  suggestion  to  make  on 
this  point. 

As  to  : 

5.  Refunding  of  Interest  Obligations. 

France,  Italy  and  all  of  the  other  Allied  and  Associated 
Governments,  even  perhaps  including  England,  will  be 


3U0         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

unable  for  some  time  to  meet  in  gold  the  interest  on  their 
exterior  obligations  contracted  during  the  war.  These 
loans  are  held  principally  by  the  United  States  and 
England.  Some  provision  should  be  made  for  tem- 
porarily refunding  the  interest  on  such  obligations  held 
by  the  United  States  or  England.  As  the  debtor  gov- 
ernments cannot  apparently  pay  this  interest  for  at  least 
three  years,  it  will  be  a  serious  humiliation  to  them  to 
force  them  to  acknowledge  their  inability  to  do  so. 
Therefore,  from  every  practical  point  of  view,  it  is  ad- 
visable to  arrange  the  matter  before  it  becomes  a  real 
issue.  England  is  already  alive  to  this  point,  and  as  we 
are  informed,  has  no  intention  of  attempting  to  collect, 
for  several  years,  the  interest  due  her  from  those  govern- 
ments. In  order  for  the  United  States  Treasury  to  re- 
lieve the  situation  in  similar  manner,  certain  legislation 
will  be  required. 

The  fimding,  in  part  or  in  whole,  of  the  principal  of 
these  obligations  (for  which  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
already  possesses  authority)  would  also  be  vastly  helpful 
to  the  exchange  situation  in  both  Europe  and  America; 
and  would  impose  upon  the  United  States  Treasury'  no 
heavier  burden  than  it  now  carries. 

SUMMARY  OF  RECOMMENDATIONS 

In  order  to  deal  effectively  with  the  several  situations, 
as  above  set  forth,  we  recommend  the  following  immediate 
steps : 

A  Non-Governmental  European  Committee 

(1)  The  organization,  with  the  general  approval  of 
the  British  and  French  governments,  of  a  small  Special 
Committee  made  up  of  bankers  and  men  of  affairs,  to 
coordinate,  so  far  as  possible,  in  Europe  the  general 
scheme  of  credits  that  are  to  be  extended  through  banking 
and  commercial  channels.  Such  committee  should  con- 
sider the  situation  of  the  lesser  nations,  which  should,  in 
turn,  engage  to  arrange  their  credits  in  accordance  with 
the  whole  general  situation.  This  non-governmental 
committee  should  keep  in  close  contact  with  the  man- 


THE  EUROPEAN  ECONOMIC  SITUATION  861 

agers  of  the  proposed  investment  group  in  America  as 
follows : 

Investment  Mobilization  in  America. 

(2)  The  organization  in  America  of  a  country-wide 
investment  group  of  banks  and  bankers;  the  managers  of 
which,  working  in  unison  with  commercial  and  manu- 
facturing interests,  shall 

(a)  act    in    co-operation    with    the   Special    European 

Committee,  and 

(b)  co-ordinate    the   American    investment    public    in 

broad  plans  for  meeting  the  European  situation. 
Such  American  group  to  act  under  the  general  approval 
of  the  United  States  Treasury,  and  American  credit  oper- 
ations generally  to  function  through  this  group. 

Recommendations  to  Congress. 

(3)  To  present  the  situation  to  Congress,  in  order  to 
secure  such  legislation  as  may  be  necessary: 

(a)  To  grant  total  additional  credits  to  any  or  all  the 

countries  in  Europe  of  sums  not  to  exceed  $  , 

on  condition  that  any  part  of  such  credits  as 
shall  not  have  been  availed  of  by  January  1st, 
1921,  shall  thereupon  be  cancelled.  If  Congress 
shall  see  fit  to  authorize  such  credits,  that  very 
fact  will  lead  to  greater  activity  and  confidence  on 
the  part  of  American  exporters,  and  will  lessen  the 
amount  of  credits  requested  from  the  Treasury. 

(b)  To  fund,  without  interest,  for,   say,  three  years, 

interest  payments,  due  or  coming  due,  upon  obli- 
gations of  European  countries  held  by  the  United 
States  Treasury. 

(c)  To   grant   the   War   Finance    Corporation   power, 

within  prescribed  limits,  to  assume  the  risk  of 
practically  direct  commercial  credits  against 
American  exports. 

Educational  Campaign  Essential. 

(4)  The  organization  of  an  active  campaign  of  educa- 
tion for  the  purpose  of  acquainting  the  American  public 


302         WOODROW  WILSOX  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

generally  with  the  urgency  of  the  whole  European  prob- 
lem, the  necessity  for  hearty  co-operation  in  solving  it, 
and  for  handling  the  situation  in  a  broad  and  generous 
manner. 

To-day  there  is  no  real  conception  in  America  of  the 
situation  in  Europe.  Not  only  is  the  desperate  character 
of  the  situation  not  understood,  but  there  is  no  apprecia- 
tion of  the  fact  that  America's  destinies  are  in  a  large 
measure  inseparable  from  those  of  the  rest  of  the  world. 
Complete  knowledge  of  the  situation  here  can  be  gained 
only  through  observation  upon  the  spot.  Sympathy, 
however,  and  desire  for  co-operation  can  be  cultivated 
through  the  establishment  of  joint  interests.  If  x\merica 
comes  to  feel  that  she  has  in  Europe  an  interest  that  is 
both  material  and  spiritual,  she  will  grow  to  have  a  more 
kindly  understanding  of  Europe's  needs  and  of  the  ways 
to  help  her. 

The  practical  workings  of  the  League  of  Nations  will 
be  immensely  stimulated  if  the  citizens  of  America  can 
persuade  themselves  of  the  wisdom  of  taking  a  close 
interest  in  the  affairs  of  the  European  nations.  Nothing 
is  more  certain,  for  example,  than  that,  in  case  the  Ameri- 
can people  grant  credits  on  a  substantial  scale  to  the 
European  countries,  the  close  interest  that  will  result 
will  surely  prove  a  great  permanent  factor  in  increasing 
the  harmony  and  peace  of  the  world. 

To  this  manifestly  desirable  end,  education,  in  the 
broad  sense  of  the  word,  is  essential  throughout  the 
United  States.  No  one,  at  the  present  time,  can  set  that 
process  of  education  under  way  so  admirably  or  so  effec- 
tively as  the  President  himself. 


Document  52. 

Confidential  report  (printed),  June  4,  1919, 
from  a  Committee  of  Economists  appointed  by 
the  Four  Heads  of  States  to  report  on  Europe's 
requirements  of  food  and  raw  materials,  and  the 
means  of  financing  such  supplies.  This  report 
was  never  seriously   considered   by   The  Four. 

Mr.  Norman  Davis  )  e     tt  -a.  j  c^  ^ 
TVT      T»  c  lor  United  l::5tates. 

Mr.  Baruch  ) 

Lord  Robert  Cecil^    p     t>  -x-  i   t? 

Tv/r      x^  ("  lor  British  Empire. 

Mr.  Keynes  )  ^ 


for  France. 


m.  loucheur 

M.  Clementel 

SlGNOR  CrESPI  }     p        y      I 

Prof.  Attolico         \  ^' 


having  been  appointed  a  Committee  by  the  Four  Heads  of 
States  to  report  on  Europe's  requirements  of  food  and 
raw  materials  and  the  means  of  financing  such  supplies 
beg  leave  to  report  as  follows : — 

1.  They  have  considered  separately  the  problems  of 
the  new  states  and  Eastern  Allies,  of  the  Enemy  States, 
and  of  the  Western  Allies. 

2.  In  the  case  of  the  New  States  and  Eastern  Allies 
(i.  e.,  the  Baltic  States,  Poland,  Roumania,  Czecho- 
slovakia, and  Jugo-Slavia),  the  Committee  find  that 
private  credit  will  be  inadequate  by  itself  to  provide  the 
working  capital  necessary  to  restart  industry,  mainly  for 
the  two  reasons,  first  that  the  credit  of  the  individual 
firms  is  in  itself  not  sufficient  under  present  conditions  to 
enable  them  to  obtain  large  fimds  abroad,  and  second 
that,  where  the  firms  are  in  a  satisfactory  position  to 
manufacture  and  market  their  goods,  they  are  likely  to 

363 


304         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

receive  in  payment  depreciated  paper  money  which  is 
inconvertible  into  the  foreign  currency  required  to  liqui- 
date the  credits  so  obtained.  Both  factors  hinder  mer- 
chants or  bankers  outside  these  countries  from  lending  on 
a  large  scale,  and  the  second  factor  deters  prudent  and 
businesslike  persons  in  them  from  incurring  foreign  ob- 
ligations, even  when  they  are  in  a  position  to  do  so,  which 
they  see  no  likelihood  of  being  able  to  discharge  out  of  the 
proceeds  of  selling  their  wares.  Overriding  all  this  are 
the  two  political  factors,  that  most  of  the  Governments 
are  in  an  experimental  stage,  and  general  political  move- 
ments rendering  all  credit  uncertain  are  at  least  a  possi- 
bility, and  that,  of  the  principal  natural  markets  of  these 
countries,  neither  Russia  nor  Germany  will  be  in  a  posi- 
tion to  purchase  as  before. 

The  Committee,  is,  however,  of  the  opinion  that  no 
lasting  solution  is  possible  w^iich  is  not  based  upon  a  re- 
establishment  of  international  trade  on  tjie  basis  of 
private  rather  than  Government  credit,  and  with  this  ob- 
ject they  recommend  that: — 

(i)  Each  of  the  principal  Allied  and  Associated  Gov- 
ernments should  seek  out  some  appropriate  method  by 
which  their  own  traders  can  be  partially  relieved  of  the 
credit  risks  of  trading  with  these  countries  whether  by 
an  insurance  scheme,  by  some  Governmental  or  semi- 
Governmental  body  sharing  the  political  as  distinct  from 
the  trading  risks  or  otherwise.  There  should  be  an  inter- 
change of  information  between  the  Governments  con- 
cerned as  to  the  progress  of  such  arrangements.  The 
Committee  is  of  opinion  in  this  connection  that  it  is  more 
necessary  for  Governments  to  share  risks  than  to  provide 
funds,  the  latter  being  within  the  capacity  of  existing 
banks. 

(ii)  A  currency  reorganization  should  be  carried 
through  in  these  countries  with  a  view  to  withdrawing 
all  the  existing  issues  of  currency  and  replacing  them  by 
a  new  currency  based  on  a  definite  unit  of  real  value.  The 
Committee  is  of  opinion  that  the  Governments  of  all  these 
countries  should,  as  a  condition  of  receiving  any  further 
financial  assistance  whatever,  forego  absolutely  the  pre- 


CONFIDENTIAL  REPORT  ON  EUROPE'S  REQUIREMENTS    865 

rogative  of  issuing  currency  or  legal  tender  of  any  de- 
scription for  a  period  of  not  less  than  ten  years. 

The  committee  is  of  opinion  that  if  this  currency  re- 
organization is  to  be  carried  through  it  will  be  necessary 
for  the  principal  Allied  and  Associated  Governments  to 
contribute  a  guarantee  fund  which  might  have  to  amount 
to  as  much  as  £80,000,000  to  £100,000,000.  It  would  also 
be  desirable  that  the  assisted  Governments  should  under- 
take to  pay  over  to  the  guarantee  fund  a  proportion  of  their 
customs  receipts  or  other  revenue  for  a  considerable  period 
of  years.  The  issue  of  such  currency  should  aim  at  being  as 
automatic  and  as  much  out  of  the  control  of  the  Govern- 
ments of  these  countries  as  if  it  were  actually  composed  of 
full  value  metal;  and  to  secure  this  the  issue  should  be 
under  the  control  of  some  independent  authority  satisfac- 
tory to  the  Governments  contributing  to  the  Guarantee 
Fund. 

3.  Both  of  the  above  measures,  especially  the  second, 
must  necessarily  occupy  many  months  before  they  can 
come  into  effective  operation.  In  the  meantime  pro- 
visional measures  are  necessary,  mainly  for  the  supply 
of  raw  material  for  industry,  of  tools  for  agriculture,  and 
of  means  for  the  restoration  of  communications,  without 
which  there  can  be  no  employment.  The  Committee 
is  of  the  opinion  that  for  the  immediate  future  a  sum  of 
from  £30,000,000  to  £40,000,000  might  be  adequate  for 
the  whole  of  this  group  of  countries.  They  do  not  be- 
lieve that  this  sum  could  be  obtained  through  private 
channels,  and,  if  provided,  it  would  have  to  be  by  the 
Allied  and  Associated  Governments. 

They  suggest  that  it  should  be  a  condition  of  such 
supplies  that  no  expenditure  be  incurred  by  any  of  these 
countries  for  munitions,  except  with  the  approval  of  the 
Allied  and  Associated  Governments,  and  that  unauthor- 
ized hostilities  of  any  description  should  be  followed  by 
an  immediate  stoppage  of  supplies. 

There  would  be  advantages  in  arranging  that  these 
supplies,  so  far  as  they  were  required  for  commercial  and 
industrial  purposes,  should  be  made  through  private 
firms  who  should  obtain  the  best  possible  security  from 


3GU      ^^ooDRO^v  wilson  and  ^YORLD  settlement 

the  importers  on  the  other  side.  If  the  suppHes  are  made 
direct  by  the  Government  the  Committee  suggest  that 
the  goods  should  be  suppHed  not  against  Government 
bonds,  but  against  the  deposit  and  withdrawal  from  cir- 
culation of  existing  paper  money  at  rates  of  exchange 
to  be  determined.  Approved  and  properly  backed  com- 
mercial bills,  expressed  in  local  currency,  might  also  be 
accepted  in  payment.  If  this  plan  were  adopted,  the 
Governments  concerned  would  have  to  agree  to  suspend 
all  further  issues  of  currency  pending  currency  reorgan- 
ization as  already  proposed,  in  which  case  such  reorgan- 
ization would  have  to  be  undertaken  immediately. 

As  regards  food,  they  understand  that  the  population 
is  cared  for  by  existing  arrangements  up  to  next  harvest, 
with  the  exception  of  the  supply  of  seed  for  autumn 
sowing. 

4.  In  making  the  above  recommendations  the  Com- 
mittee have  assumed  that  these  States  will  not  be  required 
to  shoulder  any  part  of  the  responsibility  of  the  enemy 
States  for  Reparation  payments.  If  this  question  is 
decided  otherwise,  they  are  of  opinion  that  the  above 
proposals  would  be  inadequate  to  meet  the  requirements 
of  the  case.  The  Committee  believe,  indeed,  that  the 
attempt  to  exact  such  payments  from  the  newly  consti- 
tuted States  is  incompatible  with  their  financial  rehabili- 
tation, the  difficulties  of  which,  even  apart  from  this,  will 
be  very  formidable. 

5.  In  the  case  of  Germany,  the  financial  situation  is 
overshadowed  by  the  Reparation  demands  of  the  draft 
Treaty  of  Peace.  It  appears,  from  recent  negotiations 
as  to  the  finance  of  food  supplies  for  Germany,  that  the 
data  on  which  the  Reparation  Commission  recommend 
a  payment  of  £1,000,000,000  in  the  first  two  years  after 
peace  will  now  probably  have  to  be  revised.  There  is, 
for  example,  reason  to  fear  that  for  various  reasons  the 
German  Government  would  be  unable  to  deliver  the 
quantity  of  foreign  securities  contemplated  by  the  Repa- 
ration Commission. 

Under  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace  the  German 
Government  is  required  to  cede  or  deliver  various  specific 


CONFIDENTIAL  REPORT  ON  EUROPE'S  REQUIREMENTS    3G7 

forms  of  property,  of  which  the  mercantile  marine  is  the 
most  valuable.  But  the  Committee  feel  that  they  must 
be  prepared  for  the  possibility  of  the  Germans  only  being 
able,  in  addition  to  the  above  cessions,  to  make  inap- 
preciable payments  within  two  years.  Even  if  no  pay- 
ment is  required  of  her  within  this  period,  it  might  be 
impossible  for  Germany,  without  some  assistance,  to  pay 
for  the  necessary  importations  which  would  place  her 
in  a  position  later  on  to  make  considerable  payments  for 
reparation. 

Therefore,  in  the  probable  contingency  of  Germany 
being  (a)  unable  to  pay  off  in  liquid  assets  the  total  of 
the  first  20,000,000,000  of  marks,  (6)  unable  to  import, 
for  lack  of  means  or  of  credits,  or  (c)  not  in  possession 
of  adequate  working  capital,  the  Committee  think  that 
one  or  more  of  the  following  means  of  assistance  would 
have  to  be  considered: — 

(i)  The  various  cessions  of  property  could  be  treated 
not  as  advances  in  respect  of  Reparation  but  as  sales,  and 
the  various  Governments  receiving  this  property  might 
make  the  value  of  it  available  to  Germany  in  cash  to 
enable  her  to  pay  for  importations,  or,  alternatively, 
Germany  might  be  permitted  to  retain  a  sufficient  amount 
of  her  existing  assets  to  allow  her  to  meet  her  requirements 
for  working  capital;  (ii)  the  Allied  and  Associated  Gov- 
ernments might  advance  a  loan  to  Germany;  or  (iii)  the 
terms  of  the  Reparation  chapter  might  be  so  amended 
as  to  permit  Germany  to  sell  bonds  ranking  in  front  of 
all  reparation  payments  and  having  a  specific  security, 
as,  for  example,  customs  or  foreign  properties,  attached 
to  them,  or  to  direct  the  Reparation  Commission  to 
accept  part  payment  of  the  first  20,000,000,000  marks 
in  this  form. 

The  Committee  is  aware  of  the  great  difficulties  at- 
tending each  of  the  proposed  alternatives,  not  least  on 
account  of  the  large  sums  involved.  But  the  problem 
is  unfortunately  one  of  great  urgency,  of  which  a  solution 
will  be  necessary  immediately  upon  the  signature  of 
Peace  by  Germany.  So  far,  no  beginning  has  been  made 
with  the  supply  of  raw  materials,  the  cost  of  which  is 


368        WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

estimated  by  the  Raw  Materials  Section  of  the  Supreme 
Economic  Council  at  £180,000,000;  and  if  the  collapse 
of  Germany  is  to  be  avoided  such  supply  must  commence 
immediately.  Yet  Germany  is  at  present  virtually 
destitute  of  resources.  The  fuliSlment  of  the  food  pro- 
gramme up  to  the  end  of  June  will  have  reduced  her  gold 
reserve  from  £110,000,000  to  £60,000,000,  below  which 
it  cannot  fall  much  further  without  the  final  collapse  of 
her  currency  system,  and  will  also  have  exhausted  all 
of  the  known  stock  of  immediately  saleable  or  loanable 
foreign  securities  so  far  obtained  by  requisition.  The 
Committee  is  not  aware  of  any  other  resources  available 
for  immediate  payments,  except  such  foreign  securities 
and  properties  as  private  German  nationals  may  possess 
outside  the  jurisdiction  of  their  Government,  the  amount 
of  which  available  for  this  purpose  cannot  yet  be  esti- 
mated. If  it  were  not  for  Germany's  obligations  for 
Reparation  the  Committee  believe  that  through  her 
associations  in  foreign  countries  she  would  be  able  to 
obtain  large  credits  through  private  channels,  but  her 
indefinite  and  very  large  Reparation  obligations  greatly 
reduce  such  opportunities.  The  Finance  Section  of  the 
Supreme  Economic  Council  is  informed  by  the  Neutral 
Financiers'  Committee  that  there  is  no  expectation  in 
present  circumstances  of  neutral  countries  extending 
large  credits  to  Germany,  especially  for  the  purchase  of 
raw  materials  not  originating  in  those  neutral  countries 
which  is  chiefly  the  case  with  those  most  urgently  required. 
The  state  of  the  German  currency,  already  alluded  to, 
is  a  serious  aggravation  of  the  position.  The  value  of 
the  mark  in  relation  to  the  dollar  has  now  fallen  to  less 
than  a  third  of  its  par  value.  As  the  price  of  raw  materials 
in  terms  of  dollars  has  risen  to  two  and  a  quarter  times 
pre-war  level,  it  follows  that  imported  raw  materials  will 
cost  in  marks  about  seven  times  their  pre-war  price.  As 
Germany  has  been  cut  off  from  imports  for  a  long  period, 
her  internal  prices  have  not  adjusted  themselves  to  this 
state  of  affairs.  In  the  case  of  imported  food,  the  military 
authorities  in  the  occupied  areas  report  that  the  price  is 
too  high  for  the  purchasing  power  of  all  but  five  per  cent. 


CONPIDENTIAL  REPORT  ON  EUROPE'S  REQUIREMENTS    369 

of  the  population,  so  that  even  when  food  is  available  it 
cannot  be  sold  unless  the  German  Government  or  the  Ar- 
mies of  Occupation  subsidise  it.  If,  however,  the  German 
Government  sells  imported  commodities  below  cost  price, 
its  financial  position  becomes  desperate,  and  a  further 
inflation  of  the  currency  inevitable. 

The  Committee  have  devoted  considerable  space  to  the 
German  situation  because,  in  their  opinion,  this  is  the 
key  to  the  whole  European  financial  problem. 

6.  Some  modification  of  the  existing  terms  of  the 
Draft  Treaty  of  Peace  would  be  required  to  enable  the 
above  proposals  to  be  carried  into  effect,  should  they 
receive  the  approval  of  the  Four  Heads  of  States. 

7.  Austria,  Hungary,  and  Bulgaria  cannot  be  dealt 
with  in  advance  of  the  reparation  proposals.  The  Com- 
mittee is  of  opinion  that  it  is  impossible  to  expect  any 
appreciable  payments  from  these  countries  in  the  near 
future.  They  suggest  that  this  fact  should  be  recog- 
nized, and  that  these  countries  should  be  dealt  with  on 
the  same  general  lines  as  the  Eastern  Allies,  but  much 
less  generously. 

8.  The  French  and  Italian  Representatives  explained 
to  the  Committee  with  great  force  the  situation  of  their 
respective  countries,  and  called  attention  in  particular  to 
the  very  heavy  adverse  balance  of  trade  to  which  they 
are  at  present  subject. 

The  situation  of  France  is  characterized  by  two  facts: 

(a)  The  heavy  adverse  balance  of  her  commerce. 

(b)  The  devastation  of  war,  the  reparation  of  which 
necessitates  expenditures  comparable  to  those  of  war 
itself. 

One  of  the  principal  assets,  to  which  she  looked  to  aid 
her  in  reestablishment  of  her  equilibrium,  was  her  claims 
on  Germany,  the  fate  of  which  she  linked  with  that  of 
Germany  herself.  The  observations  made  above  upon 
the  financial  position  of  that  country  indicate  that  France 
cannot  hope  to  find  in  these  claims  alone  any  immediate 
alleviation  of  her  present  and  future  burdens. 

She  must,  therefore,  look  elsewhere  for  the  resources  nee-? 
essary  to  secure  a  prompt  restoration  of  her  economic  life. 


370         WOODROW  ^^^LSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

For  the  immediate  future,  it  is  understood  that  she 
has  sufficient  dollar  resources  to  meet  her  requirements 
in  the  United  States. 

As  for  the  other  indispensable  requirements,  which  she 
must  secure  elsewhere,  and  in  the  main  from  the  British 
Empire,  e.  g.,  wool,  coal,  freights,  her  position  is  be- 
coming serious.  The  means  of  payment  in  London, 
arising  in  great  part  out  of  dollar  and  sterling  resources, 
the  result  of  the  presence  of  the  British  and  American 
armies  in  France,  is  constantly  dwindling. 

The  French  Representatives  estimate  that  in  July  or 
August  France  will  not  be  able  to  make  new  purchases  of 
wool  or  coal,  and  that  the  French  Government  will  find 
itself,  so  far  as  its  own  engagements  are  concerned,  in  a 
very  difficult  position. 

The  Italian  situation  is  not  less  difficult  and  in  some 
respects  more  urgent.  The  external  war  debt  of  Italy 
is  heavier  in  proportion  to  her  wealth  than  that  of  any 
other  country.  She  is  also  more  dependent  on  imported 
raw  materials,  having  within  her  own  borders  neither 
coal,  nor  iron  ore,  nor  wool.  Nor  has  she  a  large  mer- 
cantile marine.  Her  exports  are  mainly  manufactured 
articles,  and  certain  unessential  agricultural  products, 
for  w^hich  Germany,  Austria,  and  Russia,  formerly  her 
principal  markets,  must  be  considered  lost.  Remit- 
tances from  emigrants,  formerly  so  important,  have 
largely  disappeared  for  the  time  being.  The  newly- 
acquired  provinces  are  not  self-supporting  from  the  point 
of  view  of  raw  materials,  and  they  therefore  constitute 
in  this  regard  an  additional  burden  on  Italy.  She  has, 
therefore,  no  possibility  at  present  of  balancing  her 
exports  and  imports,  and  is  not  in  a  position  to  purchase 
the  absolutely  necessary  raw  materials  without  credit. 
For  the  time  being  she  is  receiving  substantial  loans 
from  the  United  States  and  the  British  Government. 

As  regards  the  United  Kingdom,  the  British  Repre- 
sentatives expressed  the  opinion  that  the  assistance 
already  afforded  them  by  the  United  States  would  meet 
the  case  until  the  early  autumn,  and  that  they  hoped 
even  then  to  be  able  to  maintain  their  position  without 


CONFIDENTL\L  REPORT  ON  EUROPE'S  REQUIREMENTS    371 

further  assistance  from  the  United  States  Government, 
provided  they  were  not  to  become  Hable  for  any  large 
measure  of  assistance  to  others;  the  British  Treasury 
was  not  in  a  position  to  give  any  further  assistance  to 
France  or  Italy. 

The  financial  position,  therefore,  of  these  three  countries 
as  well  as  that  of  Belgium,  is  full  of  anxiety. 

The  American  Representatives  pointed  out  to  the  Com- 
mittee that  the  Secretary  of  the  United  States  Treasury 
is  not  empowered  to  establish  credits  after  peace  except 
for  the  purchase  of  wheat  in  the  United  States,  and  only 
for  that  purpose  in  so  far  as  any  balance  may  be  left  over 
out  of  the  appropriation  of  $10,000,000,000  for  advances 
to  the  Associated  Governments;  and  also  that,  according 
to  advices  received  from  Washington,  it  will  be  very  diffi- 
cult, and  probably  impossible,  to  obtain  legislation  em- 
powering the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  to  establish  credits 
for  further  advances  to  these  countries.  They  also  pointed 
out,  however,  that  Congress  had,  at  the  request  of  the 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  extended  the  powers  of  the 
War  Finance  Corporation  by  authorising  it  to  extend 
aid  to  American  exporters  up  to  a  maximum  of 
$1,000,000,000,  upon  acceptable  obligations  maturing 
within  a  limit  of  five  years;  and  that  in  their  opinion  the 
facilities  thus  provided  (if  supplemented  by  private 
credit  and  initiative)  should  be  sufficient  to  meet  the 
necessary  purchases  in  the  United  States. 

Some  members  of  the  Committee  were  doubtful  if 
private  credits  and  enterprise  would  be  adequate  to  meet 
the  situation. 

Before  concluding,  the  Committee  considers  it  advis- 
able to  point  out  that,  in  spite  of  a  well-organized  cur- 
rency and  credit  system,  and  of  the  private  credits  and 
resources  available  to  England,  France,  and  Italy,  it 
will  nevertheless  be  difficult,  if  not  impossible,  for  them 
(within  the  next  two  or  three  years)  to  pay  for  all  the  raw 
materials  which  they  may  require  and  to  overcome  their 
unfavourable  trade  balance  to  such  an  extent  as  to  be 
able  also  to  cover  the  interest  on  their  obligations  held 
abroad.     Although  it  has  been  anticipated  that  funds  to 


372        WOODROW  ^^^LSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

meet  these  needs  would  be  received  from  Germany  on 
account  of  reparation,  the  Committee  now  feels  convinced 
that  it  is  impossible  to  count  on  any  substantial  financial 
assistance  from  this  source  in  the  near  future.  The  final 
solution  may,  therefore,  require  a  more  comprehensive 
plan  than  for  the  other  portions  of  Europe,  and  it  is  most 
advisable  that  immediate  consideration  should  be  given 
by  all  concerned  to  meet  the  situations  not  already 
provided  for.  The  Committee  also  feels  that  until  France 
and  Italy  obtain  the  raw  materials  required,  and  until 
England,  France  and  Italy  can  cover  their  adverse  trade 
balances  and  meet  the  foreign  interest  payments  due  by 
them  for  the  next  two  or  three  years,  the  improvement 
or  stability  in  exchange  and  the  confidence  necessary  to 
stimulate  private  enterprise  may  be  perhaps  fatally  re- 
tarded. 


Document  53. 

Cablegram  from  R.  C.  Leffingwell,  Assistant 
Secretary  of  the  Treasury  to  Norman  H.  Davis, 
May  7,  1919,  giving  views  of  Treasury  regarding 
further  financial  assistance  to  Europe.  Trans- 
mitted to  President  Wilson  May  9. 

Dated,  May  7,  1919. 

For  Davis  from  Leffingwell.     Treasury  1030. 

Referring  to  your  D-259  and  266,  there  was  never  any 
doubt  here  that  your  position  was  as  outlined  in  D-266, 
but  we  thought  that  it  might  help  with  Lloyd  George  for 
you  to  have  our  views  vigorously  stated.  It  is  perhaps 
unfortunate,  but  nevertheless  true,  that  public  sentiment 
in  this  country  is  in  no  mood  to  tolerate  the  assumption 
by  government  of  further  financial  burdens  in  aid  of 
Europe.  One  of  the  gravest  difficulties  in  the  way  of  the 
success  of  the  Victory  Liberty  Loan  has  been  the  inability 
of  our  people  to  understand  why  we  go  on  lending  such 
huge  sums  to  the  Allies.  Since  the  armistice  these  have 
been  in  the  neighborhood  of  a  billion  and  three  quarters 
dollars.  Such  loans  in  the  month  of  April  alone  exceeded 
$400,000,000.  We  are  looking  forward  to  making  further 
loans  up  to  the  statutory  limit  of  $10,000,000,000.  This 
means  that  we  shall  have  loaned  to  Europe  in  the  neigh- 
borhood of  $3,000,000,000  since  the  cessation  of  hostilities, 
our  total  loans  to  the  time  of  the  armistice  having  been 
in  the  neighborhood  of  $7,000,000,000.  You  can  imagine 
that,  having  successfully  carried  on  the  fight  for  per- 
mission to  continue  our  foreign  loans  to  the  Allies  after 
the  armistice,  and  having  failed  originally  to  obtain 
general  extension  of  authority  for  government  loans  to 
the  Allies,  and  believing  that  the  very  fact  that  we  are 
making  these  loans  is  a  great  obstacle  to  the  success  of  the 

373 


31i        WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

Victory  Liberty  Loan,  I  am  strongly  apprehensive  of  the 
popuhir  and  poHtical  effect  of  any  suggestion  of  govern- 
ment loans  or  guaranties  in  aid  of  former  enemies.  The 
American  people  have  lived  an  existence  of  provincial 
isolation  for  one  hundred  years;  foreign  trade  has  never 
been  an  important  factor  in  our  commercial  or  industrial 
life;  we  think  of  ourselves  as  having  performed  heroic 
deeds  and  borne  great  sacrifices  to  save  France  and  Italy 
and  hence  England  from  annihilation  by  the  Hun;  and 
now  we  are  inclined  to  feel  that  there  is  a  disposition  on 
Europe's  part  to  exploit  our  generosity  and  to  take  ad- 
vantage of  us  in  financial  matters.  Unfortunate  though 
it  be,  these  are  partly  views  of  the  average  American.  On 
the  other  hand  the  War  Finance  Corporation  was  recently 
authorized  by  Congress  to  extend  aid  to  American  ex- 
porters up  to  a  maximum  of  $1,000,000,000.  To  this 
extent  the  Treasury  has  been  successful  in  obtaining 
authority  to  meet  the  situation  to  which  your  D-259 
refers  and  in  which  you  say  the  President  is  interested, 
namely  devising  some  practicable  plan  for  affording  assist- 
ance to  Europe  with  especial  reference  to  the  Govern- 
ments which  have  been  newly  constituted.  The  com- 
mittees and  members  of  both  houses  of  Congress,  though 
unanimously  opposed  without  distinction  of  party  to 
further  government  loans,  were  induced  by  the  Treasury 
to  accept  amendment  to  the  War  Finance  Corporation 
Act  for  this  purpose.  These  amendments  were  incor- 
porated in  Victory  Liberty  Loan  bill  signed  by  the  Presi- 
dent March  3rd,  last.  The  passing  of  this  bill  during  the 
closing  days  of  Congress,  in  the  midst  of  a  bitter  partisan 
fight  to  force  a  special  session,  was  thought  here  to  be 
an  important  achievement  of  the  Treasury.  It  would 
be  very  disappointing,  not  to  say  humiliating,  to  the 
Treasury  to  have  the  means  thus  devised  for  meeting  the 
situation  to  which  the  President  calls  attention  ignored, 
and  no  serious  effort  made  to  take  advantage  of  them. 
You  have  already  been  fully  advised  as  to  the  nature  of 
this  War  Finance  Corporation  legislation;  it  in  effect 
provides  adequate  machinery  for  reasonably  long  time 
credit  for  the  movement  of  goods  out  of  America.     The 


ATTITUDE  OF  THE  U.  S.  TREASURY  375 

problem  is,  therefore,  to  get  American  exporters  and  the 
business  men  in  the  territories  which  the  President  has 
in  mind  in  contact  with  each  other  for  the  purpose  of 
doing  business.  I  think  you  can  be  helpful  in  suggesting 
to  the  goveTnments  concerned  that  America  is  ready  to 
supply  the  goods  and  to  finance  their  movement  in  the 
way  indicated  and  that  the  thing  to  do  is  to  bring  their 
intelligent  and  substantial  business  men  in  contact  with 
American  exporters  for  the  purpose  of  developing  some 
real  business.  You  can,  I  think,  be  helpful  in  bringing 
the  matter  to  the  attention  of  such  men  now  in  Europe 
as  Alexander  Legge,  whom  you  know  very  well,  and 
whom  we  here  regard  very  higlily.  If  the  Harvester 
Company,  the  Steel  Company,  and  Kyan  Copper  interest 
would  start  something  on  these  lines  I  believe  we  should 
have  taken  a  very  important  step  towards  the  solution 
of  the  problem  during  the  period  of  war.  Government 
aid  has  furnished  an  easy  and  prompt  cure  for  everybody's 
troubles.  It  is  hard  for  business  men,  even  in  this 
country,  to  realize  that  the  time  has  come  for  reliance 
upon  individual  initiative.  I  realize  how  hard  it  must  be, 
therefore,  for  business  men  in  the  countries  which  have 
been  devastated  by  war  to  begin  again.  That  is,  however, 
what  must  be  done  if  sound  and  permanent  relief  is  to 
be  given.  We  are  doing  all  in  our  power  to  bring  the 
importance  of  this  situation  to  the  attention  of  American 
business  men  and  to  make  them  realize  that  the  War 
Finance  Corporation  is  prepared  to  finance  their  opera- 
tions for  a  substantial  period.  The  question  is  not,  there- 
fore, whether  America  will  help,  but  whether  Europe  has 
adaptability  enough  and  vigor  enough  to  work  out  some 
business  transactions  and  interest  American  business  men 
in  their  financial  and  economic  restoration.  There  are 
signs  of  increasing  interest  among  our  people  such  as 
Farrell  for  steel,  Ryan  for  copper,  and  among  the  cotton 
people.  I  hope  the  War  Finance  Corporation  will  im- 
mediately send  two  or  three  men  to  Europe  with  a  view 
to  looking  over  the  field  and  possibly  making  some  helpful 
suggestion  for  the  purpose  of  expediting  these  operations. 

Polk,  Acting. 


Document  54. 

Report,  March  20,  1919,  made  by  Norman  H. 
Davis,  Rt.  Hon.  E.  S.  Montagu,  and  Louis 
Loucheur  regarding  the  reparation  settlement, 
with  special  reference  to  Germany's  capacity  to 
pay. 

REPORT   TO   THE    THREE   HEADS   OF   STATE. 
By  Messrs.  Davis,  Montague,  and  Loucheur. 

In  endeavoring  to  arrive  at  what  Germany  can  pay  and 
how  she  can  pay  it,  it  is  necessary  to  take  into  considera- 
tion the  following  questions : 

(a)  The  future  labor  and  political  situation  of  Germany 
and  the  length  of  time  necessary  for  her  to  return  to  her 
pre-war  efficiency; 

(b)  Whether  or  not  she  can  be  made  to  work  for  the 
next  30  years  practically  on  a  war  basis,  by  restricting  her 
imports  to  absolute  necessities  and,  in  addition,  be  given 
freedom  of  the  markets  of  the  world  for  the  sale  of  her 
products; 

(c)  To  what  extent  such  a  plan  will  throw  the  burden 
of  reparation  on  England  and  France  by  closing  Germany 
as  a  market  for  their  export  products  and  making  these 
countries,  together  with  other  countries  of  the  world,  a 
dumping  ground  for  Germany's  surplus  products,  to  the 
detriment  of  the  trade  of  the  countries  concerned; 

(d)  Just  what  amount  Germany  would  be  willing  to 
undertake  to  pay  without  breaking  off  negotiations  and 
forcing  military  occupation  or  other  similar  action  upon 
the  Allies. 

Before  the  war  Germany's  exports  were  less  than  her 
imports.  In  1913  (the  best  year  in  her  history),  Ger- 
many's  imports   exceeded   her   exports   by   300   million 

376 


GERMANY'S  CAPACITY  TO  PAY  377 

dollars.  Against  this  unfavorable  balance,  her  receipts 
from  mercantile  freights,  profits  of  German  enterprises 
and  investments  abroad,  insurance  and  remittances  from 
Germans  living  abroad,  amounted  to  approximately  700  to 
800  million  dollars.  This  covered  the  trade  deficit  and 
left  a  surplus  of  approximately  400  to  500  million  dollars. 
If  her  ships  and  her  foreign  investments  are  taken  from 
her,  this  source  of  income  will  be  withdrawn,  and  accord- 
ing to  pre-war  figures  Germany  would  not  be  able  to 
make  any  payment  abroad.  However,  Germany  spent 
approximately  400  million  dollars  per  annum  on  her 
Army  and  Navy,  and  if  the  amount  of  labor  and  material 
thus  consumed  were  turned  into  the  production  of  essen- 
tials, Germany  could  have  produced  an  exportable  sur- 
plus, approximately  sufficient  to  cover  her  trade  deficit 
and  leave  a  balance  of  100  million  dollars — assuming 
that  a  market  could  have  been  found  for  such  exportable 
surplus. 

On  the  other  hand,  there  was  apparently,  in  1913,  no 
unfilled  demand  for  any  further  products,  and  if  Germany 
had  exported  such  additional  amount,  it  would  have 
been  through  a  corresponding  decrease  in  the  exports  of 
other  countries. 

The  question  therefore  resolves  itself  entirely  into  how 
much  can  be  saved  by  Germany  confining  her  imports  to 
essentials,  and  how  much  can  the  consumptive  power 
of  the  world  be  increased. 

On  a  liberal  basis,  we  estimate  that  Germany  might 
possibly  pay  from  10  to  20  billion  dollars  over  a  period  of 
20  to  30  years. 

As  nearly  as  we  can  judge  from  the  present  estimates, 
the  damage  done  by  Germany  for  which  she  is  liable 
under  the  strictest  interpretation  of  the  exchange  of 
notes  between  President  Wilson  and  the  German  Gov- 
ernment, as  modified  by  the  Allies  on  November  4  and 
accepted  by  President  Wilson,  might  amount  to  approxi- 
mately 25  billion  dollars.  It  is  felt  that  Germany  should, 
if  possible,  be  forced  to  pay  at  least  this  amount,  and  that, 
if  the  demands  are  confined  to  this  interpretation,  which 
the  Germans  have  accepted,  the  moral  opinion  of  the 


378         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

world  would  force  Germany  to  pay  this  amount  if  she 
can  do  so,  no  matter  how  many  years  it  may  take  to  do 
so.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is  felt  that  if  Germany  should 
even  reluctantly  obligate  herself  to  pay  more  than  that, 
she  might,  within  a  few  years,  repudiate  the  entire  ob- 
ligation as  having  been  an  imposition,  and  the  moral 
opinion  of  the  world  might  support  her  in  this.  We 
believe,  however,  that  this  will  not  arise,  because  Germany 
would  prefer  an  occupation  rather  than  agree  to  any 
greater  amount. 

As  to  the  estimates  which  have  been  given  by  some 
eminent  bankers,  to  the  effect  that  Germany  would  be 
able,  over  a  period  of  30  years,  to  pay  3  or  4  billion 
dollars  per  annum,  we  can  say  only  that  we  are  satisfied 
that  such  a  performance  on  the  part  of  Germany  is 
utterly  impossible,  because  in  the  first  place  she  would 
never  agree  to  such  an  undertaking,  and  in  the  second 
place,  even  if  she  were  able  to  do  so,  which  is  improbable, 
it  could  only  be  done  by  absolutely  destroying  the  trade 
of  England  and  France  and  other  countries  of  the  world, 
and  in  order  to  do  so  Germany  would  have  to  develop  a 
state  of  efficiency  such  as  has  never  been  known  in  the 
history  of  the  world,  and  if  she  can  do  this,  there  is  nothing 
we  can  do  which  would  prevent  Germany  from  over- 
running the  world  thereafter. 

We  therefore  recommend  that  a  demand  be  made  upon 
Germany  to  pay  a  capital  sum  of  30  billion  dollars,  one- 
half  of  which  shall  be  paid  in  dollars  or  sterling  or  gold 
marks  at  the  standard  of  weight  and  fineness  at  the  be- 
ginning of  the  war,  and  that  the  other  half  should  be 
payable  in  German  currency. 

Of  the  15  billion  dollars  to  be  paid  in  foreign  currency, 
we  think  that  approximately  4  or  5  billion  dollars  might 
be  paid  by  Germany  within  the  next  two  or  three  years, 
through  the  liquidation  of  her  foreign  properties  abroad, 
including  the  amount  credited  to  her  for  her  merchant 
fleet  and  German  properties  in  ceded  territories.  The 
balance  of  this  amount,  say  10  or  11  billion  dollars,  we 
think  should  be  paid,  beginning  in  5  years,  and  amortized 
within  30  years. 


GERMANY'S  CAPACITY  TO  PAY  379 

We  are  recommending  that  half  of  the  30  bilhon  dollars 
be  paid  in  German  currency,  because  we  are  satisfied  it 
cannot  be  paid  in  any  other  way.  The  German  currency 
received  in  this  way  could  be  reinvested  to  a  certain 
extent  in  Germany  and  could  probably  be  withdrawn  in 
the  next  30  to  60  years. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war,  the  total  national  wealth 
of  Germany  was  estimated  at  75  billion  dollars,  of  which 
15  billion  dollars  was  invested  in  industrial  enterprises. 
Even  if  all  of  the  German  industries  were  purchased  by 
foreign  capital,  it  would  therefore  be  impossible  to  invest 
more  than  15  billion  dollars  now  in  such  a  way — which 
is  absolute  proof  of  the  impossibility  of  investing  German 
marks  to  the  extent  reckoned  by  the  parties  who  have 
made  such  high  estimates  as  to  Germany's  ability  to  pay. 

(We  subsequently  found  Germany  did  not  have  4  or  5 
billion  in  foreign  countries  and  all  idea  of  this  dropped.) 


Document  55. 

Memorandum  on  reparations  made  by  Nor- 
man H.  Davis  for  Mr.  Lloyd  George. 

MR.  DAVIS'S  ARGUMENT  TO  LLOYD  GEORGE. 

I.  The  amount  Germany  can  pay  is  not  capable  of 
exact  determination.  It  depends  on  uncertain  factors, 
e.  g.,  the  future  prosperity  of  Germany,  the  willingness 
of  the  German  people  to  work  over  a  period  of  years  in 
order  to  make  payment,  and  the  hidden  resources  of 
the  country. 

It  is  fair  to  say,  after  an  examination  by  experts,  that 
all  agree  that  Germany  can  pay,  within  a  short  period, 
such  as  two  years,  a  sum  of  from  $4,000,000,000  to 
$5,000,000,000,  by  the  use  of  such  assets  as  its  merchant 
marine,  property  in  ceded  territories,  gold  reserve, 
foreign  securities,  and  credits.  Probably  all  agree  that 
an  additional  amount  of  from  $5,000,000,000  to  $10,000- 
000,000  can  be  paid  over  a  period  of  years,  making  a 
total  amount  of  from  $10,000,000,000  to  $15,000,000,000 
(£3,000,000,000). 

The  amount  that  Germany  can  pay  in  excess  of  the 
figures  stated  is  a  matter  upon  which  there  is  a  great 
opportunity  for  difference  of  opinion,  but  there  is  a  strong 
probability  that  an  additional  amount  of  perhaps  $15,000- 
000,000  could  be  paid,  making  a  total  of  $30,000,000,000 
(£0,000,000,000)  if  Germany  be  permitted  to  pay,  say, 
50%  of  this  in  German  currency. 

II.  The  amount  of  damage  to  the  persons  and  property 
of  the  civilian  population  of  the  Allies  for  which  Germany 
is  bound  to  make  reparation  under  any  construction  of 
the  negotiations  which  preceded  the  Armistice,  will  prob- 
ably be   $30,000,000,000.     It   is  not,   therefore,  of   any 

380 


NORMiNJ^  H.  DAVIS  TO  MR.  LLOYD  GEORGE  381 

practical  importance  whether  she  has  obHgated  herself  to 
pay  an  amount  in  excess  of  that. 

III.  The  question  of  the  amount  which  it  is  wise  to 
demand  that  Germany  shall  pay  is  affected  by  political 
and  economic  considerations,  such  as  the  following: 

(a)  The  danger  of  demanding  so  large  a  sum  as  to 
induce  the  German  Delegates  to  refuse  to  pay  it,  thereby 
confronting  the  Allies  with  the  alternative  of  publicly 
reducing  their  demands  or  undertaking  a  military  oc- 
cupation for  an  indefinite  period,  in  order  either  to  force 
acceptance  of  the  demands  or  attempting  to  collect  them- 
selves the  amount  demanded. 

(b)  The  possibility  of  causing  economic  damage  to  the 
Allies.  Germany  can  pay  only  by  the  labor  of  its  subjects 
and  by  becoming  prosperous.  The  imports  must  be 
reduced,  thereby  depriving  the  Allies  of  markets,  and 
exports  must  be  increased,  thereby  causing  severe  com- 
petition with  the  Allies.  The  consequence  of  forcing 
Germany  to  a  state  of  maximum  efficiency  and  saving 
for  a  long  period  of  years  in  order  to  make  large  annual 
payments  may  cause  greater  economic  damage  to  the 
Allies  than  the  benefits  they  will  derive  from  the  repa- 
ration. 

(c)  There  is  a  strong  probability  that  forcing  an  un- 
willing people  to  work  for  a  generation  to  discharge  a 
large  debt  will  cause  unrest  which  may  again  disturb  the 
peace  of  the  world  through  agitation  for  repudiation, 
and  it  may  also  in  time  produce  an  effect  on  the  public 
opinion  of  the  world  which  will  react  upon  the  Allies. 

IV.  It  seems  probable,  therefore,  that  $30,000,000,000 
is  the  maximum  which  Germany  can  be  asked  to  pay,  in 
the  following  manner: 

4  to  5  billion  dollars  in  next  two  years. 
10    to    11    billion  dollars    (making    a    total    in    all  of 
$15,000,000,000)    payable    over   a   period    of   years, 
in  cash,  foreign  securities,  credits,  etc. 
15  billion  dollars  additional  in  German  currency. 
There  is  a  serious  question  whether  the  Allies  can,  with 
safety,  fix  as  large  an  amount  as  this. 

V.  In  order  to  provide  for  future  action  which  may 


382        WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

be  rendered  necessary  by  unforeseen  circumstances,  a 
commission  should  be  created  from  the  Powers  interested 
with  power  to  modify',  suspend,  extend,  and  possibly 
even  cancel,  paj'ments  that  may  accrue  over  a  long  period 
of  years. 


Document  56. 

Letter  of  Norman  H.  Davis,  March  25, 
1919  (autographed  original),  to  President  Wilson, 
with  memorandum  of  American  experts  on  the 
reparation  settlement,  their  estimates,  and  those 
of  the  French  and  British  (typewritten  original). 

AMERICAN  COMMISSION 
TO    NEGOTIATE    PEACE. 

March  25,  1919. 
Memorandum  for  the  President: 

As  you  will  recall,  after  Messrs.  Loucheur,  Montague 
and  myself  had  agreed  upon  and  submitted  a  report  to 
you  and  the  two  Prime  Ministers  as  to  the  amount  which 
Germany  might  be  called  upon  to  pay,  Mr.  Lloyd  George, 
in  the  absence  of  Mr.  Montague,  called  into  the  last 
meeting  Lord  Sumner,  one  of  the  British  representatives 
on  the  Reparation  Committee,  and  Mr.  Keynes  of  the 
British  Treasury.  In  an  endeavor  to  arrive  at  a  unani- 
mous report  by  reconciling  the  views  which  had  been 
previously  submitted  by  Lord  Sumner,  we  have  had 
several  meetings.  We  have  agreed  substantially  upon 
the  form  for  the  Peace  Treaty  and  upon  the  plan  for  its 
execution,  but  we  have  been  unable  to  arrive  at  any 
agreement  with  Lords  Sumner  and  Cunliffe  (who  was 
called  in  by  Lord  Sumner),  because  these  two  gentlemen 
still  stand  upon  their  original  estimate  of  eleven  billion 
pounds.  Mr.  Lloyd  George  told  Mr.  Lamont  and  myself 
last  Saturday  that  he  thought  five  billion  pounds  would 
be  all  right  and  that  it  would  be  quite  acceptable  to  him 
provided  we  could  get  Lords  Sumner  and  Cunliffe  to 
agree  to  this  amount,  which  he  would  like  to  have  them 
do  for  his  own  protection  and  justification.  We  have 
handed  our  proposed  wording  to   Colonel  House  who, 

383 


384        WOODROW  ^^^LSON  AND  ^YORLD  SETTLEMENT 

I  understand,  has  transmitted  it  to  you,  with  the  various 
schedules  of  figures  which  may  be  used  after  you  agree 
with  the  two  Prime  Ministers  upon  the  exact  sum  which 
shall  be  taken. 

In  our  opinion  it  is  very  essential  to  have  Sub-Com- 
mittee No.  2  of  the  Reparations  Committee  (which  is 
to  report  on  the  amount  which  Germany  can  pay  and 
how  it  may  be  paid)  make  its  report  and  get  out  of  the 
way.  As  Lord  Cunliffe  is  the  British  representative  on 
this  Sub-Committee,  it  is  apparently  going  to  be  im- 
possible to  make  a  unanimous  report;  and  even  if  it 
were  possible,  it  is,  as  I  understand,  your  view  as  well 
as  that  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George  and  Mr.  Clemenceau  that 
it  would  be  inadvisable  now  to  have  any  fixed  amount 
reported  by  that  Sub-Committee  even  if  they  could 
agree  upon  it. 

I  therefore  suggest  the  advisability  of  having  this 
Sub-Committee  make  a  report  to  the  General  Committee, 
in  general  as  follows: 

I.  It  is  impossible  to  estimate  with  any  accuracy 
just  how  much  Germany  can  pay,  but  the  Sub- 
Committee  estimated  that  Germany  could  pay, 
over  a  series  of  years,  anywhere  from  one  hundred 
billion  to  two  hundred  fifty-five  billion  marks,  de- 
pending upon  various  factors,  such  as  (a)  the  amount 
of  territory  which  may  be  taken  from  Germany; 
(b)  the  number  of  years  over  which  payment  can 
be  exacted;  (c)  the  extent  to  which  German  commerce 
may  be  expanded  without  detriment  to  the  creditor 
nations. 

II.  That  a  Commission  be  provided  for  in  the 
Peace  Treaty  which  shall  have  power,  within  certain 
limits,  to  determine  what  can  and  should  be  paid 
during  certain  periods  by  Germany. 

III.  Or  we  suggest,  as  an  alternative  plan,  that, 
instead  of  having  any  estimate  made  by  the  Sub- 
Committee,  they  state  in  substance  that,  in  view 
of  the  uncertain  elements  involved  and  until  it  is 
known  what  Germany  will  be  left  with,  it  is  impossible 
to  make  any  accurate  estimate,  and  it  is  therefore 


NORMAN  H.  DAVIS  TO  PRESIDENT  WILSON  385 

recommended  that  the  sub-committee  be  dissolved 
and  that  the  representatives  of  the  respective  Gov- 
ernments report  directly  to  their  chiefs  from  time 
to  time  during  the  negotiations  as  to  what,  in  their 
opinion,  might  be  collected  from  Germany. 
Under  such  a  general  form  of  report,  the  embarrassment 
of  the  present  situation  could  be  avoided,  and  you  and 
the  two  Prime  Ministers  could   then  appoint  indepen- 
dently a  representative  each  to  conduct  the  negotiations 
and  agree  upon  something  more  concrete  and  constructive, 
because  it  is  impossible  to  handle  such  a  delicate  matter 
as  this  in  so  large  a  committee. 

The  foregoing  is  dictated  hastily,  but  we  are  preparing 
for  submission  to  you  today  a  more  carefully  prepared 
plan  of  the  whole  situation. 

This  is  now  ready  and  is  submitted  herewith. 

[Signed]  Norman  H.  Davis. 
The  President, 

American  Commission  to  Negotiate  Peace, 
Hotel  Crillon,  Paris. 

P.S.  I  have  shown  this  to  Col.  House  who  approves. 

N.  H.  D. 

The  following  are  submitted  as  the  joint  views  of 
Messrs.  Davis,  Strauss  &  Lamont. 

REPARATION. 

1.  We  believe  that  the  Special  Committee  which  has  been 
considering  this  matter  has  arrived  at  practical  agree- 
ment as  to  the  form  of  its  report.  As  to  the  figures, 
however,  they  have  been  unable  to  agree.  Therefore, 
all  three  delegations  have  decided  to  submit  the  form  to 
their  respective  chiefs,  together  with  figures  showing 
precisely  the  different  ideas  prevailing,  suggesting  that 
the  heads  of  the  three  Governments  may  wish  to  decide, 
from  among  the  sets  of  figures  submitted,  what  schedule 
shall  finally  be  inserted  in  the  Treaty;  or  may  desire  to 
refer  the  matter  back  with  further  definite  instructions 
to  the  Special  Committee. 


386        WOODROW  VMLSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

2.  To  this  end  we  attach  Schedule  A,  being  a  form 
which  we  have  drafted  for  embodiment  in  the  Treaty. 
The  British  and  French  state  that  in  a  general  way  they 
are  in  accord  as  to  this  form. 

3.  The  chief  points  embodied  in  this  form  are: 

(a)  To  fix  the  sums  which  the  Enemy  countries  shall 

pay  over  a  series  of  years,  and 

(b)  To  establish  a  permanent  Commission  which  shall 

control  the  whole  matter  of  Reparation  pay- 
ments and,  within  limitations,  have  power  to 
postpone  and  modify  the  sums  which  the  Enemy 
shall  be  called  upon  to  pay. 

4.  Recognizing  that  the  Commission  may,  in  future 
years,  receive  information  not  now  available  as  to  the 
Enemy's  capacity  to  pay,  we  propose  that  the  Asso- 
ciated Governments  (whose  representatives  are  to  com- 
pose the  Commission)  shall  file  with  the  Commission 
immediate  instructions,  giving  this  Commission  lati- 
tude and  discretion  along  certain  lines,  and  specifically 
authorizing  it  to  reduce  the  payments  down  to  what  we 
style  a  series  of  "minimum"  payments.  It  is  obviously 
unwise  to  exhibit  to  the  Enemy  at  Versailles  the  fact  that 
we  contemplate  the  necessity  for  the  course  just  de- 
scribed. The  proposed  instructions  should  cover  con- 
siderable ground,  and  for  your  information  we  attach 
(Schedule  B)  a  copy  of  such  a  letter.  You  will  note  that, 
among  other  things,  this  letter  permits  the  proposed 
Commission  to  accept  payment  (in  general  up  to  50  per 
cent)  in  the  form  of  reichsmarks. 

5.  The  constitution  of  such  a  commission  presents 
certain  difficulties.  Attached  (Schedule  C)  is  suggestion 
as  to  how  such  a  Commission  shall  be  set  up.  You  will 
note  that  our  suggestion  is  to  name,  as  the  Government's 
representatives  on  this  Commission,  Great  Britain,  France 
and  Italy.  This  will  very  likely  be  objected  to  on  the  part 
of  these  Governments,  who  will  fear  a  deadlock  and  who 
will  then  wish  America  to  be  represented.  If  this  should 
be  deemed  advisable,  the  Commission  should  be  made  to 
include  five  members,  one  the  representative  of  the 
smaller  powers.     Further,  provision  should  be  made  to 


NORMAN  H.  DAVIS  TO  PRESIDENT  WILSON  387 

enable  any  Government  to  withdraw  its  representative 
upon  one  year's  notice.  If  America  finds  it  necessary 
to  have  a  seat  on  such  Commission  in  order  to  try  to 
maintain  harmony,  at  least  she  should  have  an  oppor- 
tunity to  retire  if  she  deems  it  necessary. 

6.  It  should  be  noted  that  in  the  estimates  submitted 
by  the  American  Delegation  this  morning,  it  was  assumed 
that  the  Enemy  States  should  not  be  hampered  in  their 
manufactures  and  trade  by  embargoes  and  other  re- 
strictions. 

SCHEDULE  "^" 

Copy  sent  to 
Col.  House 

(Third  revise 

March  24). 

Tentative  and  Submitted  with  Every  Reservation. 

Total  Damage  for  Which  Enemy  Responsible. 

(1)  The  loss  and  damage  to  which  the  Allies  and  Associ- 
ated Governments  and  their  nationals  have  been  subjected 
as  a  direct  and  necessary  consequence  of  the  war  imposed 
upon  them  by  the  Enemy  States,  is  upwards  of  800 
thousand  million  marks. 

(2)  It  is  recognized  by  all  of  the  Allied  and  Associated 
Governments  that  the  financial  and  economic  resources 
of  the  Enemy  States  are  not  unlimited,  and  that  it  will 
therefore  be  impracticable  for  the  Enemy  States  to  make 
complete  reparation  for  the  loss  and  damage,  above  stated, 
resulting  from  the  aggression  of  such  Enemy  States. 

What  Enemy  Obligated  to  Pay. 

(3)  The  Allied  and  Associated  Governments  have  made 
a  preliminary  investigation  of  the  material  damage  and  of 
the  personal  injury  to  civilians,  which  the  Enemy  States 
have  caused,  and  of  the  damage  resulting  from  their  acts 
in  violation  of  formal  engagements  and  of  the  law  of  nations. 
Such  investigation  shows  that  the  aggregate  of  these 
items  alone  is  a  sum  in  excess  of  million  marks. 


388         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 
What  Enemy  Can  and  Shall  Pay. 

(4)  The  Allied  and  Associated  Governments  have 
determined  that  the  Enemy  States  shall  be  called  upon 
to  pay  the  sums  as  set  forth  below. 

Initial  Payment. 

(5)  The  Enemy  States  shall  pay  within  a  period  of  two 
years,  beginning  May  1,  1919,  the  sum  of  20  thousand 
million  marks,  and  on  account  of  the  foregoing  sum,  shall 
immediately  hand  over  to  a  Commission  (hereinafter  pro- 
vided for)  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Governments: 

(a)  the  whole  of  the  Enemy  mercantile  marine; 

(b)  per  cent,  of  the  stock  of  Enemy  gold  in  the 
Government  banks  and  in  all  other  banks. 
(N.B.  What  per  cent,  this  shall  be  is  a  matter 
for  decision.) 

(c)  the  whole  of  the  Enemy  property  and  rights  of 

Enemy  nationals  situated  outside  Germany, 
including  all  foreign  securities,  properties,  busi- 
nesses and  concessions. 

Administration  of  Liquid  Assets. 

(6)  The  aforesaid  assets  shall  be  administered  by  the 
Commission  (hereinafter  provided  for),  which  shall  have 
power  to  restore,  in  whole  or  in  part,  to  the  Enemy 
States,  particular  assets  out  of  the  above  if  such  Commis- 
sion are  satisfied  that  it  is  in  the  interests  of  the  Allied  and 
Associated  Governments,  having  regard  to  the  future 
condition  of  the  Enemy  States,  that  such  assets  should 
be  so  returned.  The  net  proceeds,  if  any,  of  the  assets 
retained  by  the  Commission,  after  meeting  the  cost  of 
supplies  to  the  Enemy  States,  approved  for  payment  by 
the  Allied  and  Associated  Governments,  also  the  cost 
of  the  Armies  of  Occupation,  shall  be  applied  by  the 
Commission  towards  meeting  instalments  of  annual 
payments  due  as  below. 

Subsequent  Payments. 

(7)  The  Enemy  States  shall  pay  further  sums  in  ac- 
cordance with  the  following  schedule: 


NORMAN  H.  DAVIS  TO  PRESIDENT  WILSON  389 

(Here  insert  such  schedule  of  maximum  payments  as 
the  AlHed  and  Associated  Governments  may  agree 
upon) . 

Commission  with  Plenary  Powers. 

(8)  With  reference  to  the  aforesaid  payments  by  the 
Enemy  States,  a  Commission  shall  forthwith  be  consti- 
tuted in  the  following  manner: 

(Here  insert  provisions  relative  to  the  constitution  of 
the  Commission). 

Such  Commission  shall  have  power: 

(a)  To  handle,  in  the  manner  prescribed  in  the  fore- 
going paragraph  (6)  those  Enemy  assets  that  are  to  be 
immediately  handed  over  by  the  Enemy  States; 

(b)  To  fix  the  manner,  form  and  place  of  the  subse- 
quent payments; 

(c)  In  general  to  control  and  direct  in  all  respects  the 
matter  of  payments  in  such  manner  as  may  be,  in 
the  judgment  of  the  Commission,  most  conducive  to  the 
interests  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Governments; 
including  the  power,  subject  to  such  limitations  as  the 
Allied  and  Associated  Governments  may  fix,  to  suspend, 
extend  or  cancel,  in  part  or  in  whole,  any  payments  due 
or  to  become  due. 

Acknowledgment  by  Enemy. 

(9)  The  Enemy  States  recognize  that  the  very  inten- 
sity and  extent  of  their  aggression  renders  it  impracti- 
cable to  express  in  precise  pecuniary  terms  the  full 
measure  of  the  loss  and  damage  resulting  therefrom,  and 
they  further  recognize,  without  qualification  and  reserve, 
that  the  sums  above  set  forth  to  be  paid  by  them  fall 
short  of  adequate  compensation  for  that  damage  which 
the  Enemy  States  should  repay. 

Undertaking  by  Enemy. 

(10)  The  Enemy  States  hereby  agree  to  make  repara- 
tion to  the  extent  of  the  sums  above  set  forth,  as  the 
amounts  to  be  paid  by  them,  and  to  abide  by  and  comply 


390         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

with    the   decisions   and    directions   of   the   Commission 
above  provided  for  and  described. 

SCHEDULE  "5" 

Suggestions  for  Instructions  to  Commission. 

March  25,  1919. 

Maximum  Payments. 

The  Commission  is  hereby  instructed  as  follows: 

(1)  Attached  hereto  and  made  a  part  hereof  and 
marked  "A"  is  a  schedule  of  payments  for  which,  pur- 
suant to  Article  of  the  Treaty,  the  enemy  govern- 
ments are  liable. 

Minimum  Payments. 

(2)  Attached  hereto  and  made  a  part  hereof  and  marked 
"B"  is  a  further  schedule  of  payments,  which  schedule 
is  not  embodied  in  the  Treaty  itself.  The  Commission 
shall  not  authorize  payments  by  the  enemy  govern- 
ments to  fall  below  those  in  said  Schedule  "B"  set  forth, 
except  as  in  the  next  succeeding  paragraph  provided. 

Exceptional  Deferment  of  Principal  Sums  and 
Waiver  of  Interest  During  First  5-yr.  Period. 

(3)  In  the  event  that  the  Commission  shall  judge  that 
the  enemy  governments  are  incapable  of  making  the 
payments  which  said  Schedule  "B"  contemplates  shall 
be  made  within  the  period  May  1,  1921-April  30,  1926, 
then,  and  as  an  exception  to  the  next  preceding  paragraph, 
the  Commission,  in  its  discretion,  may 

(a)  Authorize  the  postponement,  to  the  extent  and  in 
the  manner  that  the  Commission  may  determine,  of  the 
payment  of  the  principal  sums  contemplated  by  said 
Schedule  "B"  to  be  payable  within  the  period  of  May  1, 
1921-April  30,  1926. 

(b)  "\Vaive  permanently  payment  of  all  or  any  part  of 
interest  which  said  Schedule  "B"  may  contemplate  to 
become  due  during  the  period  May  1,  1921-April  30, 
1926. 


NORMAN  H.  DAVIS  TO  PRESIDENT  WILSON  391 

Proportion  Payable  in  Reichsmarks. 

(4)  The  Commission,  in  fixing  the  method  in  which 
payments  under  either  Schedule  "A"  or  Schedule  "B" 
shall  be  made,  may  authorize  up  to,  but  not  more  than, 
66  -f  per  centum  of  the  payments  in  any  year  up  to  and 
including  the  year  1931  to  be  made  in  the  currency  of 
enemy  countries  (reichsmarks)  which  shall  be  accepted 
at  the  par  of  exchange,  and  it  may  authorize  up  to,  but  not 
more  than,  50  per  centum  of  the  payments  in  any  year 
subsequent  to  the  year  1931  to  be  made  in  such  currency, 
and  at  the  same  rate  of  exchange. 

SCHEDULE  "C" 

Reference  to  Treaty. 

Whereas,  Article  of  the  Treaty  contemplates  the 
constitution  by  the  Governments  of  Great  Britain,  France 
and  Italy  of  a  Commission,  now,  therefore,  the  said 
Governments  do  hereby  constitute  said  commission  as 
follows : 

Name  of  Commission. 

(1)  The  said  Commission  shall  be  known  as  "High 
Commission  on  Reparation." 

Its  Membership. 

(2)  The  said  Commission  shall  be  composed  of  three 
members.  Each  of  the  Governments  of  Great  Britain, 
France  and  Italy  shall  appoint  one  member  upon  such 
Commission.  The  Government  or  Governments  en- 
titled to  appoint  members  may  fix  the  tenure  of  office  of 
their  appointees. 

Expenses  Borne  by  Enemy  Governments. 

(3)  Proper  provision  shall  be  made  by  the  Enemy 
States  for  the  compensation  and  expenses  of  the  Commis- 
sion and  of  such  staff  as  it  may  find  it  necessary  to  employ. 

Procedure. 

(4)  The  Commission  shall  act  by  the  affirmative  vote 
of  not  less  than  two  members.     Otherwise  the  Commis- 


392         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

sion  shall  fix  its  own  procedure  and  the  time  and  place 
of  its  meetings.  The  first  meeting  of  the  Commission 
shall  be  held  on  the  first  day  of  May,  1919,  at  the  City 
of  Paris. 

Powers. 

(5)  The  Commission  shall  have  power,  subject  to  the 
instructions,  if  any,  of  the  undersigned  Governments  of 
them : 

(a)  To  receive  and  control  in  the  manner  already 
described  in  Article  of  the  Treaty  the  initial  pay- 
ments and  property  to  be  handed  over  by  the  Enemy 
States; 

(b)  To  fix  the  manner,  form  and  place  of  the  subsequent 
payments,  pursuant  to  Article       of  the  Treaty : 

(c)  In  general  to  control  and  direct  in  all  respects  the 
matter  of  payments  in  the  manner,  in  the  judgement  of 
the  Commission,  most  conducive  to  the  interests  of  the 
Allied  and  Associated  Governments  including  the  Power 
subject  to  such  limitations  as  the  Allied  and  Associ- 
ated Governments  may  fix,  to  suspend,  extend  or  cancel, 
in  part  or  in  whole,  any  payments  due  or  to  become 
due; 

(d)  In  general  to  do  such  acts  and  things  as,  in  the 
judgment  of  the  Commission,  may  be  necessary  or  use- 
ful to  permit  of  the  effective  exercise  of  the  foregoing 
powers. 

Duties. 

(6)  It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  Commission  to  exercise 
its  powers  to  give  effect  to  the  provisions  of  Articles  of 
the  Treaty  and  the  provisions  of  such  directions,  if  any, 
as  may  be  given  the  Commission  by  the  undersigned 
Governments  or  of  them. 

Responsibility. 

(7)  Each  member  of  the  Commission  shall  be  respon- 
sible only  to  the  Government  or  Governments  having 
appointed  him. 


NORMAN  H.  DAVIS  TO  PRESIDENT  WILSON  393 

Termination  of  Commission's  Life. 

(8)  The  Commission  shall  cease  to  exist  whenever  the 
undersigned  Governments  or  of  them  shall  so 
determine. 

Amendment. 

(9)  This  instrument  is  subject  to  amendment  by  the 
undersigned  Governments  or  of  them. 

FRANCE  IN  1908. 

Lands,  and  Forests £3,020,000,000 

Animals  and  Agricultural  material 357,000,000 

Buildings  (including  factories) 2,317,000,000 

Businesses  (including  mines) 381,000,000 

Bonds,    including    public    bonds    represented   by 

property! 1,657,000,000 

Foreign  Securities 1,520,000,000 

Gold  and  Silver 347,000,000 

Furniture,  Jewelry,  Automobiles,  Horses,  Carriages  890,000,000 

£10,489,000,000 
Deduct  foreign  securities  and  gold  and  silver   .        1,867,000,000 

say £8,600,000,000 

of  which  5  per  cent,  is £430,000,000 

Double  this  for  increase  of  value  and  prices 

since  1908 £860,000,000 

1.  The  estimates  contained  below  must  be  taken  with 
the  reservation  that,  in  our  opinion,  long  before  the 
amounts  are  collected,  the  Allied  Governments  may, 
and  probably  will,  find  that  such  collection  is  doing  to 
them  as  much  damage  as  to  the  enemy,  and  that  the 
Allied  Governments  will  find  it  to  their  interest  volun- 
tarily to  reduce  or  suspend  such  payments.  It  must 
also  be  recognized  that  any  such  estimates  involve  large 
elements  of  conjecture. 

Subject  as  the  above, 

2.  It  is  our  opinion  that  Germany  can  pay  the  minimum. 


^Omitting  dead  weight  public  debt. 


394         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

and  may  be  able  to  pay  the  maximum,  amounts  per 
annum  set  forth  in  the  American  annexed  schedule,  it 
being  understood  that  the  Financial  Commission  to  be 
appointed  will  have  the  power  to  fix  the  amount  of  the 
payments  between  the  maximum  and  minimum  limits 
and  to  modify  the  methods  of  payment,  and  if  necessary 
will  exercise  its  power  to  permit  one-half  thereof  to  be 
paid  in  paper  reichsmarks  at  the  par  of  exchange. 

3.  These  payments  may  be  continued  for  as  many 
years  as  is  necessary  to  produce  the  sum  adjudged  to  be 
due  in  respect  of  reparation  under  the  definitions  con- 
tended for  by  the  United  States. 

4.  If  it  is  deemed  wise  not  to  extend  said  payments 
beyond  a  fixed  number  of  years  (say  30  years)  whether 
or  not  the  present  value  thereof  reached  the  amount  due 
for  reparation,  then  the  present  value  of  said  maximum 
and  minimum  payments  running  over  a  period  of  30 
years  will  amount  respectively  to  $25,000,000,  and 
$35,000,000. 

5.  The  original  estimate  of  $30,000,000,000  which 
Messrs.  Davis,  Strauss  and  Lamont  unanimously  arrived 
at  several  weeks  ago,  is  still,  in  their  judgment,  the  most 
reasonable  basis.  But  they  have  expressed  their  willing- 
ness to  raise  this  estimate  to  the  maximum  figures  submit- 
ted herewith,  in  order  to  try  to  meet  the  British  and 
French  views. 

AMERICAN   PROPOSAL   FOR   MINIMUM. 

PAYMENTS    (to    BE    REDUCED    TO    THE   FOLLOWING  WITHIN 
DISCRETION    OF    COMMISSION). 

STERLING 

Cash  Payments  (up  to  May,  1921)  ....  £  1,000,000,000 
10  annual  payments  of  £200,000,000,  each,  1922- 

1931 2,000,000,000 

10  annual  payments  of  £300,000,000  each,  1932- 

1941 3,000,000,000 

10  annual  payments  of  £270,000,000  each  1942- 

1951 2,700,000,000 


Total  payments   (including  interest  and  sinking 

fund) £  8,700,000,000 


NOR^L\N  H.  DAVIS  TO  PRESIDENT  WILSON  395 

The  present  worth  (as  of  May,  1921)  of  this  series  of  payments  is 
£5,000,000,000  or  $25,000,000,000 


It  should  be  noted  that  the  initial  sum  above  mentioned 
(£1,000,000,000)  will  probably  be  reduced  to  £600,000,000 
because  of  the  necessary  cash  payments  to  be  allowed 
from  it,  covering  food  for  Germany,  cost  of  army  of 
occupation  and  raw  materials  necessary  to  permit  Ger- 
many to  resume  industrial  work. 


AMERICAN   PROPOSAL   FOR  MAXIMUM 
PAYMENTS  TO  BE  INSERTED  IN  PEACE  TREATY. 


STERLING 

Cash  Payment  (up  to  May,  1921) £  1,000,000,000 

10  annual  payments  of  £300,000,000  each,  1922- 

1931 3,000,000,000 

10  annual  payments  of  £400,000,000  each,  1931- 

1941 4,000,000,000 

10  annual  payments  of  £500,000,000  each,  1942- 

1951 5,000,000,000 

Total  payments    (including  interest  and  sinking 

fund) £13,000,000,000 


The  present  worth  (as  of  May,  1921)  of  this  series  of  payments  is 
£7,000,000,000  or  $35,000,000,000 


It  should  be  noted  that  the  initial  sum  above  men- 
tioned (£1,000,000,000)  will  probably  be  reduced  to 
£600,000,000  because  of  the  necessary  cash  payments  to 
be  allowed  from  it,  covering  food  for  Germany,  cost  of 
army  of  occupation  and  raw  materials  necessary  to  permit 
Germany  to  resume  industrial  work. 


396         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEIVIENT 


FRENCH  PROPOSAL  FOR  MINIMUM. 


Cash  Payment  (up  to  ISIay,  1921) 
In  1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 


8TERLINO 

1,000,000,000 
200,000,000 
240,000,000 
280,000,000 
320,000,000 
360,000.000 
400,000,000 
13,400,000,000 


From  1927-1961  inclusive  (34  years) 

Total  payments  (including  interest  and  sinking 
fund) 

The  present  worth  (as  of  May,  1921)  of  this  series  of  payments  is 
£6,200,000,000  or  $31,000,000,000 


£16,400,000,000 


FRENCH  PROPOSAL  FOR  MAXIMUM. 

STERLING 

Cash  Payment  (up  to  May,  1921)           ....  £  1,000,000,000 

In  1921 400,000,000 

1922 440,000,000 

1923 480,000,000 

1924 520,000,000 

1925 560,000,000 

1926 600,000,000 

From  1927  to  1961  inclusive   (34  years)    annual 

payments  of  £600,000,000  each 20,400,000,000 

Total  payments   (including  interest  and  sinking 

fund)   ' £24,400,000,000 

The  present  worth  (as  of  May,  1921)  of  this  series  of  payments  is 
£9,400,000,000  or  $47,000,000,000 

BRITISH  PROPOSALS  (n.B.) 

STERLING 

Cash  Payment  (up  to  May,  1921) £  1,000,000,000 

1921-1926  not  stated 

Thereafter,  for  a  period  of  33  years,  annual  pay- 
ments of  £600,000,000  each 21,800,000,000 

Total  payments  (including  interest  and  sinking 
fund) £22,800,000,000 

The  present  worth  (as  of  May,  1921)  of  this  series  of  payments  is 
£11,000,000,000  or  $55,000,000,000 

N.  B.  The  British  proposals  are  in  the  form  of  a  memorandum  from  Lord  Sumner,  the  text  of  which  is 
not  entirely  clear  as  to  the  total  term  of  payments,  nor  to  the  present  worth  of  such  payments.  No  mini- 
mum proposals  were  submitted. 


Document  57. 

Memorandum  of  progress  with  the  reparation 
settlement,  April  1,  with  Anglo-American  draft 
of  Reparations  Clauses  (typewritten  copies). 

April  1,  1919. 

British,  United  States,  French  and  Italian  financial 
representatives  met  yesterday  morning. 

After  preliminary  discussion,  the  conference  was  ad- 
journed, to  enable  Mr.  Klotz  to  submit  amendments  to 
Mr.  Lloyd  George's  proposals.  Since  then,  the  United 
States  representatives  and  the  British  representatives 
have  been  in  almost  continuous  session. 

It  has  been  agreed  between  them  that  Mr.  Lloyd 
George's  plan  shall  be  in  substance  adopted,  that  is  to 
say: 

1.  That  Germany   shall   be  compelled   to   admit  her 

financial  liability  for  all  damage  done  to  the 
civilian  population  of  the  Allied  and  Associated 
Powers  and  their  property  by  the  aggression  of 
the  Enemy  States  by  land,  by  sea  and  from  the 
air,  and  also,  for  damage  resulting  from  their  acts 
in  violation  of  formal  engagements  and  of  the  Law 
of  Nations. 

2.  That  a  commission  should  be  established  to  decide: 

(1)  The  value  of  the  claims  in  the  categories  agreed 

by  the  Allies  as  falling  within  Germany's 
liabilities  as  above. 

(2)  The  total  amount  which  Germany  was  capable 

of  paying  to  satisfy  these  claims. 

(3)  That  the  commission  should  report  by  the  end 

of  1921,  but  should  have  power  to  modify, 
from  time  to  time,  the  time  and  mode  of  Ger- 
many's payments  subsequent  to  1921. 


398         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLE]\IENT 

(4)  That  payments  should  be  made  by  an  initial 
sum  and  annual  instalments  over  a  period  of 
not  more  than  thirty  years. 

It  was  further  agreed  that  an  interpretation  document 
should  be  prepared,  to  be  handed  to  the  Germans  as  an 
explanation  of  what  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers 
regarded  as  the  liabilities  payment  for  which  they  were 
in  a  position  to  enforce  under  the  above  clause,  subject 
to  Germany's  capacity  to  pay  as  determined  by  the  com- 
mission. The  United  States  and  British  representatives 
agreed  that  among  the  categories  to  be  included  should 
be  the  cost  of  pensions  and  the  cost  of  damage  to  prop- 
erty. 

It  was  understood  that  Mr.  Lloyd  George  and  Mr. 
Clemenceau  have  agreed  that  pensions  shall  be  calcu- 
lated on  the  French  basis  of  payments. 

In  order  to  avoid  the  challenging  and  putting  forward 
of  doubtful  claims,  we  think  it  would  be  expedient  to 
agree  at  once  between  the  Allies  a  proportionate  dis- 
tribution of  all  payments  received  from  Germany. 

We  propose  to  meet  further  in  order: 

1.  To  draft  the  interpretation  clause  and  to  consider 

Mr.    Klotz's    amendments    which    are     directed 
towards  this  end,  and 

2.  To  make  proposals  as  to  the  proportionate  distribu- 

tion of  receipts  between  the  Allies. 

Text  Tentatively  Agreed  upon  by  the  British 
AND  American  Delegates. 

1.  The  Allied  and  Associated  Governments  affirm  the 
responsibility  of  the  Enemy  States  for  causing  all  the 
loss  and  damage  to  which  the  Allied  and  Associated 
Governments  and  their  nationals  have  been  subjected 
as  a  consequence  of  the  war  imposed  upon  them  by  the 
aggression  of  the  enemy  states. 

2.  The  Allied  and  Associated  Governments  recognize 
that  the  financial  resources  of  the  enemy  states  are  not 
unlimited  and,  after  taking  into  account  permanent 
diminutions  of  such  resources  which  will  result  from  other 
treaty  clauses,  they  judge  that  it  will  be  impracticable  for 


ANGLO-AMERICAN  DRAFT  OF  REPARATIONS  399 

enemy  states  to  make  complete  reparation  for  all  such 
loss  and  damage.  The  Allied  and  Associated  Govern- 
ments, however,  require  that  the  enemy  states,  to  the 
extent  of  their  utmost  capacity,  make  compensation  for 
all  damage  done  to  the  civilian  population  of  the  Allied 
and  Associated  Powers  and  to  their  property  by  the  ag- 
gression of  the  Enemy  States  by  land,  by  sea,  and  from 
the  air. 


(See  Annex  for  interpretation  clause 
prepared  by  the  British.) 

3.  The  amount  of  such  damage  for  which  compensa- 
tion is  to  be  made  shall  be  determined  by  an  inter-allied 
commission,  to  be  constituted  in  such  form  as  the  Allied 
and  Associated  Governments  shall  forthwith  determine. 
This  commission  shall  examine  into  the  claims  and  give  to 
the  enemy  states  a  just  opportunity  to  be  heard.  The 
findings  of  the  commission  as  to  the  amount  of  damage 
defined  in  Article  2  shall  be  concluded  and  communicated 
to  the  enemy  states  on  or  before  May  1st,  1921.  The 
commission  at  the  same  time  shall  also  draw  up  a  schedule 
of  payments  up  to  or  within  the  total  sum  thus  due, 
which  in  their  judgment  Germany  should  be  able  to 
liquidate  within  a  period  of  thirty  years,  and  this  schedule 
of  payments  shall  then  be  communicated  to  Germany  as 
representing  the  extent  of  her  obligations. 

4.  The  inter-allied  commission  shall  further  have  dis- 
cretion to  modify  from  time  to  time  the  date  and  mode 
of  the  schedule  of  payments  fixed  in  clause  3  and,  if  neces- 
sary, to  extend  them  in  part  beyond  thirty  years,  by 
acceptance  of  long  period  bonds  or  otherwise,  if  subse- 
quently such  modification  or  extension  appears  necessary, 
after  giving  Germany  a  just  opportunity  to  be  heard. 
Payment  may  be  required  and,  with  the  approval  of  the 
commission,  accepted  in  the  form  of  properties,  chattels, 
businesses,  rights,  and  concessions  in  ceded  territory; 
of  ships,  of  gold  and  silver,  of  properties,  chattels,  busi- 
nesses, rights  and  concessions,  of  bonds,  shares  and 
securities  of  all  kinds,  of  foreign  currencies  or  the  cur- 


100      wooDROw  ^^^LS0N  and  world  settlement 

rency  of  the  enemy  state,  or  of  German  Government 
bonds. 

5.  In  order  to  enable  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers 
to  proceed  at  once  to  the  restoration  of  their  industrial 
and  economic  life,  pending  the  full  determination  of  their 
claim,  the  enemy  states  shall  pay  in  such  instalments 
and  in  such  manner  (whether  in  gold,  commodities, 
ships,  securities  or  otherwise)  as  the  inter-allied  com- 
mission may  fix,  in  1919  and  1920  the  equivalent  of 
$5,000,000,000  gold  towards  the  liquidation  of  the  above 
claims,  out  of  which  the  expenses  of  the  army  of  occupa- 
tion, subsequent  to  the  Armistice,  shall  first  be  met, 
provided  that  such  supplies  of  food  and  raw  materials 
as  may  be  adjudged  by  the  Allied  and  Associated  Gov- 
ernments to  be  essential  to  enable  Germany  to  meet 
her  obligations  for  reparation  may,  with  the  approval 
of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Governments,  be  paid  for 
out  of  the  above  sum. 

6.  The  successive  instalments  paid  over  by  the  enemy 
states  in  satisfaction  of  the  above  claims  shall  be  divided 
by  the  Allied  and  Associated  Governments  in  proportions 
which  have  been  determined  upon  by  them  in  advance, 
on  a  basis  of  general  equity,  and  of  the  rights  of  each. 

7.  The  payments  mentioned  above  do  not  include 
restitution  in  kind  of  cash  taken  away,  seized  or  seques- 
tered, nor  the  restitution  in  kind  of  animals,  objects  of 
every  nature  and  securities  taken  away,  seized  or  seques- 
tered, in  the  cases  in  which  it  proves  possible  to  identify 
them  in  enemy  territory.  If  at  least  half  the  number  of 
the  animals  taken  by  the  enemy  from  the  invaded  territories 
cannot  be  identified  and  returned,  the  balance,  up  to  a 
total  of  half  the  number  taken,  shall  be  delivered  by 
Germany  by  way  of  restitution. 

The  attention  of  the  four  Chiefs  of  the  respective  Gov- 
ernments is  to  be  called  to  the  following: 

(a)  That  necessary  guarantees  to  insure  the  due  col- 

lection of  the  sums  fixed  for  reparation  should  be 
planned;  and 

(b)  That  there  are  other  financial  clauses  which  this 

conference  has  not  been   charged  to  deal  with. 


ANGLO-AMERICAN  DRAFT  OF  REPARATIONS  401 

ANNEX    TO    CLAUSE    2. 
Personal  Injury. 

(1)  Personal  injury  to  or  death  of  civilians  resulting 
from  military  operations  or  mistreatment  by  the  enemy. 

Pensions. 

(2)  Damage  to  the  civilian  population  resulting  from 
the  absence,  incapacitation  or  death,  in  military  service, 
of  persons  upon  whom  they  are  dependent  and  which 
damage  is  met  by  pensions  or  payments  of  like  nature 
made  by  the  State.     (French  scale  to  govern.) 

Damage  to  Labor. 

(3)  Damage  to  civilians  resulting  from  their  being 
forced  by  the  enemy  to  labor  without  just  remuneration, 
or  to  abstain  from  labor. 

Damage  to  Property. 

(4)  Damage  to  non-military  property  and  property 
rights  caused  by  military  operations  or  illegal  act  of 
the  enemy  or  w^ar  measures  in  the  nature  of  requisitions 
or  sequestrations,  taken  by  the  enemy. 

Fines,  etc. 

(5)  Damage  in  the  form  of  levies,  fines  and  other 
similar  extractions  imposed  by  the  enemy  upon  the  civi- 
lian population. 

Violations  of  Law  and  Engagements. 

(6)  Damage  resulting  from  acts  in  violation  of  inter- 
national law  (as  found  by  the  Commission  on  Responsi- 
bilities) and  in  violation  of  formal  engagements. 

Note:  Where  the  State  or  other  public  authority  has 
already  itself  made  compensation  for  the  damage,  it  may 
present  the  claim  in  its  own  behalf. 

INTERPRETATION  OF  CLAUSE  2. 

April  2nd. 
Compensation  may  be  claimed  under  Clause  2  under 
the  following  categories  of  damage: 


402         WOODROW  ^^^LSON  and  world  SETTLEIVIENT 

I. 

(a)  Damage  caused  to  civilian  victims  of  acts  of  war 
(including  bombardments  or  other  attacks  on  land,  on  sea 
or  from  the  air  and  all  the  direct  consequences  thereof 
and  of  all  operations  of  war  by  the  two  groups  of  bellig- 
erents wherever  arising)  and  to  the  surviving  dependents 
of  such  victims. 

(b)  Damage  caused  to  civilian  victims  of  acts,  cruelties, 
violence,  or  maltreatment  (including  injuries  to  life  or 
health  as  a  consequence  of  imprisonment,  deportation, 
internment,  or  evacuation,  of  exposure  at  sea,  or  of  being 
forced  to  labor  by  the  enemy)  committed  or  ordered  by 
the  enemy  wherever  arising  and  to  the  surviving  depend- 
ents of  such  victims. 

(c)  Damage  caused  to  civilian  victims  of  all  acts  of  the 
enemy  in  occupied,  invaded  or  enemy  territory,  injurious 
to  health  or  capacity  for  work  or  to  honor  and  to  the 
surviving  dependents  of  such  victims. 

II. 

(a)  All  pensions  and  compensations  in  the  nature  of 
pensions  to  naval  and  military  victims  of  war,  whether 
mutilated,  w^ounded,  sick  or  invalided,  and  to  the  de- 
pendents of  such  victims. 

(b)  Cost  of  assistance  by  the  State  to  prisoners  of  war 
and  to  their  families  or  dependents. 

(c)  Allowances  by  the  State  to  the  families  and  depend- 
ents of  mobilized  persons,  or  persons  serving  with  the 
forces. 

III. 

Damage  in  respect  of  all  property  belonging  to  any  of 
the  Allied  and  Associated  States  or  to  any  of  their  sub- 
jects, with  the  exception  of  military  works  or  material, 
which  has  been  carried  off,  seized,  injured  or  destroyed 
by  the  acts  of  the  enemy  on  land,  on  sea,  or  from  the  air, 
or  damaged  directly  in  consequence  of  hostilities  or  any 
operation  of  war. 


Document  58. 

Letter  of  Norman  H.  Davis  and  Vance  McCor- 
mick  to  President  Wilson,  April  4  (autographed 
original),  with  draft  clauses,  comments  and  reser- 
vations (typewritten  copy). 

AMERICAN  COMMISSION 
TO    NEGOTIATE    PEACE 

April  4,  1919. 

My  dear  Mr.  President: 

Supplementing  our  conversation  with  you  of  last  night, 
we  hand  you  herewith  a  schedule  showing  the  basic  text 
of  the  reparation  clauses  and  categories  of  damage,  to- 
gether with  the  comment  and  reserves  in  regard  thereto 
made  by  the  representatives  of  the  Four  Powers  who  have 
been  participating  in  the  discussions. 

These  comments  and  reserves  are  taken  from  the  record 
and  may  appear  to  you  to  be  somewhat  formidable.  As 
a  matter  of  fact  we  believe  that  serious  question  exists 
only  with  reference  to  Article  3,  to  which  the  French 
appear  to  make  serious  objection.  There  is  also  the 
hesitation  of  the  British  relative  to  the  acceptance  of  the 
categories.  We  have  reason  to  believe  that  the  Italians 
are  prepared  to  accept  our  text  in  toto. 

Sincerely  yours, 

ro-       71      TNorman  H.  Davis 
^    ^      ^      (Vance  McCormick 

Hon.  Woodrow  Wilson, 

President  of  the  United  States, 
Paris. 


403 


401        WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 


Reparation  Claims. 


TEXT. 


1.  The  Allied  and  Associated 
Governments  affirm  the  respon- 
sibility of  the  enemy  States  for 
causing  all  the  loss  and  damage 
to  which  the  Allied  and  Asso- 
ciated Governments  and  their 
nationals  have  been  subjected  as 
a  consequence  of  the  war  imposed 
upon  them  by  the  aggression  of 
the  enemy  States. 


2.  The  Allied  and  Associated 
Governments  recognize  that  the 
financial  resources  of  the  enemy 
States  are  not  unlimited,  and, 
after  taking  into  account  per- 
manent diminutions  of  such  re- 
sources which  will  result  from 
other  treaty  clauses,  they  judge 
that  it  will  be  impracticable  for 
enemy  States  to  make  complete 
reparation  for  all  such  loss  and 
damage.  The  Allied  and  As- 
sociated Governments,  however, 
require  that  the  enemy  States,  to 
the  extent  of  their  utmost  ca- 
pacity, make  compensation  for 
all  damage  done  to  the  civilian 
population  of  the  Allied  or  As- 
sociated Powers  and  to  their 
property  by  the  aggression  of 
the  enemy  States  by  land,  by  sea, 
and  from  the  air. 

(Reference  to  Categories  may  be 
inserted  here.) 

3.  The  amount  of  such  damage 
for  which  compensation  is  to  be 
made  should  be  determined  by 


BRITISH,     FRENCH,     ITALIAN    AND 
U.    S.     COMMENT    AND    RESERVES. 

Article  1  is  agreed  to  subject  to : 

(a)  Italian  reserve  with  re- 
spect to  substituting  for  "enemy 
States"  where  it  first  occurs,  the 
word  "  Germany  ",  thus  proclaim- 
ing the  liability  of  Germany  for 
all  consequences  of  the  war  of 
herself  and  her  Allies; 

(b)  French  reserve  as  to  po- 
litical policy  of  incorporating 
Article  1  and  the  first  half  of 
Article  2,  as  this  is  in  the  nature 
of  a  preamble  and  might  be 
omitted  or  placed  in  the  general 
preambles  of  the  Treaty. 

Article  2  is  agreed  to,  subject 
to  the  observation  of  the  French 
that  the  phrase  "to  the  extent  of 
their  utmost  capacity"  is  incon- 
sistent with  the  30-year  limita- 
tion in  Article  3. 

With  regard  to  the  parenthet- 
ical reference  to  categories,  it  is 
left  undetermined  as  to  whether 
these  shall  or  shall  not  be  incor- 
porated in  the  first  instance  in 
the  treaty  as  to  be  proposed  to 
Germany.  The  British,  French 
and  Italians  regard  this  as  indis- 
pensable; the  United  States  re- 
served their  view  as  being  a 
question  of  strategy  to  be  sub- 
sequently decided. 


Article  3  is  agreed  to,  except  as 
to  France,  which  rejects  the 
paragraph  particularly  in  that  it 


DAVIS  AND  McCORMICK  TO  WILSON.  APRIL  4 


405 


an  inter-allied  commission,  to  be 
constituted  in  such  form  as  the 
Allied  and  Associated  Govern- 
ments shall  forthwith  determine. 
This  commission  shall  examine 
into  the  claims  and  give  to  the 
enemy  States  a  just  opportunity 
to  be  heard.  The  findings  of  the 
commission  as  to  the  amount  of 
damage  defined  in  Article  2 
shall  be  concluded  and  com- 
municated to  the  enemy  States 
on  or  before  May  1,  1921.  The 
commission  shall  also,  concur- 
rently, draw  up  a  schedule  of 
payments  up  to  or  within  the 
total  sum  thus  due,  which  in 
their  judgment  Germany  should 
be  able  to  liquidate  within  a 
period  of  thirty  years,  and  this 
schedule  of  payments  shall  then 
be  communicated  to  Germany  as 
representing  the  extent  of  her 
obligations. 

4.  The  inter-allied  commission 
shall  further  have  discretion  to 
modify  from  time  to  time  the 
date  and  mode  of  the  schedule  of 
payments  fixed  in  clause  3,  and, 
if  necessary,  to  extend  them  in 
part  beyond  thirty  years,  by  ac- 
ceptance of  long  period  bonds  or 
otherwise,  if  subsequently  such 
modification  or  extension  appear 
necessary,  after  giving  Germany 
a  just  opportunity  to  be  heard. 

5.  In  order  to  enable  the  Allied 
and  Associated  Powers  to  proceed 
at  once  to  the  restoration  of  their 
industrial  and  economic  life, 
pending  the  full  determination 
of  their  claim,  Germany  shall 
pay  in  such  instalments  and  in 
such  manner  (whether  in  gold, 
commodities,  ships,  securities  or 
otherwise)  as  the  inter-allied 
commission  may  fix,  in  1919  and 


does  not  insure  the  complete 
payment  of  the  debt  to  be  es- 
tablished in  accordance  with 
Article  2.  The  French  contend 
that  the  Commission  should  be 
required  to  secure  complete  pay- 
ment but  have  discretion  so  as  to 
permit  such  proportion  of  this  as 
may  be  necessary  to  be  paid  in 
marks  and  German  internal 
bonds. 


Article  4  is  accepted,  subject 
to  any  modifications  which  might 
be  required  if  Article  3  is  changed 
in  accordance  with  the  French 


view. 


Article  5  is  accepted  by  the 
British  and  Americans.  The 
French  and  Italians  propose  the 
following  alternative  text: 

"Germany  shall  pay,  in  such 
instalments  and  in  such  manner 
(either  in  gold,  commodities, 
ships,  securities  or  otherwise)  as 
the  inter-allied  commission  may 
fix,  in  1919  and  1920,  the  equiv- 
alent of  $5,000,000,000  gold,  of 


406        WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 


1920,  the  equivalent  of  $5,000, 
000,000  gold  towards  the  liqui- 
dation of  the  above  claims,  out  of 
which  the  expenses  of  the  Army 
of  Occupation  subsequent  to  the 
Armistice  shall  first  be  met,  pro- 
vided that  such  supplies  of  food 
and  raw  materials  as  may  be 
judged  by  the  Allied  and  Asso- 
ciated Governments  to  be  essen- 
tial to  enable  Germany  to  meet 
her  obligations  for  reparation 
may,  with  the  approval  of  the 
Allied  and  Associated  Govern- 
ments, be  paid  for  out  of  the 
above  sum. 

6.  The  successive  installments 
paid  over  by  the  enemy  States  in 
satisfaction  of  the  above  claims 
shall  be  divided  by  the  Allied 
and  Associated  Governments  in 
proportions  which  have  been  de- 
termined upon  by  them  in  ad- 
vance, on  a  basis  of  general 
equity,  and  of  the  rights  of  each. 

7.  The  payments  mentioned 
above  do  not  include  restitution 
in  kind  of  cash  taken  away, 
seized  or  sequestrated,  nor  the 
restitution  in  kind  of  animals, 
objects  of  every  nature  and  se- 
curities taken  away,  seized,  or 
sequestrated  in  the  cases  in  which 
it  proves  possible  to  identify 
them  in  enemy  territory.  If  at 
least  half  the  number  of  animals 
taken  by  the  enemy  from  the  in- 
vaded territories  cannot  be  iden- 
tified and  returned,  the  balance, 
up  to  a  total  of  half  the  number 
taken,  shall  be  delivered  by  Ger- 
many by  way  of  restitution. 

N.  B.  The  attention  of  the  four 
chiefs  of  the  respective  Govern- 
ments is  to  be  called  to  the  fol- 
lowing: 


which  $4,500,000,000  shall  be 
applied  to  meet  the  expenses  of 
the  Armies  of  Occupation  and 
the  reparation  of  damage  above 
contemplated,  and  $500,000,000 
shall  be  upi)lied  to  the  payment 
of  supplies  of  food  and  raw  mate- 
rials, approved  and  controlled  by 
the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers 
for  the  purpose  of  supplying 
Germany  up  to  May  1,  1921." 


Article  6  is  agreed  to,  subject 
to  the  Italian  reservation  that  in 
the  event  of  the  inability  of  the 
Allied  and  Associated  Govern- 
ments to  agree  upon  a  division 
of  the  reparation  payments,  the 
question  shall  be  arbitrated  by 
or  under  the  direction  of  the 
President  of  the  United  States, 

Article  7  is  agreed  to,  subject  to 
the  British  reservation  of  the  word 
"cash"  in  the  first  sentence. 
The  British  have  proposed  that 
the  propriety  of  including  cash 
be  decided  by  the  American  dele- 
gation. The  French  reserve  the 
question  of  their  willingness  to 
accept  such  decision. 


DAVIS  AND  Mccormick  to  wilson,  april  4       407 

(a)  That  necessary  guarantees 
to  insure  the  due  collection 
of  the  sums  fixed  for  repara- 
tion should  be  planned;  and 

(b)  That  there  are  other  finan- 
cial clauses  which  this  con- 
ference has  not  been  charged 
to  deal  with. 


ANNEX. 

Compensation  may  be  claimed  under  Article  2  for  the 
following  categories  of  damage: 

(1)  Personal  injury  to  or  death  of  civilians  resulting 
from  acts  of  war  on  land  and  sea  and  from  the  air  or  mis- 
treatment by  the  enemy. 

(2)  Damage  to  the  civilian  population  resulting  from 
the  absence,  incapacitation  or  death  of  persons  serving 
with  the  forces  and  which  damage  is  met  by  pensions  or 
allowances  of  like  nature  made  by  the  State  (French 
scale  to  govern). 

(3)  Damage  to  civilians  resulting  from  their  being 
forced  by  the  enemy  to  labor  without  just  remuneration 
or  abstain  from  labor. 

(4)  Damage  to  or  interference  with  non-military  prop- 
erty, as  from  date  of  damage  or  interference,  directly 
caused  by  acts  of  war  on  land  and  sea  and  from  air,  or 
illegal  acts  of  the  enemy  or  war  measures  in  the  nature 
of  requisitions  or  sequestrations,  taken  by  the  enemy. 

(5)  Damage  in  the  form  of  levies,  fines  and  other 
similar  exactions  imposed  by  the  enemy  upon  the  civilian 
population. 

(6)  Damage  resulting  from  acts  in  violation  of  inter- 
national law  (as  found  by  the  Commission  on  Responsi- 
bilities) and  in  violation  of  formal  engagements. 

Note:  Where  the  State  or  other  public  authority  has 
already  itself  made  compensation  for  the  damage, 
it  may  present  the  claim  in  its  own  behalf. 
(These  categories  are  accepted,  subject  to  the  following: 
(a)  British  do  not  oppose,  but  state  present  instruc- 
tions from  Mr.  Lloyd  George  do  not  permit  them 
to  accept  all  of  the  categories; 


408         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

(b)  French  propose  additional  categories:  (1)  expense 

of  relief  to  prisoners  of  war,  (2)  expense  involved 
in  repurchase  of  marks; 

(c)  Italians  state  they  construe  Category  6  to  permit 

a  claim  for  expense  in  providing  defense  against 
air  raids  and  gas  attack.  Other  delegations  do 
not  accept  this  construction). 


Document  59. 

French  memorandum,  April  5,  criticizing  the 
Anglo-American  draft  of  Reparations  Clauses 
(carbon  copy,  translation). 

April  5,  1919. 

Remarks  of  the  French  Delegation 

ABOUT  THE  ScHEME 

OF  THE  British  and  American  Delegations 

Article  I. — The  French  Delegation  makes  all  reserves 
concerning  the  political  advisableness  of  asserting  amongst 
the  financial  clauses  of  the  treaty  Germany's  incapacity 
of  discharging  the  whole  of  her  debt. 

Articles  II  and  III. — ^The  note  brought  forward  by 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  on  the  29th  of  March  1919  and  the 
memorandum  of  the  British  and  American  Delegation 
of  the  1st  of  April  asserted  both  the  right  for  the  Allied 
and  Associated  Governments  of  getting  full  reparation 
for  all  the  loss  and  damage  caused  to  the  persons  and  to  the 
property  whatever  may  be  the  cost  for  the  enemy  states. 
But  the  terms  of  Article  III  were  inconsistent  with  that 
principle,  since  they  compelled  the  interallied  commission 
to  limit  the  amount  of  the  payments  to  be  made  by  the 
enemy  by  taking  into  account  its  financial  capacity  during 
30  years.  If,  for  instance,  Germany's  liability  towards  the 
Allied  and  Associated  Governments,  for  compensating 
the  damage  defined  in  Article  II,  is  found  to  be  50  billions 
of  dollars,  and  if  her  financial  capacity  during  30  years  is 
estimated  by  the  interallied  commission  to  be  40  billions  of 
dollars,  the  indebtedness  of  Germany  toward  the  Allies 
would  be  declared  to  amount  to  40  billions  instead  of 
50  billions  of  dollars.  Therefore  the  fixing  of  the  amount 
of  the  damage  for  which  compensation  is  to  be  given 

409 


410         WOODROW  ^MLSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

becomes  useless,  and  [to]  assert  in  Article  II  the  principle 
of  the  complete  reparation  by  the  enemy  leads  only  to 
misleading  the  peoples. 

The  Anglo-American  scheme,  in  the  new  shape  in 
which  it  was  brought  forward  on  the  3rd  of  April,  leaves 
aside  the  declaration  that  the  Allied  and  Associated 
Governments  are  entitled  to  get  full  reparation  of  the 
damage  defined  in  Article  II,  by  omitting  the  words: 
"At  whatever  cost." 

It  gives  to  the  financial  interallied  Commission  a  double 
task:  on  the  one  hand  it  has  to  fix  the  total  amount  of 
the  German  debt,  such  as  the  Allied  and  Associated 
Governments  have  agreed  upon;  on  the  other  hand  it  has 
to  reduce  that  debt  by  taking  into  account  Germany 's 
eventual  ability  to  pay  in  30  years. 

The  French  Delegation  which  has  already  admitted 
Germany's  debt  to  be  reduced  to  the  amount  of  the  war 
costs  cannot  now  agree  to  a  new  reduction.  This  last 
one  is  based  on  the  assumption;  which  it  is  impossible  to 
verify;  in  1921  as  well  as  in  1919;  on  Germany's  incapacity 
to  discharge  the  whole  of  her  debt  in  30  years. 

It  is  of  a  bad  policy  as  well  as  dangerous  concerning 
the  people  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Governments  as 
well  as  the  German  people;  to  declare  in  one  of  the 
clauses  of  the  treaty  that  the  Allied  and  Associated  Gov- 
ernments shall  take  into  account  Germany's  eventual 
incapacity  to  compensate  the  damage  for  which  she  has 
herself  admitted  to  be  responsible  by  signing  the  armistice 
of  the  11th  of  November  1918. 

It  amounts  to  tempting  Germany  into  declaring  herself 
bankrupt  and  shifting  to  the  allied  populations,  for  genera- 
tions, the  burden  which  would  be  spared  to  the  enemy. 

It  is  contrary  to  the  engagements  taken  by  the  four 
great  Powers  as  well  as  to  President  Wilson's  Points  7 
and  8,  to  admit  that  Germany  may  restore  neither  Bel- 
gium nor  the  invaded  territory, 

It  is  contrary  to  the  principles  of  Laws  to  admit  that  a 
debt  may  be  considered  as  cancelled  or  remitted  because 
the  debtor  could  not  discharge  it  in  a  fixed  amount  of 
time. 


FRENCH  MEMORANDUM  ON  REPARATIONS  CLAUSES     411 

Such  being  the  case,  the  rule  is  that  delays  of  payments 
ought  to  be  granted  to  the  debtor.  Therefore  it  is  neces- 
sary to  do  away  with  the  30  years  hmit. 

The  French  Delegation  gets  back,  in  Article  2,  to  the 
wording  proposed  the  first  of  April  by  the  British  and 
American  delegations. 

As  for  remainder  of  Article  2  the  French  Delegation 
calls  the  attention  to  the  necessity  of  inserting  immedi- 
ately, at  least  as  an  annex,  the  list  of  the  categories  of 
damage.  If  not,  the  financial  interallied  Commission 
shall  have  to  deal  continually  with  Germany's  disputes, 
when  the  time  shall  come  for  her  of  fulfilling  her  ob- 
ligations. 

It  is  to  be  added  that  the  Commission  ought  to  be 
given  full  executive  powers. 

Article  IV. — The  wording  of  the  first  paragraph  of 
Article  IV  depends  from  the  wording  of  Article  III  in  fine. 

Article  V. — It  is  of  a  bad  policy  as  well  as  dangerous, 
after  having  declared  to  the  populations  of  the  invaded 
countries,  that  Germany,  in  order  to  allay  their  sufferings, 
shall  pay  a  provision  of  5  billions  of  dollars,  to  add  that 
she  may  charge  on  that  sum,  beyond  the  expenses  of  the 
armies  of  occupation,  all  supplies  of  food  and  raw  ma- 
terials which  shall  be  granted  to  her. 

It  amounts  practically  to  reducing  to  nothing  the 
advantage  promised  to  those  unhappy  populations,  by 
presenting  them  with  a  tumbler  such  as  all  the  liquid 
poured  into  flows  immediately  away  through  a  hole: 

It  amounts  to  adding  to  the  provision  asked  from 
Germany  sums  which  shall  be  spent  for  her  own 
advantage. 

It  amounts  to  tempting  Germany  not  to  make  any 
endeavor  for  paying  through  her  labor  as  represented 
by  her  exports. 

M.  Clemenceau: 

I  do  not  accept  that  the  Commission  should  have 
power  to  declare  the  capacity  of  payment  of  Germany. 
I  w^ould  say  this:  Germany  owes  me  X  for  damages  to 
persons  and  property.     The  governments  will  have  the 


412        WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

right  to  reduce  that  sum  in  the  course  of  years  if  they 
deem  it  just.  But  we  are  not  prepared  to  accept  any 
reduction  now.  We  shall  see  what  is  possible  and  what  is 
not,  we  shall  take  into  account  the  question  of  accumu- 
lated interest  (we  may  have  to  abandon  our  claim  to 
interest  altogether).  We  are  willing  to  let  the  door  open 
to  every  liberal  solution. 

But  I  ask,  in  the  name  of  the  French  Government, 
after  consultation  with  my  colleagues,  that  what  the 
enemy  owes  to  us  should  be  declared  (if  not  by  means  of 
sum,  at  least  by  determining  categories  of 
damages  to  be  compensated  for).  We  shall  retain  our 
faculty  of  allowing  time  to  pay.  Let  us  fix  a  limit  of  30 
years,  as  thought  desirable  by  most  of  us.  If  everything 
has  not  been  paid  for  after  30  years,  then  the  Commission 
will  have  the  right  to  extend  the  period. 

CATEGORIES  OF  DAMAGE. 

As  to  categories  of  damage  the  French  Delegation 
accepts  the  draft  submitted  on  April  3rd  by  the  Ameri- 
can Delegation,  suggesting  only  that  the  two  following 
clauses  be  added: 

(1st)  Damage  arising,  for  the  Allied  Powers,  out  of 
the  necessity  of  redeeming  the  securities  and  generally 
speaking  all  credits  expressed  in  enemy  currency  belong- 
ing to  the  inhabitants  (corporations  or  individuals)  of 
the  invaded  territories,  or  belonging  to  prisoners  of  war 
or  civilians  interned. 

(2nd)  Cost  of  upkeep,  by  the  Allied  Powers,  of  enemy 
prisoners  of  war,  officers  or  soldiers,  and  of  interned 
enemies  (this  category  had  been  accepted  by  the  American 
Delegation  on  April  2nd). 

GUARANTEES. 

The  guarantees  have  not  been  studied,  the  American 
and  British  experts  having  stated  that  they  had  no  powers 
to  discuss  the  subject. 

They  ought  to  be  determined  in  the  shortest  delay. 


Document  60. 

French  memorandum  (printed;  no  date)  sub- 
mitted to  the  Economic  Commission,  on  per- 
manent economic  relations,  together  with  draft 
clauses  for  the  treaty  of  peace.  In  French: 
translated  by  Dr.  J.  V.  Fuller. 

PRELIMINARY  PEACE  CONFERENCE. 

Economic  Commission. 

PROJECT. 

Presented  by  the  French  Delegation  to  the  Commis- 
sion of  the  Peace  Conference  concerning  the  economic 
regime. 

The  French  Delegation  having  sought  for  the  general 
idea  expressed  in: 

1.  President  Wilson's  third  point,  as  follows: 

"The  removal,  so  far  as  possible  of  all  economic  barriers, and  the 
establishment  of  an  equality  of  trade  conditions  among  all  the  nations 
consenting  to  the  peace  and  associating  themselves  for  its  main- 
tenance." 

2.  Article  21  of  the  Covenant  of  the  League  of  Nations 
adopted  by  the  Peace  Conference  on  President  Wilson's 
proposition,  which  is  as  follows: 

"Nothing  in  this  covenant  shall  be  deemed  to  affect  the  validity 
of  international  engagements  such  as  treaties  of  arbitration  or  regional 
understandings  like  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  for  securing  the  main- 
tenance of  peace." 

3.  The  programme  of  work  for  the  Commission  adopted 
by  the  Delegates  of  the  Great  Powers  on  February  21, 

Submits  the  following  propositions  to  the  examination 

413 


414         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEIVIENT 

of  the  Peace  Conference  as  the  basis  of  the  new  economic 
State,  composed,  to  begin  with,  of  the  Alhed  Countries, 
and  later  of  all  the  peoples  admitted  into  the  League  of 
Nations: 

DECLARATION. 

In  conformity  with  Article  23  of  the  Covenant  of  the 
League  of  Nations,  the  Conference  has  decided  to  estab- 
lish a  special  Commission  of  the  League  of  Nations  "to 
secure  and  maintain  freedom  of  communications  and  of 
transit  and  equitable  treatment  for  the  commerce  of  all 
members  of  the  League,"  as  well  as  to  insure  the  observ- 
ance of  the  special  arrangements  which  may  be  taken  in 
consequence  of  the  needs  of  regions  devastated  during  the 
war  of  1914-1918." 

PROPOSITION. 

1.  During  the  period  of  economic  restoration  of  the 
world,  especially  difficult  for  countries  which  have  suf- 
fered devastation  by  the  enemy,  it  is  proper  that  the 
Allied  and  Associated  peoples,  who  have  carried  on  to- 
gether the  war  against  the  common  enemy,  should  retain 
the  right  to  take  all  tariff  and  fiscal  measures  required 
for  their  own  economic  revival. 

2.  During  this  period,  the  Allied  and  Associated 
Countries  will  render  to  each  other  all  the  collaboration 
necessary  to  shorten  its  duration.  They  will  study,  on 
the  basis  suggested  by  the  League  of  Nations,  the  measures 
to  be  taken  with  a  view  to  hastening  the  re-establishment 
of  world  economic  equilibrium  and  normal  conditions 
as  regards  production  and  expansion  in  the  case  of  each. 

3.  In  order  to  put  an  end,  as  far  as  possible,  to  eco- 
nomic rivalries  among  the  nations  in  the  search  for  raw 
materials,  suppress  the  numerous  causes  of  economic 
rivalry  which  endanger  the  peace  of  the  world,  and 
neutralize  the  natural  economic  inequalities  resulting 
from  the  geographic  distribution  of  wealth  throughout 
the  world,  the  Allied  and  Associated  Countries  agree 
that  henceforward  the  raw  materials  of  industry  shall  be 
free  of  both  import  and  export  duties. 


FRENCH  MEMOEANDUM  TO  ECONOMIC  COMMISSION    415 
These  raw  materials  are  as  follows: 

Undressed  hides  and  skins; 

Wool  in  bulk  or  on  skins; 

Unfinished  hair  and  bristles; 

Silk  in  cocoons,  raw  silk,  silk-floss  or  in  bulk; 

Natural  and  artificial  fertilizers; 

Gums  in  their  raw  state,  rubber,  guttapercha; 

Undressed  timber; 

Rough  cork; 

Raw  cotton; 

Flax,  hemp,  jute  and  other  fibrous  plants  in  their  raw 

state; 
Mineral  ores; 
Iron 
Copper 

Zinc  I       in  lumps,  ingots,  pigs,  or 

Tin  (  cathodes; 

Nickel 

Gold,  platinum,  silver^ 
Mercury; 
Arsenic ; 
Filings,  scales,  chips,  and  waste  of  all  metals  and  their 

alloys; 
Stone  and  earths  used  in  the  arts  and  crafts; 
Pit  coal; 
Oleaginous  seeds  and  fruits  used  in  other  industries 

than  those  of  food  products. 

Food  and  forage  products  are  not  included  in  this  list, 
in  recognition  of  the  vital  necessity  for  each  country  to 
assure  its  own  food  supply  at  all  times  and  in  the  largest 
possible  degree  through  its  national  agriculture  and  stock 
raising. 

4.  Nevertheless,  each  of  the  Allied  and  Associated 
Countries  reserves  the  right  to  regulate  by  internal 
measures  the  exploitation  of  its  national  resources,  with 
a  view  to  preventing  their  too  rapid  depletion. 

5.  In  order  to  safeguard  the  loyalty  of  commercial 
transactions,  each  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  Countries 
agrees  to  prohibit  the  entrance  into  its  territory,  the 


416         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

circulation  in  transit,  and  the  export  of  products  or  goods 
bearing  marks,  signs,  or  indications  of  such  as  would 
cause  them  to  appear  to  have  an  origin  or  source  other 
than  their  real  origin  or  source. 

Each  of  the  High  Contracting  Parties  is  forbidden  to  per- 
mit the  manufacture  or  sale  in  its  territory,  under  a  name 
indicating  origin,  of  products  which  have  not^ — by  reason 
of  their  composition — an  integral  right  to  that  designation. 

6.  The  Allied  and  Associated  Nations  agree  to  take, 
each  on  its  own  territory,  all  necessary  measures  to  frus- 
trate manoeuvres  such  as  dumping  or  other  action  re- 
sulting in  distortion  of  the  export  sale  price. 

SPECIAL  CLAUSES  TO  BE  IMPOSED  ON  GERMANY. 

In  the  preliminaries  of  peace  and  likewise  to  be  in- 
serted in  the  treaty  of  peace  with  the  other  enemy  powers. 

Article  One. — The  German  Government  undertakes 
not  to  subject  goods,  raw  or  finished  products  of  the 
territories  of  any  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  States 
imported  into  the  territory  of  Germany,  as  determined 
by  the  Peace  Conference,  from  whatever  place  arriving, 
to  duties  or  charges  other  or  higher  than  those  to  which 
are  subjected  the  same  goods,  raw  or  finished  products  of 
any  other  of  the  said  States  or  of  any  other  foreign 
country. 

The  German  Government  will  not  maintain  or  impose 
any  prohibition  or  restriction  on  the  importation  into 
German  territory,  as  above  defined,  of  any  goods,  raw 
or  finished  product,  of  the  territories  of  any  of  the  Allied 
and  Associated  States,  from  whatever  place  arriving, 
which  does  not  apply  equally  to  the  importation  of  the 
same  goods,  raw  or  finished  product  of  any  other  of  the 
said  States  or  any  other  foreign  country. 

Article  Two. — The  German  Government  under- 
takes, in  addition,  to  establish  no  discrimination  as 
regards  the  treatment  of  imports,  even  by  indirect  means, 
such  as  the  regulation  of  customs  procedure,  or  adminis- 
trative methods  of  classification  or  interpretation  of 
tariS's. 


FRENCH  MEMORANDUM  TO  ECONOMIC  COMMISSION    417 

Article  Three. — As  regards  export,  the  German 
Government  undertakes  not  to  impose  on  goods,  raw 
or  finished  products  exported  from  German  territory 
into  the  territories  of  any  of  the  AlHed  and  Associated 
States  duties  or  charges  other  or  higher  than  those  paid 
on  the  same  goods  exported  to  any  other  of  the  said  States 
or  any  other  foreign  country. 

It  will  not  maintain  or  impose  any  prohibition  or  re- 
striction on  the  export  of  goods  from  German  territory 
into  any  of  the  Allied  and  Associated  States  which  does 
not  apply  equally  to  the  export  of  the  same  goods,  raw 
or  finished  products  into  any  other  of  the  said  States 
or  any  other  foreign  country. 

Article  Four. — The  German  Government  under- 
takes not  to  take  any  measures  which,  directly  or  in- 
directly, would  have  the  effect  of  preventing  or  even 
hindering  the  free  transit  across  German  territory  of 
products  or  goods  coming  from  one  of  the  Allied  and 
Associated  Countries  and  bound  for  any  other  country. 

Article  Five. — The  German  Government  undertakes 
to  prohibit,  prevent,  or  counteract  all  manoeuvres  such 
as  dumping  or  other  proceeding,  having  the  effect  of 
interfering  with  the  normal  course  of  competition  by 
lowering  the  sale  price  for  export. 

Article  Six. — By  reason  of  the  devastations  committed 
by  Germany  on  the  territory  of  certain  of  the  belligerent 
countries,  the  effect  of  which  is  to  render  especially  diffi- 
cult and  to  delay  the  economic  restoration  of  these 
countries,  the  latter  reserve  the  right  to  impose  an  export 
duty  on  such  of  their  raw  materials  as  are  shipped  di- 
rectly or  indirectly  to  destinations  in  German  territory. 

Article  Seven. — In  order  that  Germany  may  not 
prevent  or  retard,  by  the  use  of  the  undamaged  means 
of  production  at  her  disposal,  the  material  reconstruc- 
tion of  the  industries  she  has  destroyed  on  the  territory 
of  countries  where  she  has  carried  on  war,  the  importa- 
tion of  raw  materials  into  German  territory  and  the 
exportation  of  manufactured  products  from  those  terri- 
tories is  placed:  (a)  for  the  duration  of  the  Preliminaries 
of  Peace,  under  the  control  of  the  Allies;  (b)  ultimately, 


418         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

that  is  to  say  after  the  ratification  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace, 
under  the  control  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

Article  Eight. — For  a  period  of  ten  years  dating 
from  the  ratification  of  the  Prehminaries  of  Peace,  manu- 
factured products  coming  from  the  territories  of  Alsace- 
Lorraine  reunited  with  France  shall  be  received  into 
German  territory  free  of  all  customs  duties. 

The  French  Government  shall  fix  every  year,  by  decree 
communicated  to  the  German  Government,  the  kind  and 
quantity  of  the  products  to  enjoy  this  exemption. 

Article  Nine. — The  above  stipulations  shall  be  sub- 
ject to  revision  by  the  Council  of  the  League  of  Nations; 
but  that  revision  may  not  take  place  within  a  period  of 
five  years  after  the  ratification  of  the  Treaty  of  Peace. 


Document  61. 

Draft  convention  submitted  to  the  Aero- 
nautical Commission  by  the  American  members, 
Rear-Admiral  H.  S.  Knapp  and  Major  General 
Mason  M.  Patrick  (carbon  copy). 

AMERICAN. 

Article  1. — The  Contracting  States  recognise  the  full 
and  absolute  sovereignty  and  jurisdiction  of  every  State 
in  the  air  space  above  its  territory  and  territorial 
waters. 

Article  2. — The  Contracting  States  recognise  the  right 
of  every  State  to  establish  such  regulations  and  restrictions 
as  appear  to  the  State  to  be  necessary  in  order  to  guar- 
antee its  own  security  or  that  of  the  lives  and  property 
of  its  inhabitants,  and  its  right  to  exercise  such  juris- 
diction and  supervision  as  will  secure  observance  of  its 
municipal  legislation.  These  regulations  shall  be  im- 
posed on  foreign  aircraft  without  discrimination,  but  it 
is  agreed  that  any  one  Contracting  State  may  refuse  to 
accord  to  the  aircraft  of  any  other  Contracting  State 
any  facilities  which  the  latter  does  not  itself  accord  under 
its  regulations. 

Article  3. — Each  Contracting  State  shall  have  the 
right  to  impose  special  restrictions  by  way  of  reservation 
or  otherwise  with  respect  to  the  public  conveyance  of 
persons  and  goods  between  two  points  on  its  territory. 

Article  4. — Each  Contracting  State  undertakes  in 
time  of  peace  to  accord  the  liberty  of  innocent  passage 
above  its  territories  to  the  aircraft  of  the  other  Contract- 
ing States,  subject  to  the  conditions  established  by  this 
Convention. 

Article  5. — Each  Contracting  State  has  the  right  to 

419 


420        AVOODROW  AMLSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

prohibit  the  aircraft  of  other  Contracting  States  from 
flying  over  certain  zones  of  its  territory. 

If  a  State  exercises  this  right,  it  must  publish  and 
notify  beforehand  to  the  other  Contracting  States  the 
location  and  extent  of  the  forbidden  zones.  All  of  the 
aircraft  of  a  State  except  those  belonging  to  its  military 
establishment  and  other  state-owned  aircraft  engaged 
in  public  business,  shall  be  excluded  from  any  zones  which 
are  forbidden  to  foreign  aircraft. 

Article  6. — Every  aircraft  which  finds  itself  over  a 
forbidden  zone  shall  at  once  give  signal  of  distress  pro- 
vided for  in  Article  of  the  regulations  annexed  here- 
to, and  as  soon  as  possible  shall  land  at  a  station  outside 
the  prohibited  zone  but  as  near  as  possible  thereto  and 
within  the  territory  of  the  State  within  which  the  pro- 
hibited zone  is  located. 

Any  aircraft  when  called  upon  to  land  by  signal  or 
otherwise,  must  do  so  at  once.  Each  state  shall  publish 
and  notify  to  the  other  Contracting  States  the  landing  sig- 
nals adopted  by  it. 

Article  7. — The  present  Convention  applies  solely 
to  aircraft  possessing  the  nationality  of  a  Contracting 
State.  No  Contracting  State  shall,  except  by  special 
and  temporary  authorization,  permit  any  aircraft  to  fly 
over  its  territory  unless  such  aircraft  does  possess  the 
nationality  of  a  Contracting  State. 

Article  8. — An  aircraft  shall  possess  the  nationality 
of  the  State  upon  which  official  register  it  is  borne. 
Every  aircraft  of  a  Contracting  State  which  leaves  its 
jurisdiction  and  enters  the  jurisdiction  of  another  Con- 
tracting State  shall  be  borne  upon  the  official  register  of 
the  State  whose  nationality  it  possesses.  No  aircraft 
of  a  Contracting  State  shall  be  permitted  to  enter  the 
jurisdiction  of  another  Contracting  State  unless  it  be- 
longs wholly  to  nationals  of  a  single  Contracting  State. 

Joint  Stock  Companies,  Limited  Liability  Companies, 
and  all  other  incorporated  or  associated  bodies  shall  be 
considered  nationals  of  the  State  under  the  laws  of  which 
they  are  created.  At  least  two-thirds  of  the  stock  of 
all  such  companies  which  operate  aircraft  in  inter-state 


CONVENTION  FOR  AERONAUTICAL  COMMISSION       421 

traffic  shall  be  owned  by  nationals  of  the  State  under 
the  laws  of  which  they  are  created,  and  all  of  their  di- 
rectors shall  be  nationals  of  such  State. 

Article  9. — So  long  as  an  aircraft  possesses  the  nation- 
ality of  one  of  the  Contracting  States  in  accordance  with 
Article  ,  no  other  State  shall  confer  its  nationality 
upon  it.  In  cases  where  the  home  station  of  an  aircraft  is 
in  the  territory  of  a  Contracting  State  whose  nationality 
it  does  not  possess,  the  latter  State  shall  be  immediately 
notified  of  its  registration  by  the  State  in  which  it  is 
registered. 

Article  10. — The  Contracting  States  will  exchange 
and  will  forward  to  the  Permanent  International  Aerial 
Commission  every  month  lists  of  new  entries  on  their 
registers  and  of  the  annulment  of  entries  made  on  their 
registers  during  the  preceding  month. 

Article  11. — The  aircraft  of  a  Contracting  State 
when  within  the  jurisdiction  of  another  Contracting 
State  must  bear  their  nationality  and  registration  marks 
and  the  name  and  address  of  their  owners. 

Article  12. — Every  aircraft  which  passes  from  the  ju- 
risdiction of  the  State  whose  nationality  it  possesses  into 
the  jurisdiction  of  another  Contracting  State  shall  be 
provided  with  a  certificate  of  airworthiness  issued  or 
authorized  by  the  State  whose  nationality  it  possesses. 

Article  13. — All  Commanding  Officers,  pilots,  en- 
gineers, and  other  members  of  the  operating  crew  of  an 
aircraft  of  a  Contracting  State  which  passes  into  the 
jurisdiction  of  another  Contracting  State  must  be  pro- 
vided with  certificates  of  their  competency  and  licenses 
issued  or  authorized  by  the  State  whose  nationality  the 
aircraft  possesses. 

Article  14. — Certificates  of  airworthiness  and  certi- 
ficates of  competency  and  licences  issued  or  authorized 
by  the  State  conferring  nationality  upon  an  aircraft  will 
be  recognized  as  valid  by  the  other  Contracting  States 
provided  they  are  issued  in  accordance  with  the  condi- 
tions of  this  Convention  and  the  regulations  appended 
thereto. 

Each  Contracting  State  shall  have  the  right  to  refuse 


422        WOODROW  ^\^LSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

to  recognize  certificates  of  airworthiness  or  certificates 
of  competency  or  licenses  issued  to  any  of  its  own  nationals 
by  another  Contracting  State. 

Such  non-recognition  shall  immediately  be  notified  to 
the  State  which  had  issued  the  certificates  and  to  the 
State  where  the  aircraft  has  its  home  station. 

Article  15. — Every  aircraft  engaged  in  inter-state 
navigation  must  carry: — 

(a)  A  certificate  of  nationality. 

(b)  A  certificate  of  airworthiness. 

(c)  Certificates    of   competency    and    licenses   for   its 

operating  crew. 

(d)  If  merchandise  is  carried,  a  bill  of  lading  and  a 

manifest. 

(e)  A  log  book. 

Article  16.^ — All  aircraft  log  books  shall  be  kept  for 
two  years  after  the  last  entry  and  shall  be  presented 
when  demanded  by  the  public  officials  of  any  Contract- 
ing State  within  whose  jurisdiction  the  aircraft  may  be. 

Article  17.^ — The  proper  authorities  of  a  Contracting 
State  shall  verify  the  documents  which  its  aircraft  must 
carry  and  it  is  their  duty  to  verify  the  quantity,  quality, 
weight  and  measure  of  any  merchandise  carried  and  to 
furnish  the  manifest. 

Article  18. — Each  Contracting  State  agrees  to  take 
all  necessary  measures  to  assist  aircraft  in  distress. 

Article  19. — Each  Contracting  State  agrees  to  allow 
aircraft  belonging  to  other  Contracting  States  to  land 
on  all  landing  fields  in  its  territory  which  are  available 
for  general  use  by  its  own  nationals.  The  landing  charges 
and  charges  for  sojourn  will  apply  equally  to  all  aircraft 
of  the  other  Contracting  States  without  distinction  on 
account  of  nationality. 

Article  20. — Transportation  by  aircraft  of  explosives, 
arms  and  ammunition,  and  of  any  other  dangerous  ma- 
terial is  prohibited  in  international  traffic. 

Article  21. — Each  Contracting  State  has  the  right 
to  prohibit  the  use  of  photographic  apparatus  above  its 
territory,  and  also  the  right  to  develop  any  films  or  plates 
found  on  board  an  aircraft,  and  the  right  to  take  posses- 


CONVENTION  FOR  AERONAUTICAL  COMMISSION       423 

sion  of  any  apparatus  and  plates  which  have  been  used 
above  its  territory. 

Article  22. — The  following  will  be  considered  as 
state-owned  aircraft: — 

(a)  Military  aircraft. 

(b)  Aircraft  used  for  State  service  other  than  military, 

such  as  customs  and  postal  service,  police,  etc. 

(c)  All  other  aircraft  which  are  the  property  of  the 

State. 

All  other  aircraft  are  considered  as  private  aircraft. 

Article  23. — Without  special  authorization  which 
may  be  granted  by  any  Contracting  State,  military  air- 
craft belonging  to  one  Contracting  State  will  not  enter 
the  jurisdiction  of  another  Contracting  State.  Any 
military  aircraft  which  finds  itself,  or  which  without  such 
authorization  is  found,  within  the  jurisdiction  of  a  Con- 
tracting State  shall  be  subject  to  all  of  the  conditions 
contained  in  this  Convention. 

Article  24.^ — There  shall  be  created  under  the  name 
of  a   central   office   at  .     The 

expenses  connected  therewith  shall  be  borne  by  the  Con- 
tracting States  in  such  proportions  as  shall  be  fixed  by  the 
permanent  Commission  provided  for  in  Article 

Article  25. — ^This  bureau  shall  be  under  the  control 
of  a  permanent  commission  consisting  of  two  repre- 
sentatives each  of  the  United  States,  France,  the  British 
Empire,  Italy  and  Japan,  with  five  other  representa- 
tives nominated  by  the  remainder  of  the  Contracting 
States. 

This  Commission  is  empowered  to  collect,  collate,  pub- 
lish and  distribute  information  of  every  kind  concerning 
aerial  navigation;  to  render  opinions  upon  questions  in 
dispute  at  the  request  of  the  Contracting  States  con- 
cerned; to  examine  proposals  for  any  modification  of  the 
provisions  of  this  Convention;  to  recommend  such  modi- 
fications as  may  seem  necessary;  in  general,  to  conduct 
such  investigations  or  carry  on  such  other  work  as  may  be 
for  the  benefit  of  the  international  aerial  traffic  of  the 
Contracting  States. 

Article  26. — To  this  Convention  there  are  attached 


424         WOODROW  A\7LS0N  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

regulations  which  have  the  same  force  and  eflFect  as  the 
convention  itself  and  which  will  be  put  in  force  at  the  same 
time.  The  provisions  of  this  convention  and  of  the  at- 
tached regulations  may  be  modified  at  any  time  after 
agreement  between  the  Contracting  States. 


Document  62. 

Cablegram  of  Postmaster  General  A.  S.  Bur- 
leson to  President  Wilson  (forwarded  through 
Secretary  Tumulty,  March  14),  regarding 
American  policy  and  control  of  international 
cable  lines. 

CIPHER  CABLE 

THE  WHITE  HOUSE 

Washington  No.  11 

The  President, 

March  14;  8  p.  m.  Following  from  Postmaster  General : 
"I  beg  to  suggest  following  for  incorporation  in  peace 
treaty  or  separate  treaty  or  treaties:  'In  order  that  the 
cable  service  of  the  world  may  be  properly  developed 
and  made  available  to  the  countries  signatory  hereto, 
under  proper  and  reasonable  regulation  and  supervision 
consistent  with  sovereign  rights,  and  such  as  will  not 
interfere  with  the  transaction  and  privacy  of  business 
in  normal  times,  insuring  priority  to  government  busi- 
ness and  equality  in  all  commercial  business;  each  country 
signatory  hereto  will  give  to  duly  authorized  corporations 
of  other  countries  reciprocal  rights  to  land  and  operate 
cables,  erect  open  stations,  with  the  right  and  authority  to 
arrange  for  and  to  operate  lines  exclusively  for  business  in 
transit  to  interior  or  exterior  points.  Each  country  may 
respect  exclusive  landing  rights,  concessions  or  transit 
rights  heretofore  made  and  now  existing,  but  no  conces- 
sions, landing  or  transit  rights  inconsistent  with  the  obli- 
gations herein  assumed  shall  be  hereafter  made.' 

"As  showing  importance  attached  by  England  to  the 
control  of  cables,  I  quote  from  recent  issue  of  [London] 
Standard:  'Too  speedy  relaxation  of  the  censorship  of  com- 
mercial messages  might  work  great  injury  to  Allied  inter- 

425 


426        AVOODROW  WILSON  AND  \YORLD  SETTLEMENT 

ests.  That  the  secret  of  its  potency  is  in  the  fact  that  it 
gives  power  to  survey  the  trade  of  the  world  and  as  a 
result  of  that  survey  to  facilitate  those  activities  which  are 
to  the  interest  of  the  Allies  and  impede  those  which  are 
not.  That  the  maintenance  of  control  of  the  cables  will 
enable  us  to  prevent  our  enemies  from  cornering  the 
markets  of  the  world  against  us  by  making  contracts  for 
post  bellum  delivery.  That  it  is  essential  that  during 
the  reconstruction  period  the  powerful  weapon  of  cable 
control  should  not  be  wholly  scrapped.  Thanks  to  the 
present  administration,  the  commercial  interests  of  the 
country  (England)  demand  that  it  should  in  some  form 
continue  to  exist.' 

"This  indicates  the  reliance  that  commercial  England 
puts  upon  cable  facilities  in  connection  with  items  of 
commerce. 

"Without  quick,  reliable  intercommunication,  foreign 
commerce  cannot  be  built  up.  Our  ships  and  merchant 
marine  now  have  to  depend  upon  the  courtesj^  of  foreign 
controlled  means  of  communication  to  get  home  connec- 
tions. The  world  system  of  international  electric  com- 
munication has  been  built  up  in  order  to  connect  the 
old  world  commercial  centers  with  that  world  business. 
The  United  States  is  connected  on  one  side  only.  A  new 
system  should  be  developed  with  the  United  States  as 
a  center.  This  would  give  the  United  States  business  a 
determined  communication  with  all  the  trade  of  the  world, 
and  all  the  countries  direct  communication  with  the 
United  States,  instead  of  over  the  present  indirect  ex- 
pensive foreign -controlled  lines.  There  should  be  an  in- 
ternational comity  or  reciprocal  arrangement  by  which 
the  electric  carriers  of  communication  should  have  under 
proper  regulation  the  same  rights  that  citizens,  ships, 
mails  and  parcels  have  of  landing  and  transit." 

[Signed]     Tumulty. 


Document  63. 

Memorandum  on  cables  and  radio,  submitted 
to  President  Wilson  by  Walter  S.  Rogers,  com- 
munications expert  of  the  American  Commission 
to  Negotiate  Peace  on  February  12th,  1918 
(typewritten  original,  with  autographed  letter). 

MEMORANDUM 

ON 

WIRE  AND  RADIO  COMMUNICATIONS 

Paris, 
12  February,  1919. 

SYLLABUS. 

Letter  of  Transmittal 

General  Statement  Relation  Wire  and  Radio  Communi- 
cation to  League  of  Nations 

Immediate  Communication  Problems  before  Peace  Con- 
ference 

Radio:  Present  Importance  as  Means  of  World  Com- 
munication; Need  for  Broad  Statesmanship  and 
Constructive  Policy 

Cables:  Present  Obstacles  in  the  Way  of  Cable  Extension 
and  Suggestions  for  Their  Removal 

Disposition  of  German  Cables  Seized  During  War 

Proposal  for  International  Ownership  and  Operation  of 
Trans-Pacific  Cables 

Suggestions  for  Incorporation  in  Programme  of  League 
of  Nations  to  Meet  Present  Day  Communication 
Needs 

Conclusion 

427 


428        WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

Paris,  12  February,  1919. 

Dear  Mr.  President: 

Herewith  I  hand  you  a  discussion  of  an  important 
matter  bearing  on  the  Peace  Conference  and  the  pro- 
posed League  of  Nations,  namely,  international  communi- 
cations by  wire  and  radio. 

The  world-wide  distribution  of  your  addresses  and  of 
other  American  news  has  played  a  considerable  part  in 
bringing  the  war  to  a  conclusion,  in  clearing  the  way  for 
a  common  understanding,  and  in  conveying  to  the  world 
America's  purposes  and  ideals. 

This  work  had  to  be  done  by  a  government  agency, 
as  outside  a  few  metropolitan  centers  and  two  or  three 
countries,  the  press  of  the  world  cannot  afford  a  foreign 
news  service  adequate  to  place  the  reader  in  contact  with 
world  activities. 

A  League  of  Nations  exercising  power  through  appeal 
to  the  public  sentiment  of  the  world,  may  fail  unless 
provision  is  made  for  its  reports  being  distributed  promptly 
throughout  the  world.  Certainly  no  public  document, 
however  important,  if  merely  handed  to  the  press 
will  receive  anything  like  universal  textual  publication. 
Most  of  the  world  will  receive  but  hastily  made  sum- 
maries. 

When  communication  facilities  are  lacking,  an  oppor- 
tunity is  left  for  growth  of  international  misunderstand- 

When  communication  facilities  are  controlled  by  one 
nation  which  gives  its  commerce  and  its  press  prefer- 
ential service  or  rates,  misunderstandings  are  sure  to 
arise. 

The  attached  memorandum  contains  constructive  sug- 
gestions aimed  to  prevent  animosities  growing  out  of 
unfair  use  of  communication  facilities,  or  arising  from  a 
lack  of  facilities,  and  to  provide  for  the  generous  flow  of 
intelligence  in  all  directions. 
I  am, 

Yours  respectfully, 

[Signed]  Walter  S.  Rogers. 


MEMORANDUM  ON  CABLES  AND  RADIO  429 

GENERAL  STATEMENT. 

The  conception  of  a  League  of  Nations  includes  not 
only  a  central  organization  endowed  with  power,  but 
behind  that  organization  a  world  of  people  acquainted 
with  each  other,  cognizant  of  each  other's  needs  and 
problems. 

Barriers  to  the  flow  of  news  from  nation  to  nation  due 
to  lack  of  communication  facilities,  to  prohibitive  charges, 
to  preferential  or  discriminatory  services  or  rates,  to 
private  or  national  efi^orts  to  "guide"  the  character  of 
news,  should  be  removed  in  the  general  public  interest. 

The  ideal  is  a  world-wide  freedom  for  news,  with  im- 
portant news  going  everywhere.  The  breaking  down  of 
existing  barriers  resulting  from  selfishness,  chauvinism  or 
a  lack  of  vision  is  but  part  of  present  day  needs. 

There  is  a  call  to  the  imagination  and  organizing 
talents  of  the  press  of  the  world  to  develop  the  business 
of  news  gathering  and  distribution  to  the  point  where 
the  individual  newspaper  reader  in  the  remotest  nook 
will  have  daily  before  him  interesting  items  from  all  over 
the  world.  The  newspaper  man  himself  must  carry  with 
him  a  vision  of  a  world  reading  newspapers — a  world  in 
which  more  and  more  political  power  is  passing  to  the 
common  man. 

There  is  also  a  call  to  the  newer  world  statesmanship 
not  only  to  further  the  breaking  down  of  barriers,  but 
actively  to  assist  in  the  development  of  wire  and  radio 
communications.     Science  stands  ready  to  do  its  part. 

Not  only  is  the  flow  of  intelligence  in  the  form  of  news 
mainly  dependent  on  quick  transmission,  but  shipping 
and  trade  and  finance  are  becoming  more  and  more 
associated  with  telegraph,  cable,  and  radio  communica- 
tion. Fraught  with  danger  is  a  situation  in  which  the 
commerce  of  some  nations  languishes  through  lack  of 
means  of  communication,  while  the  commerce  of  others 
is  subventioned  through  control  of  communication 
facilities.  And  there  must  be  direct,  unhampered  com- 
munication lest  suspicion  lurk  that  intermediaries  profit 
by  trade  information  passing  through  their  hands. 


430         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLE^IENT 

Immediate  Communication  Problems  before  Peace 

Conference. 

Specific  questions  having  to  do  with  telegraph,  cable 
and  radio  come  up  in  connection  with  the  terms  of  the 
peace  treaty  itself: 

I.  Germany  owned  an  extensive  cable  system  which 
was  seized  by  the  Allies  early  in  the  war.  There  were 
two  German  cables  between  Germany  and  the  United 
States  via  the  Azores. 

There  is  an  extensive  German  cable  system  in  the 
South  Atlantic. 

Another  German  cable  extends  from  Shanghai  to  Yap 
to  the  Celebes,  where  it  connects  with  cables  owned  by 
the  Netherlands.     A  short  cable  connects  Yap  and  Guam. 

II.  Germany  owns  cable-laying  and  repair  ships.  A 
German  cable-laying  ship  is  interned  in  Spain.  Both 
types  of  ships  are  needed  by  the  British  and  the  American 
cable  companies. 

III.  Provision  will  have  to  be  made  for  the  ultimate 
reestablishment  of  radio  communications  between  the 
enemy  countries  and  the  balance  of  the  world.  In  this 
connection  it  should  be  kept  in  mind  that  Germany 
can  communicate  by  radio  with  the  Far  East  and  with 
America. 

IV.  Provision  will  have  to  be  made  for  the  reestablish- 
ment of  interrupted  telephone,  telegraph  and  cable 
services. 

V.  In  any  disposition  of  the  German  colonies  their 
possible  availability  as  cable  landing  points  and  as  sites 
for  radio  stations  should  not  be  overlooked. 

RADIO. 

It  is  quite  possible  to  erect  a  radio  station  so  powerful 
that  its  signals  can  be  read  all  over  the  world.  As  receiv- 
ing apparatus  is  inexpensive  and  requires  no  great  space, 
there  is  no  technical  reason  why  a  radio  message  broad- 
casted cannot  be  intercepted  in  every  house  in  the  world. 

It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  statesmanship  has  the 
imagination  to  grasp  the  possibilities  of  such  an  agency. 


MEMORANDUM  ON  CABLES  AND  RADIO  431 

The  exigencies  of  the  war  furnished  an  extraordinary 
impetus  to  radio  development,  inimitable  possibilities 
loom  ahead. 

Here  is  a  new  tool  for  the  use  of  the  civilized  world. 
A  laissez-faire  policy  may  result  in  slow  progress,  con- 
fusion, and  a  monopolistic  control,  with  selfish  interest 
rather  than  the  general  good  of  humanity  furnishing  the 
directive  motive. 

There  is  little  ground  for  belief  that  in  the  foreseeable 
future  radio  will  render  the  cable  obsolete.  There  is 
the  distinct  danger,  however,  that  radio  exploitation 
and  hit-or-miss  competition  may  cause  capital  to  hesitate 
from  financing  cable  extensions.  Both  the  radio  and 
the  cable  has  its  own  sphere  and  each  will  act  as  a  feeder 
to  the  other. 

Radio  from  ship  to  ship  and  between  ship  and  shore 
gives  a  service  important  for  convenience,  commerce, 
safety,  and  navigation.  Such  radio  service  ought  always 
to  be  available,  quite  apart  from  any  prospects  of  direct 
profit  making. 

High-power  radio,  with  its  unlimited  possibilities  for 
broadcasting  messages  to  the  ends  of  the  earth,  pre- 
sents a  startling  opportunity  for  disseminating  intel- 
ligence. 

Its  availability  for  permitting  direct  communications 
between  inland  nations  and  those  far  beyond  their  im- 
mediate neighbors  should  not  be  overlooked. 

The  full  utilization  of  the  possibilities  of  high-power 
radio  raises  a  series  of  problems  requiring  the  highest  or- 
ganizing ability  joined  to  world-wide  perspective.  While 
direction  sending  and  other  technical  improvements  are 
being  worked  out,  the  demand  for  communication  facili- 
ties is  likely  to  keep  ahead  of  the  scientists. 

Countries  far  distant  from  the  great  centers  should  be 
provided  not  only  with  receiving  apparatus,  but  with 
sending  stations  capable  of  reaching  a  high  power  station, 
which  in  turn  can  re-send  messages.  Such  facilities 
should  be  established  quite  apart  from  possibilities  of 
financial  gain. 

The  working  out  of  such  a  comprehensive  system  of 


432        WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

radio  communication,  the  making  of  schedules,  the  stand- 
ardization of  practice,  and  so  forth,  goes  beyond  the 
possibihties  of  private  enterprise  or  of  the  interest  of  any 
one  nation. 

It  is  therefore  suggested  that  each  of  the  nations  should 
nationalize  its  radio  facilities,  and  that  the  nations  of 
the  world  acting  together  develop  a  truly  world-wide 
radio  service.  National  ownership  is  in  accord  with  the 
general  trend  in  this  field. 

A  start  can  be  made  by  approving  radio  relations 
which  have  been  formed  during  the  war,  and  by  providing 
for  an  exchange  of  government  messages  by  radio  for 
the  League  of  Nations  and  between  the  members  of  the 
League.  Next  a  comprehensive  plan  can  be  devised  for 
transmitting  commercial  press  messages  at  low,  uniform 
rates,  so  that  the  people  of  the  world  may  have  the  op- 
portunity of  becoming  informed  regarding  each  other. 
Later  arrangements  can  be  made  for  transmission  of 
general  commercial  and  private  messages. 

Such  an  arrangement  for  development  and  control  of 
radio  will  not  injure  the  cable  companies,  but  will  stabilize 
communications,  provide  fair  competition,  and  through 
such  competition  afford  the  regulation  now  so  lacking 
over  cable  rates  and  services.  Such  an  arrangement  offers 
great  advantages  to  the  cable  companies,  for  as  against 
some  such  an  arrangement,  they  are  confronted  either  with 
going  into  the  radio  field,  or  withstanding  a  disorganized 
and  possibly  demoralizing  competition. 

Such  an  arrangement  also  provides  the  necessary  basis 
for  exchange  of  traffic  between  different  modes  of  com- 
munication, and  insuring  continuous  communication  even 
when  one  channel  of  communication  is  interrupted. 

CABLES. 

Part  of  the  present  cables  of  the  world  are  privately 
owned  and  part  governmentally  owned.  Because  of 
their  international  aspects  privately  owned  cables  have 
largely  escaped  the  supervision  that  has  been  imposed 
upon  other  public  utilities.     Cable  systems  have  grown 


MEMORANDUM  ON  CABLES  AND  RADIO  433 

up  by  extension.  No  attempt  has  been  made  to  develop 
cable  communication  from  a  comprehensive  world  view- 
point. Cable  tariff  rates  have  grown  up  like  "Topsy" 
and  are  in  some  instances  excessive  and  discriminatory. 
Many  places  which  should  be  connected  by  direct  cables 
are  not. 

Great  Britain  early  saw  the  political  and  commercial 
importance  of  cable  communication,  particularly  the 
desirability  of  linking  together  the  British  Empire  by 
cables.  Naturally  enough,  British  cable  systems  were 
built  with  British  interests  primarily  in  view.  As  Ger- 
many became  a  factor  in  world  trade  that  country  un- 
dertook cable  development.  The  only  important  cable 
manufacturing  establishments  are  in  England  and  Ger- 
many. Both  these  countries  realize  that  the  extension 
of  foreign  trade  and  the  development  of  communication 
facilities  must  go  hand  in  hand. 

The  suggestion  has  been  made  that  the  important 
cables  of  the  world  be  internationalized  and  put  under 
the  control  of  the  League  of  Nations,  and  that  the  League 
undertake  the  development  of  cable  communication  for 
the  general  welfare.  Beyond  its  political  aspects  this 
suggestion  opens  up  a  wide  vista  of  administrative  and 
financial  problems. 

No  attempts  will  be  made  here  to  discuss  the  argu- 
ments in  favor  of  such  a  proposal  or  to  enumerate  the 
many  difficulties  in  the  way.  This  memorandum  is 
presented  with  a  view  to  suggesting  readily  worked  out 
possibilities  for  extending  means  of  communication  along 
already  established  lines.  However,  cable  communi- 
cation between  the  Orient  and  America  presents  a  dis- 
tinct problem,  and  the  internationalization  of  transpacific 
cables  is  recommended.  This  subject  is  discussed  in  a 
separate  section. 

Far-seeing  cable  officials,  anticipating  competition 
from  radio  and  a  greatly  increased  demand  for  communi- 
cation facilities,  realized  that  they  must  extend  their 
operations  and  must  pass  from  a  basis  of  a  limited  amount 
of  traffic  at  high  rates  to  a  basis  of  a  huge  volume  of  busi- 
ness at  low  rates.     As  a  cable  official  put  it,  ''We  should 


434         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

give  such  service  as  to  make  obsolete  the  letter  between 
Europe  and  America." 

There   are  certain   obstacles   to  cable   development — 

(a)  The  fear  of  future  ruinous  competition  from  radio: 
This  point  will  be  discussed  in  a  section  on  radio. 

(b)  Exclusive   landing   rights:    Obviously   in   a   world 

which  needs  more  and  more  communication  fa- 
cilities exclusive  landing  rights,  resulting,  as  they 
do,  in  monopolies  and  consequent  inadequate 
service  and  high  rates,  should  no  longer  be  toler- 
ated. Existing  exclusive  cable  landing  rights 
should  not  be  renewed,  and  wherever  power 
exists  to  revoke  such  exclusive  rights,  the  power 
should  be  exercised. 

(c)  Hesitancy  to  cable  touching  intermediate  countries : 

Cable  messages  between  two  countries  that  pass 
through  a  third  country  in  transit  should  not 
in  peace  times  be  subject  to  inspection  or  control 
by  the  third  country.  In  times  of  war  neutrals 
should  have  the  right  to  relay  their  cables  so 
as  to  avoid  control  on  the  part  of  any  belligerent. 
As  an  illustration  of  the  bearing  of  these  points, 
the  cable  from  Vancouver  to  the  Fanning  Islands 
is  too  long  for  the  most  effective  use.  From  the 
standpoint  of  good  technical  practice  the  cable 
should  touch  en  route  at  the  Hawaiian  Islands. 
This  British  cable,  however,  does  not  touch  the 
Hawaiian  Islands  because  of  the  possibility  of  the 
American  Government  at  some  time  undertaking 
to  interfere  with  its  operation. 

(d)  Lack  of  Land  Line  Extensions:  Cable  companies 

and  government  owned  cables  should  be  allowed 
land  line  extensions,  not  carrying  local  business 
and  not  competing  with  local  telegraph  systems, 
to  central  points  within  or  beyond  a  given  juris- 
diction. Inland  countries  would  thus  be  given 
freedom  from  dependence  upon  their  neighbors 
for  communication  with  parts  of  the  world  be- 
yond. 
Such  an  extension  of  cable  service  will  greatly  stim- 


MEMORANDUM  ON  CABLES  AND  RADIO  435 

ulate  cable  traffic  and  further  the  extension  of 
cable  facilities.  Important  inland  places  will  be 
provided  with  direct  cable  communications. 

(e)  Unfair  practices:  There   should   be   uniform   pub- 

lished rates,  no  discriminations,  no  rebates,  no 
special  or  wholesale  rates.  The  principle  of  low 
rates  for  press  matter  should  be  applied  to  all 
cable  companies. 

(f)  Refusal   to   exchange   business:   Every   cable  and 

telegraph  administration  should  be  compelled 
to  exchange  business  with  every  other  adminis- 
tration. All  traffic  agreements  should  be  made 
public.  No  exclusive  or  preferential  agreements 
should  be  allowed. 

(g)  Lack  of  government  spur :  The  great  nations  should 

commit  themselves  to  encourage  extensions  and 
technical  improvements. 

Disposition  of  German  Cables  Seized  dubing  War. 

If  the  League  of  Nations  is  given  any  jurisdiction  over 
cables,  the  disposition  of  the  German  cables  should  be 
determined  in  the  light  of  that  jurisdiction. 

GERMAN  CABLE  SYSTEM  OF  NORTH  ATLANTIC. 

Before  the  war  there  were  two  good  German  cables 
between  Germany  and  the  United  States  via  the  Azores. 
Both  were  cut.  One  now  extends  from  Canada  to  Eng- 
land via  the  Azores;  the  other,  in  possession  of  the  French, 
extends  from  the  United  States  to  the  Azores,  but  the 
cut  section  beyond  the  Azores  has  not  been  connected 
with  France. 

The  two  German  cables  were  the  only  means  of  cable 
communication  between  Germany  and  the  United  States, 
other  than  through  England  or  France,  the  latter  route 
being  unimportant,  as  the  two  French  cables  are  poor  in 
quality  and  inefficiently  operated. 

Leaving  these  German  cables  in  their  present  ownership 
not  only  penalizes  Germany  but  injures  the  United  States. 

The   United   States   has   undoubted   claims   to   those 


436         WOODROW  ^^^LSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLE]MENT 

portions  of  these  cables  lying  within  the  territorial  waters 
of  the  United  States. 

In  the  landing  permits  granted  for  these  cables,  the 
United  States  reserves  the  right  to  modify  or  to  revoke 
such  landing  permits. 

The  United  States  might  well  insist  in  its  own  interest 
on  the  return  of  these  cables  to  their  original  location  or 
at  least  upon  being  left  in  such  position  that  other  cables 
may  be  laid  between  the  United  States  and  Continental 
Europe.  For  this  latter  purpose  it  is  required  that  the 
exclusive  landing  rights  for  the  Azores  held  by  a  British 
company  should  be  cancelled  and  that  Great  Britain 
and  France  should  each  agree  to  permit  the  landing  of 
cables  between  the  United  States  and  Continental  Europe 
when  such  landings  are  necessary  for  relay  purposes  and 
agree  not  to  exercise  any  supervision  or  scrutiny  over 
messages  in  transit  through  such  relay  stations,  and  to 
further  agree  not  to  attempt  to  regulate  the  services  or 
charge  on  messages  in  transit  over  such  cables. 

GERMAN  CABLE  SYSTEM  IN  SOUTH  ATLANTIC. 

This  cable  system  extends  from  Germany  to  the  Canary 
Islands  and  thence  to  various  points  on  the  west  coast 
of  Africa  and  from  Monrovia  to  Pernambuco. 

Brazil  has  an  immediate  interest  in  this  cable  system. 
As  American  cable  companies  are  extending  to  Brazil, 
the  United  States  also  acquires  a  direct  interest. 

Whatever  disposition  is  made  of  the  German  South 
Atlantic  cable  system,  whether  returned  to  Germany, 
turned  over  to  some  other  country,  leased  or  sold,  the 
transaction  should  carry  with  it  stipulations  requiring  a 
waiver  of  all  exclusive  rights,  full  publicity  for  all  its  trans- 
actions and  agreements,  prohibition  of  any  preferential 
treatment  as  to  rates  or  service,  and  an  agreement  to 
submit  to  full  regulatory  control,  including  fixing  of  rates, 
by  the  League  of  Nations. 

GERiLiN  CABLE   SYSTEM  IN  THE  PACIFIC. 

This  system  extends  from  Shanghai  to  Yap  thence  to 
the  Celebes  where  it  connects  with  a  cable  system  owned 


MEMORANDUM  ON  CABLES  AND  RADIO  437 

by  The  Netherlands,  which  in  turn  connects  with  cable 
systems  extending  to  Australia  and  to  India  and  beyond. 
A  short  cable  connects  Guam  and  Yap.  The  system  is 
of  great  commercial  and  political  importance. 

Upon  the  seizure  of  Yap  by  the  Japanese  this  cable 
system  became  dominated  by  that  country. 

While  the  ownership  of  the  cable  does  not  follow  neces- 
sarily the  ownership  of  the  island  of  Yap,  nevertheless 
the  possession  of  the  island  carries  with  it  a  considerable 
measure  of  control  over  the  cable. 

Were  the  island  and  cable  left  in  the  control  of  the 
Japanese,  that  country  would  no  doubt  lay  a  cable  direct 
from  Japan  to  Yap  and  give  her  commerce  and  press 
special  rates  and  services.  Such  a  course  of  action  would 
stir  up  innumerable  animosities  and  might  be  a  con- 
tributing cause  to  serious  international  difficulties. 

The  Japanese  government  owns  and  operates  cables 
and  is  alert  to  the  political  and  commercial  value  of  con- 
trolling communications.  It  is  quite  possible  that  Japa- 
nese eagerness  for  the  former  German  islands  north  of  the 
equator  is  partially  stimulated  by  a  desire  for  control 
of  the  German  cable  system. 

The  following  suggestions  are  offered: — 

1.  International  ownership  and  operation  of  this  cable 
as  part  of  an  international  Trans-Pacific  cable  system. 
This  suggestion  is  discussed  in  a  separate  section. 

If  this  suggestion  is  not  adopted: — 

2.  That  whatever  the  fate  of  the  island  of  Yap  may  be, 
that  under  proper  guarantees  the  cable  system  be  turned 
over  to  The  Netherlands,  as  the  system  is  in  a  way  an 
extension  of  the  cable  system  now  owned  and  operated 
by  that  country. 

3.  If  by  any  mischance  the  cable  should  fall  into  Japa- 
nese control,  before  consent  is  given,  Japan  should  be 
compelled  to  agree  to  grant  cable  landings  on  Japanese 
territory;  to  agree  to  exchange  business  with  all  cable  and 
radio  administrations  on  equal  basis  and  to  cancel  any 
exclusive  landing  rights  or  privileges  that  Japan  may  have 
in  Continental  Asia;  and  further  to  agree  to  permit  cable 
landings  on  any  of  the  islands  taken  over. 


438         WOODROW  AVILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

4.  Whatever  disposition  is  made  of  the  German  Pacific 
Cable  system,  whether  returned  to  Germany,  turned 
over  to  some  other  country,  leased  or  sold,  the  transaction 
should  carry  with  it  stipulations  requiring  a  waiver  of 
all  exclusive  rights,  full  publicity  for  all  its  transactions 
and  agreements,  prohibition  of  any  preferential  treatment 
as  to  rates  or  service,  and  an  agreement  to  submit  to  full 
regulatory  control,  including  fixing  of  rates  by  the  League 
of  Nations. 

While  it  may  be  advantageous  for  the  United  States  to 
own  and  control  this  cable  system,  so  long  as  it  is  not  the 
established  policy  of  the  United  States  to  own  and  operate 
cables,  there  is  not  much  point  in  seeking  a  remote  cable 
system. 

GERMAN  CABLE  LAYING  AND  REPAIR  SHIPS. 

These  ships  should  be  turned  over  jointly  to  Great 
Britain  and  the  United  States,  as  these  two  countries 
can  make  the  greatest  use  of  them. 

Proposal  for  International  Ownership  and 
Operation  of  Transpacific  Cables. 

The  lack  of  adequate  cable  facilities  across  the 
Pacific  not  only  retards  the  development  of  business  but 
prevents  the  peoples  of  the  countries  concerned  coming 
to  understand  each  other. 

Very  little  Chinese  or  Japanese  news  reaches  the  Ameri- 
can press.  Prior  to  the  establishment  of  an  American  gov- 
ernment news  service  to  the  Orient,  the  Chinese  and 
Japanese  press  received  less  than  a  hundred  words  a  day 
from  America.  This  small  amount  contained  a  high 
percentage  of  sensational  news.  The  periodic  Japanese 
outbursts  against  America  are  to  some  extent  explained 
by  the  character  of  the  news  reaching  Japan. 

No  greater  contribution  can  be  made  to  Japanese- 
American  relations  than  the  making  possible  of  a  generous 
exchange  of  news  between  the  two  countries.  Japan  is 
almost  as  much  a  newspaper  reading  country  as  is  America. 

There  are  two  cables  crossing  the  Pacific.     The  Com- 


MEMORANDUM  ON  CABLES  AND  RADIO  439 

mercial-Pacific  Company's  cable  extends  from  San  Fran- 
cisco to  Honolulu  to  Guam;  from  Guam  a  cable  extends 
to  Peel  Island  where  it  connects  with  a  Japanese  govern- 
ment cable;  from  Guam  another  cable  extends  to  Manila 
and  thence  to  Shanghai. 

The  rates  charged  by  the  Commercial-Pacific  Cable 
Company  are  extortionate.  From  New  York  to  Manila 
the  rate  is  $1.12  a  word;  New  York  to  Tokyo  $1.33;  New 
York  to  Shanghai  $1.22. 

It  is  actually  cheaper  to  cable  from  New  York  to  Lon- 
don and  thence  from  London  to  the  Orient  via  the  Medi- 
terranean than  by  the  direct  Pacific  route.  British 
cable  companies  are  alleged  to  be  interested  in  the  Com- 
mercial-Pacific Cable  Company.  Certainly  American 
business  suffers  not  only  from  high  rates  but  from  unjust 
discrimination.  Not  only  are  rates  high,  but  the  service 
is  inadequate  and  occasionally  interrupted  for  weeks  at 
a  time. 

In  granting  landing  rights  to  the  Commercial-Pacific 
Cable  Company  the  United  States  reserved  the  right  to 
purchase  the  cables  and  property  of  the  Company  at 
an  appraised  value. 

The  other  cable  crossing  the  Pacific  is  owned  by  Great 
Britain  and  connects  Canada  and  Australia.  Rates  are 
low,  business  is  encouraged  and  the  cable  looked  upon 
as  an  important  aid  in  linking  together  the  British  Em- 
pire. 

There  is  need  for  a  cable  from  Seattle  to  the  Aleutian 
Islands  with  branches  extending  to  Japan  and  to  Asiatic 
Russia  which  cannot  now  be  reached  directly  from  the 
United  States.  There  is  need  for  connecting  cables 
which  would  ensure  service  despite  any  given  section 
being  out  of  order. 

With  low  rates  there  would  be  in  a  short  time  a  suffi- 
cient volume  of  business  to  justify  the  laying  of  other 
cables.  There  is  no  reasonable  expectation  that  private 
enterprise  will  meet  the  political  and  commercial  com- 
munication needs  of  the  Pacific. 

Great  Britain,  Japan,  China  and  the  L^nited  States 
ought  to  get  together  and  formulate  and  develop  a  com- 


440         WOODROW  ^VILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

prehensive  cable  scheme  with  a  view  to  providing  ample 
facilities  at  low  rates. 

A  number  of  cables  in  various  parts  of  the  world  are 
owned  and  operated  jointly  by  two  countries. 

If  the  four  countries  most  immediately  concerned  work 
out  a  joint  program  for  cable  development  and  opera- 
tion in  the  Pacific,  then  the  German  cable  system  in  that 
part  of  the  world  should  be  turned  over  to  the  four 
countries  for  incorporation  in  a  general  system.  The 
location  of  the  German  cables  is  such  that  their  maximum 
use  would  come  from  such  an  arrangement. 

Suggestions  for  Incorporation  in  Program 
OF  League  of  Nations. 


Section  1.  Each  member  nation  agrees  to  further  the 
extension  of  telephone,  telegraph,  cable  and  radio  com- 
munications between  the  members  of  the  League  of 
Nations. 

Section  2.  Each  member  nation  agrees  to  prevent  dis- 
crimination as  to  rates  and  services  and  to  provide  for  the 
interchange  of  business  between  telephone,  telegraph, 
cable  and  radio. 

Section  3.  Each  member  nation  agrees,  with  special 
reference  to  communication  by  wire,  to  permit  the  landing 
of  cables  and  to  revoke  when  possible  or  at  least  not  to 
renew  any  agreement  or  lease  giving  exclusive  landing 
rights;  and  to  authorize  the  maintenance  or  leasing  of 
land  line  extensions  of  cables  to  principal  inland  points 
in  its  own  jurisdiction  and  beyond,  provided  such  lines 
handle  no  local  business  and  do  not  compete  with  local 
telegraph  administrations;  and  not  to  read  or  to  interfere 
with  messages  in  transit  across  its  territory. 

II. 

Each  member  nation  agrees  to  maintain  such  govern- 
ment radio  stations  as  may  be  needed  to  receive  and  for- 
ward distress  calls  and  other  messages  from  ships  at  sea. 


MEMOR.\NDUM  ON  CABLES  AND  RADIO  441 

III. 

Each  member  nation  agrees  to  maintain  radio  facil- 
ities for  the  handhng  of  official  messages  of  the  League 
of  Nations,  and  official  messages  between  members  of 
the  League  of  Nations  at  a  uniform  rate. 

Section  2.  Each  member  nation  agrees  to  handle 
through  its  radio  service  a  reasonable  amount  of  com- 
mercial press  matter  of  general  interest  at  a  uniform  rate. 

Section  3.  Each  member  nation  holds  itself  ready  to 
negotiate  with  other  member  nations  for  establishment 
of  commercial  radio  communications. 

IV. 

Section  1.  With  special  reference  to  communication 
by  telephone,  telegraph,  cable  and  radio  the  League  of 
Nations  is  authorized:  to  investigate  complaints  arising 
in  connection  therewith;  in  case  of  international  disputes 
to  determine  rates,  practices  and  schedules;  to  fix  the 
rates  indicated  in  Paragraph  III,  Sections  1  and  2;  to 
act  as  a  center  for  the  exchange  of  technical  information; 
to  call  special  conferences,  or  to  recognize  existing  con- 
ferences such  as  the  International  Telegraph  Convention 
and  International  Radio-Telegraph  Convention. 

CONCLUSION. 

The  steady  extension  of  democratic  forms  of  govern- 
ment and  the  increasing  closeness  of  contact  between  all 
parts  of  the  world  point  to  the  conclusion  that  the  ulti- 
mate basis  of  world  peace  is  common  knowledge  and 
understanding  between  the  masses  of  the  world.  Hence 
the  distribution  of  intelligence  in  the  form  of  news  be- 
comes of  the  utmost  importance. 

The  extent  of  news  dissemination  is  determined  largely 
by  availability  of  wire  and  radio  facilities  and  by  rates 
charged  for  press  matter.  The  existence  of  adequate 
facilities  and  low  rates  to  all  parts  of  the  world  would 
bring  about  a  generous  flow  of  news. 

Inadequate  facilities  and  high  rates  leave  a  situation 


442        WOODROW  ^MLSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

where  the  press  of  many  parts  of  the  world  remains 
provincial  owing  to  lack  of  general  news  and  at  the  same 
time  leave  the  press  of  such  sections  easy  victims  to  the 
propagandist. 

Modern  business  with  its  world-wide  ramifications 
likewise  demands  an  extension  of  communication  facilities. 

Abuses  in  connection  with  existing  communication 
facilities  should  be  removed  and  adequate  facilities  es- 
tablished with  rates  that  are  fair  to  every  user. 

If  statesmanship  has  the  vision  and  the  organizing 
ability,  the  most  widely  separated  communities  can  be 
made  neighbors,  trading  with  each  other,  interested  in 
each  other,  understanding  each  other,  learning  from 
each  other. 


Document  64. 

Letter  of  Walter  S,  Rogers,  communications 
expert  of  the  American  Commission  to  Negotiate 
Peace,  to  President  Wilson,  dated  May  2,  1919, 
discussing  the  problem  of  the  disposition  of  the 
captured  German  oceanic  cables. 

AMERICAN  COMMISSION 
TO   NEGOTIATE   PEACE. 

Paris,  May  2,  1919. 
Dear  Mr.  President: 

As  I  see  the  matter,  the  problem  regarding  the  German 
cables  can  be  summarized  as  follows: 

1 .  The  German  cable  systems  have  been  largely  broken 
up.  Certain  of  the  cables  have  been  cut  or  sealed; 
others  are  being  used  in  situ  by  the  Allies;  others  have 
been  taken  up  and  used  elsewhere;  others  have  been 
diverted  to  new  points ;  on  at  least  one  cable  (Pernambuco- 
Monrovia)  an  ally  has  spent  considerable  money. 

2.  While  it  is  very  questionable  whether  the  Allies  have 
any  legal  justification  for  their  actions,  nevertheless  the 
dispersal  of  the  German  cable  systems  has  been  carried 
to  a  point  where  it  is  quite  impossible  to  return  the  cables 
to  Germany  in  anything  like  their  former  condition. 
Nor  can  it  be  forgotten  that  German  cables  were  laid 
partly  for  political  reasons. 

3.  The  British  attitude  is  largely  influenced  by  a  desire 
to  retain  the  former  Emden-Azores-New  York  cable, 
which  has  been  diverted  to  Land's  End-Azores-Halifax. 
This  cable  can  be  of  considerable  importance  to  Canada, 
for  the  Dominion,  like  the  United  States,  needs  additional 
cable  facilities.  Should  the  Canadian  and  British  Govern- 
ments operate  this  cable  in  such  a  way  as  to  force  down 
trans-x\tlantic  cable  rates,  the  United  States  would  benefit. 

443 


444         WOODROW  WTXSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

4.  As  to  the  question  arising  over  the  ownership  of  the 
other  trans-Atlantic  cables,  the  immediate  ownership 
of  a  cable  or  group  of  cables  is  not  especially  significant. 
Every  cable  is  a  part  of  the  world  system  of  communi- 
cations, and  as  such  it  is  operated  in  conjunction  with 
other  telegraph  and  cable  administrations.  The  cable 
business  has  grown  up  without  plan  or  supervision,  so 
that  every  cable  company  is  enmeshed  in  a  snarl  of 
inter-relationships  which  limit  individual  action.  Speak- 
ing generally,  it  is  true  that  the  British  cable  companies 
dominate  the  cable  business.  A  certain  amount  of  gov- 
ernmental supervision  is  exercised  over  cable  companies 
through  the  control  of  landing  rights.  The  American 
operated  trans-Atlantic  cables  could  not  live  a  day  except 
for  their  arrangements  with  the  British  Government  tele- 
graph system  for  the  interchange  of  business. 

5.  The  Japanese  attitude  is  largely  influenced  by  their 
desire  to  retain  the  cable  running  from  Shanghai  to  Yap 
to  Menado  and  the  cable  connecting  Guam  and  Yap. 
The  Japanese  Government  owns  other  cables  and  no 
doubt  wants  the  German  cables  to  further  Japanese 
trade  and  influence  in  the  Dutch  East  Indies  and  beyond. 
These  German  cables  do  not  pay;  incorporated  in  a  well 
worked  out  system  of  Pacific  cables,  they  probably  would 
prove  profitable. 

6.  The  French  attitude  is  largely  influenced:  (a)  By 
a  desire  to  retain  the  former  Emden-Azores-New  York 
cable,  which  now  runs  Brest-Azores-New  York.  There 
are  already  two  French  cables  crossing  the  Atlantic,  both 
ineflSciently  operated.  These  French  cables  have  not 
been  used  to  bring  down  rates  or  to  force  an  improvement 
of  service,  (b)  By  a  desire  to  retain  the  Pernambuco- 
Monrovia  cable  or  to  be  reimbursed  for  money  expended 
upon  it. 

7.  Looking  at  the  cable  situation  broadly,  there  is  a 
great  human  need  for  more  cables,  for  lower  rates  and 
for  better  service.  Low,  uniform  rates  and  adequate 
service  would  do  much  to  bring  about  a  common  under- 
standing throughout  the  world.  Every  country  should 
have  direct,  unfettered  communication  with  every  other 


DISPOSITION  OF  GERMAN  OCEANIC  CABLES  445 

country.  Cable  development  is  checked  largely  by  British 
control  of  gutta-percha,  by  combinations  between  pres- 
ent telegraph  and  cable  administrations,  and  by  exclusive 
landing  rights  held  by  certain  companies. 

8.  As  a  step  toward  giving  the  world  better  cable  facil- 
ities, the  German  cables  and  the  new  lines  based  on  them 
might  well  be  turned  over  to  the  "Big  Five"  as  trustees 
with  power  to  own  and  operate  them  or,  if  later  thought 
advisable,  to  dispose  of  them. 

9.  If  the  trustee  arrangement  is  not  agreed  upon,  there 
is  nothing  left  but  to  divide  the  cables  among  the  powers. 
In  any  such  arrangement  the  United  States  should  in- 
sist that  guarantees  be  given  (a)  that  every  cable  user  be 
given  equal  service  and  equal  rates  and  that  there  be  no 
secret  or  preferential  rates;  and  (b)  that  assurances  be 
given  that  arrangements  will  be  made  for  the  interchange 
of  traffic  upon  a  uniform  basis  with  all  telegraph,  cable 
and  radio  administrations.  These  provisions  will  be  in 
the  direction  of  introducing  into  the  cable  business  now 
generally  recognized  principles  of  fair  dealing.  In  any 
parcelling  out  of  the  cables  the  United  States  should 
insist  as  a  very  minimum  upon  having  a  half  interest  in 
the  Yap-Guam  cable,  the  ownership  of  the  Brest-Azores- 
New  York  cable,  and  assurances  of  cable  connections 
from  Brest  to  Emden.  If  the  Japanese  should  obtain 
the  Yap-Guam  cable,  they  would  insist  upon  going  to 
Guam — a  strategic  point  now  closed  to  all  outsiders. 
Ownership  of  the  Brest-Azores -New  York  cable  would 
give  the  American  Government  a  certain  amount  of 
power  over  the  trans- Atlantic  cable  situation,  such  as 
Great  Britain  and  Canada  w^ould  obtain  through  re- 
taining the  Land's  End-Azores-Halifax  cable.  The  French 
Government,  through  the  present  French  cables,  already 
has  such  a  lever,  and  then  it  is  presumed  that  France 
would  receive  the  Pernambuco-Monrovia  cable.  The 
United  States  should  also  receive  the  former  German 
cable  now  derelict  off  New  York. 

10.  It  is  probable  that  to  the  suggestion  that  the  Ger- 
man cables  be  turned  over  to  the  Big  Five  as  trustees,  that 
Great  Britain  will  insist  on  keeping  out  of  the  trust  the 


446        WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

Land's  End-Azores-Halifax  cable  on  the  ground  that  it  is 
no  longer  German,  having  been  incorporated  into  the  Brit- 
ish cable  system.  The  PVench  will  probably  argue  that  they 
should  not  give  up  the  Pernambuco-Monrovia  cable  until 
they  have  been  compensated  for  their  expenditures  on 
it.  The  Japanese  may  claim  that  the  island  of  Yap  is 
theirs  and  that  the  ownership  of  the  cable  is  an  incident 
to  the  ownership  of  the  island.  It  is  entirely  clear  that 
no  trust  arrangement  can  be  satisfactory  unless  all  the 
German  cables  are  included  and  in  addition  such  cables 
as  have  resulted  from  the  division  of  German  cables. 

1 1.  In  any  event  it  should  now  be  decided  to  hold  later  in 
the  year  an  international  conference  to  deal  with  the 
entire  subject  of  international  communication  by  tele- 
phone, telegraph,  cable  and  radio.  Such  a  conference 
should  be  charged  especially  with  devising  ways  and 
means  of  providing  small  nations  with  adequate  service 
and  further  with  the  development  of  plans  for  facilitating 
the  distribution  of  intelligence  throughout  the  world  at 
uniform,  nominal  rates. 

I  am,  my  dear  Mr.  President, 

Sincerely  yours, 

[Signed]  Walter  S.  Rogers. 


PART  IX 
GERMANY  AND   THE   PEACE    CONFERENCE 


Document  65. 

Memorandum  of  Major  General  Tasker  H. 
Bliss  for  President  Wilson,  "Some  Considerations 
for  the  Peace  (  onference  before  They  Finally 
Draft  Their  Terms,"  dated  March  25,  1919 
(typewritten  original). 

Some  Considerations  for  the  Peace  Conference 
BEFORE  They  Finally  Draft  Their  Terms 

When  nations  are  exhausted  by  wars  in  which  they 
have  put  forth  all  their  strength  and  which  leave  them 
tired,  bleeding  and  broken,  it  is  not  difficult  to  patch  up 
a  peace  that  may  last  until  the  generation  which  experi- 
enced the  horrors  of  the  war  has  passed  away.  Pictures 
of  heroism  and  triumph  only  tempt  those  who  know 
nothing  of  the  sufferings  and  terrors  of  war.  It  is  there- 
fore comparatively  easy  to  patch  up  a  peace  which  will 
last  for  30  years. 

What  is  difficult,  however,  is  to  draw  up  a  peace  which 
will  not  provoke  a  fresh  struggle  when  those  who  have 
had  practical  experience  of  what  war  means  have  passed 
away.  History  has  proved  that  a  peace  which  has  been 
hailed  by  a  victorious  nation  as  a  triumph  of  diplomatic 
skill  and  statesmanship,  even  of  moderation,  in  the  long 
run  has  proved  itself  to  be  shortsighted  and  charged  with 
danger  to  the  victor.  The  Peace  of  1871  was  believed  by 
Germany  to  ensure  not  only  her  security  but  her  perma- 
nent supremacy.  The  facts  have  shown  exactly  the 
contrary.  France  itself  has  demonstrated  that  those 
who  say  you  can  make  Germany  so  feeble  that  she  will 
never  be  able  to  hit  back  are  utterly  wrong.  Year  by 
year  France  became  numerically  weaker  in  comparison 
with  her  victorious  neighbor,  but  in  reality  she  became 

449 


450         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

ever  more  powerful.  She  kept  watch  on  Europe,  she 
made  alHance  with  those  whom  Germany  had  wronged 
or  menaced;  she  never  ceased  to  warn  the  world  of  its 
danger  and  ultimately  she  was  able  to  secure  the  over- 
throw of  the  far  mightier  power  which  had  trampled  so 
brutally  upon  her.  You  may  strip  Germany  of  her 
colonies,  reduce  her  armaments  to  a  mere  police  force 
and  her  navy  to  that  of  a  fifth  rate  power;  all  the  same 
in  the  end  if  she  feels  that  she  has  been  unjustly  treated 
in  the  peace  of  1919  she  will  find  means  of  exacting 
retribution  from  her  conquerors.  The  impression,  the 
deep  impression,  made  upon  the  human  heart  by  four 
years  of  unexampled  slaughter  will  disappear  with  the 
hearts  upon  which  it  has  been  marked  by  the  terrible 
sword  of  the  great  war.  The  maintenance  of  peace  will 
then  depend  upon  there  being  no  causes  of  exasperation 
constantly  stirring  up  the  spirit  of  patriotism,  of  justice 
or  of  fair  play  to  achieve  redress.  Our  terms  may  be 
severe,  they  may  be  stern  and  even  ruthless,  but  at  the 
same  time  they  can  be  so  just  that  the  country  on  which 
they  are  imposed  will  feel  in  its  heart  that  it  has  no  right 
to  complain.  But  injustice,  arrogance,  displayed  in  the 
hour  of  triumph  will  never  be  forgotten  or  forgiven. 

For  these  reasons  I  am,  therefore,  strongly  averse  to 
transferring  more  Germans  from  German  rule  to  the  rule 
of  some  other  nation  than  can  possibly  be  helped.  I  can- 
not conceive  any  greater  cause  of  future  war  than  that 
the  German  people,  who  have  certainly  proved  themselves 
one  of  the  most  vigorous  and  powerful  races  in  the  world 
should  be  surrounded  by  a  number  of  small  states,  many 
of  them  consisting  of  people  who  have  never  previously 
set  up  a  stable  government  for  themselves,  but  each  of 
them  containing  large  masses  of  Germans  clamouring 
for  reunion  with  their  native  land.  The  proposal  of  the 
Polish  Commission  that  we  should  place  2,100,000  Ger- 
mans under  the  control  of  a  people  which  is  of  a  different 
religion  and  which  has  never  proved  its  capacity  for 
stable  self-government  throughout  its  history  must,  in 
my  judgment,  lead  sooner  or  later  to  a  new  war  in  the 
East  of  Europe.     What  I  have  said  about  the  Germans 


GENERAL  BLISS  TO  PRESIDENT  WILSON,  MARCH  25,  1919    451 

is  equally  true  of  the  Magyars.  There  will  never  be 
peace  in  South  Eastern  Europe  if  every  little  state  now 
coming  into  being  is  to  have  a  large  Magyar  Irredenta 
within  its  borders.  I  would  therefore  take  as  a  guiding 
principle  of  the  peace  that  as  far  as  is  humanly  possible 
the  different  races  should  be  allocated  to  their  mother- 
lands, and  that  this  human  criterion  should  have  prece- 
dence over  considerations  of  strategy  or  economics  or 
communications  which  can  usually  be  adjusted  by  other 
means.  Secondly,  I  would  say  that  the  duration  for  the 
payments  of  reparation  ought  to  disappear  if  possible 
with  the  generation  which  made  the  war. 

But  there  is  a  consideration  in  favour  of  a  long-sighted 
peace  which  influences  me  even  more  than  the  desire  to 
leave  no  causes  justifying  a  fresh  outbreak  30  years 
hence.  There  is  one  element  in  the  present  condition  of 
nations  which  differentiates  it  from  the  situation  as  it  was 
in  1815.  In  the  Napoleonic  war  the  countries  were 
equally  exhausted  but  the  revolutionary  spirit  had  spent 
its  force  in  the  country  of  its  birth  and  Germany  had 
satisfied  the  legitimate  popular  demands  for  the  time 
being  by  a  series  of  economic  changes  which  were  in- 
spired by  courage,  foresight  and  high  statesmanship.  Even 
in  Russia  the  Czar  had  effected  great  reforms  which  were 
probably  at  that  time  even  too  advanced  for  the  half 
savage  population.  The  situation  is  very  different  now. 
The  revolution  is  still  in  its  infancy.  The  extreme  figures 
of  the  Terror  are  still  in  command  in  Russia.  The  whole 
of  Europe  is  filled  with  the  spirit  of  revolution.  There 
is  a  deep  sense  not  only  of  discontent,  but  of  anger  and 
revolt  amongst  the  workmen  against  pre-war  conditions. 
The  whole  existing  order  in  its  political,  social  and  eco- 
nomic aspects  is  questioned  by  the  masses  of  the  popula- 
tion, from  one  end  of  Europe  to  the  other.  In  some 
countries,  like  Germany  and  Russia,  the  unrest  takes  the 
form  of  open  rebellion,  in  others,  like  France,  Great  Britain 
and  Italy  it  takes  the  shape  of  strikes  and  of  general 
disinclination  to  settle  down  to  work,  symptoms  which 
are  just  as  much  concerned  with  the  desire  for  political 
and  social  change  as  with  wage  demands. 


452        WOODROW  AVILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

Much  of  this  unrest  is  healthy.  We  shall  never  make  a 
lasting  peace  by  attempting  to  restore  the  conditions  of 
1914.  But  there  is  a  danger  that  we  may  throw  the  masses 
of  the  population  throughout  Europe  into  the  arms  of  the 
extremists  whose  only  idea  for  regenerating  mankind 
is  to  destroy  utterly  the  whole  existing  fabric  of  society. 
These  men  have  triumphed  in  Russia.  They  have  done 
so  at  a  terrible  price.  Hundreds  and  thousands  of  the 
population  have  perished.  The  railways,  the  roads, 
the  towns,  the  whole  structural  organization  of  Russia 
has  been  almost  destroyed,  but  somehow  or  other  they 
seem  to  have  managed  to  keep  their  hold  upon  the  masses 
of  the  Russian  people,  and  what  is  much  more  significant, 
they  have  succeeded  in  creating  a  large  army  which  is 
apparently  well  directed  and  well  disciplined,  and  is,  as 
to  a  great  part  of  it,  prepared  to  die  for  its  ideals.  In 
another  year  Russia,  inspired  by  a  new  enthusiasm,  may 
have  recovered  from  her  passion  for  peace  and  have  at 
her  command  the  only  army  eager  to  fight,  because  it 
is  the  only  army  that  believes  that  it  has  any  cause  to 
fight  for. 

The  greatest  danger  that  I  see  in  the  present  situation 
is  that  Germany  may  throw  in  her  lot  with  Bolshevism 
and  place  her  resources,  her  brains,  her  vast  organizing 
power  at  the  disposal  of  the  revolutionary  fanatics  whose 
dream  it  is  to  conquer  the  world  for  Bolshevism  by  force 
of  arms.  This  danger  is  no  mere  chimera.  The  present 
government  in  Germany  is  weak;  it  has  no  prestige;  its 
authority  is  challenged;  it  lingers  merely  because  there  is 
no  alternative  but  the  spartacists,  and  Germany  is  not 
ready  for  spartacism,  as  yet.  But  the  argument  which 
the  spartacists  are  using  with  great  effect  at  this  very 
time  is  that  they  alone  can  save  Germany  from  the  in- 
tolerable conditions  which  have  been  bequeathed  her 
by  the  war.  They  offer  to  free  the  German  people  from 
indebtedness  to  the  Allies  and  indebtedness  to  their  own 
richer  classes.  They  offer  them  complete  control  of 
their  own  affairs  and  the  prospect  of  a  new  heaven  and 
earth.  It  is  true  that  the  price  will  be  heavy.  There 
will  be  two  or  three  years  of  anarchy,  perhaps  of  blood- 


GENERAL  BLISS  TO  PRESIDENT  WILSON,  MARCH  25,  1919    453 

shed,  but  at  the  end  the  land  will  remain,  the  people  will 
remain,  the  greater  part  of  the  houses  and  the  factories 
will  remain,  and  the  railways  and  the  roads  will  remain, 
and  Germany,  having  thrown  off  her  burdens,  will  be 
able  to  make  a  fresh  start. 

If  Germany  goes  over  to  the  spartacists  it  is  inevitable 
that  she  should  throw  in  her  lot  with  the  Russian  Bol- 
shevists. Once  that  happens  all  Eastern  Europe  will 
be  swept  into  the  orbit  of  the  Bolshevik  revolution  and 
within  a  year  we  may  witness  the  spectacle  of  nearly 
three  hundred  million  people  organized  into  a  vast  red 
army  under  German  instructors  and  German  generals 
equipped  with  German  cannon  and  German  machine  guns 
and  prepared  for  a  renewal  of  the  attack  on  Western 
Europe.  This  is  a  prospect  which  no  one  can  face  with 
equanimity.  Yet  the  news  which  came  from  Hungary 
yesterday  shows  only  too  clearly  this  danger  is  no  fantasy. 
And  what  are  the  reasons  alleged  for  this  decision  .^^  They 
are  mainly  the  belief  that  large  numbers  of  Magyars  are  to 
be  handed  over  to  the  control  of  others.  If  we  are  wise, 
we  shall  offer  to  Germany  a  peace,  which,  while  just, 
will  be  preferable  for  all  sensible  men  to  the  alternative 
of  Bolshevism.  I  would,  therefore,  put  it  in  the  fore- 
front of  the  peace  that  once  she  accepts  our  terms,  es- 
pecially reparation,  we  will  open  to  her  the  raw  materials 
and  markets  of  the  world  on  equal  terms  with  ourselves, 
and  will  do  everything  possible  to  enable  the  German 
people  to  get  upon  their  legs  again.  We  cannot  both 
cripple  her  and  expect  her  to  pay. 

Finally,  we  must  offer  terms  which  a  responsible  Gov- 
ernment in  Germany  can  expect  to  be  able  to  carry  out. 
If  we  present  terms  to  Germany  which  are  unjust,  or 
excessively  onerous,  no  responsible  Government  will 
sign  them;  certainly  the  present  weak  administration 
will  not.  If  it  did,  I  am  told  that  it  would  be  swept  away 
within  24  hours.  Yet  if  we  can  find  nobody  in  Germany 
who  will  put  his  hand  to  a  peace  treaty,  what  will  be  the 
position  .^^  A  large  army  of  occupation  for  an  indefinite 
period  is  out  of  the  question.  Germany  would  not  mind 
it.     A  very  large  number  of  people  in  that  country  would 


454         WOODROW  ^^^LSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

welcome  it  as  it  would  be  the  only  hope  of  preserving 
the  existing  order  of  things.  The  objection  would  not 
come  from  Germany,  but  from  our  own  countries.  Neither 
the  British  Empire  nor  America  would  agree  to  occupy 
Germany.  France  by  itself  could  not  bear  the  burden 
of  occupation.  We  should  therefore  be  driven  back 
on  the  policy  of  blockading  the  country.  That  would 
inevitably  mean  spartacism  from  the  Urals  to  the  Rhine, 
with  its  inevitable  consequence  of  a  huge  Red  Army 
attempting  to  cross  the  Rhine.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  I 
am  doubtful  whether  public  opinion  would  allow  us  de- 
liberately to  starve  Germany.  If  the  only  difference 
between  Germany  and  ourselves  were  between  onerous 
terms  and  moderate  terms,  I  very  much  doubt  if  public 
opinion  would  tolerate  the  deliberate  condemnation  of 
millions  of  women  and  children  to  death  by  starvation. 
If  so  the  Allies  would  have  incurred  the  moral  defeat  of 
having  attempted  to  impose  terms  on  Germany  which 
Germany  had  successfully  resisted. 

From  every  point  of  view,  therefore,  it  seems  to  me 
that  we  ought  to  endeavour  to  draw  up  a  peace  settlement 
as  if  we  were  impartial  arbiters,  forgetful  of  the  passions 
of  the  war.  This  settlement  ought  to  have  three  ends  in 
view.  First  of  all  it  must  do  justice  to  the  Allies,  by 
taking  into  account  Germany's  responsibility  for  the 
origin  of  the  war,  and  for  the  way  in  which  it  was  fought. 
Secondly,  it  must  be  a  settlement  which  a  responsible 
German  government  can  sign  in  the  belief  that  it  can 
fulfil  the  obligations  it  incurs.  Thirdly,  it  must  be  a 
settlement  which  will  contain  in  itself  no  provocations 
for  future  wars,  and  which  will  constitute  an  alternative 
to  Bolshevism,  because  it  will  commend  itself  to  all  reason- 
able opinion  as  a  fair  settlement  of  the  European  problem. 


II.  It  is  not,  however,  enough  to  draw  up  a  just  and 
far-sighted  peace  with  Germany.  If  we  are  to  offer 
Europe  an  alternative  to  Bolshevism  we  must  make  the 
League  of  Nations  into  something  which  will  be  both  a 
safeguard  to   those   nations  who  are  prepared  for  fair 


GENERAL  BLISS  TO  PRESIDENT  WILSON,  MARCH  25,  1919    455 

dealing  with  their  neighbours,  and  a  menace  to  those  who 
would  trespass  on  the  rights  of  their  neighbours,  whether 
they  are  imperialist  empires  or  imperialist  Bolshevists. 
An  essential  element,  therefore,  in  the  peace  settlement 
is  the  constitution  of  the  League  of  Nations  as  the  effective 
guardian  of  international  right  and  international  liberty 
throughout  the  world.  If  this  is  to  happen  the  first  thing 
to  do  is  that  the  leading  members  of  the  League  of  Nations 
should  arrive  at  an  understanding  between  themselves 
in  regard  to  armaments.  To  my  mind  it  is  idle  to  en- 
deavour to  impose  a  permanent  limitation  of  armaments 
upon  Germany  unless  we  are  prepared  similarly  to  impose 
a  limitation  upon  ourselves.  I  recognise  that  until  Ger- 
many has  settled  down  and  given  practical  proof  that 
she  has  abandoned  her  imperialist  ambitions,  and  until 
Russia  has  also  given  proof  that  she  does  not  intend  to 
embark  upon  a  military  crusade  against  her  neighbours,  it 
is  essential  that  the  leading  members  of  the  League  of 
Nations  should  maintain  considerable  forces  both  by 
land  and  sea  in  order  to  preserve  liberty  in  the  world. 
But  if  they  are  to  present  an  united  front  to  the  forces 
both  of  reaction  and  revolution,  they  must  arrive  at 
such  an  agreement  in  regard  to  armaments  among  them- 
selves as  would  make  it  impossible  for  suspicion  to  arise 
between  the  members  of  the  League  of  Nations  in  regard 
to  their  intentions  towards  one  another.  If  the  League 
is  to  do  its  work  for  the  world  it  will  only  be  because  the 
members  of  the  League  trust  it  themselves  and  because 
there  are  no  rivalries  and  jealousies  in  the  matter  of  ar- 
maments between  them.  The  first  condition  of  success 
for  the  League  of  Nations  is,  therefore,  a  firm  under- 
standing between  the  British  Empire  and  the  United 
States  of  America  and  France  and  Italy  that  there  will 
be  no  competitive  building  up  of  fleets  or  armies  between 
them.  Unless  this  is  arrived  at  before  the  Covenant  is 
signed  the  League  of  Nations  will  be  a  sham  and  a  mock- 
ery. It  will  be  regarded,  and  rightly  regarded  as  a  proof 
that  its  principal  promoters  and  patrons  repose  no  con- 
fidence in  its  efficiency.  But  once  the  leading  members 
of  the  League  have  made  it  clear  that  they  have  reached 


450        WOODROW  ^MXSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEIVIENT 

an  understanding  which  will  both  secure  to  the  League 
of  Nations  the  strength  which  is  necessary  to  enable  it 
to  protect  its  members  and  which  at  the  same  time  will 
make  misunderstanding  and  suspicion  with  regard  to  com- 
petitive armaments  impossible  between  them  its  future 
and  authority  will  be  ensured.  It  will  then  be  able  to 
ensure  as  an  essential  condition  of  peace  that  not  only 
Germany,  but  all  the  smaller  states  of  Europe  undertake 
to  limit  their  armaments  and  abolish  conscription.  If 
the  small  nations  are  permitted  to  organize  and  maintain 
conscript  armies  running  each  to  hundreds  of  thousands, 
boundary  wars  will  be  inevitable  and  all  Europe  will  be 
drawn  in.  Unless  we  secure  this  universal  limitation 
we  shall  achieve  neither  lasting  peace,  nor  the  permanent 
observance  of  the  limitation  of  German  armaments  which 
we  now  seek  to  impose. 

I  should  like  to  ask  why  Germany,  if  she  accepts  the 
terms  we  consider  just  and  fair,  should  not  be  admitted 
to  the  League  of  Nations,  at  any  rate  as  soon  as  she  has 
established  a  stable  and  democratic  Government.  Would 
it  not  be  an  inducement  to  her  both  to  sign  the  terms 
and  to  resist  Bolshevism.'^  Might  it  not  be  safer  that  she 
should  be  inside  the  League  than  that  she  should  be 
outside  it.f^ 

Finally,  I  believe  that  until  the  authority  and  effective- 
ness of  the  League  of  Nations  has  been  demonstrated,  the 
British  Empire  and  the  United  States  ought  to  give  to 
France  a  guarantee  against  the  possibility  of  a  New  Ger- 
man aggression.  France  has  special  reasons  for  asking  for 
such  a  guarantee.  She  has  twice  been  attacked  and 
twice  invaded  by  Germany  in  half  a  century.  She  has 
been  so  attacked  because  she  has  been  the  principal 
guardian  of  liberal  and  democratic  civilization  against 
Central  European  autocracy  on  the  continent  of  Europe. 
It  is  right  that  the  other  great  Western  democracies  should 
enter  into  an  undertaking  which  will  ensure  that  they 
stand  by  her  side  in  time  to  protect  against  invasion, 
should  Germany  ever  threaten  her  again  or  until  the 
Leag^ie  of  Nations  has  proved  its  capacity  to  preserve 
the  peace  and  liberty  of  the  world. 


GENERAL  BLISS  TO  PRESIDENT  WILSON,  MARCH  25,  1919    457 

III.  If,  however,  the  Peace  Conference  is  really  to 
secure  peace  and  prove  to  the  world  a  complete  plan  of 
settlement  which  all  reasonable  men  will  recognise  as  an  al- 
ternative preferable  to  anarchy,  it  must  deal  with  the  Rus- 
sian situation.  Bolshevik  imperialism  does  not  merely 
menace  the  States  on  Russia's  borders.  It  threatens  the 
whole  of  Asia  and  is  as  near  to  America  as  it  is  to  France. 
It  is  idle  to  think  that  the  Peace  Conference  can  separate, 
however  sound  a  peace  it  may  have  arranged  with  Ger- 
many, if  it  leaves  Russia  as  it  is  today.  I  do  not  propose, 
however,  to  complicate  the  question  of  the  peace  with 
Germany  by  introducing  a  discussion  of  the  Russian 
problem.  I  mention  it  simply  in  order  to  remind  our- 
selves of  the  importance  of  dealing  with  it  as  soon  as 
possible. 

Paris 

March  25,  1919. 


Document  66. 

Letter  of  General  J.  C.  Smuts  to  the  Prime 
Minister,  Lloyd  George,  May  22,  criticizing 
the  terms  of  the  Treaty  as  drawn  and  suggesting 
changes  (carbon  copy). 

22nd  May,  1919. 

The  Prime  Minister. 

I  append  a  list  of  the  most  important  provisions  of  the 
Peace  Treaty  which  in  my  opinion  call  for  amendment. 

1.   The  Occupation  Clauses  (Paras.  428-432). 

The  most  dangerous  provision  of  the  whole  Treaty  is 
the  occu'pation  of  the  left  hank  of  the  Rhine  for  15  years — 
and  even  thereafter — at  the  option  of  the  Allies,  or  in 
case  the  Germans  have  not  (as  they  will  not)  have  ful- 
filled all  the  terms  of  the  Treaty.  In  the  first  place  the 
size  of  the  French  army  is  not  fixed,  and  it  would  be  pos- 
sible for  France  for  the  next  15  years  to  put  most  of  her 
military  expenditure  on  to  German  shoulders  by  keeping 
the  bulk  of  her  troops  in  the  occupied  area.  In  the 
second  place  the  military  regime  to  be  followed  is  not 
fixed,  and  a  system  of  martial  law  may  and  probably  will 
be  adopted  which  will  be  most  irksome  and  irritating  to 
the  population  and  hampering  to  industry.  The  least 
that  should  be  done  if  the  Occupation  Clauses  are  to 
remain  is  that  the  French  army  of  occupation  should  be 
limited  to  reasonable  numbers,  that  provision  should  be 
made  that  the  civil  population  and  administration  should 
not  in  any  way  be  under  military  law,  order  or  regulation, 
and  that  the  German  Government  should  remain  in  un- 
disturbed civil  administration  of  the  occupied  area.  Both 
this  area  and  the  Saar  basin  should  remain  in  the  German 
Customs  system. 

458 


SMUTS  CRITICIZES  THE  TREATY,  MAY  22,  1919         459 

Military  occupation  and  martial  law  for  such  a  long 
period  will,  however,  be  so  productive  of  friction  and 
mischief,  and  involve  such  risks  to  Peace,  that  I  would 
very  strongly  urge  that  the  occupation  be  dropped  in 
favour  of  the  proposed  Treaty  of  Guarantee.  France 
should  not  have  the  double  insurance  of  both  the  occupa- 
tion and  the  guarantee.  The  Allies  will  have  military, 
naval  and  air  commissions  going  over  Germany  with 
full  powers  for  an  indefinite  time.  The  League  of  Nations 
also  has  powers  of  investigation.  The  Reparation  Clauses 
will  effectively  prevent  military  manufacture  for  30  years. 
All  fortifications  are  to  be  razed  and  no  troops  may  be 
assembled  within  50  km.  east  of  the  Rhine  (paras.  42-3). 
In  view  of  all  this  and  also  the  proposed  Guarantee,  the 
Occupation  provisions  should  be  deleted. 

2.  The  Saar  Basin. 

With  the  Occupation  Clauses  are  associated  the  special 
provisions  for  the  administration  of  the  Saar  Basin  for 
15  years.  The  German  character  of  the  great  bulk  of 
the  population  is  beyond  question,  and  there  is  no  neces- 
sity to  hold  a  referendum  at  the  end  of  fifteen  years.  I 
consider  the  special  administration  a  clumsy  device  and 
really  uncalled  for  so  long  as  France  has  full  powers  in 
respect  of  the  coal  mines.  But  if  the  special  administra- 
tion is  to  be  established,  it  should  automatically  cease 
after  fifteen  years  as  soon  as  Germany  can  repurchase 
the  coal  mines.  (I  understand  that  the  drastic  Penalty 
Clause  in  case  the  mines  are  not  paid  for  in  gold  in  six 
months  after  the  valuation  will  be  dropped.) 

3.  The  Reparation  Clauses. 

I  am  advised  that  while  a  very  large  amount  of  repara- 
tion could  be  obtained  from  Germany  in  the  long  run, 
the  actual  scheme  adopted  in  our  Reparation  Clauses  is 
unworkable,  and  must  kill  the  goose  which  is  to  lay  the 
golden  eggs.  We  could  not  get  anything  like  one  milliard 
sterling  out  of  Germany  within  the  first  two  years.  Apart 
from  ships,  foreign  securities  and  certain  raw  material, 
we  could  get  nothing  but  worthless  paper.     So  far  from 


460        WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

getting  anything  more  out  of  Germany  the  first  couple 
of  years,  the  real  practical  problem  is  to  find  credit  for 
Germany  wherewith  she  could  purchase  food  and  the 
necessary  raw  materials  to  restart  her  industrial  life. 
There  is  actually  sitting  a  Commission,  whose  object  it 
is  to  find  out  how  to  finance  Germany  and  other  European 
countries  in  the  immediate  future. 

Besides  the  impossibility  of  paying  this  milliard  in  two 
years,  I  am  also  advised  that  the  scheme  of  the  five 
milliard  bonds  is  unworkable  and  should  be  scrapped. 

I  think  we  should  be  prepared  to  listen  to  what  the 
Germans  have  to  say  in  criticism  of  our  scheme  of  Repara- 
tion, and  to  modify  it  with  a  view  to  making  it  practicable 
and  not  crippling  German  industry  irreparably  in  the  next 
few  years.  Our  policy  should  rather  be  to  begin  nursing 
German  industry  and  finance  in  order  to  obtain  heavy  con- 
tributions from  them  when  they  have  become  productive. 

In  particular  I  think  the  coal  demands  we  are  making 
on  Germany  are  too  heavy,  and  must  seriously  cripple 
her  industry.  Three  separate  commissions  have  taken 
coal  from  Germany:  one  confiscated  the  Saar  Basin, 
another  cut  off  the  Silesian  coal  fields,  and  the  third  laid 
heavy  contributions  on  the  Westphalian  fields  in  favour 
of  France,  Belgium  and  Italy.  The  combined  result  of 
all  this  is  a  burden  which  it  will  probably  be  too  heavy  for 
German  industry  to  bear.  All  this  requires  reconsidera- 
tion, and  would  probably  have  received  it  but  for  the 
hurry  in  which  the  Treaty  was  finally  put  together  from 
the  various  Commission  Reports. 

While  sticking  generally  to  our  scheme  of  Reparation, 
I  would  eliminate  the  above  objectionable  or  unworkable 
features,  and  in  particular  I  would  scrap  the  schedules 
dealing  with  the  future  delivery  of  coal  and  coal  products, 
and  the  future  construction  of  ships.  I  would  give  the 
Reparation  Commission  full  power  to  settle  not  only 
the  amount  but  also  the  form  in  which  the  payments  are 
to  be  made  (in  money  or  kind).  I  would  certainly  take 
away  the  power  from  the  French  and  Belgian  manu- 
facturers to  rove  about  German  factories  in  order  to 
despoil  them  of  machinery  which  they  may  allege  to  be 


SMUTS  CRITICIZES  THE  TREATY,  MAY  22,  1919  4G1 

necessary  for  their  works  (para.  4  of  the  Fourth  Annex 
to  Reparation  Clauses).  This  industrial  looting  would 
be  most  mischievous,  and  could  not  in  peace  time  be  jus- 
tified as  a  reprisal  for  crimes  committed  in  war  time. 
The  proper  reprisal  is  to  make  the  Germans  pay. 

4.  Germany's  Eastern  Frontier. 

I  am  convinced  that  in  the  undue  enlargement  of 
Poland  we  are  not  only  reversing  the  verdict  of  history, 
but  committing  a  cardinal  error  in  policy  which  history 
will  yet  avenge.  The  new  Poland  will  include  millions 
of  Germans  (and  Russians)  and  territories  which  have 
a  German  (or  Russian)  population,  or  which  have  for 
very  long  periods  been  part  of  Germany  (or  Russia). 
It  is  reasonably  certain  that  both  Germany  and  Russia 
will  again  be  great  Powers,  and  that,  sandwiched  between 
them  the  new  Poland  could  only  be  a  success  with  their 
good  will.  How,  under  these  circumstances,  can  we  ex- 
pect Poland  to  be  other  than  a  failure,  even  if  she  had 
that  ruling  and  administrative  capacity  which  history 
has  proved  she  has  not.^  Even  now  while  the  Confer- 
ence is  sitting,  the  Poles  are  defying  the  Great  Powers. 
What  is  going  to  happen  in  future  with  the  Great  Powers 
divided  and  at  loggerheads  .^^  I  think  we  are  building  a 
house  of  sand.  And  in  view  of  these  and  many  other 
considerations,  I  would  revise  the  boundaries  of  Poland 
as  provisionally  settled  in  the  Treaty,  leave  Upper 
Silesia  and  all  real  German  territory  to  Germany,  con- 
tract the  boundaries  of  the  Free  City  of  Danzig,  and 
instead  of  placing  her  under  the  suzerainty  of  Poland 
as  we  propose  doing,  leave  her  under  the  suzerainty 
of  Germany  with  an  administration  under  the  League  of 
Nations.  I  think  the  two  cardinal  errors  in  policy  of 
this  Treaty  are  the  long  occupation  of  the  Rhine,  and 
the  enlargement  of  Poland  beyond  anything  which  we 
had  contemplated  during  the  war.  These  two  errors 
are  full  of  menace  for  the  future  peace  of  Europe,  and  I 
urge  that  every  means  be  taken  to  remove  them  before 
it  is  too  late.  It  is  not  yet  too  late.  There  is  no  doubt 
that  the  German  Delegates  are  going  to  make  a   stiff 


46;^         WOODROW  ^MLSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

fight,  perhaps  a  condition  for  signature  of  the  Treaty, 
that  the  Settlement  of  their  Eastern  frontiers  in  Silesia, 
East  and  West  Prussia,  should  be  revised.  I  would 
advise  that  we  consider  the  case  to  be  put  forward  by 
them  most  carefully  on  its  merits. 

5.  The  Punishment  Clauses. 

While  I  am  all  in  favour  of  the  policy  laid  down  in  the 
Punishment  Clauses,  I  feel  that  for  the  German  Govern- 
ment to  agree  to  them  as  they  stand  must  be  almost,  if 
not  quite,  impossible.  An  indefinite  obligation  to  sur- 
render any  person  whom  any  Ally  might  name,  and 
actually  to  have  to  supply  the  evidence  for  his  conviction 
is  more  than  any  Government  with  a  sense  of  honour 
and  regard  for  its  people  could  sign.  The  demand  should 
be  limited  to  a  definite,  reasonably  short  list  of  war 
criminals,  whose  position  or  whose  crimes  were  really 
outstanding.  And  when  the  Germans  press  for  such  an 
amendment  I  hope  we  shall  meet  them  fairly. 

The  above  are  the  most  important  alterations  which 
I  would  suggest  to  the  Peace  Treaty.  There  are,  however, 
a  number  of  other  more  or  less  important  provisions  to 
which  I  wish  to  draw  attention. 

6.  The  Military  and  Air  Clauses. 

I  think  we  are  doing  wrong  in  trying  to  bind  down  Ger- 
many to  a  maximum  army  of  100,000  men.  For  a  popu- 
lation so  large,  and  in  such  a  state  of  internal  ferment, 
and  with  frontiers  and  neighbours  such  as  Germany 
has,  I  think  such  a  force  totally  inadequate  for  necessary 
police  and  defense  purposes.  It  took  us  more  than 
100,000  men  to  maintain  order  in  Ireland  during  the 
latter  part  of  the  war,  and  Germany's  case  is  much  more 
serious.  We  should  be  prepared  to  listen  to  the  case 
which  the  German  delegates  may  make  on  this  matter. 

I  think  it  is  also  quite  wrong  to  deprive  her  completely 
of  tanks  and  military  aircraft.  These  things  have  be- 
come part  of  the  equipment  of  a  properly  organized  army, 
and  we  should  be  prepared  to  leave  her  the  necessary 
quota   of    tanks   and   aircraft   for   her   small   army.     A 


SMUTS  CRITICIZES  THE  TREATY,  MAY  22,  1919         463 

similar  argument  applies  to  the  airships  and  seaplanes 
necessary  for  her  reduced  navy. 

There  is  a  provision  that  all  aerodromes  within  150  km. 
of  the  eastern,  western  and  southern  boundaries  of 
Germany  should  be  demolished.  This  is  far  too  drastic, 
and  indeed  unnecessary,  if  not  impracticable.  The 
Treaty  bristles  with  similar  pinpricks  which  embody 
merely  the  whims  of  minor  officials  and  should  not  remain 
in  the  Treaty  in  its  final  form. 

7.  International  Rivers  and  Railways. 

While  the  internationalization  of  the  rivers  and  rail- 
ways of  Germany  which  provide  outlets  for  the  new 
States  is  perfectly  sound  in  principle,  the  administration 
laid  down  for  these  rivers  and  railways  is  entirely  in- 
defensible. These  rivers  are  to  be  administered  by 
Boards  which  contain  a  small  minority  of  German  rep- 
resentatives, and  this  even  in  the  case  of  rivers  which 
are  exclusively  German.  English,  Italian,  French,  Scan- 
dinavian and  Belgian  representatives  form  a  great 
majority  in  these  Boards.  It  is  as  if  the  Thames  Con- 
servancy consisted  almost  entirely  of  representatives  of 
foreign  Governments!  Principles  are  laid  down  for  the 
fixing  of  rates  over  German  railways  which  are  almost 
unintelligible,  and,  so  far  as  I  understand  them,  un- 
workable. Generally  most  of  the  provisions  in  respect 
of  German  rivers  and  railways  are  hopelessly  one-sided, 
and  seem  intended  merely  to  bring  the  whole  principle  of 
internationalization  into  disrepute.  They  require  drastic 
revision.  I  would  suggest  that  the  principle  laid  down 
in  the  case  of  the  Kiel  Canal  be  generally  followed.  That 
is  to  say,  the  administration  of  these  international  rivers 
and  railways  in  German  territory  should  be  German,  but 
a  right  given  to  an  aggrieved  party  to  appeal  to  the  League 
of  Nations,  who  shall  have  power  to  appoint  an  adminis- 
tering Commission  in  a  proper  case. 

8.  Pin  Pricks. 

As  I  have  said,  the  Treaty  is  full  of  small,  compara- 
tively   unimportant   provisions   which    serve   no    useful 


464        WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

purpose,  but  must  be  unnecessarily  galling  and  wounding 
to  the  feelings  of  a  defeated  enemy.  While  making  the 
Treaty  as  hard  and  stiff  as  Germany  deserves  after  the 
manner  of  her  warfare,  we  should  be  careful  to  eliminate 
from  it  all  trace  of  petty  spite  and  ill-feeling,  which  cannot 
serve  so  great  a  cause  as  ours,  nor  promote  the  interests 
of  future  goodwill  and  peace.  I  am  for  drastic  revision 
of  all  such  pin  pricks;  they  relate  largely  to  the  treatment 
of  German  nationals  and  German  property  and  rights. 
But  they  are  found  in  almost  every  chapter  of  the  Treaty. 

9.  Procedure  for  Alterations. 

I  have  set  out  what  I  think  should  be  done  with  this 
Treaty.  I  add  a  few  words  as  to  the  method  which  I 
think  should  be  followed  in  the  necessary  revision. 

I  am  very  anxious,  not  only  that  the  Germans  should 
sign  a  fair  and  good  Peace  Treaty,  but  also  that,  for  the 
sake  of  the  future,  they  should  not  merely  be  made  to 
sign  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet,  so  to  speak.  The 
treaty  should  not  be  capable  of  moral  repudiation  by 
the  German  people  hereafter.  And  for  this  purpose  I 
consider  it  important  that  we  should  as  far  as  possible 
carry  the  German  Delegates  with  us,  that  we  should 
Hsten  to  what  they  have  to  say,  that  we  should  give  all 
necessary  explanations  to  them,  and  that  where  our 
Clauses  appear  really  untenable,  we  should  be  prepared 
to  accept  alterations  or  compromises.  In  order  to  do 
this,  it  will  be  necessary  to  meet  them  in  oral  discussion. 
And  the  suggestion  I  would  make  for  this  purpose  is  that 
a  small  Committee  of  minor  delegates  be  appointed  to 
meet  the  Germans  after  they  have  handed  in  their  final 
note  on  the  29th  May,  and  confer  with  them  in  regard  to 
the  Treaty  as  a  whole.  This  Committee  to  make  a 
report  to  the  Supreme  Council  of  the  alterations  they 
recommend  after  hearing  the  German  side.  In  this  way 
the  Supreme  Council  will  avoid  direct  negotiations  with 
the  German  Delegates,  but  will  have  before  them  rec- 
ommendations arrived  at  after  full  cognisance  has  been 
taken  of  the  German  case.     Necessarily  much  will  depend 


SMUTS  CRITICIZES  THE  TREATY,  MAY  22,  1919         465 

on  the  personnel  of  this  Committee.  I  would  suggest 
that  it  consist  of  three  delegates,  one  nominated  by  the 
United  States,  the  British  Empire  and  France  respectively. 
It  is  essential  for  rapid  work  that  the  Committee  be  as 
small  as  possible,  and  Italy  and  Japan  are  not  sufficiently 
interested  in  the  German  Treaty  to  make  it  worth  while 
overloading  the  Committee  with  two  additional  represen- 
tatives. If  the  three  Delegates  are  carefully  selected, 
their  work  may  be  of  first-class  importance,  not  only  in 
securing  the  necessary  modifications  in  the  Treaty,  but 
in  listening  to  and  considering  the  German  case,  and 
thereby  removing  from  the  making  of  the  peace  all  ap- 
pearance of  one-sidedness,  and  unnecessary  dictation. 
The  moral  authority  of  the  Treaty  will  be  all  the  greater 
and  more  binding  on  that  account.  And  not  only  the 
enemy,  but  the  public  opinion  of  the  world  will  accept 
it  more  readily  as  an  honorable  ending  of  the  most  awful 
and  most  tragic  dispute  in  history.  The  final  sanction 
of  this  great  instrument  must  be  the  approval  of  man- 
kind. 

[Sd]  J.  C.  Smuts. 


Document  67. 

Letter  of  General  Smuts  to  President  Wilson 
(autographed  original),  dated  May  30,  1919, 
criticizing  the  Treaty  and  asserting  that  it  "is 
against  the  letter  and  spirit  of  your  points." 

BRITISH  DELEGATION 
PARIS 

30th  May,  1919. 
Dear  President  Wilson, 

Even  at  the  risk  of  wearying  you  I  venture  to  address 
you  once  more. 

The  German  answer  to  our  draft  Peace  Terms  seems 
to  me  to  strike  the  fundamental  note  which  is  most 
dangerous  to  us,  and  which  we  are  bound  to  consider  most 
carefully.  They  say  in  effect  that  we  are  under  solemn 
obligation  to  them  to  make  a  Wilson  Peace,  a  peace  in 
accordance  with  your  Fourteen  Points  and  other  Prin- 
ciples enunciated  in  1918.  To  my  mind  there  is  abso- 
lutely no  doubt  that  this  is  so.  Subject  to  the  two 
reservations  made  by  the  Allies  before  the  Armistice,  we 
are  bound  to  make  a  peace  within  the  four  corners  of 
your  Points  and  Principles,  and  any  provisions  of  the 
Peace  Treaty  which  either  go  contrary  to  or  beyond  their 
general  scope  and  intent  would  constitute  a  breach  of 
agreement. 

This  seems  to  my  mind  quite  clear,  and  the  question 
of  fact  remains  whether  there  are  any  such  provisions. 
If  there  are,  then  our  position  is  indeed  serious,  as  I 
understand  it.  This  war  began  with  a  breach  of  a  solemn 
international  undertaking,  and  it  has  been  one  of  our 
most  important  war  aims  to  vindicate  international  law 
and  the  sanctity  of  international  engagements.  If  the 
Allies  end  the  war  by  following  the  example  of  Germany 

466 


'LETTER  OF  SMUTS  TO  WILSON,  MAY  30,  1919  467 

at  the  beginning,  and  also  confront  the  world  with  a 
"scrap  of  paper,"  the  discredit  on  us  will  be  so  great  that 
I  shudder  to  think  of  its  ultimate  effect  on  public  opinion. 
We  would  indeed  have  done  a  worse  wrong  than  Germany 
because  of  all  that  has  happened  since  August,  1914, 
and  the  fierce  light  which  has  been  concentrated  on  this 
very  point. 

The  question  becomes,  therefore,  most  important 
whether  there  are  important  provisions  of  the  Treaty 
which  conflict  with  or  are  not  covered  by,  but  go  beyond, 
your  Points  and  Principles.  I  notice  a  tendency  to  put 
the  whole  responsibility  for  deciding  this  question  on 
you,  and  to  say  that  after  all  President  Wilson  agrees  to 
the  Treaty  and  he  knows  best  what  the  Points  and  Prin- 
ciples mean.  This  is  most  unfair  to  you,  and  I  think  we 
should  all  give  the  gravest  consideration  to  the  question 
whether  our  Peace  Treaty  is  within  the  four  corners  of 
your  Speeches  of  1918. 

Frankly  I  do  not  think  this  is  so,  and  I  think  the 
Germans  make  out  a  good  case  in  regard  to  a  number  of 
provisions.  All  the  one-sided  provisions,  which  exclude 
reciprocity  or  equality,  and  all  the  pinpricks,  with  which 
the  Treaty  teems,  seem  to  me  to  be  both  against  the 
letter  and  the  spirit  of  your  Points.  I  cannot  find  any- 
thing in  the  Points  or  the  Principles  which  should  cover, 
for  instance,  the  one-sided  internationalization  of  German 
rivers,  and  the  utterly  bad  and  one-sided  administration 
arranged  in  respect  of  them.  Reparation  by  way  of 
coal  cannot  cover  the  arrangements  made  in  respect  of 
the  Saar  Basin  and  its  people.  I  even  doubt  whether 
the  Occupation  of  the  Rhine  for  fifteen  years  could  be 
squared  either  with  the  letter  or  the  spirit  of  your  Points 
and  Principles.  And  there  are  many  other  points  to 
which  I  shall  not  refer,  but  which  no  doubt  your  Advisers 
will  consider. 

There  will  be  a  terrible  disillusion  if  the  peoples  come 
to  think  that  we  are  not  concluding  a  Wilson  Peace,  that 
we  are  not  keeping  our  promises  to  the  world  or  faith 
with  the  public.  But  if  in  so  doing  w^e  appear  also  to 
break  the  formal  agreement   deliberately   entered   into 


468         WOODROW  ^MLSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEINIENT 

(as  I  think  we  do),  we  shall  be  overwhelmed  with  the 
gravest  discredit,  and  this  Peace  may  well  become  an  even 
greater  disaster  to  the  world  than  the  war  was. 

Forgive  me  for  troubling  you  with  this  matter,  but 
I  believe  it  goes  to  the  root  of  our  whole  case. 
Yours  very  sincerely, 

[Signed]  J.  C.  Smuts. 


Document  68. 

Stenographic  report  of  meeting  between 
President  VVilson,  the  Peace  Commissioners  and 
technical  advisers  of  the  American  Commission 
to  Negotiate  Peace,  Hotel  Crillon,  June  3,  1919, 
at  11:00  o'clock  A.  m.  This  was  the  meeting  in 
which  President  Wilson  sought  advice  upon  sug- 
gested changes  in  the  Treaty  (mimeograph). 

Book  No.  4. 

Secret. 

Stenographic  Report  of  Meeting  between  the 
President,  the  Commissioners,  and  the  Technical 
Advisers  of  the  American  Commission  to  Negotiate 
Peace,  Hotel  Crillon,  Paris,  June  3,  1919,  at  11:00 
O'clock  A.  M. 

PRESENT 

The  President. 
Honorable  Robert  Lansing. 
Honorable  Henry  White. 
Honorable  Edward  M.  House. 
General  Tasker  H.  Bliss. 

Admiral  W.  S.  Benson,  U.  S.  N. 
Rear-Admiral  H.  S.  Knapp,  U.  S.  N. 
Rear-Admiral  a.  T.  Long,  U.  S.  N. 
Major-General  M.  M.  Patrick,  U.  S.  A. 
Brigadier-General  C.  H.  McKinstry,  U.  S.  A. 
Honorable  John  W.  Davis. 
Mr.  Bernard  M.  Baruch. 
Mr.  Vance  McCormick. 
Mr.  Norman  H.  Davis. 


470        WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

Mr.  Thomas  W.  Lamont. 
Mr.  Herbert  Hoover. 
Dr.  James  Brown  Scott. 
Mr.  Leland  L.  Summers. 
Dr.  Frank  W.  Taussig. 
Mr.  John  Foster  Dulles. 
Mr.  Jereml\h  Smith,  Jr. 
Mr.  E.  L.  Dresel. 
Mr.  Osborne. 
Dr.  C.  H.  Haskins. 
Dr.  R.  H.  Lord. 
Dr.  Clive  Day. 
Captain  S.  K.  Hornbeck. 
Mr.  G.  L.  Beer. 
Dr.  Charles  Seymour. 
Mr.  M.  O.  Hudson. 
Colonel  T.  H.  Dillon. 
Colonel  S.  D.  Embick. 
Mr.  B.  W.  Palmer. 
Mr.  F.  K.  Nielsen. 
Mr.  Leland  Harrison. 
Mr.  C.  a.  Herter. 
Mr.  a.  C.  Kirk. 
Captain  James  Garfield. 
Mr.  Ray  Stannard  Baker. 

The  President:  Gentlemen,  we  have  come  together  in 
order  that  we  may  hear  from  you  on  the  question  of  the 
German  counter-proposals.  We  all  have  moving  recol- 
lections of  the  struggles  through  which  we  have  gone  in 
framing  the  treaty,  and  the  efforts  we  made  that  were 
successful,  and  the  efforts  we  made  that  were  unsuccess- 
ful to  make  the  terms  different  from  what  they  are, 
and  I  have  come  here  not  to  express  an  opinion  but  to 
hear  opinions,  and  I  think  perhaps  the  best  course  to 
follow  will  be  to  get  a  general  impression  from  each  other 
as  to  which  parts  of  the  German  counter-arguments  have 
made  the  greatest  impression  upon  us. 

Just  as  a  guide,  I  find  that  the  parts  that  have  made 
the  greatest  impression  on  our  British  colleagues  are  the 


WILSON  SEEKS  ADVICE  UPON  THE  TREATY  471 

arguments  with  regard  to  the  eastern  frontier  with  Poland, 
the  parts  with  regard  to  reparations,  the  parts  about  the 
period  of  occupation,  together  with  the  point  about  the 
League  of  Nations,  their  impression  being  that  the  Ger- 
mans might  very  well  be  given  reasonably  to  expect  that 
the  period  of  their  probation  would  not  be  long  in  the 
matter  of  admission  into  the  League.  Those  are  the  four 
points,  the  four  subjects  upon  which  the  German  counter- 
proposals have  made  the  deepest  impressions  upon  them. 
That  might  be  the  start. 

The  reparation  is  the  biggest  point.  That  involves 
left-overs  of  the  financial  clauses.  I  would  be  glad  to  hear 
from  anyone  of  our  financial  group  who  would  like  to 
express  himself  on  that  point. 

Mr.  Norman  H.  Davis:  We  feel  that  the  Germans 
have  really  given  us  a  basis  for  getting  together  properly 
on  reparation,  by  coming  back  with  a  fixed  sum.  It  is 
a  rather  rigid  fixed  sum,  which  can  be  modified  and  made 
more  workable.  There  is  a  considerable  possibility  of 
getting  together  there,  if  we  can  get  the  French  to  agree 
upon  a  fixed  sum.  As  you  know,  we  have  always  in- 
sisted on  the  necessity  of  having  a  fixed  sum,  because 
by  leaving  it  indefinite  we  had  to  give  considerable  powers 
to  the  Reparations  Commission,  and  that  is  what  seems 
to  worry  the  Germans  more  than  anything  else — the 
powers  given  to  the  Reparations  Commission,  which, 
as  they  claim,  are  rather  destructive  than  constructive, 
and  if  we  come  back  and  make  a  fixed  amount,  it  will  be 
possible  to  do  away  with  the  functions  of  the  Reparations 
Commission  which  most  worry  the  Germans,  and  it  will 
avoid  the  necessity  of  interfering  with  their  internal 
affairs,  and  so  on. 

Colonel  House  :  Have  not  the  Germans  misconstrued 
what  the  treaty  says  on  that  point  .^^  That  it  really  does 
not  go  as  far  as  the  Germans  think  it  goes,  and  if  the 
matter  were  explained  to  them  personally,  that  they 
would  understand  it  differently  from  what  they  now 
understand  it.'' 

Mr.  Thomas  W.  Lamont:  I  believe  that  they  could 
be  made  to  understand  that.  Colonel  House.     Certainly 


472         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

the  intent  of  the  Reparations  Commission  is  nothing  like 
as  inquisitorial  nor  as  arbitrary  as  the  Germans  have  con- 
strued it  to  be,  and  I  believe  that  we  could  explain  that 
to  a  very  large  extent,  provided,  as  Mr.  Davis  says,  there 
was  coupled  with  it  the  change  from  an  indefinite,  vague 
sum  to  be  determined  two  years  from  now,  to  a  definite 
sum  to  be  determined  to-day,  because  that  very  change 
would  do  away  with  a  large  part  of  the  necessity  of  such 
a  commission. 

The  President:  May  I  ask  if  you  saw  Messrs.  Tardieu 
and  Loucheur  this  morning? 

Mr.  Lamont:  We  saw  Mr.  Tardieu.  Mr.  Loucheur 
did  not  come. 

The  President:  What  was  his  statement.? 

Mr.  Lamont:  Mr.  Tardieu's  first  reply  was  that  they 
could  consider  no  change,  because  Mr.  Lloyd  George 
had  brought  up  so  many  changes.  He  alluded  to  the 
conference  at  the  President's  house  yesterday  afternoon. 
But  during  the  last  part  of  the  conference  he  finally  came 
around  and  said  that  if  it  were  a  question  of  reparation 
alone  and  not  a  question  of  the  Army  of  Occupation  and 
these  other  things,  he  did  not  know  but  that  they  could 
devise  with  us  the  machinery  that  could  work  out  the 
idea  of  a  fixed  sum,  provided  the  sum  were  adequate 
enough.  He  alluded  to  the  first  answer,  Mr.  President, 
that  3'ou  made  to  the  first  German  note,  in  which  you 
indicated  that  execution  might  be  changed  somewhat, 
or  made  to  conform,  and  he  said  that  if  we  could  work 
reparation  under  the  head  of  execution  rather  than  change 
of  principle,  "I  believe  we  could  be  with  you." 

The  President:  May  I  ask  that  what  I  say  by  way 
of  reference  to  our  British  colleagues  be  not  repeated 
outside  of  this  room,  because  I  am  at  liberty  to  use  it 
only  for  the  purposes  of  this  conference.  But  here  are 
the  alternative  methods  of  reparation  which  were  sug- 
gested: first,  that  the  Germans  should  undertake  as  a 
contract  the  whole  task  of  restoration,  that  is  to  say,  the 
physical  restoration  of  the  ravaged  parts  of  northern 
France,  and  that  a  sum  should  be  fixed  in  the  treaty  of 
peace,  under  several  items  in  the  category  of  damages, 


WILSON  SEEKS  ADVICE  UPON  THE  TREATY  473 

the  principle  being  that  inasmuch  as  it  was  impossible 
now  to  estimate  what  the  actual  restoration  would  cost, 
that  they  should  be  put  under  contract  to  restore  northern 
France  within  a  definite  period,  and  that,  since  the  rest 
of  the  categories  would  perhaps  hold  them,  a  definite  sum 
ought  to  be  arrived  at  in  regard  to  that. 

The  alternative  plan  was — and  it  is  a  rather  vague  one 
— that  the  Germans  should  sign  the  reparation  clauses 
as  they  stand,  but  that  three  months  should  be  given 
them  to  effect  an  arrangement  for  fixing  a  definite  sum  in 
cash  as  a  compensation  of  all  claims.  That  the  repara- 
tion clauses  were  to  stand,  giving  them  three  years  for 
proposals  as  to  the  definite  sum. 

Mr.  Baruch:  We  discussed  those  two  alternatives 
that  you  speak  of,  Mr.  President,  yesterday,  but  we  still 
feel  that  the  best  solution  would  be  to  come  to  a  fixed 
sum  now,  to  start  with.     We  went  over  this  yesterday. 

The  President:  And  reject  the  idea  of  a  contract  for 
restoration.'^ 

Mr.  Davis:  It  would  be  difficult,  as  a  matter  of  prac- 
tice, to  carry  that  out. 

Mr.  Summers  :  There  is  an  economic  unsoundness  in  it, 
because  many  of  the  districts  and  places  that  were  dev- 
astated and  destroyed  were  located  many  years  ago, 
and  have  now  no  economic  basis  for  being  there.  For 
instance,  they  could  combine  into  one  steel  mill  several 
destroyed  mills.  Many  of  the  existing  mills  could  be 
combined  into  one;  one  could  be  substituted  for  many. 
Unless  there  was  a  latitude  given,  it  would  be  economi- 
cally unsound. 

Mr.  Lamont:  Mr.  President,  with  all  respect  to  Mr. 
Lloyd  George,  he  is  simply  trying  to  postpone  the  evil 
day,  as  far  as  public  opinion  is  concerned. 

The  President:  I  think  he  has  stated  the  way  it  is 
to  be  gone  about. 

Mr.  Lamont:  Still,  whichever  way  one  looks  at  it, 
from  the  Allied  point  of  view  or  from  the  German  point 
of  view,  it  is  better  to  make  it  definite.  Germany  cannot 
start  her  economic  and  industrial  life,  cannot  gain  any 
credit,  as  long  as  it  remains  open. 


474         WOODROW  \\TLSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEIVIENT 

Mr.  Davis:  He  is  trying  to  play  both  ways  undoubtedly 
there,  and  as  a  matter  of  practice,  it  is  very  hard  to  work 
that  out,  because  we  can  never  get  together  as  to  the 
distribution  of  this  fixed  amount,  because  they  would 
have  to  calculate  all  the  time  what  would  be  France's 
share  in  the  restoration  of  the  Germans. 

Colonel  House:  It  would  be  something  like  rewriting 
the  treaty. 

Mr.  Davls:  We  are  convinced,  Mr.  President,  that 
on  account  of  Europe's  financial  situation  to-day  it  is  a 
most  important  thing  to  fix  an  amount,  and  an  amount 
which  Germany  and  the  world  itself  have  some  hope  of 
her  being  able  to  pay,  and  carrying  out,  which  can  be 
used  as  a  basis  for  France  and  Italy  and  the  other  coun- 
tries getting  on  their  feet  and  meeting  their  require- 
ments. 

Under  the  present  arrangements,  as  the  Germans  very 
properly  state,  if  they  are  not  prosperous  and  cannot  get 
back  to  work  they  will  pay  nothing,  but  on  the  other 
hand,  if  they  buckle  down  to  work  and  work  hard  and 
save,  the  harder  they  work  and  the  more  they  save,  the 
more  they  will  pay.  And  that  is  a  rather  poor  incentive 
for  the  Germans  to  buckle  down  and  work  hard.  But 
if  there  is  a  fixed  amount  which  will  let  them  see  a  chance 
of  getting  from  under  some  day,  I  believe  that  would  be 
a  better  incentive  for  them. 

The  President:  How  about  the  other  side  of  it:  a 
fixed  sum  will  form  a  basis  of  credit  for  the  other  nations, 
but  what  will  form  a  basis  for  Germany's  credit.^ 

Colonel  House:  It  was  practically  a  fixed  sum. 

The  President:  Yes,  there  would  be  that  definiteness 
in  it,  but  where  would  her  assets  be.^ 

Mr.  Davis:  We  must  insist  upon  her  being  left  with 
sufficient  assets  as  a  working  capital. 

The  President:  As  a  matter  of  fact  the  Reparations 
Commission  can  do  that. 

Mr.  Davis:  They  are  permitted  to  leave  her  with 
certain  assets,  except  the  ships.  We  feel  that  some  ar- 
rangement certainly  must  be  made  whereby  Germany 
can  at  least  have  a  sufficient  number  of  those  ships,  either 


WILSON  SEEKS  ADVICE  UPON  THE  TREATY  475 

retaining  them  or  making  some  arrangement  for  getting 
them  back,  so  that  she  will  have  enough  for  her  own 
trade,  and  which  I  understand  amounts  to  about  one- 
third  of  the  ships  which  she  has  turned  over. 

Secretary  Lansing:  Now  Germany  offers  a  fixed 
sum,  does  she? 

Mr.  Davis:  Yes. 

Secretary  Lansing:  It  is  100  milliards  of  marks? 

Mr.  Davis:  Yes.  Of  course  they  make  quite  a  large 
amount  of  deductions.  They  say  that  they  will  pay  the 
first  sum  of  20  milliards  of  marks  in  the  first  seven  years, 
but  that  you  must  deduct  from  that  the  war  materials 
they  have  turned  over  and  everything  else  they  have 
turned  over  and  will  turn  over  under  the  treaty,  and  also 
the  proportionate  share  of  the  pre-war  and  the  war  debt 
of  Alsace-Lorraine  and  of  that  part  of  the  territory  that 
Poland  gets,  which  they  estimate  roughly  would  amount 
to  about  three  million  dollars. 

Mr.  Lamont:  Still,  Mr.  Secretary,  it  is  very  striking 
that  they  have  made  two  definite  offers:  the  offer  of  20 
milliards,  and  the  further  offer  to  devote  to  reparations  a 
sum  annually  amounting  approximately  to  the  total 
net  peace  budget  of  the  German  Empire,  between 
$750,000,000  and  one  billion  dollars. 

Secretary  Lansing:  As  I  recall  it,  they  offer  to  pay 
20  milliards  of  marks  on  or  before  May  1st,  1926,  and 
then  they  offer  to  pay  one  milliard  a  year  after  that. 
But  they  will  increase  it,  on  the  basis  that  their  people 
shall  not  be  taxed  more  than  the  greatest  amount  paid 
by  any  injured  country. 

Mr.  Davis:  They  say  that  as  a  result  they  will  be 
compelled,  according  to  that,  to  tax  that  heavily;  but 
at  least  20  milliards  they  offer  to  pay  within  seven  years, 
and  without  interest.  That  is  not  a  capital  sum.  If 
you  reduce  that  to  a  capital  sum  that  will  amount  to 
12^  or  15  milliards.  We  feel,  from  a  practical  standpoint, 
that  it  is  better  to  have  it  interest  bearing.  Of  course 
you  have  to  give  them  a  few  years  before  they  can  af- 
ford to  pay  interest,  because  otherwise  it  would  run  so 
fast  against  them  that  they  could  not  catch  up. 


476         WOODROW  ^MLSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

Secretary  Laxsing:  It  does  not  come  so  very  far 
from  the  15  billions  of  dollars  talked  about. 

IMr.  Lamoxt:  It  is  a  little  bit  less.  After  you  take 
away  deductions  it  would  amount  to  the  capital  sum  of 
10  billion  dollars. 

The  President:  Do  you  understand  that  the  French 
this  morning  were  not  willing  to  consider  an  alteration  or 
change  of  that  sort.^^ 

IVIr.  Laaiont:  I  think  they  are  willing  to  consider  a 
change  of  that  sort  if  some  one  will  tell  them  that  that 
is  the  only  change  that  would  be  discussed.  At  least 
that  was  Mr.  Tardieu's  attitude.  Mr.  McCormick  could 
better  tell  us  that. 

Mr.  Vance  McCormick:  He  said  that  every  modi- 
fication proposed  by  the  British  was  against  the  French.' 
The  British  never  mentioned  any  concession  regarding 
ships  or  the  colonies,  and  Mr.  Tardieu  called  Mr.  Lloyd 
George's  attention  to  that  fact.  Mr.  Tardieu's  position 
was  that  they  should  not  agree  to  a  change  in  the  present 
treaty;  that  during  these  five  months  the  experts  have 
discussed  these  questions  pro  and  con,  and  having  finally 
come  to  a  decision,  it  would  be  fatal  to  change  any  prin- 
ciple whatever.  The  question  of  machinery  of  execu- 
tion, as  you  stated  in  your  note,  might  be  considered; 
that  was  the  position  the  French  took.  And  as  he  went 
out  of  the  room  he  intimated  to  Mr.  Lamont  that  he 
might  consider  such  questions  as  the  question  of  the 
reparation  clauses,  along  the  line  we  have  just  been  dis- 
cussing, provided  it  was  not  opening  the  door  to  con- 
cessions along  the  other  lines.  France  could  not  afford 
to  concede  anything  further. 

The  President  :  Would  he  regard  fixing  a  capital  sum 
as  a  modification  of  principle,  or  a  method  .f* 

Mr.  McCormick:  A  method.  Didn't  you  gather  that? 
(Addressing  Mr.  Lamont.) 

Mr.  Lamont:  Yes.  Mr.  Loucheur,  of  course,  has  more 
to  say  about  that  than  Mr.  Tardieu  has.  If  it  had  not 
been  for  the  British  "Heavenly  Twins"  we  could  have 
gotten  together  with  Loucheur  months  ago. 

Mr.  Davis:  Now  he  is  a  httle  bit  worried  about  that 


WILSON  SEEKS  ADVICE  UPON  THE  TREATY  477 

political  aspect  of  it,  but  if  there  are  some  changes  made 
which  would  affect  the  British  I  think  it  would  have  a 
certain  influence  on  the  French,  but,  as  Tardieu  says, 
the  only  changes  that  are  proposed  are  practically  those 
that  affect  the  French. 

Colonel  House:  Premier  Clemenceau  told  me  last 
night  that  he  was  willing  to  discuss  Silesia.  He  was  not 
willing  to  discuss  the  period  of  occupation,  and  he  was 
not  willing  to  discuss  any  of  the  other  things  that  Lloyd 
George  wanted. 

The  President:  Did  he  say  that  he  would  not  discuss 
reparation? 

Colonel  House  :  No,  and  I  gathered  that  he  would.  I 
think  we  could  get  him  to  discuss  reparation.  And  I 
also  think — much  to  my  surprise — that  he  would  about 
the  League  of  Nations.  He  said  he  would  not  consider 
for  a  moment  letting  the  Germans  in  now,  and  I  said: 
"Well,  your  attitude  about  that  I  think  is  the  worst 
attitude  for  France,  and  I  cannot  understand  it.  It 
seems  to  me  that  you  can  see  that  the  sooner  the  League 
of  Nations  gets  its  grip  on  Germany  the  better  it  would 
be  for  France."  He  said:  "I  concede  that;  that  is  all 
right;  but  not  for  the  moment.  Presently."  So  I  don't 
think  he  is  going  to  be  very  bad  on  that.  I  think  the 
Germans  could  be  told  privately  that  Germany  will  come 
in  very  shortly.  I  think  we  could  get  him  to  consent 
to  that. 

The  President:  Well,  if  you  gentlemen  of  the  repara- 
tion group  had  a  free  hand — if  only  we  ourselves  were 
concerned — what  would  you  propose  with  regard  to  the 
reparation? 

Mr.  Davis  :  Well,  we  have  not  definitely  agreed  among 
'ourselves  as  to  just  what  we  would  propose,  but  we  cer- 
tainly are  in  accord  with  this,  that  we  would  propose 
and  insist  upon  a  fixed  sum,  and  that  that  fixed  sum 
would  be  as  high  as  we  really  could  get  Germany  to  agree 
to  without  having  a  bayonet  at  her  throat,  because,  after 
all,  the  important  thing,  as  stated  before,  is  to  get  some- 
thing which  can  be  used  as  a  basis  for  France  and  Italy 
to  get  more  credit,  and  which  will  not  be  so  burdensome 


478        WOODROW  ^^^LSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEIVIENT 

as  will  prevent  Germany  from  going  ahead  with  restoring 
her  industrial  life,  because,  after  all,  what  they  need  to 
do  more  than  anything  is  to  get  people  to  work,  and  they 
have  pretty  nearly  all  exhausted  their  credit.  Loucheur 
is  worried  about  that  now,  and  the  important  thing  is 
not  so  much  what  Germany  can  pay  now,  really  just  now, 
as  fixing  a  reasonable  amount  which  the  German  people 
are  willing  to  buckle  down  to  attempting  to  pay,  and 
which  the  investors  of  the  world  think  she  will  pay, — 
and  they  are  rather  apt  to  believe  that  Germany  w411 
pay  what  she  undertakes  to  pay. 

The  President:  The  aspect  of  the  subject  which 
interests  me  is  the  world  aspect  of  it.  Unless  these 
securities  that  Germany  is  going  to  give  are  known  to  be 
worth  something  they  cannot  be  used  as  a  basis  for 
credit,  and  somebody  else  will  have  to  supply  the  credit. 
Now  they  cannot  be  made  worth  anything  unless  Ger- 
many has  the  means  of  going  to  work  and  producing. 
Which  is  the  result  of  saying  that  they  cannot  be  made 
worth  anything  unless  she  has  assets  to  begin  with  to 
establish  her  own  credit.  And  therefore  the  thing  has 
two  sides  to  it;  not  only  the  aspect  of  Germany  and 
France  and  Italy — but  the  world  aspect;  working  out 
a  method  by  which  this  sum  would  be  made  not  only 
dejSnite  but  worth  something,  by  having  means  for  Ger- 
many to  get  to  work. 

Mr.  Davis:  Yes,  we  think  so. 

The  President:  Now  it  seems  to  me  that  we  could 
have  made  it  evident  to  the  Germans,  by  explaining  to 
them,  that  the  real  functions  of  the  Reparations  Com- 
mission, are,  as  I  understand  them  to  be,  to  help  them 
in  carrying  out  their  obligations.  The  only  trouble  is, 
that  it  is  one  thing  to  say  that  this  is  the  way  the 
Reparations  Commission  is  going  to  work,  and  another 
thing  to  find  it  in  the  treaty.  Because  we,  of  the  present 
group  of  persons,  are  putting  a  certain  interpretation  on 
the  treaty,  but  there  will  be  others  following  us  who  may 
not  put  the  same  interpretation  upon  it. 

Mr.  Davis:  We  probably  have  not  got  in  there  as 
clear  a  picture  of  what  our  idea  was  as  to  the  policy  that 


WILSON  SEEKS  ADVICE  UPON  THE  TREATY  479 

would  be  followed  by  the  Reparations  Commission  as  we 
should  have,  and  it  would  be  well,  and  it  would  undoubt- 
edly affect  the  Germans,  if  they  could  be  told. 

The  President:  Why  not  write — I  don't  know  what 
the  language  would  be — an  accompanying  memorandum, 
agreed  to  by  all  the  powers,  as  to  the  method  of  adminis- 
tration by  the  Reparations  Commission? 

Mr.  Baruch  :  Of  course  if  we  fixed  a  sum  the  Repara- 
tions Commission  would  die.  If  we  fixed  a  definite  sum, 
and  Germany  agreed  to  it,  and  she  delivered,  the  Repara- 
tions Commission,  as  we  have  got  it  set  up,  would  die, 
and  another  would  be  set  up  to  receive  the  funds  and 
bonds. 

Mr.  Davis:  The  Reparations  Commission  was  set  up 
principally  because  they  were  leaving  this  matter  indefi- 
nite, and  because  we  were  imposing  a  burden  upon  Ger- 
many concerning  which  there  was  some  doubt  as  to 
her  capacity  to  meet.  But  as  it  was  clearly  understood 
that  they  must  follow  a  constructive  policy,  and  that 
Germany  could  not  pay  anything  unless  she  was  given 
facilities  and  working  capital  it  was  absolutely  neces- 
sary to  set  up  this  commission,  with  the  idea  of  getting 
all  they  could  out  of  Germany,  but  doing  this  in  a  broad 
way.  But  that  is  not  the  picture  that  is  really  conveyed 
in  there  (i.  e.,  in  the  Treaty).  The  powers  of  the 
Reparations  Commission  are,  in  a  sense,  destructive  as 
far  as  Germany  is  concerned — they  could  be — but  it 
ought  to  be  explained  to  the  Germans  that  no  intelligent 
people  could  perform  its  destructive  powers  unless  Ger- 
many wilfully  failed  to  comply. 

There  is  no  limitation  on  what  the  Reparations  Com- 
mission can  do,  and  since  the  armistice  the  agreements 
with  the  Germans  have  been  outrageously  violated  by  the 
French,  as  for  instance,  the  Luxembourg  protocol,  etc., 
and  the  Germans  have  had  an  experience  of  what  the 
giving  of  this  power  has  meant,  and  they  complained 
of  it,  to  which  I  responded  and  asked  them  if  they  did 
not  think  they  were  entitled  to  it.  They  have  got  evi- 
dence to  show  that  the  commissions  have  thus  far  been 
outrageously  unfair. 


480         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEIVIENT 

The  President:  You  think  that  difficulty  would  be 
met  then  by  a  fixed  sum? 

Mr.  Summers:  Unquestionably.  We  have  always  re- 
warded, by  pensions  and  in  similar  ways,  deeds  of  heroism, 
and  each  nation  has  chosen  to  reward  its  heroes  as  it  saw 
fit,  and  to  place  that  on  the  Germans  on  the  basis  that 
the  French  have  awarded  theirs  is  unprecedented  in  the 
history  of  the  world.  And  if  we  had  stood  for  actual 
reparation  we  might  get  some  place  within  a  rational  sum, 
which  Germany  could  pay,  and  we  would  have  a  basis 
for  understanding  upon  that  amount. 

Mr.  Lamont:  Mr.  President,  I  believe  our  difficulties 
with  Germany  would  fade  away  if  you  and  Mr.  Clemen- 
ceau  and  Mr.  Lloyd  George  would  instruct  your  technical 
committees  to  arrive  at  a  definite  sum  within  twenty- 
four  hours  instead  of  two  years,  and  at  the  same  time  to 
reach  an  agreement  as  to  how  much  working  capital 
should  be  left  in  Germany's  hands. 

The  President:  We  instructed  them  once  to  find  a 
definite  sum.     And  then  we  got  Klotz-on  the  brain. 

Mr.  Lamont:  Mr.  Lloyd  George  kicked  over  the  traces, 
but  now  he  has  come  back  to  the  fold. 

Mr.  Davis:  You  remember  they  used  to  change  com- 
missions such  as  this,  in  times  gone  by,  every  time  they 
decided  against  the  wishes  of  the  heads  of  the  states. 

Colonel  House:  Do  you  remember  how  we  always 
knew,  when  the  individual  members  would  come  into  a 
meeting  just  what  the  trend  of  the  meeting  was  going  to 
be  that  day? 

The  President:  Now  the  joke  of  it  is  that  Lord 
Sumner  was  one  of  those  who  contributed  to  the  unani- 
mous counsel  of  the  British  the  other  day,  and  betakes 
a  dift'erent  position  now. 

Mr.  Lamont:  I  believe  we  could  get  together  on  this 
point. 

Mr.  Davis:  Of  course  on  those  constructions  you 
should  make  the  necessary  consequential  changes  in  the 
Reparations  Commission,  and  if  possible  do  something 
to  get  away  with  it.  I  am  afraid  you  will  have  to  have 
a  reparations  commission  for  a  while. 


WILSON  SEEKS  ADVICE  UPON  THE  TREATY  481 

But  it  is  necessary  to  have  a  commission,  really,  to 
receive  the  funds  and  the  bonds,  and  open  the  trust  for 
the  proper  distribution  at  the  proper  time. 


The  President:  Now  what  about  the  eastern  borders 
of  Germany? 

Dr.  R.  H.  Lord  :  I  must  confess  that  the  general  tenor 
of  the  German  argument  about  the  cession  to  be  made 
to  Poland  struck  me  as  a  rather  weak  attempt  to  escape 
from  the  principle  laid  down  in  the  fourteen  points  with 
regard  to  the  united  Polish  state,  containing  all  Polish 
territories,  and  a  secure  access  to  the  sea. 

The  territories  which  the  treaty  proposes  to  give  to 
Poland  are  so  indisputably  Polish  that  in  general  the 
Germans  have  not  been  able  to  pick  very  serious  flaws 
in  the  treaty  from  the  point  of  view  of  nationality,  sta- 
tistics or  the  principle  of  uniting  indisputably  Polish  ter- 
ritories to  Poland.  They  have  gone  out  to  find  all,  what 
they  call,  the  purely  German  districts  which  are  awarded 
to  Poland  under  this  treaty,  and  what  they  have  been 
able  to  find  is  very  little.  They  have  been  able  to  detect 
a  small  district  here  and  another  small  district  there 
where  there  is  a  German  majority.  Sometimes  they 
use  very  bad  figures  in  establishing  that.  But,  at  any 
rate,  here  and  there  they  have  found  places  where,  owing 
to  necessities  of  topography  or  of  railway  communica- 
tions, or  in  order  to  secure  a  half-way  compact  frontier, 
the  proposal  incorporated  in  the  treaty  had  been  to  give 
slight  areas  of  German  majority  to  Poland.  There  are 
a  couple  of  such  cases  where  it  is  possible  that  recti- 
fications in  the  line  proposed  by  the  treaty  might  be 
made  without  serious  consequences  to  the  integrity  of 
the  whole  solution.  Here  is  one  case  where  there  is  a 
short  bit  of  railway  line  (exhibiting  on  map)  that  might 
be  rectified. 

But,  as  everyone  knows,  the  linguistic  border  between 
Germans  and  Poles  is  an  extremely  sinuous  and  contorted 
one.  There  has  been  an  immense  admixture  of  the  two 
races  in  this  part  of  the  world, — an  admixture  which  has 


482         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

been  largely  due  to  the  systematic  work  of  the  Prussian 
government,  with  its  colonization  methods,  which  has 
flooded  certain  portions  with  Germans  by  purely  artificial 
means,  and  kept  the  Germans  there  by  purely  artificial 
means. 

Now  it  was  impossible  for  the  Commission  on  Polish 
Affairs  in  making  the  proposals  of  the  boundaries  here,  to 
avoid  including  in  the  frontiers  of  Poland  some — not 
large — regions  of  Germans.  Otherwise  no  compact  fron- 
tier could  have  been  reached.  The  Commission  in  its 
proposals  left  out  a  number  of  regions  that  were  on  the 
other  side,  and  it  made  quite  consistent  efforts  to  be  fair 
in  its  proposals.  We  can  see  only  two  places  where 
slight  changes  might  be  made  without  serious  results,  and 
even  in  one  of  them,  because  of  its  character,  I  think  a 
change  would  be  quite  questionable  because  it  would 
make  dangerously  narrow  and  insecure  that  access  to  the 
Baltic  Sea  which  is,  I  think,  one  of  the  cardinal  and  in- 
dispensable elements  of  the  general  Polish  settlement. 

The  point  which  the  Germans  lay  most  stress  on,  per- 
haps, is  the  question  of  Upper  Silesia,  and  perhaps  that 
is  a  question  on  which  it  is  better 

Colonel  House  :  (Interrupting)  They  ask  for  a  pleb- 
iscite there,  and  following  that  plebiscite,  what  in  your 
opinion  would  be  the  result.'^ 

Dr.  Lord  :  My  opinion  is  that  it  would  result  favor- 
ably to  Poland — I  have  very  little  doubt  about  that — 
if  it  could  be  arranged  under  conditions  that  would  ensure 
a  fair  expression  of  the  popular  will. 

I  cannot  forbear,  however,  laj^ing  before  you  the  very 
great  practical  difficulties  in  the  way  of  that.  I  think 
everyone  recognizes  that  a  plebiscite  in  German  terri- 
tory cannot  be  held  while  the  territory  is  occupied  by 
German  troops  and  by  German  officials.  Just  at  present, 
in  spite  of  the  republican  government  of  Germany,  they 
are  having  a  veritable  reign  of  terror  in  Upper  Silesia  which 
is  as  bad  as  anything  that  went  on  under  the  Imperial 
Government,  and  such  a  state  exists  there  that  they  have 
been  arresting  every  prominent  Polish  leader;  they  have 
been  placing  people  on  trial  charged  with  being  guilty  of 


WILSON  SEEKS  ADVICE  UPON  THE  TREATY  483 

high  treason  for  the  crime  of  having  made  speeches  in 
favor  of  union  with  Poland,  or  collecting  money  in  favor 
of  Polish  national  causes. 

So,  under  present  conditions  it  is  impossible  to  have 
a  fair  plebiscite.  You  would  have  to  occupy  the  country 
with  Allied  troops,  and  I  wonder  whether  the  Allied  and 
Associated  Governments  are  prepared  to  do  that.  Con- 
sequently, even  under  those  present  conditions  there  is 
this  difficulty  about  a  plebiscite. 

Upper  Silesia  is  a  country  where  a  very  great  part  of 
the  land  and  a  great  part  of  the  industries  of  the  country 
are  in  the  hands  of  a  very  small  group  of  great  magnates. 
There  is  such  a  concentration  of  property  in  the  hands 
of  a  few  great  families  as  you  find  almost  nowhere 
else  in  Germany.  They  are  in  the  hands  of  such  families 
as  the  Hohenlohe,  von  Pless,  and  half  a  dozen  others. 
And  then  the  great  industries  of  the  country  are  also  con- 
trolled by  German  capital.  It  means  that  the  Polish 
population  is  economically,  without  a  doubt,  in  great 
dependence  upon  German  land  owners  and  capitalists, 
and  as  the  experience  of  every  election  that  comes  from 
that  country  shows,  it  is  extremely  difficult  for  them  to 
vote  as  they  please  without  ruining  their  chances  of 
a  livelihood.  I  can  think  of  few  countries  where  the 
countryman  finds  it  so  dangerous  to  express  his  opinion 
at  the  polls. 

As  for  the  other  general  fact  about  the  Upper  Silesian 
situation,  the  part  of  Upper  Silesia  which  the  treaty  pro- 
poses to  give  to  Poland  has  a  ratio  of  Polish  majority  of 
two  to  one,  and  in  fact,  decidedly  more  than  that  accord- 
ing to  the  revision  of  the  German  statistics  which  the  Brit- 
ish experts  have  prepared.  It  comes  as  near  to  being  indis- 
putably Polish  territory  as  any  part  of  eastern  Europe. 

The  chief  value  of  that  territory  to  Germany,  of  course, 
lies  in  its  immense  mineral  wealth,  which  is  undoubtedly 
the  fact,  as  their  response  says  that  Upper  Silesia  pro- 
duces 23  percent  of  the  total  coal  output  of  the  German 
Empire,  and  I  think  it  is  something  like  four-fifths  of  the 
production  of  zinc,  and  a  large  part  of  the  production  of 
iron. 


484        WOODROW  ^^^LSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

It  is  true  that  the  loss  of  that  territory  might  be  a  very 
serious  economic  blow  to  Germany,  but  I  would  like  to  lay 
before  3'ou  this  other  fact  that  if  Upper  Silesia  contains 
about  one-quarter  of  Germany's  coal  output,  it  contains 
about  three-quarters  of  the  coal  output  of  the  territories 
of  Polish  nationality,  so  the  loss  to  Germany  on  the  one 
hand  would  also  mean  that  it  would  be  a  serious  blow  and 
a  loss  to  Poland  on  the  other.  Three-quarters  of  her  coal 
would  be  a  far  more  decisive  thing. 

Mr.  Lamont:  I  don't  see  how  that  could  be  a  loss  to 
Poland,  because  she  never  had  it. 

The  President:  But  it  is  theoretically  Polish. 

Colonel  House:  That  was  never  a  part  of  Poland, 
was  it.^ 

The  President:  Creating  a  state  out  of  Polish  popu- 
lation in  some  places  like  Upper  Silesia  which  never 
constituted  a  part  of  ancient  Poland,  isn't  that  right, 
Dr.  Lord? 

Dr.  Lord  :  Not  entirely,  Mr.  President.  The  German 
memorandum  is  an  extremely  fallacious  article  in  its 
historical  data.  It  states  repeatedly  that  Upper  Silesia 
belonged  to  Germany  for  750  years,  which  is  not  at  all  true. 
Upper  Silesia  was  Polish  from  the  beginning;  was  Polish 
for  several  centuries. 

The  President:  You  mean  it  was  part  of  the  Polish 
state,  or  only  Polish  in  population.^ 

Dr.  Lord:  Part  of  the  Polish  state,  and  it  resulted  in 
there  being  there  a  Polish  population.  It  passed  from 
Poland  to  Bohemia  some  time  in  1500;  from  Bohemia  it 
passed  to  Austria  in  1600,  and  it  passed  to  the  Germans  in 
1700;  so  it  belonged  to  the  German  state,  to  the  Germans, 
about  200  years. 

Mr.  Lamont:  It  has  not  belonged  to  Poland  for  400 
years. 

Secretary  Lansing:  Isn't  the  real  point  the  question 
where  the  coal  is  used  after  it  is  mined.''  Is  it  used  mainly 
in  Poland  to-day.'^ 

Dr.  Lord:  No.  There  was  a  considerable  export  to 
Poland,  but  in  the  main  the  coal  was  used  in  eastern 
Germany,  in  the  region  east  of  Berlin.     Now  they  point 


WILSON  SEEKS  ADVICE  UPON  THE  TREATY  485 

out  that  a  great  part  of  that  territory  which  is  wholly- 
dependent  on  Silesia  is  going  to  Poland.  Poland  and  West 
Prussia  do  consume  a  great  part  of  it.  A  great  part  of  it 
went  to  Austria-Hungary  also. 

Secretary  Lansing:  Where  did  what  is  now  new 
Poland  get  her  coal  if  she  did  not  get  it  from  Silesia.^ 

Dr.  Lord:  Russian  Poland  got  about  six  million  tons 
a  year  in  the  Dombrowka  district.  There  is  a  coal 
mining  region  in  Russian  Poland  and  also  a  smaller  coal 
mining  region  in  Galicia. 

Secretary  Lansing:  And  German  Poland  got  how 
much  of  its  coal  from  this  region.'^ 

Dr.  Lord:  All  of  it. 

Secretary  Lansing:  How  much  did  they  use? 

Dr.  Lord  :  I  cannot  give  you  the  exact  figures. 

Secretary  Lansing:  Approximately.? 

Dr.  Lord:  I  know  that  in  Poland  this  winter  they 
were  practically  without  coal. 

Secretary  Lansing  :  Then  Poland  will  get  a  good  deal 
more  coal  than  she  had  before,  if  she  gets  this  area.'^ 

Dr.  Lord:  It  depends  on  what  you  mean  by  "Poland." 

Secretary  Lansing:  I  am  speaking  of  this  territory 
that  is  now  embraced  in  the  new  boundaries. 

Dr.  Lord:  Yes. 

Secretary  Lansing:  She  would  get  a  good  deal  more 
coal. 5^ 

Dr.  Lord:  Yes. 

The  President:  After  all  that  is  probably  susceptible 
of  solution  in  a  different  way;  by  guarantees  obtained 
as  to  the  supply  of  coal,  that  is,  putting  no  restrictions 
on  the  supplying  of  coal  to  Germany. 

Mr.  Baruch  :  It  is  true  that  the  coal  and  the  iron  is  more 
or  less  locked  up  in  the  mines  of  Germany,  and,  as  sug- 
gested by  you,  in  the  division  of  this  territory  it  should 
be  guaranteed  that  the  coal  and  iron  should  go,  anyhow 
for  a  number  of  years  until  there  is  a  chance  for  readjust- 
ment, to  the  places  it  had  gone  before. 

The  President  :  That  no  restrictions  should  be  placed 
on  it. 

Mr.  Davis:  Where  it  goes   naturally.     To   do  that, 


486         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

under  the  present  treaty  Poland  has  a  right  to  take  over 
all  this  property,  the  privately  owned  property,  after  the 
war,  which  is  a  rather  unusual  procedure;  while  the  Ger- 
mans have  developed  this,  the  Polish  government  can 
come  and  purchase  all  this  property  and  turn  it  over  to 
Polish  citizens. 

The  President:  They  have  to  pay  for  it. 

Mr.  Davis:  That  is  true,  but  Germany  has  to  pay 
for  it. 

The  President:  How  do  you  mean? 

Mr.  Summers:  Germany  agrees  to  reimburse  her 
nationals. 

The  President:  You  mean  the  property  can  be 
expropriated.'^ 

Mr.  Davis:  Not  for  public  use  but  for  private  use. 
In  other  words,  the  German  government  has  to  pay  its 
citizens  for  the  property  which  the  Polish  government 
wants  to  take  from  them. 

Mr.  Taussig:  The  Polish  government  may  take  it 
from  the  people  who  now  own  it,  and  the  valuation  is 
fixed  by  the  Polish  government,  without  any  control  or 
supervision  of  any  kind.  I  think  that  is  one  of  the  worst 
provisions  of  the  treaty. 

Mr.  Palmer:  That  is  one  of  the  unexpected  results 
of  the  application  of  the  general  clauses  to  a  case  with 
which  we  have  not  been  concerned  at  all.  The  general 
committee  on  Alien  Enemy  Property  hadn't  anything 
to  do  with  Alsace-Lorraine  or  Poland,  which  we  under- 
stood were  to  be  covered  by  different  clauses  entirely — 
as  took  place  in  the  case  of  Alsace-Lorraine.  It  is  aston- 
ishing to  me  that  there  should  exist  in  Silesia  any  such 
effect  as  has  been  outlined,  and  I  think  Silesia  ought  to  be 
treated  by  itself.  A  large  territory  like  that  should  have 
its  own  special  clauses  covering  it,  because  this  particular 
language  which  we  have  adopted  for  application  under 
totally  different  circumstances,  has  an  unexpected  effect. 

The  President:  That  had  escaped  my  notice. 

Mr.  Palmer:  I  am  not  sure  that  it  has  that  result,  Mr. 
President,  but  if  it  has,  it  should  be  provided  for. 

Mr.   Baruch:  The  economic  feature  of  the  Silesian 


WILSON  SEEKS  ADVICE  UPON  THE  TREATY  487 

question  should  be  taken  up  and  have  special  treatment 
as  regards  the  distribution  of  the  assets,  and  also  the 
questions  of  private  property  and  other  matters  of  that 
kind,  and  I  think  that  it  does  require  and  is  entitled  to 
special  treatment. 

Mr.  Davis:  It  is  not  supposed  that  the  Polish  gov- 
ernment should  take  that 

The  President:  That  is  not  in  the  Polish  part  of  the 
treaty. 

Mr.  Davis:  It  is  not  in  the  Polish  part,  Mr.  Presi- 
dent. Poland  has  been  construed  in  this  treaty  as  one 
of  the  Allied  Governments.     It  is  in  the  economic  clauses. 

Mr.  Taussig:  Poland  figures  as  one  of  the  Allied  and 
Associated  Powers,  and  in  drafting  those  provisions  of  the 
Allied  and  Associated  Powers,  I  don't  believe  that  it  was 
expected  that  it  would  be  a  constituted  state,  figuring 
in  every  respect  as  a  duly  constituted  Allied  and  Asso- 
ciated Power,  but  they  had  it  in  the  treaty  draft.  I  do 
not  think,  JNIr.  President,  there  would  be  any  serious 
difficulty  in  disposing  of  that  problem.  I  think  the  dis- 
position of  the  German  property,  after  it  came  under 
Polish  jurisdiction,  would  not  be  difficult.  I  think  it 
is  more  a  matter  of  sentiment.  The  sentimental  features 
of  it  are  more  important, — the  fact  of  depriving  the  Ger- 
mans of  property  which  has  been  German  for  many 
centuries  presents  a  more  serious  difficulty;  there  is  a 
sentimental  difficulty  on  both  sides. 

The  President  :  Now  is  there  not  in  Paris  some  Polish 
representative  with  whom  you  could  discuss  these  eco- 
nomic aspects  of  the  matter  at  once  so  as  to  see  if  there 
is  not  some  arrangement  that  would  not  be  so  objection- 
able in  regard  to  raw  materials,  and  this  matter  of  ex- 
propriation? 

Mr.  Baruch:  This  might  affect  reparations,  Mr. 
President.  This  property  that  is  taken  over  by  the 
Polish  government,  that  is  not  to  be  held  under  the 
economic  clauses. 

Secretary  Lansing:  I  want  to  ask  another  thing  in 
connection  with  the  Polish  coal  supply.  Northeast  of 
Teschen  there  is  a  large  area  which  I  understand  is  coal 


488        WOODROW  ^\^LSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

bearing  and  undeveloped  which  will  come  to  Poland. 
Is  that  correct? 

Dr.  Lord:  In  the  northeastern  part  of  Teschen? 

The  President:  No. 

Secretary  Lansing:  Northeast  of  Teschen. 

The  President:  It  does  not  mean  the  Teschen  coal 
basin.  As  they  show  the  area  on  the  map  I  should 
think  it  is  about  one-fifth  of  a  large  coal  area  that  ex- 
tended northeastward  into  Poland.  Is  that  well  estab- 
lished that  there  is  a  large  coal  bearing  region  there  in 
Poland  that  is  undeveloped? 

Dr.  Lord:  There  is  a  considerable  area,  in  Galicia 
especially,  where  I  think  they  expect  a  large  development. 
In  general  this  coal  area  comes  just  at  the  intersection 
of  the  old  frontiers  of  Austria,  Russia  and  Prussia.  The 
basin  is  divided  between  the  three  powers,  most  of  it 
being  on  the  Prussian  side,  all  of  it  being  in  Polish  terri- 
tory with  very  slight  exceptions,  and  the  undeveloped 
parts  are  mainly  towards  the  east,  in  Austria,  and,  to  a 
very  slight  extent,  in  what  was  formerly  Russian  territory. 

Secretary  Lansing  :  About  one-twelfth  of  that  area  is 
developed.  I  do  not  mean  to  say  one-twelfth  of  the 
wealth,  but  one-twelfth  of  the  area. 


The  President:  The  other  most  prominent  subject 
is  the  subject  of  the  occupation  of  the  Rhenish  Provinces 
for  five,  ten  and  fifteen  years.  And  I  say  in  the  same 
confidential  way  that  I  indicated  a  moment  ago,  that 
Mr.  Lloyd  George  represented  his  military  advisers  and 
his  cabinet  as  all  together  a  unit  that  the  period  of  oc- 
cupation should  extend  over  a  period  of  only  two  years, 
with  a  possibility  of  extending  it  further  in  case  the 
Germans  refused  to  carry  out  the  terms  of  the  treaty, 
or  in  any  deliberate  way  failed  to  carry  out  the  terms. 
That  creates  a  very  serious  impasse  between  the  British 
and  French  opinion. 

If  I  may  just  say  a  word  of  explanation,  the  French 
military  opinion,  as  it  has  been  interpreted  to  me,  does  not 
believe  that  the  fifteen-year  occupation  is  in  any  way 


WILSON  SEEKS  ADVICE  UPON  THE  TREATY  489 

satisfying.  As  I  understand  it,  Marshal  Foch  wanted  to 
occupy  the  Rhenish  provinces  for  thirty  years,  the  proba- 
ble period  of  payment  of  reparation,  and  it  was  a  com- 
promise, I  infer,  which  reduced  it  to  fifteen  years.  And 
they  have  made  an  arrangement  under  which  this  inter- 
esting comment  has  been  made,  that  the  areas  of  occupa- 
tion, one  for  five,  one  for  ten  and  one  for  fifteen  years, — 
all  abutting  on  the  Rhine,  of  course — extend  in  a  line 
northwest  and  southeast,  not  east  and  west,  and  the 
reason  given  me  for  that  was  that  extending  that  way 
they  would  always  protect  the  direct  route  from  Germany 
to  Paris.  But  the  direct  route  is  not  the  route  that  is 
at  all  likely  to  be  taken. 

The  route  that  has  usually  been  taken,  and  that  was 
taken  this  time,  is  the  northern  route,  across  which  lies 
the  area  which  is  to  be  first  evacuated,  and  the  territory 
next  most  likely  to  be  used,  from  a  military  point  of  view, 
is  to  be  evacuated  in  ten  years,  and  the  territory  which 
would  certainly  not  be  used  is  to  be  evacuated  in  fifteen 
years.  And  the  intimation  was  that  the  real  object  was 
the  control  of  the  navigation  of  the  Rhine.  That  is  the 
last  area,  and  all  this  occupation  touches,  of  course,  Lor- 
raine and  the  commercial  interests  of  France  that  center 
on  the  Rhine. 

So  that  the  question  of  occupation  has  this  drawback 
to  it:  it  is  not  strictly  speaking  a  military  question,  ap- 
parently. It  is  a  means  of  quieting  public  opinion  during 
the  period  that  Germany  is  certainly  not  going  to  be  able 
to  do  anything  in  a  military  line,  and  withdrawing  their 
forces  just  at  about  the  time  when  she  is  likely  to  recu- 
perate, which  is  not,  if  I  am  stating  it  correctly,  a  military 
proposition  at  all. 

And  another  very  serious  drawback  to  it — at  least  from 
the  point  of  view  of  several  of  the  powers,  on  reparations 
— is  that  Germany  is  to  pay  for  this  Army  of  Occupation, 
and  it  would  cost  several  hundreds  of  millions  to  maintain 
it,  and  those  millions  would  come  out  of  the  reparations, 
and  if  you  have  a  fixed  sum — not  otherwise — it  would  be 
that  much  in  addition  to  the  French  portion  of  the  repara- 
tions, because  everyone  contends  that  the  Army  of  Occupa- 


490         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEINIENT 

tion  will  be  French.  They  would  not  expect  Great  Britain 
and  ourselves  to  furnish  more  than  some  small  number 
that  would  be  sufficient  to  keep  the  colours  afloat  and  jus- 
tify the  name  of  an  inter-allied  force. 

So  I  do  not  know  who  it  calls  for  to  discuss  it,  if  I  am 
right  that  it  is  not  strictly  a  military  question,  and  if 
it  is  a  civil  question  it  is  a  question  involving  many 
embarrassments,  chiefly  embarrassments  of  French  public 
opinion. 

But  I  would  be  very  glad  if  the  military  people  would 
fire  away  at  it  if  they  have  anything  to  say. 

Colonel  House  :  How  serious  is  this  republic  that  they 
have  formed  there  .^^ 

The  President:  I  don't  know  how  serious  it  is. 

Colonel  House  :  You  see  if  that  would  get  agoing  that 
would  settle  that  question,  because  that  is  what  they 
asked  for. 

The  President:  I  don't  believe  it  is  at  all  genuine — I 
mean  spontaneous.  I  would  be  very  suspicious  of  it  in 
the  present  circumstances. 

Colonel  House:  Yes,  I  think  it  is  an  imposture. 

The  President:  Yes,  I  know  it  is. 

G^eral  Bliss:  Mr.  President,  I  would  like  to  say  one 
word  (m  that  subject.  I  think  as  you  just  stated,  it  is 
almost  entirely  a  political  question  rather  than  a  military 
one,  because  no  essential  military  objects  will  be  accom- 
plished by  the  military  occupation  of  the  territories  pro- 
posed to  be  occupied  under  the  proposed  conditions.  And 
I  have  never  been  in  favour  of  the  prolonged  military 
occupation  and  I  base  my  views  on  two  considerations: 
the  first  is  the  matter  of  good  sound  policy,  and  the  other 
sound  business. 

As  a  matter  of  policy  I  have  always — and  a  good  many 
other  military  men  agree  with  me  on  that — looked  with 
apprehension  on  the  possibilities  of  a  military  occupation 
of  a  territory,  the  people  of  which  we  will  be  officially  at 
peace  with  for  a  long  time.  It  is  so  likely  to  result  in  in- 
cidents that  will  bring  about  the  very  thing  that  we  want, 
of  course,  to  avoid,  and  that  is  a  resumption  of  war.  It 
has  always  seemed  to  me  that  it  is  almost  a  slap  in  the 


WILSON  SEEKS  ADVICE  UPON  THE  TREATY  491 

face  of  the  League  of  Nations,  in  which  we  are  all  so  in- 
terested, to  assume  that  the  execution  of  this  treaty, 
extending  over  a  long  term  of  years,  can  only  be  accom- 
plished by  a  military  force  instead  of  by  this  League  of 
Nations,  which  presumably  at  an  early  date  will  be  in 
operation. 

Then  you  have  yourself  pointed  out  the  reason  why  it 
is  not  sound  business. 

Mr.  Ribot  in  the  speech  that  he  made  in  the  French 
Senate  the  other  day  used  figures  which  I  have  no  doubt 
are  exaggerated,  but  they  still,  after  making  a  due  allow- 
ance for  exaggeration,  indicate  a  wasteful  amount  of 
money  that  would  be  simply  eaten  up  in  the  collection  of 
the  remainder,  and  he  estimated  that  out  of  the  first  25 
milliards  of  francs  that  would  come  from  Germany,  partly 
to  the  French  and  partly  to  the  Belgians,  at  least  15  mil- 
liards of  it  would  be  eaten  up  in  the  expense  of  the  army 
of  occupation.  I  think  that  figure  is  exaggerated,  and  he 
probably  assumes  a  continuance  of  an  army  of  occupation 
approximating  the  present  force  there,  w^iich  now  num- 
bers a  million  men — a  grossly  exaggerated  and  unnecessary- 
number  for  any  purpose  that  it  is  agreed  it  may  be  called 
upon  to  accomplish. 

The  Marshal's  demand  is  that  after  the  signature  of 
peace  there  be  maintained  an  army  of  thirty  infantry  di- 
visions, and  not  to  exceed  five  cavalry  divisions,  which, 
together  with  all  the  attached  services,  would  amount  to 
somewhere  in  the  neighbourhood  of  600,000  men.  It  is 
not  enough  for  war,  on  the  supposition  that  Germany 
could  resume  the  war — which  she  cannot  do — and  it  is 
entirely  unnecessary  on  the  assumption  that  she  cannot 
resume  the  war.  He  proposes  to  keep  that  army  there 
during  the  period  of  disarmament  in  Germany.  Now  no 
one  know^s  how  long  that  will  be.  The  Germans  in  their 
reply  have  said  that  it  is  technically  impossible  to  execute 
the  clauses  of  the  treaty  on  which  time  limit  was  imposed, 
within  the  time  limits  imposed;  that  the  time  limits  should 
be  prolonged,  and  they  say  the  matter  should  be  subject 
of  negotiations.  And  in  the  Marshal's  office  yesterday 
afternoon  in  the  conference  which  we  had,  it  was  agreed 


492        WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

by  all  that  it  was  absolutely  impossible  to  comply  with 
the  terms,  so  far  as  the  time  limits  are  concerned. 

The  President:  Did  the  French  agree  to  that? 

General  Bliss:  Oh,  yes.  Now  how  long  that  will 
continue,  nobody  knows.  But  during  its  continuance, 
during  all  this  period,  military  control  of  commissions  will 
be  kept  in  operation,  which  will  also  be  contributing  to 
the  diminution  of  the  available  funds  that  they  get  out 
of  Germany  for  reparations  and  otherwise. 

Now  those  who  have  read  the  German  counter-proposals 
on  the  subject  of  military,  naval  and  air  terms,  know  that 
they  accept  everything  in  principle  subject  to  their  ad- 
mission into  the  League  of  Nations,  and  in  regard  to  this 
term  of  occupation — whatever  it  be — if  Germany  is  at 
any  time  to  be  admitted  into  the  League  of  Nations,  cer- 
tainly that  occupation  in  Germany  must  cease  the  moment 
she  is  so  admitted.  It  would  be  intolerable,  and  there  is 
no  provision  in  any  part  of  the  Covenant  for  the  occupa- 
tion of  territory  of  a  nation  which  has  been  accepted  into 
membership  in  the  League  of  Nations,  which  acceptance 
is  only  done  after  you  are  satisfied  that  she  has  given 
every  guarantee  to  comply  with  the  League's  obliga- 
tions. 

I  understand  that  there  has  been  some  consideration 
given  to  a  very  material  reduction  in  the  period  of  occupa- 
tion, and  I  hope  that  it  can  be  carried  through,  and  that 
whatever  that  time  will  be 

The  President:   (Interrupting)   By  whom.   General? 

General  Bliss:  Based  on  the  German  proposals,  there 
has  been  more  or  less  consideration  given 

The  President:  By  the  French? 

General  Bliss:  Well,  it  has  been  discussed.  I  don't 
think  the  French  are  willing  to  consider  it  now,  but  to 
take  not  to  exceed  four  months  to  consider  that.  It  might 
be  prolonged  long  after  that  and  still  come  within  the  lim- 
its proposed  in  the  treaty,  and  I  take  it  if  any  change  is 
made  at  all,  or  if  the  present  figures  are  kept  to  five,  ten 
or  fifteen  years,  occupation  should  cease  the  moment  Ger- 
many becomes  a  member  of  the  League  of  Nations. 

Personally  I  hope  very  much  that  the  term  of  occupa- 


WILSON  SEEKS  ADVICE  UPON  THE  TREATY  493 

tion  made  by  common  agreement  will  be  very  materially 
reduced. 

The  President:  The  only  door  for  consideration  which 
Mr.  Clemenceau  said  he  was  willing  to  leave  open  yester- 
day, was  the  cost.  I  was  interested  to  know  just  what 
he  would  consider,  and  he  said  at  first  that  he  would  not 
consider  the  reduction  of  the  term  of  occupation  at  all, 
that  was  impossible  for  him,  and  then  he  subsequently 
said  he  would  consider  it  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
cost.  Now  just  what  and  how  much  that  meant  I  do  not 
know;  we  did  not  go  into  it.  But  of  course  that  is  a  very 
serious  side.  If  they  agree  to  a  fixed  sum  of  reparation, 
then  every  dollar  of  what  has  been  spent  on  occupation 
is  a  reduction  of  that  sum. 

Mr.  Davis:     It  goes  to  support  their  army. 

The  President:  It  goes  to  support  their  army,  yes,  but 
they  would  not  otherwise  be  paid  to  support  so  large  an 
army.  I  don't  know  how  large  an  army  they  would  other- 
wise have.     Can  you  tell  us,  General.'* 

General  Bliss:  Under  their  organic  law  they  would 
have  800,000  men,  and  I  have  not  seen  nor  heard  any  word 
from  any  source  nor  have  I  heard  of  any  proposition  being 
before  their  legislature  to  modify  that. 

Colonel  House:  Don't  you  suppose  it  would  be  possi- 
ble upon  these  disputed  questions,  that  is,  not  upon  all 
the  German  questions,  but  upon  some  of  them,  to  appoint 
committees  of  the  experts  and  see  what  modifications,  if 
any,  could  be  made  and  agreed  upon.? 

The  President:  Well,  the  plan  I  had  in  mind  was  to 
have  our  own  conference,  as  we  were  advised  that  Mr. 
Orlando  was  having  his  this  morning,  and  Mr.  Clemenceau 
is  having  his, — in  order  that  we  might,  without  having  any 
of  the  usual  round-about  expressions  of  international 
intercourse,  learn  each  others'  minds,  real  minds,  and  then 
my  idea  was  that  each  one  of  our  groups  would  either  re- 
tire, and  they,  or  some  representatives  whom  they  would 
select,  would  meet  the  corresponding  groups  of  the  other 
countries  and  have  an  exchange  of  views. 

Colonel  House:  That  was  what  I  had  in  mind. 

The  President  :  Have  a  clearing  house. 


494         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

Colonel  House:  Wouldn't  it  modify  the  general  se- 
lection if  we  knew  what  the  commission  that  Mr.  Davis 
is  on  is  doing? 

The  President:  John  W.  Davis? 

Colonel  House:  Yes. 

Mr.  John  W.  Davis:  I  don't  know  that  that  commis- 
sion has  any  more  to  do  than  to  recommend  the  size  of 
the  army.  All  they  have  to  do  is  to  draw  up  a  scheme 
of  the  organization  of  the  army  and  the  size. 

The  President:  That  might  soften  the  blow  to  them. 

Mr.  John  W.  Davis:  Yes,  make  it  a  little  bit  less  Dra- 
conian. 

Secretary  Lansing  :  Is  it  possible  to  fix  the  time  when 
Germany  can  be  admitted  into  the  League  of  Nations? 

The  President:  I  don't  honestly  think  it  is.  I  think 
it  is  necessary  that  we  should  know  that  the  change  in 
government  and  the  governmental  method  in  Germany  is 
genuine  and  permanent.  We  don't  know  either  of  them 
yet. 

Secretary  Lansing:  When  are  we  going  to  know? 
When  are  you  going  to  get  consent  from  all  these  countries, 
from  France  or  the  Executive  Council? 

The  President:  I  think  that  France  would  be  one  of 
the  first. 

Mr.  Davis:  Do  you  think  it  would  if  it  were  condi- 
tioned upon  withdrawing  the  Army  of  Occupation?  That 
is  mentioned  as  a  condition  upon  Germany  coming  into 
the  League  of  Nations. 

The  President  :  Except  as  to  Germany  paying  for  the 
army.  I  think  she  would  be  sick  of  the  Army  of  Occupa- 
tion. 

Mr.  Davis:  She  wants  to  control  this  from  an  economic 
standpoint  too. 

The  President:  But  I  don't  see  how  they  can  do  that 
without  a  proper  convention. 

Mr.  Davis:  We  have  a  convention  now,  you  know, 
with  them,  and  they  are  all  the  time  springing  the  Eco- 
nomic Council,  and  they  do  not  stand  by  the  convention. 

The  President:  Convention  of  what? 

Mr.  Davis:  Among  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers. 


WILSON  SEEKS  ADVICE  UPON  THE  TREATY  495 

The  President  :  But  the  convention  I  am  speaking  of 
is  the  permanent  convention,  the  fifteen-year  convention 
under  which  there  would  be  no  interference  with  the  eco- 
nomic or  industrial  hfe  of  the  country  whatever. 

Mr.  Davis:  But  now  I  see  there  is  a  convention  be- 
tween the  Alhed  and  Associated  Powers  that  there  would 
not  be  an  interference,  and  the  French  are  not  living  up 
to  it. 

The  President:  My  only  hope  is  that  when  v«c  sign 
peace  those  things  will  be  settled. 

Dr.  C.  H.  Haskixs:  Is  it  proper  to  ask  at  this  time  if 
that  Erzberger  letter  which  appeared  in  the  Chicago 
Tribune,  Paris  Edition,  some  days  ago,  is  genuine.^  I  ask 
that  because  it  has  a  great  deal  of  popular  effect  as  to  the 
attitude  of  the  German  government. 

The  President:  I  do  not  know.  I  asked  that  same 
question  myself  and  did  not  find  anybody  who  could  give 
me  a  satisfactory  answer. 

Colonel  House:  AVhere  did  we  get  it  from.-^ 

Mr.  Dresel:  It  came  from  Berne.  I  think  undoubt- 
edly from  the  Poles  there.  My  private  opinion  is — and 
I  have  studied  it  very  carefully — that  it  is  not  genuine. 
I  think  that  if  the  language  in  regard  to  Poland  is  carefully 
studied  it  would  appear  more  and  more  as  a  piece  of  Polish 
propaganda.  And  knowing  the  probable  source  from 
which  it  came,  and  the  fact  that  the  Poles  are  still  en- 
deavouring to  circulate  it — it  came  from  our  legation  only 
yesterday  again,  from  the  Polish  legation  at  Berne,  and 
it  got  to  England  and  was  published  there — I  can  have 
very  little  doubt  that  it  is  an  organized  frameup. 

Colonel  House:  Can  you  not  get  somebody  to  ask 
Erzberger  directly.'* 

Mr.  Dresel:  Yes. 

The  President:  Is  it  not  stated  in  the  Tribune — that 
is  the  way  I  got  it — that  it  was  supposed  to  have  been  an 
interview  in  the  last 

Colonel  House:  The  first  of  April. 

Mr.  Dresel:  It  came  through  the  military  about  three 
weeks  ago,  and  then  it  came  again  in  the  Tribune  yester- 
day, but  we  have  had  it  for  three  or  four  weeks. 


498         WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

The  President:  It  is  said  to  be  an  interview  with  him, 
and  not  a  letter? 

Mr.  Dresel:  It  was  supposed  to  be  a  circular  sent  to 
the  different  German  authorities.  It  is  not  like  Erz- 
berger's  style,  however.  I  question  also  whether  Erz- 
berger  had  a  right  to  send  out  such  a  circular;  it  was  not 
within  his  province.  The  whole  thing  was  very  much 
out  of  his  province. 


Mr.  Lamont:  Shall  we  hear  further  from  you,  or  go  to 
the  Allied  groups  directly? 

The  President:  I  think  it  would  be  better  if  you 
would  take  the  initiative  and  seek  a  conference. 

Mr.  McCormick:  Express  a  fixed  sum? 

The  President:  Find  out  if  you  can  get  a  common 
agreement.  As  I  was  pointing  out  in  the  beginning,  they 
(the  British)  have  taken  the  American  position  at  last, 
and  that  is  a  pretty  good  position. 

Mr.  Hoover:  Did  Mr.  Dresel  say  what  points  the  Ger- 
mans are  most  insistent  upon  the  modification  of?  If  we 
take  their  reply,  they  contend  as  vigorously  for  things  of 
no  moment  as  for  things  of  great  moment. 

Mr.  Dresel:  When  I  was  in  Germany  more  than  a 
month  ago  the  thing  that  struck  me  most  was  the  Saar 
Basin,  but  that  may  be  because  that  had  come  out  and 
the  others  had  not  yet  come  out.  They  did  not  know 
about  the  eastern  Silesian  coal  mines  at  that  time,  but  the 
Saar  Basin  was  the  one  point  on  which  they  laid  the  most 
stress.  They  said  they  would  give  up  the  coal,  but  did 
not  want  to  give  up  the  control  to  France  entirely. 

Mr.  Hoover:  I  had  a  consultation,  and  there  are 
three  or  four  points  which  they  raised  most  insistently: 
the  fixed  indemnity  at  some  sum;  the  modification  of  the 
Saar  Basin  terms;  the  period  of  occupation,  and  the 
Silesian  coal  mines.  They  seemed  to  be  more  insistent 
upon  that  than  Dantzig. 

Dr.  Haskins:  I  got  the  same  impression  from  reading 
the  German  proposals  in  the  original. 


WILSON  SEEKS  ADVICE  UPON  THE  TREATY  497 

Secretary  Lansing:  I  think  it  brings  out  just  those 
points  also. 

Dr.  Haskins:  They  raise  the  question  of  the  colonies 
also,  and  ask  to  be  appointed  as  mandatory. 

Colonel  House:  Clemenceau  conceded  that  point, 
didn't  he.^^ 

The  President:  We  have  been  bearing  on  this  point 
of  the  Saar  Basin,  and  we  have  gotten  concessions  on 
other  points.  Are  there  any  points  that  anybody  would 
like  to  raise  .^ 

Admiral  Benson:  The  naval  representatives  have 
gotten  together  on  some  points,  and  no  change  has  been 
made.  Of  course  thej^  do  not  make  any  point,  except 
the  destruction  of  the  harbours  in  Heligoland,  and  the 
other  nationalities  think  we  ought  to  stand  on  that  and 
recommend  that  no  change  be  made  in  that  at  all. 

The  President:  Except  for  the  technical  impossi- 
bility of  carrying  out  the  military  terms  they  do  not 
seem  to  make  any  objection  to  the  military  terms. 

General  Bliss:  They  base  it  all  on  their  acceptance 
into  the  League,  conditioned  on  their  acceptance  into 
the  League  of  Nations. 

The  President:  Yes,  but  they  do  not  raise  specific 
points. 

General  Bliss:  They  will  not  accept  the  military 
points  unless  they  are  admitted  into  the  League.  If 
they  are  admitted  they  will  accept,  and  they  undertake 
to  go  ahead  of  the  terms  in  one  or  two  cases. 

Mr.  Taussig:  There  runs  through  the  German  pro- 
posals a  criticism  or  complaint  that  in  matters  of  exe- 
cution of  the  treaty  there  is  no  consultation  at  all  with 
the  Germans.  It  lays  down  that  the  amount  should  be 
fixed  by  the  Allied  and  Associated  governments;  that  the 
details  should  be  regulated  by  the  Allied  and  Associated 
governments.  And  they,  in  a  succession  of  clauses,  com- 
plain that  that  was  put  in  with  deliberate  intent  to  keep 
the  Germans  from  giving  their  views.  As  the  treaty  is 
framed,  in  a  succession  of  clauses  that  does  appear,  and 
does  look  as  if  it  is  a  deliberate  attempt  to  keep  Germany 
from  having  anything  to  say  upon  questions  of  execution. 


498         WOODROW  ^^'ILSON  AND  ^VORLD  SETTLEMENT 

They  complain  about  the  way  the  quota  or  amount  of 
shipping  that  Germany  shall  have  is  to  be  arrived  at; 
the  Kiel  harbour  shall  be  commanded  by  the  Rhine  Com- 
mission, having  a  larger  representation  of  Frenchmen 
than  Germans. 

The  President:  Those  things,  I  think,  will  all  work 
themselves  out  in  operation.  But  it  is  necessary  to  con- 
sult the  army  with  regard  to  them. 

Mr.  White:  Another  concession  which  might  be  made 
comes  under  "Ports,  Waterways  and  Railways." 

The  President:  Are  they  new  points  that  they  raise? 

Mr.  White:  Kiel  harbour  principally. 

]Mr.  Taussig:  It  is  an  illustrative  case. 

Mr.  White:  It  is  an  illustrative  case.  It  would  take 
too  long  to  interfere 

The  President:  (Interrupting)  Mr.  Lansing  was  ask- 
ing me  if  I  did  not  think  it  would  be  a  good  idea  to  ask 
each  of  our  groups  to  prepare  a  memorandum  of  what 
might  be  conceded,  and  while  I  do  not  want  to  be  il- 
liberal in  the  matter,  I  should  hesitate  to  say  "yes"  to 
that  question.  The  question  that  lies  in  my  mind  is: 
"Where  have  they  made  good  in  their  points.^^"  "Where 
have  they  shown  that  the  arrangements  of  the  treaty 
are  essentially  unjust.'^"  Not  "Where  have  they  shown 
merely  that  they  are  hard.^^",  for  they  are  hard — but  the 
Germans  earned  that.  And  I  think  it  is  profitable  that 
a  nation  should  learn  once  and  for  all  what  an  unjust  war 
means  in  itself. 

I  have  no  desire  to  soften  the  treaty,  but  I  have  a  very 
sincere  desire  to  alter  those  portions  of  it  that  are  shown 
to  be  unjust,  or  which  are  shown  to  be  contrary  to  the 
principles  which  we  ourselves  have  laid  down. 

Take  the  Silesian  question,  for  example:  we  said  in  so 
many  words  in  the  documents  which  were  the  basis  of 
the  peace,  that  we  would  make  a  free  Poland  out  of  the 
districts  with  Polish  population.  Now  where  it  can  be 
shown  that  the  populations  included  in  Poland  are  not 
indisputably  Polish,  then  we  must  resort  to  something 
like  a  plebiscite.  I  agree  with  Dr.  Lord  that  in  the  terri- 
tory like  northern  Silesia  the  sincerity  of  the  plebiscite 


WILSON  SEEKS  .\D\1CE  UPON  THE  TREATY  499 

might  be  questioned — in  fact  it  might  be  very  diificult  to 
have  a  plebiscite  that  was  a  real  expression  of  opinion, 
and  therefore  we  would  have  to  go  by  what  we  believed 
was  the  preponderance  of  the  wishes  of  the  population. 

But  I  believe  that  where  we  have  included  Germans  un- 
necessarily, the  border  ought  to  be  rectified.  Or  where 
we  have  been  shown  to  have  departed  from  our  principles, 
then  we  must  consider  what  adjustments  are  necessary 
to  conform  to  those  principles. 

Take  Poland's  access  to  the  sea.  For  strategic  reasons 
our  Polish  experts — the  group  of  Allied  experts — rec- 
ommended a  corridor  running  up  to  Dantzig  and  it  in- 
cluded some  very  solid  groups  of  German  populations. 
We  determined  in  that  case  to  leave  the  Dantzig  district 
to  the  Germans  and  to  establish  a  plebiscite. 

Where  the  railway  track  from  Dantzig  to  Warsaw  runs, 
notwithstanding  the  capital  strategic  importance  of  that 
railway  to  Poland,  that  railway  is  to  remain  German  if 
its  population  votes  to  remain  German. 

I  think  that  we  have  been  more  successful  than  I  sup- 
posed we  could  possibly  be  in  drawing  ethnographic  lines, 
because  races  are  terribly  mixed  in  some  parts  of  Germany 
where  we  tried  to  draw  the  line.  But  wherever  we  can 
rectify  them  we  ought  to  rectify  them. 

Similarly,  if  the  reparations  clauses  are  unjust  because 
they  won't  work — not  because  they  are  putting  the  heavy 
burden  of  payment  upon  Germany  (because  that  is  just) 
— but  because  we  are  putting  it  on  them  in  such  a  way 
that  they  cannot  pay,  then  I  think  we  ought  to  rectify 
that. 

I  put  it  this  way :  We  ought  to  examine  our  consciences 
to  see  where  we  can  make  modifications  that  correspond 
with  the  principles  that  we  are  putting  forth. 

Secretary  Lansing:  That  is  what  I  say,  Mr.  Presi- 
dent, but  I  should  not  confine  it  to  "injustice";  w^here  we 
have  made  a  mistake  I  should  not  say  it  was  an  injustice. 
I  should  say  that  where  it  is  something  that  is  contrary 
to  good  policy  that  I  do  not  think  that  is  unjust;  I  simply 
think  that  we  made  an  error,  and  we  ought  to  correct 
it.    That  was  my  idea  of  what  modifications  should  be 


500      wooDROw  ^^^LSON  and  world  settlement 

suggested;  not  that  we  would  adopt  them,  but  to  say 
whether  it  was  wise  to  adopt  them,  so  that  we  would  have 
something  in  writing,  something  to  work  with.  It  is 
all  in  the  air  now. 

The  President:  The  great  problem  of  the  moment 
is  the  problem  of  agreement,  because  the  most  fatal 
thing  that  could  happen,  I  should  say,  in  the  world, 
would  be  that  sharp  lines  of  division  should  be  drawn 
among  the  Allied  and  Associated  Powers.  They  ought 
to  be  held  together,  if  it  can  reasonably  be  done,  and 
that  makes  a  problem  like  the  problem  of  occupation 
look  almost  insoluble,  because  the  British  are  at  one 
extreme,  and  the  French  refusal  to  move  is  at  the  opposite 
extreme. 

Personally  I  think  the  thing  will  solve  itself  upon  the 
admission  of  Germany  to  the  League  of  Nations.  I 
think  that  all  the  powers  feel  that  the  right  thing  to  do 
is  to  withdraw  the  army.  But  we  cannot  arrange  that 
in  the  treaty  because  you  cannot  fix  the  date  at  which 
Germany  is  to  be  admitted  into  the  League.  It  would 
be  an  indefinite  one. 

Secretary  Lansing:  Would  that  be  done  only  by 
unanimous  consent? 

Mr.  Hoover:  The  document  provides  that  on  two- 
thirds  vote  of  the  Council  she  should  be  admitted. 

Secretary  Lansing:  But  France,  being  on  the  Coun- 
cil, would  have  the  decision. 

Colonel  House:  I  agree  with  the  President:  let 
Germany  in,  and  when  she  gets  in,  the  other  follows. 

Secretary  Lansing:  And  the  army  is  to  be  paid  for 
by  Germany,  because  the  French  nation  would  not  con- 
sent to  making  it  so  long  if  they  had  to  pay  for  it. 

Colonel  House:  In  a  way  she  has  to  pay  for  it.  They 
are  going  to  make  Germany  pay  all  she  can  pay.  Every 
dollar  that  is  taken  out  for  the  army  is  taken  awa^^  from 
French  indemnities. 

The  President:  Every  man  in  the  French  army  is 
taken  away  from  French  industries  too. 

What  is  necessary  is  to  get  out  of  this  atmosphere  of 
war,   get  out  of  the  present   exaggerated   feelings  and 


WILSON  SEEKS  ADVICE  UPON  THE  TREATY  501 

exaggerated  appearances,  and  I  believe  that  if  we  can 
once  get  out  of  them  into  the  calmer  airs  it  would  be 
easier  to  come  to  satisfactory  solutions. 

Mr.  Davis:  You  assume,  Mr.  President,  that  the 
other  chiefs  of  state  are  instructing  their  other  technical 
delegations  to  get  together  with  us  in  the  same  way? 

The  President:  I  am  assuming  it  without  any  right; 
I  am  taking  it  for  granted. 

Colonel  House:  I  don't  think  it  will  make  any 
difference.     You  are  doing  it  anyway. 

The  President:  Now  I  hope  anybody  else  who  has 
been  convinced  by  the  German  arguments  will  speak  up. 

Mr.  Hoover:  Apart  from  all  questions  of  justice,  how 
far  does  the  cfuestion  of  expediency  come  in.'^ 

The  President:  In  order  to  get  them  to  sign,  do  you 
mean.'^ 

Mr.  Hoover:  In  order  to  get  them  to  sign.  It  strikes 
me  that  that  is  a  more  important  thing  than  the  question 
of  justice  or  injustice,  because  the  weighing  of  justice 
and  injustice  in  these  times  is  pretty  difficult. 

The  President:  Yes,  nobody  can  be  sure  that  they 
have  made  a  just  decision.  But  don't  you  think  that 
if  we  regard  the  treaty  as  just,  the  argument  of  expedi- 
ency ought  not  to  govern,  because  after  all  we  must  not 
give  up  what  we  fought  for.  We  might  have  to  fight 
for  it  again. 

Mr.  Hoover:  But  we  look  at  expediency  in  many 
lights.  It  may  be  necessary  to  change  the  terms  of  the 
reparation  in  view  of  getting  something,  rather  than  to  lose 
all.  And  it  is  not  a  question  of  justice;  justice  would 
require,  as  I  see  it,  that  they  pay  everything  they  have 
got  or  hope  to  get.  But  in  order  to  obtain  something 
it  may  be  expedient  to  do  this,  that  and  the  other.  Much 
the  same  might  apply  to  the  Saar  and  the  Silesian  coal 
basins. 

The  President:  I  admit  the  argument  that  it  might 
be  expedient  to  do  certain  things  in  order  to  get  what  you 
are  after.  But  w^hat  you  mean  is  the  question  of  ex- 
pediency in  order  to  obtain  the  signature? 

Mr.  Hoover:  I  would  go  even  further  than  the  point  I 


602        WOODROW  ^^TLSON  AND  AYORLD  SETTLEMENT 

mention, — that  if  it  was  necessary  to  alter  the  Saar  and 
the  Silesian  terms,  that  such  alteration  would  not  contra- 
vene the  principles  of  justice. 

The  President:  I  do  not  see  any  essential  injustice  in 
the  Saar  Basin  terms. 

Dr.  Haskins:  I  believe  that  everj^one  feels  that  the 
League  of  Nations  has  something  very  real  and  very  im- 
portant to  do.  The  Saar  Basin  is  something  for  the 
League  of  Nations  to  do. 

The  President:  We  have  removed  the  only  serious 
element  of  injustice  in  that  arrangement  as  it  stood. 
Germany  had  to  pay  a  certain  sum  in  gold  at  the  end  of 
the  period  for  the  mines,  or  else  the  plebiscite  was  of  no 
practical  result.  France  obtained  sovereignty  over  the 
region.     We  have  altered  that. 

Mr.  White:  There  is  still  the  question  of  the  vote. 

Dr.  Haskins:  There  are  two  or  three  minor  modifica- 
tions in  the  clauses  that  are  necessary  in  the  matter  of 
clarity, — Mr.  White  has  raised  one  of  them — where  the 
language  did  not  seem  perfectly  clear. 

The  President:  In  order  to  obtain  what  we  intended.'^ 

Dr.  Haskins:  Yes. 

Mr.  Davis:  It  is  necessary  to  get  peace  as  soon  as  pos- 
sible. If  Europe  does  not  get  together,  the  situation  is 
going  to  be  awful.  Our  appropriations  have  run  out, 
practically;  in  about  another  month  we  won't  have  any 
money  at  all. 

The  President:  We  won't  have  any  appropriated 
money,  you  mean.'^ 

Mr.  Davis:  We  won't  have  any  money  appropriated 
for  that  purpose.  When  real  war  is  not  being  conducted 
it  is  much  more  difficult  to  get  money.  The  w^ay  people 
now  feel  about  bonds,  it  would  be  difficult  to  get  money. 
And  the  sooner  they  can  get  something  and  issue  some 
obligations  which  these  countries  can  use  as  a  basis  of 
credit,  the  better  off  we  will  be. 

Mr.  White:  If  we  make  certain  modifications  in  the 
financial  and  economic  clauses,  would  that  not  be  enough, 
don't  you  think.'' 

Mr.  Davis:  We  feel  it  would,  if  we  can  get  together  on 


WILSON  SEEKS  ADVICE  UPON  THE  TREATY  503 

that.  Now  whether  these  other  questions  are  such  that 
Germany  will  not  agree  to  sign,  we  don't  know.  But  1 
mean  their  reply  makes  us  feel  rather  hopeful  that  we  can 
certainly  get  together  on  reparations. 

The  President:  Well,  1  don't  want  to  seem  to  be  un- 
reasonable, but  my  feeling  is  this:  that  we  ought  not,  with 
the  object  of  getting  it  signed,  make  changes  in  the  treaty, 
if  we  think  that  it  embodies  what  we  were  contending  for; 
that  the  time  to  consider  all  these  questions  was  when  we 
were  writing  the  treaty,  and  it  makes  me  a  little  tired  for 
people  to  come  and  say  now  that  they  are  afraid  the  Ger- 
mans won't  sign,  and  their  fear  is  based  upon  things  that 
they  insisted  upon  at  the  time  of  the  writing  of  the  treaty; 
that  makes  me  very  sick. 

And  that  is  the  thing  that  happened.  These  people 
that  over-rode  our  judgment  and  wrote  things  into  the 
treaty  that  are  now  the  stumbling  blocks,  are  falling 
over  themselves  to  remove  these  stumbling  blocks.  Now, 
if  they  ought  not  to  have  been  there  I  say,  remove  them, 
but  I  say  do  not  remove  them  merely  for  the  fact  of  having 
the  treaty  signed. 

Mr.  White:  Do  the  French  remind  you  of  that.^ 

The  President:  Not  so  much  as  the  British.  Here  is 
a  British  group  made  up  of  every  kind  of  British  opinion, 
from  Winston  Churchill  to  Fisher.  From  the  unreason- 
able to  the  reasonable,  all  the  way  around,  they  are  all 
unanimous,  if  you  please,  in  their  funk.  Now  that  makes 
me  very  tired.  They  ought  to  have  been  rational  to  begin 
with  and  then  they  would  not  have  needed  to  have  funked 
at  the  end.  They  ought  to  have  done  the  rational  things, 
I  admit,  and  it  is  not  very  gracious  for  me  to  remind  them 
■ — though  I  have  done  so  with  as  much  grace  as  I  could 
command. 

Mr.  Davis:  They  say  that  they  do  not  quite  under- 
stand why  you  permitted  them  to  do  that. 

Colonel  House:  So  they  say  you  are  responsible  for 
their  doing  it. 

The  President:  I  would  be  perfectly  willing  to  take 
the  responsibility  if  the  result  is  good.  But  though  we 
did  not  keep  them  from  putting  irrational  things  in  the 


501         WOODROW  WTLSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

treaty,  we  got  very  serious  modifications  out  of  them.  If 
we  had  written  the  treaty  the  way  they  wanted  it  the 
Germans  would  have  gone  home  the  minute  they  read  it. 

Well,  the  Lord  be  with  us. 

Thereupon,  at  1.15  p.  m.,  the  meeting  adjourned. 


Document  69. 

Letter  of  General  Tasker  H.  Bliss  to  President 
Wilson,  June  6,  1919,  making  "A  Brief  Analysis 
of  the  German  Proposals  on  the  Military  Terms 
of  the  Draft  Treaty"  (autographed  original). 

AMERICAN    COMMISSION   TO    NEGOTIATE    PEACE. 

Hotel  de  Crillon,  Paris, 

June  6th,  1919. 
Dear  Mr.  President: 

The  following  is  a  brief  analysis  of  the  German  Counter- 
Proposals  on  the  military  terms  of  the  draft  Treaty. 

1.  Germany  accepts  the  fundamental  principles  of  the 
military,  naval  and  air  terms,  subject  to  the  condition 
that,  on  the  conclusion  of  Peace,  she  be  admitted  with 
equal  rights  into  the  League  of  Nations. 

2.  If  admitted  to  the  League,  she  voluntarily  waives 
her  equality  of  rights  in  the  following  regards; — she 
agrees  to  disarm  at  once  and  to  abolish  universal  military 
service  provided  the  other  States  of  the  League  under- 
take, within  two  years  from  the  conclusion  of  Peace,  to 
also  disarm  and  abolish  universal  military  service. 

3.  In  agreeing  to  reduce  her  armed  forces  to  the  number 
required  by  the  Treaty,  she  asks  that  a  transition  period 
be  granted  to  her,  to  be  arranged  by  a  Special  Convention 
and,  if  necessary,  confirmed  by  the  League  of  Nations, 
during  which  period  she  may  maintain  such  armed 
forces  as  may  be  shown  to  be  necessary  and  are  agreed 
upon  in  order  to  preserve  internal  order  "which,"  she  says, 
"is  at  present  seriously  shaken." 

4.  In  the  League,  she  demands  the  right  conceded  to 
every  other  member  to  organize  and  arm  such  forces  as 
the  League  permits  her  to  have  according  to  her  judg- 
ment. 

505 


506        WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

5.  On  condition  of  admission  to  the  League,  she  agrees 
to  the  provision  for  dismantlement  of  certain  fortresses 
and  the  estabhshment  of  the  zone  which  is  to  remain 
unoccupied  by  mihtary  forces. 

6.  With  reservation  as  to  necessary  financial  measures, 
Germany  agrees  to  surrender  not  only  the  force  specifi- 
cally required  by  Article  185  of  the  Treaty,  "but  also  all 
ships  of  the  line." 

7.  She  says  that  the  time-limits  imposed  for  the  exe- 
cution of  certain  clauses  are  technically  impossible  of 
observance  and  their  necessary  prolongation  must  be 
the  subject  of  negotiation.  This  also  applies  to  the 
conversion  of  war  material  released  from  the  army  and 
navy  to  peaceful,  and  especially  to  economic,  objects. 

8.  As  regards  aerial  navigation,  she  accepts  any  limi- 
tations to  which  all  members  of  the  League  are  sub- 
jected and  will  grant  equal  and  reciprocal  rights  to  these 
members  as  regards  flight  over  and  landing  upon  German 
territory. 

9.  In  regard  to  many  unmentioned  details  connected 
with  the  foregoing  she  proposes  immediate  verbal  ne- 
gotiations. 

COMMENTS. 

Paragraph  1  above. 

It  seems  to  be  the  general  opinion  that  Germany  will 
be  far  less  a  menace  to  the  peace  of  the  world  if  she  is 
inside  rather  than  outside  of  the  League.  If  the  question 
of  the  future  status  of  Germany  with  respect  to  the  League 
were  a  matter  for  present  decision  by  the  Council  of  the 
Powers,  I  should  venture  to  suggest  the  following  for 
consideration. 

It  seems  to  me  to  be  good  policy  to  avoid,  as  far  as 
possible,  anything  which  continues  the  status  of  Ger- 
many as  that  of  a  probable  enemy  for  an  indefinite  time 
after  the  signature  of  peace.  Therefore,  while  it  is 
proper  to  deny  her  admission  into  the  League  of  Nations 
until  she  has  indicated  her  good  faith,  it  might  be  wise 
to  tell  her  the  conditions  under  which  we  shall  decide 
whether  or  not  she  is  showing  good  faith. 


"A  BRIEF  AN.VLYSIS  OF  GERIVLIN  PROPOSALS"         607 

The  terms  of  the  Treaty  may,  broadly,  be  divided  into 
two  general  classes.  The  first  class  includes  those  terms 
the  object  of  which  is  to  put  Germany  in  such  a  position 
of  military  weakness  as  will  enable  us  to  enforce  (if  she 
should  secretly  intend  not  to  act  in  good  faith)  the  other 
class  of  terms.  If  Germany  faithfully  executes  this  first 
class  of  terms,  it  seems  to  me  that  it  is  reasonable  evi- 
dence of  her  good  faith  in  complying  with  all  the  other 
terms. 

It  might,  therefore,  not  be  unwise  to  say  to  Germany 
that  on  the  complete  execution  of  all  the  military,  naval 
and  air  terms,  she  will  be  admitted  into  the  League. 

Paragraph  2  above. 

If  this  proposal  could  be  agreed  to,  it  would  bring  the 
world  at  once  into  near  sight  of  assured  and  continued 
peace. 

Paragraph  3  above. 

This  proposition  has  a  better  basis  of  sound  sense  than 
the  one  to  fix  an  arbitrary  figure  to  last  an  indefinite  time 
although  we  should  feel  sure  that  this  figure  is  too  small 
at  present  and  too  large  for  the  future.  The  maintenance 
of  the  peace  of  Europe  depends  upon  the  establishment 
and  continuance  of  a  stable  and  orderly  government  in 
Germany.  While  the  present  forces  of  disruption  are  at 
work,  it  is  the  general  opinion  that  the  military  force 
proposed  in  the  Treaty  to  be  left  to  Germany  is  too  small 
for  the  present.  Yet,  if  we  fix  in  the  Treaty  a  military 
force  for  Germany,  it  can  only  be  modified  subsequently 
by  having  the  Treaty  provide  for  a  subsequent  conven- 
tion to  pass  upon  the  question.  This  is,  in  realitj',  the 
substance  of  the  German  proposition.  Of  course  it  all 
depends  upon  whether  the  Powers  will  agree  to  take  into 
consideration  at  the  end  of  two  years  the  proposition  for 
their  own  disarmament  and  abolition  of  universal  military 
service.  If  they  refuse  to  do  this  while  Germany,  on 
the  other  hand,  proposes  to  immediately  disarm  and 
abolish  mihtary  service,  I  am  afraid  that  it  puts  Germany 


508        WOODROW  WILSON  AND  WORLD  SETTLEMENT 

in  a  better  light  as  regards  her  intention  to  abolish  mili- 
tarism than  it  does  the  Powers. 

In  short,  if  there  could  only  be  some  satisfactory  agree- 
ment as  to  a  definite  time  for  the  admission  of  (lermany 
into  the  League,  on  the  fulfillment  of  such  conditions  as 
will  establish  her  good  faith,  there  should  be  no  difficulty 
about  the  military,  naval  and  air  terms.  If  it  be  a  fact 
that  there  is  a  considerable  element  in  Germany  now 
looking  towards  and  striving  for  better  things,  their 
hands  will  be  strengthened  by  liberality  of  treatment  on 
this  subject, — a  liberality  which  will  not  in  the  slightest 
degree  prejudice  the  fulfillment  of  the  other  clauses  of  the 
Treaty  and  which,  on  the  other  hand,  will  probably  assure 
their  more  exact  fulfillment. 

Cordially  yours, 

Tasker  H.  Bliss. 


THE  END 


DUE  DATE 


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